

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SANSKRIT CONFERENCE

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI INDIA

March 26th-31st 1972
Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi.

GENERAL EDITOR
Dr. R.K. Sharma, M.A. Ph.D. (Calif.)
Director Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan

Vol. III - Part II

(Papers on different aspects of Sanskrit
Literature, thought and Culture)

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RASHTRIYA SANSKRIT SANSTHAN

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PREFACE

The printing of the Proceedings of the First International Sanskrit Conference was entrusted to Dr. Raghavan, who edited and saw through the press the first two volumes and the first part of the third volume; of these, the second part of the first volume and the first part of the third volume were finished recently after the sad demise of the noted editor.

The remaining parts were taken up for printing by the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan and it was our endeavour to see that at least before the commencement of the 5th International Sanskrit Conference, these were brought out and placed in the hands of the scholars taking part in the present Conference. The time at our disposal was very short and we had to work against odds. It is a pleasure to see our efforts being crowned with success.

I must express my thanks for this to our Assistant Director in charge of publications and the two Research Assistants without whose co-operation it would not have been possible to bring out these volumes in time. However I must crave the indulgence of all the scholars who took part in that Conference for this belated publication of the proceedings.

(R.K. SHARMA)

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SANSKRIT AND WORLD LANGUAGES— A CROSS—FERTILIZATION

By (Rev.) Dr. A. Esteller, S.J.

Sanskrit has been a great factor of unification for world languages and through them of the cultures represented by them. First of all, it has unified their attention upon a common cultural object—the Sanskrit literature and culture with its vast domain over time and space far beyond the confines even of subcontinental India. Second, it has enriched their literature and culture with a common treasure of cultural contacts, assimilations and widening of human horizons towards a broader world-wide community of mutual appreciation between cultures. Third, it has been of decisive influence in the creation of a truly scientific comparative philology which has made each language more thoroughly conscious of its own genetic and systematic structure and idiosyncratic genius, as well as of its own cultural-linguistic kinship with Sanskrit and with one another on a formerly unsuspected inter-continental scale.

In return, the Sanskrit lore has immensely benefited by the combined achievements of those languages and cultures especially in the fields of scientific philology, history, general as well as literary, and in the preservation and grasp of its traditional heirlooms through scholarly exegesis and text-criticism (honed to perfection on the Latin and Greek sister-literatures). Above all, and in response to the barrier-breaking interest in Sanskrit on the part of the world languages, there began to arise in the world of traditional Sanskrit lore a new sense of perspective and broadmindedness that was ready to break through the isolating shackles of stubbornly tradition-bound parochialism and chauvinism, and to see in those sister languages and cultures something to appreciate and Compare and also to learn from, even if with a sober and discriminating selection based on a fearless, “satyam eva jayate”. This was the road towards that mutually enriching cross-fertilization.

To bring that cross-fertilization to full fruition for the benefit of both partners I should like to put before you some thoughts that my long contact with Indian Sankrit scholarship has suggested to me as an appropriate means to that so desirable goal.

Uppermost in my mind there is a many-sided problem which in my opinion deserves precedence on the occasion of this international conference, because it has a very preponderant bearing on the future of all branches of Sanskrit and vedic lore in general and of my own field of rgvedic text-criticism more in particular: I refer to the problem of Western scholarship as confronting traditional Indian literature and learning. And this problem, as I said above, is many-sided indeed. First of all is the fact that, by and large, there is still too much left of that "chaos magnum", that great chasm between the two trends of Western or modern scholarship and Indian traditional learning.

Yes, there is still an immense reservoir and current of traditional especially vedic, lore completely undisturbed by the stream of modern scientific historico-philological outlook and dynamism. And it is this that causes my deep concern. The reason is that I sadly feel that tremendous potentialities for scholarly progress go waste and abegging for lack of proper direction and training. It should be our ambition and pride that every genuine paṇḍit is on the one hand an expert in his special branch of knowledge but at the same time a modernminded scholar who can critically assess the value of his own traditional texts and knowledge and thus lead them either forward, into new developments of thought and truth, or backward in the direction of their original text-critical forms.

Let us not allow our vedic (or Sanskrit) paṇḍits to become mere mummified museum-pieces, or merely mechanical tape-recorders—for then, I fear, the nation's progress will pass them by (and they are too valuable for that)—but let us enable them to incorporate themselves actively and dynamically into the cultural-educational forward-march of India by integrating their lore into the modern methods of search for knowledge and truth. I would decidedly advocate that they continue to foster their enviable fluency in spoken Sanskrit and specialized proficiency in particular śāstras; but I equally strongly advocate that from now on it should be considered as a sine qua non qualification of modern paṇḍitry the ability to feel quite at ease with English, at least as a library language. A true modern paṇḍit in India cannot do without at least that much English, in order to have direct and untrammelled access to the rich literature on Sanskrit (especially in its vedic stage) which exists in that language—which should be held as India's own international language. It is also a providential golden bridge to the languages and cultures of the other fellow-members of India's own Indo—European linguistic—cultural family of peoples.

But in order that this language—contact may bear full fruit every effort must be made that a modern paṇḍit should not remain exclusively confined to the world of the Pāṇinian "aṣṭādhyāyī", but should be

thoroughly familiar with the modern grammatical terminology and method, at least as represented by Whitney and Macdonnell—to put it at its bare minimum. Pāṇini was indeed a grammatical giant and genius, but that was in an age when grammatical science was in a relative infancy, without the epochmaking help of comparative philology. Now-a-days, thanks partly to Pāṇini's pioneering achievement, we are far beyond that, and there is no valid reason why a modern paṇḍit should be tied to the standards of 24 centuries ago without being made aware of the progress achieved since those ancient times.

If those bridges between the traditional paṇḍit—world and modern scholarship are well and truly built, we can expect a very fruitful cross—fertilization; for the paṇḍit—world has also something very unique to give—namely, the intimate familiarity with and minute knowledge of the texts, which is one of the most solid foundations for a thorough understanding leading to scientifically well—grounded conclusions and results.

I have gone into some detail about that aspect of this problem because as indicated above I deeply appreciate the potential fund of learning that lies in that direction (as the “paṇḍit—sammelan” brings home to us at every session of the A.I.O.C.), and also because, in the very interests of the future and development of progressive Sanskrit learning, so threatened now—a—days, I should like to see resolved that unbridged dichotomy which the very fact of a separate “sammelan” in a way makes manifest and underlines. Besides I should be very happy if the above remarks should be, in my name and yours, a moral support and encouragement to the efforts already actually being made to bring about and intensify a movement of reform in that very direction.

What I have said above applies also, only more so, to those who, in the more modernised courses and atmosphere of our Universities, are naturally more in contact with the current of modern scholarship. Here especially (and whatever be the medium of instruction) a working mastery of English and a familiar acquaintance with the modern historico-philological grammar will be the two golden keys with which the wider academic population will be able to enter into the vast domain of Indian and non-Indian literature on Sanskrit, especially at the vedic stage. And it is here, at the M.A. level (or the corresponding one in equivalent institutions of learning), that the particular crucial aspect of my problem begins to set in. For, if the proper academic levels are to be maintained on a par with Western academic centres, how can we accept as a true Master of Arts in Sanskrit (including the Vedic stage) a candidate who has no immediate

access to nor personal knowledge of some of the very best sources of information in that field—just because they are written in French or German (as the two chief languages concerned) and not translated into English? Hence I would propose that, even at the M.A. level, at least for a first—class qualification, it should be a requisite that the candidate pass a test of sufficiency in understanding French and/or German passages dealing with topics connected with the papers offered by him at the final examination—a thing similar to what is already being done in the M.Sc. course.

But my chief concern and main problem culminate with regard to the state of affairs obtaining at the professorial and research (both *pre*—Ph.D. and *post*—degree scholarly work) levels of our academic and learned élite, especially in the domain of vedic literature.

Here it should be a sheer matter of professional honour that no one should feel at ease in teaching, writing or investigating without a mastery of *both* French and German—a mastery that allows him an easy and independent use of the information contained in those (for vedic and other studies) two most important non-Indian languages. I know that among my colleagues many an example can be found of a spontaneous personal effort in that direction, out of the sheer logic of the facts and the situation itself—and that is to their credit and honour; but my point is that it should be somehow incorporated into the very texture of the preparatory process for a scholarly pursuit of knowledge at the higher academic—cultural level, as something essential and to be taken for granted. It is a crying need; for an Indian vedic scholar who works without those tools is doomed to be at least fifty years behind the times in one aspect or another or even—at times—in every aspect. Hence his work will easily fail to reach the front line of scholarly progress, and that not for lack of talent and ability, nor for want of information within the range of the English-speaking world of scholarship or of the Indian traditional lore; but simply because his ignorance of those languages cuts him off from important and at times decisively essential works of modern international scholarship and research.

But even if he possesses those languages how often will he be so well-placed near a library in a university or research centre that he can easily make use of such foreign—language publications, and how many of those libraries will be so well—stocked in that kind of journals and books that their readers can be kept abreast of every significant development in their particular line of study and research. Besides who can readily afford the time to go through all the forest of journals and publications ?

In such a quāndary, it is an inestimable boon to the scholar to come across bibliographical works like the excellent "Vedic Bibliography" by Dr. R. N. Dandekar. We need something like that in every branch of Sanskrit lore, and the brief but pithy indication of the contents in the said Vedic Bibliography should be a feature to be emulated in any such future undertaking.

But this kind of works appears, as it is the case with the above-mentioned one, only at longish intervals (I, 1946; II, 1961)—which I hope will be shortened for the now expected new instalment—and what we need is something more frequent and at the same time more completely informative as to the contents, so that wider circles of Indian scholars are, to a certain extent, helped over the difficulty of foreign languages and lack of access to publications in order that as many as possible are kept in living contact with the main trends and spearheads of outstanding modern learning and investigation both in India and abroad, especially the latter. I am rather thinking in terms of a quarterly or bi-annual periodical of digests or extracts (and summaries) as it is done in some branches of science and other disciplines, and as embryonically but unsystematically it is done in some periodicals with their review of Journals. Kurukṣetra's "Prāci-Jyoti" was a promising move—but something halted its drive. Now luckily, it has been vigorously revived. Could not the organising ability and driving energy of Dr. Raghavan and or Dr. Dandekar take this matter in hand and bring about a coordinated effort of the various agencies, Journals and Institutions—like the several Centres for Advanced Sanskrit Studies, the Kurukṣetra University or entities like the Bhandarkar and Vishveshvarānanda Institutes, etc.—already at work in the bibliographical field? I realize that the difficulties in the way are considerable; but the goal in view is well worth the effort that may have to be spent on achieving it.

But something more is still needed to solve the special problem I have set out to examine—namely, the relation of modern scholarship to Indian ṛgvedic and sanskritic lore. *Modern ṛgvedic* and Sanskrit scholarship was founded and magnificently developed by Western scholars on whose methodically sound basis we are still building today. American and British scholars, for instance, have produced many of the works that must be considered indispensable for any serious scientific study of the R̥gveda in its various aspects. I will not dwell upon them here because their being in English should put them within easy reach of the Indian learned world. But when we turn to the German achievements (leaving aside the French and Russian ones for brevity's sake only)—we find that the best Sanskrit Dictionary is still a German one (Bohtlingk-Roth), the best (and only) special R̥gveda Dictionary is in German (Grassmann); and so is the best Sanskrit Grammar (Wacker-

nagel) and the best introduction to a text-critical study of the R̥gved (Oldenberg's "Prolegomena"), and the best text-critical-exegetical commentary to the R̥gveda (the same author's "Noten"), and the best annotated translation of the R̥gveda (Geldner). All in German, and also all which brings me back to my problem—*all* still untranslated, and therefore, practically inaccessible to the bulk of those who in India are concerned with ṛgvedic studies. I know that it can be said that those who want to specialize in the R̥gveda will have to learn German and then, through them, the benefit of the German scholarly achievement will percolate to the rest. But I feel that this is a poor second best and a poor consolation. The practical and speedily efficient way is to see that those indispensable masterpieces are widely accessible to all budding scholars in a language within their normal reach. To be practical again, that language—I suggest—would have to be English (India's own international speech) so as to avoid the unbearable difficulties of multiple translation of such specialized works and of their economic viability. It would also keep forcing all pandits to learn at least English as a bridge to modern scholarship. But it seems to me that it is a matter of national honour that such first-class and essential works on a subject which is the crown-jewel of India's cultural heritage should be in a language which is practically viable to the totality of its academic and scholarly élite in as far as it concerns itself with the pursuit of Sanskrit studies.

Hence I would propose that the higher institutions of Sanskrit studies, including the universities, in conjunction with the Education Ministry should form and appoint a Translation Council. The latter should select the works of fundamental importance for the progress of Sanskrit studies which should be translated, and that same Council should be empowered to ensure qualified translators and to devise ways and means by which the publication of those works would be made economically viable with the help of official subsidies where necessary. (By the way, could not this Conference also do something towards that end ?) I would not hesitate for a moment to recommend to such a Council Oldenberg's "Prolegomena" and "Noten"—together with Geldner's Translation of the R̥gveda—as a "must" to top the list. And I feel—call me an optimist, if you like—that within a relatively short time the tone and level of our ṛgvedic studies would be improved beyond recognition and create an atmosphere of dynamically progressive approach and trail-blazing pioneering research.

It is indeed a rich harvest of results and acquired scientific facts that will replenish the granaries of our scholarly information—as a first and most obvious gain. But the main gain is the experience at first-hand of the modern scholarly outlook and approach actually at work upon the problems tackled by those great masters of the scientific-

humanistic method of study and investigation. And that invigorating experience should lead not to a mere passive acceptance and slavish copying whether of facts or of the methods, but should result in a conscious and conscientious imbibing of the method itself, in such a way that the Indian scholar is then (from the inside, as it were) in a position to evaluate and even criticise in an independent way both the results obtained by those masters and also the method itself.

Consider what happened in the philological-grammatical field. Pāṇini's genius created a masterpiece that in its analytico-synthetical grasp of its subject was far ahead of anything that the West then or for a long time afterwards had been able to achieve. But when the West discovered Pāṇini's work it did not blindly swallow it, but absorbed from it its spirit of analysis and synthesis, added its own insights from the study of its own classical languages, created the new science of comparative philology, and systematically developed the principles and methods that led to the epoch-making Grammar of Wackernagel. In comparison with the latter, Pāṇini's "aṣṭādhyāyī" is now only a monumental milestone left far behind by the further progress of the very science he so decisively helped to found and set on its way. And even in the West, books like Burrow's "The Sanskrit Language" show—in spite of possible disagreements—that the road is not yet at a dead end and that even Wackernagel is in the process of becoming a milestone to be by-passed at least in certain aspects. Who will then blame our new Indian grammarians and linguists if they in turn try to improve on the Western achievements with new trends which outwardly look so un-Pāṇinean but which inwardly carry the best of Pāṇini's spirit of analytico-synthetical attitude and can legitimately claim him as intellectual ancestor? Even here Indian scholarship took up the torch of philological studies which we can see symbolised in the name of Dr. S. K. Chatterjee, to mention but one scholar.

Or take the case of textual criticism. Both India and the West had of old tried their hand at the accurate preservation of ancient texts: the West through manuscripts; India, at first, by means of that "literary miracle" of its oral tradition—especially in the Ṛgveda—checked and counterchecked by "Pāṭhas" and "Prātiśākhya"; but later, India went in for manuscriptal transmission also. It was the West that first initiated and developed the modern science of text criticism and it was the West that gave to India the 'editio princeps' of the Ṛgveda itself through Max Müller. But it was an Indian, Dr. V. S. Sukthankar, who thoroughly imbibed the spirit of the text-critical method of the West and then he enriched and refined that Western method by adaptation to the new conditions in India and thus opened the way to the admirable achievement that is the critical edition of the

Mahābhārata—with that of the Rāmāyaṇa following in its wake and under its inspiration.

It is thus that I visualise the result of that closer contact between Western scholarship and Indian learning—as a cross-fertilization, as a never-ending process of fruitful give-and-take, where the Indian counterpart is not merely passively at the receiving end, but, as an equal partner, preserves its own initiative and makes its own contribution to the common pool of knowledge, while wholeheartedly and open-mindedly accepting all progress in scientific methods from wherever it may come. This applies in a special way to the central problem with which here I am particularly concerned : the problem of ṛgvedic text-criticism. A beginning of that text-criticism—and a uniquely ingenious beginning it is :—lies in the very constitution of the pāṭhas (especially of the Saṃhitā-and Pada-pāṭhas) and in the meticulous analysis of the Prātiśākhyaś. But after that first achievement, it became, for all practical purposes, permanently stationary, except possibly for the care bestowed on the enumeration and classification of the “chandas” as a constituent part of the text.

But after the long centuries of stagnation there came the impact of modern scholarship on the text-critical study of the ṛgvedic text after its edition by Max Müller. The text itself, its original system of arrangement into the Saṃhitā, its phonetics, its metrical patterns, its variants in other vedic texts, its language and archaisms and its grammar—all problems, in fine, concerning its textual form (besides the exegesis of its contents) were thoroughly scrutinized in the light of modern text-critical principles and of the discoveries of comparative philology. A representative and decisive culmination was reached, in my opinion, with the publication of Arnold’s “Vedic Metre” and still more of the great master Oldenberg’s “Prolegomena” and “Noten”. The result of that thorough scrutiny was the scientific establishment of the fact that the Saṃhitā of the Ṛgveda was what I have often before called a “Palimpsest”—namely an ancient archaic text editorially retouched by the Saṃhitā-Kāra agency—traditionally represented by the “Śākalāśākhā”—in function of much younger phonetics, saṃdhi and grammar. The essential ṛg-nature of the original text had thus been seriously impaired, and we could only go back to it by relying on metre and archaism against the actual form of the traditional Saṃhitā. And, in fact, that text-critical reconstruction brought about the re-emergence of a great part of the Ṛgveda as real ṛg—in a metrically regular, rhythmical pattern of verse. But this left still a good many irregular exceptions—too many, surely, to be compatible with the masterly regularity and versifying skill so brilliantly manifested by the main trend of the ṛgvedic sūktas.

And it is here that my own research set in as a confirmation of my contention that Indian scholarship can first assimilate the best of the western methods and then bring them forward to a more complete consummation in the common search for truth. I will not tire you with the details of my method and principles or of the results hitherto obtained or in course of publication. I have done that elsewhere at length. I will only say here that my hopes have been more than superabundantly fulfilled, as I trust soon to be able to demonstrate it in print. But one thing is certain that any work done in that line has only been feasible and will only be further fruitful and rewarding by the fullest possible use of the colossal spade-work done by dedicated and scholarly pioneers who beyond the boundaries of India have given to Sanskrit of their own scientific best embodied in the sister-languages of the Indo-European family. And it is only by keeping those languages as viable roads and open bridges of intellectual communication and two-way intercourse that we in India can profit from the finest achievements of Western scholars, and at the same time contrive to go forward even beyond their attained goals by developing and improving their method and labour of research. There will thus be established among the members of the Indo-European family of languages a mutually-beneficial “guruparamparā” in which, on the basis of Sanskrit, each side, East and West, will be in turn “guru” and “śiṣya” and “semper discens, semper docens”-ever progressively-dynamically nearer to that eternal goal of all scientific endeavour so pithily phrased in Sanskrit “satyam eva jayate”.

SANSKRIT AND WORLD LITERATURE

H. S. Ursekar M.A. LL.B.

City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bombay

Sanskrit can lay claim to a place of pride in the world literature in respect of antiquity, originality, stylistic merit, literary excellence and thought contribution.

What is literature ? The Shorter Oxford Dictionary says that literature means writings whose value lies in beauty of form or emotional effect. Whatever is written is not literature. But literature is the writing having literary merit like that of form, style, diction, emotional effect or thought impact. Thus it is a writing which appeals to your head and heart.

De Quincey speaks of two types of literature ; Literature of knowledge and literature of power. The literary product may add to your knowledge or may move your emotions. But this categorization suffers from overlapping. A book like Aristotle's Poetics or a play by Shaw may enlighten you as well as entertain you.

I.A. Richards considers that a book is a machine to think with. Thus he emphasizes the thought-provoking ability of a literary composition. This is also inadequate, as he overlooks another function of literature viz. its emotional impact.

According to the Sanskrit aesthetic writers literature is synonymous with Kāvya or Poetry. It is difficult to define poetry. When Wordsworth defines poetry as a spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings he emphasises its emotional aspect. Carlyle calls it musical thought. Coleridge says poetry is best words in best order. While according to Mathew Arnold poetry is a criticism of life.

Each of these approaches highlights one of the attributes of poetry. The main function of literature is communication through the medium of Words. I should think that literature is that writing having a beauty of form, expression and content. In the light of this criterion I propose

(11)

to consider the place of Sanskrit in World Literature under the types of poetry, drama, fiction, criticism, grammar, philosophy and Scientific literature.

POETRY

Poetry is one of the richest mines in the Sanskrit realms of gold. Its range is astounding. From the artless spontaneous lyrical expressions of the pristine Vedic poets to the artificial perfection of diction of a Subandhu or Jayadeva, we have all sorts of varieties in the Sanskrit Poetry.

The R̥gveda is believed to be one of the oldest specimens of world literature. It is not only a verse but at several places the Vedic poet has produced beautiful poetry of everlasting loveliness. The description of the Sun in its various forms like Sūrya, Savitṛ, signify the lyrical outbursts of the Vedic poet. The sun is a source of lyrical inspiration. In the Vedic imagery it is considered as a red bird with strong wings travelling through the sky(1), or to a white horse brought by the dawn(2), The Sun reminds the poet of the spotted bull(3): Savitṛ is a golden god with golden hands(4), which inspired the sage Viśwamitra to perceive the famous Gāyatri Mantra. The sun's career through the sky evokes the image of one striding forth three times over the earth(5). The hymn II-38 is a beautiful piece of lyrical poetry inspired by the Sun god.

Similar lyrical fancies are found in the Ushas hymns too. In one place the Vedic poet compares the dawn to a young maiden with unbraided hair following her young man.

In point of antiquity perhaps the Egyptians Hieroglyphs or the Babylonean bricks or even the Indus valley seals may sustain their claim for historical precedence, but in point of poetry the R̥gveda represents a sustained effort of poetic composition in the history of human civilization.

The R̥gveda is not a collection of primitive popular poetry but as Macdonell says 'It is rather a body of skilfully composed hymns(6). Thus

(1) R̥g. V-47-3.

(2) R̥g. VII-77-3.

(3) R̥g. VII-63-4.

(4) R̥g. I-22-5

(5) R̥g. VII-100-3

(6) History of Sanskrit Literature P.53.

it is not an anthology of anonymous floating folk poetry. It bespeaks of a beauty of form, diction and content as well of a high order. Prof. Griffith's poetic rendering of the R̥gveda will bear testimony to the literary excellence of this poetry.

The Vedic poetry has a great historical and social significance as it is one of the most original composition uninfluenced by any other contemporaneous literature, if there was any. It also reflects the conditions of law, society and other institutions of historical import.

Similar historical perspective is also noticed in the two great epics of the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa. An epic is essentially a rare type of poetry. The whole of the world literature does not have more than ten epics. Iliad, Odyssey, Aeneid, Inferno, Paradise Lost, Shah-Namah and one or two more exhaust the epic genius of the world.

The rest of this class are epic-attempts. Thus out of the eight epics produced by the world two are accounted for by Sanskrit. It is matched only by Greek which also has a couple of Homeric epics. Macdonell observed that the Mahābhārata spreading over a lac of verses is equal to about eight times as much as the Iliad and Odyssey put together and is by far the longest poem known to literary history(7). According to the classification of Prof. Abercrombie the Mahābhārata with its three versions of Jaya, Bhārat and Mahābhārata and multiple-authors led by Vyasa is an epic of growth, while the Rāmāyaṇa is an epic of art composed by Vālmiki.

Apart from its record length the Mahābhārata is unique in other respects. Its epic kernel is the fratricidal war between the Kurus and Pāṇḍus. It delineates the history of these dynasties and incidentally of other royal houses in the Northern India. It is said that it is so exhaustive that there is nothing under the Sun which is not included in its sweeping compass. It is a mine of Worldly wisdom. Its didactic appeal also adds to its value. The poetry in the Mahābhārata is not of much excellence. On the other hand in the Rāmāyaṇa we have beautiful pieces of lyrical rhapsodies and poetic flights. The description of nature in the Rāmāyaṇa, couched in simple, unadorned diction is a treat to read.

The Mahābhārata rings out an era, while the Rāmāyaṇa rings in a new era. The Rāmāyaṇa reflects the first contact and conflict between the Aryas and the Anāryas. It also furnishes evidence of a king assisted by a Council of Ministers. The ideal of Rāmarājya is the nucleus of the modern social welfare State.

These two epics have served as the perennial fountain head of inspiration for the later writers. These epics have carved out a place of distinction in the field of world epic poetry. They can be justly regarded as the Sun and the Moon of Sanskrit Poetry.

Apart from the epic poetry there is a unique type of poetry called the Court poetry or Kāvya in Sanskrit. Sanskrit literature was by and large a literature for the Classes and not for the masses. Most of the Classical poets were Court poets. They wrote an artificial poetry in highly cultivated style, adorned with figures of speech, embellished with flights of fancy and imagination in the Coleridgean sense and sublimated by flashes of Worldly wisdom. This romantic poetry is typified in the five other epics like the Raghuvansā, Kumārasambhavā by Kālidās and three others. They are epics of art, expressed in chaste and charming poetry. The Raghuvansā abounds with apt and striking similies and is an outstanding specimen of genuine poetry. It is also rich in emotional content and is famous for spots of philosophical wisdom. The line "death is natural, while life is unnatural" occurs in this great heraldic poem. It is difficult to find out a parallel in the English narrative poetry to these epics. Beauwolve or Chaucer's Canterbury Tales lack the polish or the depth of sentiments of these poems. In fact, the Kālidasean epics may be said to represent the golden age of Sanskrit Poetry. They are pure poetry free from the Sarcasm of Pope or Dryden.

One of the outstanding specimens of Sanskrit lyrical poetry is Kālidāsa's Meghadūta. Love is one of the major themes of all great poetry, but the central theme of Meghadūta a cloud messenger being briefed by a lover to meet his beloved is at once original and beautiful. The emotional sincerity of this pre-eminent Kāvya has led critics to discover an autobiographical touch in this poetry. The interplay of human sentiments and natural scenery is a remarkable feature of the poem. It is so popular that it brought in its wake a number of imitations. The poem is translated into several European and Indian languages. It was admired by the great Goethe. A parallel of this central theme is found in Maria Stuart by Schiller another German Poetic genius. There the captive queen of Scotts who is in exile calls on the passing clouds to greet the land of her young age. We may agree with Keith in his observations that "Indian criticism has ranked it highest among Kālidāsa's poems for brevity of expression, richness of content, and power to elicit sentiment, and the praise is not undeserved". (8).

The R̥tusamphāram by Kalidas is another illustration of lovely lyrical poetry. The poem describes the cycle of seasons. It displays

the poets deep sympathy with Nature, his keen observation and his genius in bringing to life the riot of colour in the Indian landscape. It is a superb representative of romantic realism in poetry. Keats' Four Seasons is a tabloid Rtusamharam.

The most outstanding lyrical creation in Sanskrit is perhaps Gita-govind by Jayadeva. Its central theme is love of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, in both its aspects of frustration and fulfilment. The poem combines perfection of form, grace of diction and beauty of emotion. Its cadences, assonences and alliterations may be said to exploit the Sanskrit language to its fullest. Its word music is enchanting. It is the Everest of lyrical creation. That is why Keith says "Jayadeva's work is a masterpiece, and it surpasses in its completeness of effect any other Indian poem". (9)

One of the astounding achievements of the Sanskrit literature is the body of short poems called the Subhāṣitas. These are short verses charged with pithy observations on life and morals. A Subhashita may be described in Marlowe's words as containing infinite riches in a little room. These verses embrace the whole gamut of Man and Nature. In this gnomic poetry we get a perfect blend of sound and sense and of sound commonsense too. One poet says "whence can happiness come to the people through the reign of an evil king, what relaxation is there in friendship with an evil friend, what happiness in the home where the wife is a bad wife, what fame in instructing a bad disciple? The Subhāṣita Ratna Bhāṇḍāgāraṁ is a veritable mine of word gemlets, and wise-cracks. It is a literary phenomena unmatched anywhere, except by the Persian Shers which have a limited range of subjects. It also lacks in didactic appeal.

The galaxy of Sanskrit poets glistens with great poets like Bhāravi, Māgha, Bhatti, Bhavabhūti, Subandhu, Bhartruhari, and the last but not the least Kālidāsa. Kālidāsa is not only an epic and lyric poet but is also the doyen of Sanskrit dramatists.

The Sanskrit dramatic tradition goes back to the hoary past and is traced to the heaven. Drama was regarded as a Veda (10). Kālidāsa calls it a charming sacrifice and an exclusive mass medium to entertain people of diverse tastes. (11). According to the Nāṭya Śāstra the purpose of drama is to give relief to the distressed and delight to the bored. Wilson in his Hindu Theatre has listed about 59 extant plays. Among

(9) Keith. History of Sanskrit Literature Page 194.

(10) Sangita Ratnākara VOL. II, VII 4.

(11) Mālavikāgnimītram, I 4.

the dramatics Bhāsa, Śūdraka, Kālidāsa, Harsha, Bhavabhūti, Viśākhadatta, Bhatta Nārāyaṇa are notable ones.

The Sanskrit drama, but for a couple of doubtful exceptions, has no tragedy either in the Greek sense of destruction of the hero by the all powerful fate or in the Shakesperean sense of 'waste' due to some fatal flaw in his character. The Sanskrit plays can be classified generally as romantic comedies. There are some Histories like the Veṇiśaṃhāram or the Mudrārākṣasam. The Sanskrit dramatists do not observe the Aristotelean unities of place and time but there is an unmistakable unity of action achieved. One of the reasons is that hardly there is any subplot, with such exceptions as in Bhavabhūti's Mālatī Mādhavam.

The central theme is generally the love-affair of a King, it being a feudal society.

The touch of realism is found in Śūdraka's Mṛcchakatikam. It is a drama written by a King about a couple of thousand years ago. Antiquity is not its sole merit. The play portrays the love of the broken Brāhmin merchant for an affluent young Courtesan. The story has a human appeal, the characterization is sharp and vivid, the dialogue is crisp and pointed. Some times we have the stichomythia or the one line dialogue of the Greek drama. The character of Śakara who is an inextricable blend of a knave and a fool is a dramatic creation of world calibre. The oddities and quiddities in his speech has a touch of modernity. Conflict is the sole of drama, and we have a soulful of conflict in the Mṛcchakatikam. It is the eternal clash between the good and the evil, where the good triumphs in the end. There is an interplay of the comic and the tragic. It projects the major human vices except drinking. It is a realistic slice of life enriched with depths of sentiments or Rasa which is the dominant feature in the Sanskrit drama. The play is a stage success even to-day. As a piece of literature it is equally a great drama. That is why Dr. Ryder and Macdonell discern a touch of Shakesperean genius in Śūdraka.

Kālidāsa may suffer in comparison with Shakespeare in point of quality of dramatic output as he is credited with only three plays. But like Shakespeare he combines the skill of a great dramatist and the genius of a great poet. His dramatic creations of Śakuntalā, her friends, her brave son Bharata who toys with a lion's cub, her foster father Kaṇva, Mālavikā, Purūravas, Urvaśī, the Vidūṣaka have the master touch of a creative mind. All the plays are well made and it is difficult to substitute a word. Poetry and prose are blended to produce a dramatic representation enriched with various sentiments. His favourite sentiment is no doubt love, but other sentiments like the heroic, pathetic and comic also enliven his plays. The Vidūṣaka recalls

the fool in the Shakesperean dramatic creation. The use of chaste lyrical muse heightens the impact of sentiments.

Another remarkable feature of the Kālidāsean drama is the part played by Nature in the life of his characters. In the Śākuntalam Dame Nature is an indispensable character. This is true even of the IVth Act of the Vikramorvaśiyam where the King haunts the Nature in a heart-rending search for missing Urvaśī. This harmony between Man and Nature echoes Wordsworth's line that 'one touch of nature makes the whole world kin'.

In Kālidāsa we have the pathetic without the tragic element. The grief of Kaṇva, Śakuntala, Purūravas is real, universal and it has an ageless appeal. The dramatic effect is enhanced by spurts of sublime philosophy. Duṣyanta's words that even a happy man's uneasiness at the sight of beauties of nature reinforces the abiding continuity of human existence, 'for life beyond life' in the Miltonic phrase. In the Merchant of Venice we here of Antonio's want-wit sadness. Kālidāsa is the measure of poetic perfection and dramatic distinction. That is why Keith calls him the Virgil of India and Sir William Jones compliments him as the Shakespeare of India. Goethe's superlative tribute is not undeserved.

Bhavabhūti's Mālātī-Mādhavam can be regarded as the Indian Romeo and Juliet. His Uttararamacharitam is profound with pathos.

Viśākhadatta's Mudrā-rākṣasam is a remarkable play of political intrigue which centres round Chāṇakya, the master of statecraft. This play illustrates that cleverness is not the monopoly of the villain but even the hero can be benevolently clever. The dialogue is limpid, forceful and fluent. It was composed before 800 A. D. while Otway's Venice Preserved appeared after about a 1000 years. Macdonell rightly observes 'it is a play composed with mature dramatic talent, being full of life, action and sustained interests' (12).

The Sanskrit drama has contributed a remarkable specimen of romantic Court Comedy full of wit and wonder, adventure and artistry, beauty and love. It has a sense of escape which is the inescapable hallmark of any successful entertainment. It enlightens the audience with truisms of life, and the fascinating fusion of man and nature. Prose and poetry play hand in hand to produce the sentiments of love, humour and pathos. In fact, the creation of Rasa is the major achievement of the Sanskrit drama to the world canvass.

FICTION

Ancient India was not only a nation of philosophers but it was also a nation of poets. Hence more poetry was produced in Sanskrit than prose. It is a strange literary paradox. In other worlds of letters the proportion is reverse. Even writers on medicine like Śuśruta and on law like Yājñyavalkya resort to verse. Probably it was because verse has the uncanny knack to stick to memory. It has a genius for condensation. Besides verse was employed as means of writing were few and far between. Further the old tradition of education required one to memorise knowledge and reproduce it. Hence as observed by Das Gupta and De, "The verse attained a far greater degree of maturity, circulation and importance, and the prose was consequently neglected (13). Even a historical title like Kalhaṇa's Rajataranginī, depicting the history of the Kings of Kashmere is in verse.

Bāṇa's Kādambarī and Daṇḍin's Daśakumāracharitam are two outstanding pieces of fiction. The Sanskrit fiction has a tendency to weave a string of stories within the fabric of the main theme. This is reflected also in the Pañcatantra and the Hitopadeśa. The prose of Bāṇa and Daṇḍin is highly ornate, full of peacock phrases and word-play. It is a style of a decadent age, as is seen in the Naughty Nineties of the last Century in the writings of Max Beerbohm and Oscar Wilde. It is a highly romantic prose literature, having little idealism and less realism. But Bāṇa and Daṇḍin though prose writers are essentially poets at heart like Sir Thomas Browne and Carlyle. Prose was a rare phenomena in Sanskrit and that is why perhaps it is said that prose is the touch stone of poets.

The real power of Sanskrit prose is found in the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya and the Mitākṣarā, the commentary by Vijñāneśwar on the code of Yājñyavalkya. Prose argues while poetry persuades. One appeals chiefly to reason while the other to emotion. The full brilliance of dialectical repertoire sustained by a cold rationalism is found fully exploited by Śāṅkara. Kant and Choupenhaur, Russel and Whitehead can be proud of such argumentative prose. Mitākṣarā excels in brevity, clarity and logic. Poetry is a product of culture, while prose is a creation of civilization. Poetry is a matter of inspiration, while prose is a matter of cultivation. Prose cannot play its innings without the pitch of the art of writing.

Thus the Sanskrit prose literature is not much in quantity, but is high in quality of stylistic merit, illuminated by literary excellences. It is also didactic as in the *Hitopadeśa*, and can stand comparison with the famous fables of Aesop and the modern writings of Kahlil Gibran. The East knows the secret of teaching that you can impress better if you speak through fables and parables. In fact, it is through the fables that the East established its earliest contacts with the West.

CRITICISM

What is criticism to literature, is grammar to language. Under criticism we may consider the aesthetic theory or the Poetics and the commentaries on the literary works. In Sanskrit the Poetics is called the *Alaṅkāra Śāstra*—Science of literary embellishment.

Like other critics, the Sanskrit writers on aesthetics have tried to define poetry in various ways. One definition stresses freshness, another emphasises the element of suggestion, or the striking trait. Another writer underlines the impact of beautiful meaning. But generally Mammaṭa's definition that poetry is an expression charged with sentiment has found favour with a majority of critics. In fact the *Rasa Siddhanta* or the doctrine of sentiment or the aesthetic emotion is an outstanding contribution of Sanskrit aesthetic writers to poetics. Hence generally aesthetic value judgements, turn upon the pivot of this criterion. Bharata in his *Nāṭya Śāstra* written about 2000 years ago presented systematically the doctrine of sentiment with its eight sub-divisions, as erotic, comic, pathetic, and those of horror, heroism, fear, disgust and wonder. Later on Ānandavardhana and others added the ninth one : Serene.

Bharata's treatise on dramaturgy can be ranked with any classic on dramaturgy. It deals methodically with the construction of the theatre, stage, orchestra, acting, singing, dancing and every other production value. It is post-Aristotelean but it is entirely free from the Greek influence and is true to the grassroots of Indian tradition.

Another landmark in the aesthetic writings is the *Kāvya Prakāśa* by Mammaṭa. It is purely indigenous and presents a logical consideration of poetry in its various aspects and dilates upon the figures of speech. According to Mammata poetry brings in fame, wealth, worldly knowledge and destroys evil. Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka* stresses the doctrine of *Dhvani* or suggestion in poetry. Daṇḍin in his *Kāvyaadarśa* insists upon the doctrine of qualities like *Prasāda* or perspicuity of sense, *Ojas* or force secured by employing long compound and *Mādhurya* or

sweetness. On the other hand Bhāmaha in his *Kāvyaalankāra* prefers the figures of speech as the material to lend effect to poetry.

Vāmana in his *Kāvyaalankāra* propounded that Rīti or the style i.e. the order of words is the soul of poetry. He anticipated a thousand years in advance Coleridge who said that poetry is best words in best order. Kuntala maintains that Vakrokti or the crooked or the figurative speech is the core of poetry. In the 17th Century Jagannātha in his *Rasa Gangādhara* asserts that poetry is words expressive of a charming idea.

Thus Sanskrit poetics was a far advanced science. It considered poetry from all possible angles, with logic and clarity. The approach is essentially analytical and critical. These theories may be regarded as outdated but so also are the classical aesthetic theories. However, their importance in the evolution of the true assessment of the poetic element cannot be ignored.

Turning to the commentaries on literary compositions, their master is Mallinātha. He lived in the 14th Century and commented upon the epics of Kālidāsa, Bhāravi, Māgha and Bhaṭṭi. His commentaries are written in the Indian tradition. He explains the text in simple words bringing out the poetic beauties and explaining allusions. The approach is analytical and hence he does not attempt a synthetic estimate of the work, nor does he try to judge its literary merit or attempt a ranking which is one of the essential features of modern criticism. Mallinātha is a commentator and not a critic. He explains and does not evaluate.

GRAMMAR

Pāṇini (5th Century B.C.), is the king of Sanskrit grammarians. His grammar is regarded as one of the earliest systematic treatises on grammar. The norms laid down by Pāṇini for the Sanskrit language still hold good, and whatever is a-Pāṇiniya, is to be avoided. The pioneering importance of his work is recognized by scholars the world over. It has greatly helped the studies of linguistics and comparative philology. There are other great grammarians like Kātyāyana and Patañjali.

PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy begins with the speculation on the origin of the world and on the eternal principle by which it is created and sustained.

Hence who is the creator, what is the nature of his creation and what is the relationship between the creator and creation are some of the fundamental questions which are dealt with by the Indian philosophy as expressed in Sanskrit. There are nine systems of philosophy. The result of their speculation is that the great Brahman or the primeval cause of creation is the only reality, the rest is illusion, and that the Brahman is unknowable and that the soul of the individual is part and parcel of the eternal soul and that is why the Vedānta is known as Brahma Vidyā. Paul Deussen says that the acme of the Biblical teaching is 'love thy neighbour. But the scripture does not provide the answer, why ? The great German philosopher says that the answer is provided by the Indian philosophy viz. because your soul and that of your neighbour's are part of the eternal soul.

The Bhagawadgītā which forms part of the Mahābhārata is described as the perennial philosophy by Huxley. Its importance as a practical guide to man is unquestionable.

Śankara is the prince of Indian philosophers. His doctrine of Māyā is considered as a major contribution to the world philosophy.

The notable peculiarity of the Vedānta philosophy is that it is expressed in literary Sanskrit, and is remarkable for analysis, logic and keen hair-splitting tendency.

SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE

One of the misunderstandings about the Sanskrit literature is that it is purely religious. This is not true. Sanskrit has a good deal of secular and scientific writings on various subjects like Mathematics and Music, Political Science and Poetics, Astronomy and Archery, Law and Medicine and even on how to construct a plane or to prepare a pan.

Among the eminent mathematicians are Āryabhaṭa, Varāhamihira, Brahmagupta and Bhāskara. The latter's *Līlāvati* is written in an easy style.

Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* is an outstanding work on Political Science. His propositions hold good even to-day. He urges the King to be ever vigilant and prepared for war. He observes that in politics there is no permanent friendship or permanent hostility. Expediency is the life-breath of politics which is a game of power. It is also a book of International Politics.

Suśruta, Charaka and Vāgbhaṭa, in medicine and Nārada, Manu and Yañjyavalkya in law are the outstanding writers.

There are treatises on Vimana Vidya or the air-craft flying, the propelling power for which was mercury.

It will be seen that the gamut of Sanskrit literature extends over the whole scale of life worldly and otherworldly. It is mostly written in verse and the writers are seldom unmindful that what they are writing is literature. That literature is Classical, Romantic, romantic-realist, but not purely realistic in the modern sense of the term, But realism is a relative term. Just as the reformer of to-day is the conservative of tomorrow as depicted by Arnold Bennet in his drama the Milestones, similarly realistic writing of today assumes a romantic tinge tomorrow. What they wrote reflected the life of the upper strata of society, mainly the Court life. Their readership was limited to the elite. It is true that the Sanskrit plays used to be performed on the occasions of public fairs and festivals. But the Sanskrit literature on the whole was meant for the classes rather than for the masses.

The Sanskrit literature has thus antiquity and originality. It hardly came under the influence of other men of letters. It displays style and other literary excellences. It was no doubt classical literature but even to-day Sanskrit literature is being produced and Sanskrit is succesfully tackling the modern problems in various books and journals that are being published.

On the whole the Sanskrit language has produced an Indian Aristotle in Bharata, an Indian Shakespeare in Kālidāsa, and an Indian Homer in Vyāsa, an Indian Machiavilli in Kauṭilya, and an Indian Justinian in Manu.

In fine the Sanskrit language, rich in diction and accurate in expression, can meet any challenge and as a vehicle of civilization Sanskrit will abide forever, in the comity of world languages.

SANSKRIT AND WORLD CULTURE

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It is unnecessary to harp on the fact that Sanskrit culture had reached its apex at a time when many civilizations of the world hadn't even been born. And also it is unnecessary to point out that Indian culture had already travelled across the seas and mountains to the Indonesian archipelago, Siam, Annam, Cambodia, China, Japan and Tibet. We are all familiar with statements like "From Persia to the Chinese sea, from the icy regions of Siberia to the islands of Java and Borneo, India has propagated her beliefs, her tales, her civilization. She has left indelible imprints on one fourth of the human race in the course of a long succession of centuries". This is all old history.

The aim of this paper is to discuss whether Sanskrit culture still has anything to offer towards building up a world culture. Before taking up that question it would be better to be clear as to what we mean by culture.

Culture is more easy to understand than to define. It would probably mean different things to different people. Culture perhaps can never really be defined to include what all one implies by the word culture. At best we can only join hands with Sancho Panza in his reply to Don Quixote's question—"Every day Sancho, you are becoming less foolish and more sensible." Sancho replies "It must be that some of Your Worship's good sense is rubbing off on me. Lands which are by themselves dry and barren, if manured and cultivated bring forth good fruit. I mean to say that Your Worship's conversation is the manure that has been spread upon the barren ground of my dry wit; the time I have spent in your company and service has been my cultivation." Hence, broadly, one could say that culture implies a cultivation of things of the mind which automatically would govern the actions of an individual. And so culture is, in a general sense, the way of life of an individual—the way he reacts to particular instances would depend largely on his cultural background. And also with countries—the reactions to different situations may differ, amongst other things, to the

cultural background of a country. And hence arises the question "What is Sanskrit Culture?"

There is a tendency amongst orthodox circles to assert that India's culture has been more or less the same throughout its chequered history. That is absurd. As culture is cultivated and reflected by the individuals composing a society it will necessarily be in a state of flux. But the assertion may be true in the sense that, though the currents keep on changing, the riverbed of culture is steady and nowhere in the world has this been proved better than in India. What is it that has enabled Sanskrit culture to maintain a continuous flow when all other ancient civilizations succumbed to the onslaughts of new comers? The answer lies in her spirit of tolerance, an enquiry into the essentials of any alien culture she came into contact with and a readiness to accept, absorb and make her own the finer aspects of another culture. Her tolerance thus worked in the direction of assimilating rather than attacking any new ideas she came in touch with. Thus what started off as Vedic culture had, by the time of the Guptas, changed totally in form growing richer and more varied by contact with the Persians, the Greeks and others. We could say that during this period in Indian history Indian life and thought took the direction which it has followed ever since.

When one studies the cultural history of India the overall impression is that of deep humanism. I am well aware of the criticisms which are usually levelled against statements like that. Granted that her rulers were sometimes cunning and unscrupulous, granted that inequality of birth was given religious sanction, granted that the poor did have a hard time of it, yet one can boldly assert that in no other part of the ancient world were the relations between man and man so fair and humane.

At a time when slaves were taken for granted, not only was their number few in India but their rights were protected by law. Thus Arthasāstra III. 13.9 & 12 say :—

"Making a slave pick up a corpse, dung, urine or leavings of food and making women slaves give bath to a naked person, giving corporal punishment to them shall result in the loss of (price) value and shall result in the freedom of a nurse, a female attendant, a women-tenant tilling for half the produce and a maid."

प्र तविष्मूत्रोच्छिष्टप्राहणमाहितस्य नग्नस्नापनं
दण्डप्रेषणमतिक्रमणं च स्त्रीणां मूल्यनाशकरम् ।
धात्रीपरिचारिकार्धसीतिकोपचारिकाणां च

मोक्षकरम् । कन्यामाहितिकां वा स्वयमन्येन वा
दूषयतो मूल्यनाशः शुल्कं तद्विगुणश्च दण्डः ॥

Even in the rules of warfare one is struck by the care that is taken to ensure that the combatants meet on an equal footing. Thus the Mānavadharmasūtra says in VII. 90-93:—"when the king fights the foe in battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed (in wood) nor with (such as are) barbed, poisoned or the points of which are blazing with fire. Let him not strike one who (in flight) has climbed on an eminence nor on eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands (in supplication) nor one who (flees) with flying hair, nor one who says 'I am thine'. Nor one who sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat of mail, nor one who is naked, nor one who is disarmed, nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor one who is fighting with another (foe). Nor one whose weapons are broken, nor one afflicted (with sorrow) nor one who has been grievously wounded, nor one who is in fear, nor one who has turned to flight."

This sense of fairplay is ingrained in Sanskrit culture. And it is in this field that Sanskrit culture has a large contribution to make towards world culture. This sense of fairplay or respect for each other is the basis of India's secularism. And the secularism or active toleration in the sociological field stems directly from the Upanishads which embody some of the noblest workings of the human mind. Thanks to these Upanishads India escaped the presence of an all-powerful church and a dogmatic religion enabling her to accept into her fold even men as questioned the very basis of her religion. One could go further and say that it was the courage born out of the Upanishadic teaching that has resulted in India declaring herself a secular state in her constitution.

Secularism should not be confused with atheism here. As Dr. Radhakrishnan defines it "Secularism tries to build up a fellowship of believers, not by subordinating individual qualities to the group mind but by bringing them into harmony with each other. The dynamic fellowship is based on the principles of diversity in unity which alone has the quality of creativeness." This definition is in accordance with the religious tradition of India.

Since it is beyond dispute that any present day society or state can survive peacefully without being secular the future of humanity lies in cultivating a large measure of tolerance and humanism in their lives. It is particularly in this area that Sanskrit culture can play a big part in educating the individual mind to adopt a tolerant attitude towards other fellow beings. How pressing is the need for a tolerant outlook is clear

when the world has lived through two periods of persecution within thirtyfive years—one in Germany and the other in Bangla Desh.

If India has to survive as a nation it is important for her to revive her Upanishadic lore and practise the precepts given in those texts. India can lead only when she lives the life she preaches. That poses before us the question as to what can the Upanishads, as the quintessence of Sanskrit culture, offer towards the building up of a better world culture.

The twentieth century world is a technological and space research oriented world. The vast advances in the scientific sphere has emancipated man from his subjection to nature and according to Bertrand Russell he is now showing the defects of slave turned master. To quote Russell "A new moral outlook is called for in which submission to the powers of nature is replaced by respect for what is best in man. It is where this respect is lacking that scientific technique is dangerous."

Man, after all, is not just body and mind. He has, in addition, a spiritual dimension. As long as the essentially free spirit of man is overlooked (which is what the natural sciences do) so-called progress will be only in a superficial sense. To quote Radhakrishnan "Man is a moral agent who can determine his behaviour. He can grow by the exercise of the will. If a human being loses his creativity and becomes an item in an enormous crowd, the knowledge which he now possesses through science and technology may choke him and the power he now commands may wipe him out. But he can control the knowledge and use the power he now has if he has a sense of values and does not betray his own creativity in his love for routine."

Today, more than ever before, man finds himself in a bewildering situation. "Never in human history has man experienced so much darkness within him in the midst of all-round enlightenment outside of him, so much inner poverty in the context of measureless enrichment without and so much loneliness in the midst of an enormous crowd." This is increasingly being felt in the growing student disturbances throughout the world as also in the growing number of the so-called hippies and flower children in western societies. The proportion of the old and the young in the population of the world today is almost fifty-fifty. And unfortunately, because of various reasons, the youth of the world have had the least amount of spiritual guidance. Even in India where the awareness of the spiritual dimension was taken for granted, it is not unusual to find amongst the young a growing indifference towards things other than the body and the mind. Without any spiritual moorings and incapable of finding any lasting peace in the so-called material

pursuits the modern world is drifting towards what the Bhagavadgita describes as vināśa.

ध्यायतो विषयान्पुंसः सङ्गस्तेषूपजायते ।

संगात्संजायते कामः कामात्क्रोधोभिजायते ॥

क्रोधाद्भवति संमोहः संमोहात्स्मृतिविभ्रमः ।

स्मृतिभ्रंशाद्बुद्धिनाशो बुद्धिनाशात्प्रणश्यति ॥

An undue attachment towards the physical aspect of things would result in such a predicament. A time has come for the world to shake itself off from its complacency and find an escape from this purely materialistic overtones.

The growing popularity of yoga, the Hare-Krishna Movement and other organizations show that the world looks to India for guidance at this juncture. A lasting and enduring answer can only come from the Upanishads. A world culture which blossoms out of an understanding and practice of the ideals of the Upanishads will indeed be an advancement in the right direction. By combining thus the sciences of the outer nature and the sciences of inner nature the future world would well be on its evolutionary path of "total fulfilment."

THE CULTURE OF SANSKRIT

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I

As the essential features of the culture of any people, namely, the fine arts, philosophy, etc., are preserved in the literature of their language, so the quintessence of arts and sciences of India are contained in the literature of Sanskrit. More particularly, the philosophy of life it embodies is in itself an everlasting cultural message to the world.

Sanskrit signifies at once the language, literature and culture of this country and the synthetic nature of all these, too. It is a language of refinement and perfection, and none of the major languages in the world bear such a significant name. It is for this reason that it is extolled as the language of gods, besides the fact that the Vedic deals with gods. Secondly, it means a literature treating of all branches of knowledge and human achievements. Finally, it signifies the culture of the Indian way of life of *pratibhā*,¹ fertile talent. Sanskrit and Bhāratah are thus synonymous.

To our pleasant surprise, the words Sanskrit and culture have the same derivational significance. Kālidāsa says that a man of refined speech is holy; the holy is adorned and adored :

संस्कारवत्येव गिरा मनीषी तया स पूतश्च विभूषितश्च Kumārasambhava, I-28

This statement is in accordance with the etymology of the word *samskr̥ta* offered by grammar :

संपरिभ्यां करोतौ भूषणे (इति सुट्) Pāṇini, VI-I-137

Similarly, 'culture' is derived from Latin 'colere' meaning adoration; and Mathew Arnold observes, "But what is greatness?—culture makes us ask. Greatness is a spiritual condition worthy to excite love, interest and admiration." E.T. Campagnac: *Prose Selections from Mathew Arnold*. p. 48)

Spirituality is the key note of India's culture in all its spheres. It consists in the realization and expression of the Self or spirit—the most significant contribution of which is the Vedānta philosophy as a way of life. It describes the Self or Spirit as delight and truth, sweetness and light (*sat-cit-ānanda*). Apart from containing all aspects of culture such as philosophy, the Sanskrit literature in its poetic form proper has for its end the delight of the Self.²

It is this literary aspect of the culture of Sanskrit that is discussed in this paper, as *pratibhā*.

Sanskrit critics like Jagannātha have identified the *rasāsvāda* (aesthetic delight) with the delight of Spirit³. This proves that the poetic activity in its purpose is spiritual. This aspect of Sanskrit poetry has of course been exhaustively discussed in the *Alankāra-śāstra*. It is attempted here to show that Sanskrit poetry is also spiritual in its origin. That is to say, the conditions of poetic creation are largely occasioned by spiritual atmosphere personally and environmentally as for example in the case of master poets like Vālmiki.

II

The art of composition as the form of poetry requires culture in literature; and imagination supplies the content. In Sanskrit *vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa* indicate the former and *pratibhā* means the latter. Among the Sanskrit poeticians Bhāmaha and Vāghbhata represent those who lay emphasis on *pratibhā* as the primary condition of poetic creation:

काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित् प्रतिभावतः ।

Bhāmaha's *Kāvyāṅkārā*, I-5

प्रतिभाकारणं तस्य व्युत्पत्तिस्तु विभूषणम् ।

Vāghbhatāṅkārā, I-3

Rudraṭa⁴ and writers like Kṣemendra who wrote manuals for the guidance of poets did so with the view that by mere *vyutpatti* aided by *abhyāsa* poetic activity can be cultivated. With Dandin all these are necessary :

नैसर्गिकीच प्रतिभा श्रुतं च बहुनिर्मलम् ।

अमन्दश्चाभियोगोऽस्याः कारणं काव्यसंपदः ॥

Kāvyādarśa, I-103

When Jagannātha says that all the three together are not the cause of poetry, *na tu trayam eva*⁵, he only means that a combination of all

these is not indispensable, and there are exceptional cases in which either of *pratibhā* or *vyutpatti* led to poetic activity. A logician that he is, he declares *pratibandhakābhāva* (absence of impediments) to be the condition universally acceptable.

The natural tendency of thought is to trace the ultimate cause of things until it becomes impossible to enquire any further; and this particularly is characteristic of Sanskrit thinkers right from the Upaniṣadic age when the nature of things was investigated into, till the ultimate reality was realized. Now *pratibhā*, etc., are given as the conditions of poetry, it is but reasonable to enquire as to what causes these conditions. That constant reading gives rise to *vyutpatti* is too evident. What remains for discussion is the *pratibhā*. *The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy* by Gopinath Kaviraj published in the volume V of the Annals of Bhandarkar Research Institute in 1924; and *Pratibhā as Sentence Meaning* by K.A. Subramania Aiyar published in the Vol. X of the All India Oriental Conference in 1940 respectively deal with the concept as understood in various systems of Indian philosophy and as interpreted in the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar. But it is here studied as an important factor bearing on poetic activity.

The word *pratibhā* does not occur in the Vedas. On the other hand we find *śakti*⁶ used in relation to *jñāna*. In the Upaniṣads⁷ *śakti* is clearly stated as the power of Iśvara, the cognates being *māyā*, etc. In the philosophical systems *śakti* is given the additional meaning of an independent category and especially of the word-function. In literature it means poetic imagination⁸, besides the word-function and is a synonym of *pratibhā*. In the epics⁹ different forms of the root *bhā* with the prefix *prati* are used in different senses like understanding, presence of mind, boldness and so on. Kālidāsa¹⁰ uses the verb *prati-bhāti* in the sense "to look like" and the word *pragalbha* in his poems indicate *pratibhā* in the sense of boldness etc. It is by the time of Bhāmaha that *Pratibhā* gathered its technical significance as a condition of poetic creation.¹¹ Vāmana¹² mentions concentration in addition to *pratibhāna* and his conception of *samādhi* as an *artha-guṇa* implies both vision and concentration, *artha-dṛṣṭi* and *avahita citta*; and that of *samāhita-alankāra* as *tat-sampatti* could also be taken to be a pointer to the objectifying capacity of poet's vision which is clearly expressed in the popular verse :

यथा स्मै रोचते विषयं तथेदं परिवर्तते ।

According to Ānandavardhana¹³ *pratibhā* is that through which the poet can multiply his theme to infinity and strike novelty even with an old motif; and it also covers up his shortcomings that are possibly due to lack of *vyutpatti*. Jagannātha paṇḍitarāja¹⁴ actually enquires into the

root cause of this *pratibhā*. He says that *adṛṣṭa* or unseen force in the form of the grace of a chosen deity or of a *mahāpuruṣa* causes poetic creation in some cases and in some others exceptional *vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa* give rise to *pratibhā* which he defines as command over the language and ideas suitable for poetry. सा च काव्य घटनानुकूल शब्दार्थोपस्थितिः. Also *vyutpatti* helps *pratibhā* in becoming full-blown (*pratibhā-vikāsa*). He is more logical when he says that there is no proof of *vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa* of previous birth in the form of *adṛṣṭa*. Further he speaks of *pratibhā* in general and *pratibhā* in particular. The former is the cause of poetic activity in general and the latter (*pratibhāgata vailakṣaṇya*) of a poetic work in particular. Coleridge also speaks of imagination in its primary and secondary manifestations. In its primary aspect it is a great ordering principle, creative: and a “repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite ‘I AM’”.¹⁵ In the secondary aspect it is the conscious use of this power. Jagannātha’s ideas of grace and *vyutpatti* as causes of *pratibhā* take us to the two fold effort in the poetry-making referred to in Kṣemendra’s *Kavikanṭhābharaṇa*, namely, *divya-prayatna* and *pauruṣa-prayatna*. The former is divine afflatus resulting from grace. Abhinavagupta describes it to be beyond the realm of empirical causality अपूर्वं यद्वस्तु प्रययति विना कारणकलापम् Divine grace is itself creative in nature, whatever is creative is poetic. God is described by the *Śruti* not as a *tārṛkika* and so on but as a poet, says Nilakaṇṭhadikṣita¹⁶. “Poetry is a kind of activity which can be engaged in by painters or philosophers or scientists and is not confined to those who employ metrical language, or even to those who employ language of any kind. Poetry in this sense brings the whole soul of man into activity.”¹⁷ Thus the culture of poetry is once again proved to be spiritual.

Just as the Creator is called poet, so is poet identified with the Creator. Both are poets, both are creators. Here is a verse equating the two Ādikavis :

आदिकवी चतुरास्यौ कमलज वल्मीकजौ वन्दे । लोकश्लोकविधात्रोर्ययोर्भिदा लेशमात्रेण ॥
(*Subhāṣitaratnabhāṇḍāgāra*, p. 36)

Insight and revelation (*Ikṣāṇa* and *darśana*) included in *pratibhā* or imagination and its condition, namely, grace (*prasāda* or *anugraha*) motivated by *kāruṇikatā* (kindness) are shared by both God and poet.¹⁸ Grace and imagination are the two great reconciling forces in the creations of both. Hence poetic activity is verily described by Nilakaṇṭha dikṣita as a better means of reaching God than all others :

अनायतप्राण मसंयताक्षमन्नह्यर्चयानिशनादिस्वेदम् ।
चित्रं महेशे निभूतं निधातुं सिद्धकवीनां कवितैवयोगः ॥

Śivalilārnava I

Ernest Lee Tuveson studies the relationship of imagination and grace in his book *The Imagination as Means of Grace* where he employs the word grace in the sense of reconciliation between man's spiritual needs and his desire to belong to a living universe of purpose and values, with a cosmos that appears alien, impersonal, remote and menacing (p. 97). The poetic *pratibhā*, when inspired by divine grace becomes a natural phenomenon. For events make such a poet of genius who is believed to belong to a separate psychobiological species. He is a Rṣi, mystic and his poem is prophetic.¹⁹ Vālmiki is such a poet. For his part he only did penance (tapas) and nothing more and divine grace spoke through him in the form of *Rāmāyaṇa*.²⁰ He never knew that he was going to make poetry and so make event. So much is for the *divya* or the supramental side of *pratibhā*, which might be more scientifically termed subliminal.

Vyutpatti is *pauruṣa-prayatna*. Its condition is diligent application of the mind. This *pauruṣa* aspect can be approached from many angles, chiefly from that of the poet-Reader-relationship. It is a well known fact that the reader when he reads a poem is in the same mental plane as that of its author in his experience of aesthetic enjoyment. Abhinavagupta's words²¹ are worth quoting in this connection :

सरस्वत्यास्तत्त्वं कविसहृदयाख्यं विजयते

It is one and the same principle of the goddess of Poetry that assumes the two forms of poet and aesthete. When this is true, it is also equally true that the poet when he creates a piece of art he is on the same plane as that of the reader. Again Abhinavagupta, observes on the aesthetic equipment of *sahṛdaya*.

येषांकाव्यानुशीलनाभ्यास वशात् विशदीभूते मनोमुकुटे

वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवन योग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः ।

Locana on Dhvanyāloka, I-I

The same are the conditions of *vyutpatti* of poet as well. Through withdrawal²² from the drudgery he creates for himself of a mental solitude in which his insight fathoms the depths of his own being—which should precede poetic creation.

"Poetry and silence", observes Radhakrishnan, "are the only adequate expressions to bring out the content of what you encounter in the moments of your highest insight." (Quoted from his speech in the International Literary Seminar, New Delhi, in connection with Tagore Centenary Celebrations, published in Contemporary Indian Literature, January 1962). This detachment and purification of mind (*viśadibhāva*) through literary culture (*kāvyaṇuśīlanābhyaśa*)—of course 'kāvya' is to

be taken in a wider sense with regard to the poet-and a complete assimilation of the poetic material (*tanmayābhavanā*) are shared by the poet in common with the reader. Only the task of creation and communication is additional for the author while the reader can confine himself merely to appreciation, and of course interpretation.

All this is within the reach of conscious effort, given the will to apply oneself.

Even in the *divya* aspect a great deal can be achieved with the willed effort. At least this is what we understand from the description of it as *prayatna* made by Kṣemendra. While the result, namely, grace is not in the hands of the aspirant of poetry, the means of worship is certainly within the reach of his conscious level. Once this condition of worship is genuinely satisfied, the result of grace is sure to follow. Thus even the so-called *divya-prayatna* falls within the boundaries of the *pauruṣa*. Sanskrit poets have demonstrated it through their literary activity. They have raised themselves to the status of Ṛṣis through the worship or *upāsana* of *Vāk* (speech) or any other divinity with *Vāk* as its primary force or essence. Poets and writers in other languages also are aware of the spiritual nature of language.²³ There are works like *Mystical Elements in the Metaphysical Poets*²⁴ by Itrat Husain and *Prayer and Poetry* by Henri Bremond who thinks that "it is the experience of the saint which makes a little less obscure the mystery of the experience of the poet." Similarly E. Underhill in his *Mysticism* says, "art is the link between appearance and reality." Also in the religious literatures of other lands Word or Speech is spoken of as eternally associated with God. Yet it is the Sanskrit poets that have experimented systematically this possibility; and they could confidently style themselves masters of Speech (*vaśya-vāk*.²⁵) Not only they showed to the world that poetic inspiration of highest order, in its every phase from origin to fruition, is within man's conscious effort, but that he can impart the same to others also, if he so wills. The great poet-philosopher Śaṅkara is said to have done this; Śrīharṣa refers to such a possibility in the *Naiṣadhiya-carita*.²⁶ Kālidāsa's stanza in the beginning of the *Raghuvamśa* proves that he owed his poetic vision to *upāsana*; and if the authorship of certain *stotras* ascribed to him is genuine, and there is no evidence to prove the contrary, we have an additional proof to this effect.

III

Generally *Vāk* is regarded as the divine power of God that is in all, *Ātmanaḥ Kalā*, in the literary tradition. But in the philosophical

tradition, especially of the Grammarians and the Tāntrikas it is identified with God Himself, which practice can be traced to the *Ṛg Veda* itself.²⁸ In the mysticism of Tantra the spiritual significance of linguistic sounds in their subtlest aspects is studied. Each letter of Sanskrit alphabet is attached with some significance of *mantra* (mystic formula). That the Veda is *śabda-pradhāna* only proves this fact. Sanskrit poets have made it an applied science through the practice of meditation and concentration on the divine potentiality of the language and thereby demonstrated the spiritual character of Sanskrit as a language,²⁹ literature and culture. Their message to the world is that the culture of *Pratibhā* is a universal possibility.³⁰

Footnotes

1. Lingayasūri's *Padavṛtti* on the *Amarakośa* III *nānārthavarga*, st. 81 (Vavilla Edn. with *Gurubalaprabodhika*):
p. 759 : सम्यक् क्रियते इति संस्कृतम्
p. 122 on the word *bhārati* बिभर्ति इति भारती
This signifies the comprehensive nature of Sanskrit literature.
The Culture and Art of India by Radhakamal Mukerjee, London, 1959; pp. 33 & 34 India is civilization, providing, as she does, many races and peoples of Asia outside her own boundaries with a common spiritual and moral basis of unity.
p. 37 Indian history is an illustration of the macrocosmic balance and rhythm of the human mind and forces of culture, which have again and again asserted supremacy and liberating power of universal and transcendental value over conflicts and discords and chequered course of Life.
2. *Foundations of Indian Culture* by Sri Aurobindo, New York, 1953, p. 4
Fundamentals of Indian Art by S.N. Dasgupta, Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavan, Bombay, p. 93. Art is not something external, but it is spiritual, identical with the formative and creative spirit of the inner intuition.
3. *Rasgangādhara*, Kāvya-mālā, 12, Bombay, 1939, p. 27
4. *Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetic* by S.K. De, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 75.
5. *Rasagangādhara*, p. 9

6. *R̥g Veda*, X-134-6 शक्तिं विभर्षि मन्तुमः,
7. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, य एकोऽवर्णो बहुधाशक्तियोगात् ।
IV-1. 9 and 10.
8. Also *Śakti* is identified with *camatkāra*—see *Comparative Aesthetic* by K.C. Pandey, vol. 1, 2nd Edn. p. 103 f
9. *Rāmāyaṇa*, I-1-15 सर्वशास्त्रार्थतत्त्वज्ञः स्मृतिमान् प्रनिभानवान्
Mahābhārata (as quoted in the *Sabdakalpadruma*, vol. III, p. 258-
XII-259-1) सूक्ष्मं साधु समुद्दिष्टं नियतं ब्रह्मलक्षणम् ।
प्रतिभा त्वस्ति मे काचित्तां ब्रूयमनुमानतः ॥
10. *Sākuntalam*, II-9.
Kumārasambhava, V-30
Raghuvamśa III-47 cf. *Amarakośa* प्रगल्भः प्रतिभान्विते ।
Māgha's conception of beauty reminds of the stanza defining
pratibhā,
प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेष शालिनी प्रतिभा
Śiśupālavadha, IV-17 क्षणे क्षणे यन्नवतामुपैति
तदेवरूपं रमणीयतायाः ॥
11. *Kāvyaśāstram*, I-5 काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित्प्रतिभावतः ॥
12. *Kāvyaśāstram sūtra and vṛtti*, III-2-6, IV-3-29
13. *Dhvanyāloka*, under III-6 अव्युत्पत्तिकृतो दोषः शक्त्या संश्रियते कवेः ।
IV-6 न काव्यार्थं विरामोऽस्ति यदि स्यात् प्रतिभागुणः ।
and under IV-7 वाल्मीकिव्यति रिक्तस्थ तत्तदानन्त्यमक्षयम् ॥
14. *Rasagangādhara*, pp. 9-11.
15. *Critical Approaches to Literature* by David Daiches, Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1967, p. 107
16. *Śivalīlārṇava*, Vanivilas, Srirangam, 1911, I-16. स्तोतुं प्रवृत्ता श्रुतिरीश्वरं
हि न शाब्दिकं प्राह न तार्किकं वा, ब्रूते तु तावत्कविरित्यभीक्ष्णं
17. *Critical Approaches to Literature*, p. 105
18. *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, IV-3-23
न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपः
I-2-5 स ऐक्षत

I-2-20 धातुः प्रसादात्

1-2-23 यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः

Raghuvamśa, XV-71 कविः कारुणिको वन्नं

10. ऋषिर्दर्शनात् ; तानृषिः कुरुते काव्यम्

In the *Uttararāmacaṛita* I-10, Bhavabhūti says

ऋषीणांपुनराद्यानां वाचमर्थोनुधावति ।

The Prophetic Element by Sir Mawrice Bowra, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 4

William Blake quoted,

Hear the voice of the Bard,

Who Present, Past, and Future sees;

20. *Dhvanyāloka*, IV-17

सरस्वत्येवैषा घटयति यथेष्टं भगवती

21. *Locana*, beginning st. 1.

The Poetic Pattern by R. Skelton, London, 1956 p. 27

Poetry is patterned life, and is often created by means of a sub-conscious recognition of a microcosmal form, a series of words dynamically related to one another, that reflect in their structure the poet's and the reader's sense of knowing, in one experience, something basic to the nature of all experience.

22. *The Life Divine*, New York, I edn, 1949.

Aurobindo observes on the conditions of poetry : So the poet forgets himself——and is for the moment only the inspired impersonal energy which works itself out in formation of word and rhythm; of all else he is oblivious.

23. *The Meaning of Meaning* by C.K. Ogden & I.A. Richards, London, 1956, p. 24

Walt Whitman quoted,

All words are spiritual, nothing is more spiritual than words.

य मेवैव वृणुते तेन लभ्यः

p. 27

In ancient Egypt precautions were taken to prevent the extinction of the Name-Soul. Pyramid texts mention a God called Khern, i. e., word.

Life of Christ by Fulton J. Sheen, Popular Library New York, 1960, p. 18 His person was the pre-existent word or logos. p. 44 Word signifies the wisdom or thought or the intelligence of God.

(30)

The Bible also identifies God and word, see John 1. 1, 3, 14.

Islam (Belief and Practices) by A. S. Tritton, Hutchinson University Library London 1966, p. 39

It (Koran) was the word of God. God without a word is unthinkable.

The Mystic Word 'OM' by Swami Prabhavananda in *Vedanta for The Western World*. London, describes the spiritual character of linguistic symbols in the Hindu Philosophy in the light of Western views.

The *Lalitāśahasranāma-stotra* and the like equate the devine Mother with Poetry, *kāvyaakalā*. st. 205

Usually God and His Śakti are respectively treated as the meaning and expression, the soul and body of language. See *Kathāsarit-sāgara*, introductory stanzas I-32

अतः शरीरभूतोसौ मम जातस्त्वदात्मना
यो हि नारायणः सा त्वं शक्तिः शक्ति मतो मम

The stem *Brahman* means both supreme Divinity and Vedic speech.

24. The following quotations from Bremond and Underhill are from this book (p. 33, 34)
25. Bhavabhūti's *Mahāvīracarita* I-4 वश्यवाचः कवेः काव्यम् ।

Uttararāmacarita I-2 यन्ब्रह्मणमियं देवी वाग्वश्यैवान्वर्तते ।

26. *Saundaryalahari* (Ganesh & Co., Madras, 1957) *Lakshmidharā* on St. 49 p: 281 भगवत्पादैः अनेङ्मूकेभ्यः लघुचर्चास्तोत्रद्वयं हस्तमस्तकसंयोगमहिम्ना अवाचि, etc.

Naiṣadhiyacarita, XIV-90

पुष्पैरभ्यर्च्यं गन्दाधिभिरपिसुभगैश्चारुहंसेनमाचैन्-
निर्यान्तीं मन्त्रमूर्तिं जपति मयि मतिन्त्यस्य मध्येवभक्तः ।
तत्प्राप्ते वत्सरान्ते शिरसि करमसौ यस्य कस्यापि धत्ते ।
सोऽपिश्लोकानकाण्डे रचयति रुचिरान् कौतुकं दृश्यमस्याः ॥

Uttararāmacarita, I-1

Imagination as Means of Grace, p. 151 ; Genius is described as the perfect realization of the Self which exists potentially within us all (as implied by Wordsworth).

28. Vākyapadiya, I-155 अनादि निधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं—

I-155 देवीवाक्

The *Tāntrika* viewpoint is found largely adopted in the *Stotra* literature. The tantra practices of other religions like Buddhism accept word symbols like 'EVAM' as representing everything, just as the Hindu's praṇava, 'OM'.

See *Yuganaddha* (by H. V. Guenther, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Studies. III p. 87 f)

Rg Veda, X-125-lff.

29. *Hindu Culture* by Guru Dutt, Hind Kitab Ltd., Bombay, 1951 p. 141

Hudson Maxim in his *The Science of Poetry and the Philosophy of Language* (New York, 1910), speaks of the Dynamics of human speech and scientific method of judging poetry (pp. xi, 3, and chapter VII).

30. A corollary of this fact is that the art-production, in its highest form as well as in its most fundamental, can be a conscious process; and even in the cases of divine afflatus and most natural creations of born poets there is the conscious or the logical mind working, which is ignored by writers like Croce.

See *Fundamentals of Indian Art* by Das gupta, p. 119

And the Culture of Sanskrit as cultivated by the greatest of Indian poets Vālmiki, Vyāsa, Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti holds out a new ray of hope for the aspirants of creative poetry. That inspired poetry of the order of the Vedas is not impossible even today is borne out by Maharshi Daivarāta's *Chhandodarsana* published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay.

SANSKRIT AND UNIVERSAL PERSONALITY

B.K. Shivaramaiah, M.A.,

I

It may be observed that the more man advances on the material plane, the more he recedes from his spiritual moorings. The overwhelming variety and diversity of the former tend to cut him off from the realization of an underlying unity which happens to be goal of the latter. Lack of such realization might result in 'a disintegrating individualism'¹ leading to an enfeebling of character and the consequent degeneration. Of course, man's efficiency on the creative side of the material plane gives him a distinctive personality, the essence of which lies in partial integration. But its fullness can be achieved only through sustained spiritual discipline. In that fullness of integration brought about by a realization of the essential unity of oneself with the entire universe lies the fact of a Universal Personality, much more effectively enshrined in Sanskrit than, perhaps, in any other language and literature of the world. It is worth-while considering a few of the means of attaining such a personality in the way the Sanskrit language gives them, with the help of its remarkably cultivated vocabulary and semantics.

II

The Rgveda contains the first and the foremost means in the form of *tapas* (penance). Among the references to *tapas* in the Rgveda, mention may be made of the following from the tenth *maṇḍala* :-

Those who through penance are unassailable
Those who through penance reached heaven

1. Will Durant; The Story of Philosophy (1954) p. 7

Those who performed penance of the highest order. ²

Sāyaṇa, the reputed Vedic commentator, while commenting on this, explains the word in terms of observance of rigorous austerities and performance of sacrifices of a very complex nature.³ It can be gathered by such references in the R̥gveda that penance formed the best means of self-realization.

Yāska, the celebrated ancient Indian etymologist, speaks of men who were the direct seers of Truth (*ṛṣis*); he also refers to lesser men who came later and who were incapable of that direct perception of Truth, but who, being preoccupied with oral instruction, compiled the Veda and Vedāṅga.⁴ Durga, Yāska's commentator, adds that the *ṛṣis* who realized Truth through *tapas* imparted it, by oral instruction, to their pupils, hence called the *Srutarṣis*.⁵ These references indicate that those ancient commentators were convinced of the fact that the penance of the first seers was of such nature as to bring to them an immediate vision of Truth. In other words, the means, namely *tapas* justified the end consisting of real and full integration of personality, universal in character. There is also, in the lines of

2. *tapasā ye anādhr̥ṣyāḥ—*
tapasā ye svaryayuh
tapo ye cakrire mahas—
tāmścidevāpi gacchatāt

— X. 154. 4

3. *ye janāstapasā kṛcchracāndrāyaṇadinā yuktaḥ anādhr̥ṣyāḥ papaira-*
pradhṛṣyā bhavati. ye ca tapasā yāgādīrūpeṇa sādhanena svaryayuh
svargam yānti prāpnuvanti. ye ca mahat mahatapo'nyairduṣkaraṇ
rājasūyāśvamedhādīkam hiranyagarbādyupāsanam vā cakrire
kurvanti eteṣu pravartante,

— on X. 154. 4

4. *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ ṛṣayo babhuvuḥ te'varebhyo'sākṣātkṛta—*
dharmabhyaḥ upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ. upadeśāya glāyanto—
avare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṁ grantham samāmnāsiṣurvedam vedāṅgāni ca.

- 5^{*} *sākṣātkṛto yairdharmaḥ sākṣād dṛṣṭaḥ prativisiṣṭena*
manasā ta ime sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ. ke punasta iti.
ucyate. ṛṣayaḥ 'ṛṣīdarśanāt' iti vakṣyati
(Nirukta. 2. 11) te ye sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaste—
avarebhyo'varakālīnebhyaḥ śaktihīnebhyaḥ śrutarṣi—
bhyaḥ teṣāṃ hi śrutvā paścādṛṣīvamupajāyate, na
yathā pūrveṣāṃ sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇāṃ śravaṇamantareṇaiva.

Durga referred to above, a hint at a state par excellence on the part of the *ṛṣis*, since those who came later are spoken of as lesser men who became *ṣrutarṣis* by oral instruction imparted to them by the former. Of course, according to these statements, the first seers were endowed with spiritual perfection, while later generations deteriorated in their mental power conducive to the attainment of such perfection. This chronological implication does not necessarily mean the cessation of the cultivation of a Universal Personality with the first seers themselves. It only signifies that later generations more and more digress from the 'ancient path', and could come back to it only after a good deal of striving along certain stipulated lines.

The Upaniṣads which form the last phase of Vedic revelation are chiefly concerned with the realization of Truth along both experimental and empirical lines. In their search for the Ultimate Reality, they hit upon not only the inner self of man (*Ātman*) and the ultimate source of the outer world (*Brahman*), but also arrived at a unitary conception of Ultimate Reality through identification of the outer Reality with the inner. This fusing of similar conceptions is expressed in great sayings like 'That thou art'. In such teachings of the Upaniṣads lies the idea of the essential unity of the individual soul with the cosmic soul. The Upaniṣads won't stop with a mere expression of such ideas or by inculcating an intellectual conviction about such unity—of course, they do both. They are also 'kindly lights' that actually lead one to the region of cosmic bliss, provided one undergoes a necessary course of discipline prescribed by them. That consists in the cultivation of detachment (*vairāgya*), and the acquisition of knowledge (*jñāna*). According to the Upaniṣads, detachment is a disinterested attitude towards the world resulting from the complete eradication of selfishness, and such detachment is induced by a long course of disciplinary training; removal, by means of right knowledge, of evil in the form of misconception of the nature of Reality could come only after the cultivation of detachment. The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*⁷ says, 'Having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring and collected, one should see the self in the self.' Acquisition of knowledge not only presupposes cultivation of detachment, but also involves further training consisting of study of

6. See Chāndogyopaniṣad, XVII
'*aittvamasī*'

7. *tasmādevamvicchānto dānta uparatastitikṣuḥ
samāhito bhutvātmanyevātmānam paśyati
sarvamātmānam paśyati*

Upaniṣads under a guru (*śravaṇa*), continued reflection upon what has been learnt, for the sake of intellectual conviction (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) which directly assists in the realization within oneself of the unity underlying the diversity of the universe. In fact, the Upaniṣads refer to this as actually perceiving⁸ *Ātman* or *Brahman*, the only reality. Therein lies the principle of a Universal Personality envisaged in the Upaniṣads. This conception of Universal Personality as laid down in the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads is always kept in view in India even to this day and further means consistent with changing times but always justifying the end are conceived of, experimented upon and adopted. Taking into consideration the enormous effort involved in the removal of the innumerable barriers to spiritual perfection, one need not wonder at the amazing diversity of means. Sanskrit could teach the gospel of Universal Personality as long as the several means are geared to it.

It may be noted that the conquest of individuation is a necessary condition of a Universal Personality. With the passing of time and growth of a material civilization, not only the area of individuation has become wider, but also the process of conquest itself has become complex and difficult. It is in this context, that one should realize the value of Sanskrit which all along has been and continues to be the repository of all aspects of this sovereign way of life.

After the Veda, the Bhagavadgita may be considered as a remarkable book setting forth the ideal of self-realization in the most effective manner. According to the Gita, this condition is brought about by self-conquest or subjective purification attained by Karma-yoga, in which all wordly desires are eliminated and the heart is cleansed. The Gita describes the man who has perfected himself⁹, as one who renounces all desires, whose mind is free from joys and sorrows, from passions, fear and anger, who feels no attachment to any thing, who can withdraw his senses from sense objects, who is even-poised in woe and weal and so on. The attitude here is predominantly one of *Jñāna* (enlightenment). It is the outcome of Karma-yoga (disinterested activity) which, as Prof. Hiriyanna observes "fulfils itself in enlightenment which enables one to

8. *Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*

Br. Up. II-4-5.

9. II. 55-58; XIV. 22.25.



see oneself in all beings and all beings in oneself"¹⁰. In such an ideal of self-realization, one can speak of the real development of a Universal Personality.

It is important to note that the Gita sets forth the ideal of God-realization also attainable through subserving the purposes of God, and passionate devotion to Him. Karma-yoga operates here also and 'finds its consummation when a loving communion is established with God'¹¹. The Gita gives a beautiful description of a direct perception of God by the devotee, in the eleventh chapter. This ideal of devotion, found in Vedic literature also, is more and more recognized as a means to spiritual perfection in the Gita and also in later literature.

Thus in the cultivation of a Universal Personality, the Gita vividly sets forth not only Karma-yoga leading to the "betterment of our spiritual nature", but also describes it as tending towards self-realization¹² and God-realization¹³ through knowledge and devotion respectively.

The several systems of Indian philosophy mostly contained in the Sanskrit language, generally aim at the inculcation of the ideal of self-realization, to be had here—"within the four corners of this life". One of the features of this ideal is the rooting out of selfishness. This means detachment, not of the world-renouncing type but self-renouncing. That attitude is characterized as 'positive asceticism' in as much as it goes hand in hand with altruistic activity, which is another feature of the Indian ideal. The pursuit of such activity is intended to so sharpen the sense of detachment as to make it culminate in total self-denial. This is, of course, characterized by disinterested activity which also involves strife and as such cannot be the ultimate ideal. On the other hand, the ideal is one of abiding 'peace of spirit' which presupposes the extinction of even the strife involved in the attitude resulting from disinterested activity and self-denial. Strife is bound to persist in the above-mentioned attitude since it involves a certain

10. Outlines of Indian Philosophy p. 127.

11. Ibid

12. *śreyān dravyamayādyajñādajñāyajñāḥ parantapa sarvaṁ karmākhilam pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate.* IV. 33.

13. *abhyāse'pyasamartho'si matkarmaparamo bhava madarthamapi karmāni kurvan siddhimavāpsyasi.*

amount of self-consciousness in the form of a notion of agency. Hence, it is laid down that one should rise above oneself completely; that is the third feature of this ideal. When this condition also is fulfilled, all strife vanishes, though activity may continue.¹⁴ The result is Supreme Joy. In this culmination of a sustained discipline lies such an ideal of practical life, in the form of the development of a Universal Personality, brought about by renunciation through service. That ideal state is recognized as *Jivamukti* in Indian Philosophy in the sense that the self is completely liberated from all strife. For one who attains it, the virtues like kindness imply no conscious effort whatsoever but form second nature with him.¹⁵ Such a man is fused with Universal Bliss.

In Indian tradition, there have been great seers and sages that achieved this ideal. Eminent poets like Kālidāsa have up-held it in their works through sublime characters and spiritually significant events. It is worth while noting Kālidāsa's conception of a Supreme God in terms of His solicitude for the welfare of all creatures and His self-denial, as given in the following lines :—

“May that lord who, though abiding in sole supremacy which yields manifold blessings to his devotee is himself clad in skin; who, though his body is united with that of his beloved, stands above ascetics whose minds are not affected by objects of sense; in whom there is no arrogance, though he supports the whole world with eight forms. May he remove your state of darkness (ignorance) so that you may behold the path of good”.¹⁶

Besides, for example, mention may be made of Duṣyanta and Kaṇva who are two characters taken from Kālidāsa's *Abhijñāna-śākuntala*, and who are depicted as selfless personages, ever intent on doing good and rendering service. The former, as King causes it to be proclaimed that whatever dearly loved kinsman any one of his subjects may lose, then he (Duṣyanta) would fill his place, sin excepted.¹⁷ In the same manner, the noble Kaṇva ‘watches over the

14. See Sankara's Comm. on Vedāntasūtra IV. 1. 15

15. Sureśvara; Naiṣkarmyasiddhi – IV. 69

16. Mālavikāgnimitra, I. 1

17. VI. 23

welfare of all about him and is, in particular the help of the helpless, as by the belief prevalent in the whole hermitage that he looks upon the heroine, who is an orphan thrown on his compassion, as his life's all (*jivita-sarvasva*)¹⁸.

III

Right from the *ṛsis* of the R̥gveda and the Upaniṣads with their penance, to some of the latest examples of saints and *siddhas*, this most ancient ideal of practical life, namely, of spontaneous self-realization, of a Universal Personality has been achieved, and its light could ever illumine the dark corridors of this mysterious Universe. Our gratefulness to the Sanskrit language that treasures this glorious tradition and to those benefactors to whom the whole Universe is their family, as stated in an ancient Sanskrit verse.¹⁹ Nothing can be more appropriate in the context of estimating the contribution of Sanskrit language and literature to the cultivation of a Universal Personality than to recall the words of the scholar-philosopher of Mysore, the late Prof. M. Hiriyanna who was himself a *jīvanmukta*. He writes that for us Indians, the value of Sanskrit "lies first and foremost in the fact that it enshrines our ancient ideal of life. It is not the philosophic portion alone that does so, but the whole of Sanskrit literature breathes the true spirit of it. The Epics and the Purāṇas are designed to point out to us its practical application by means of concrete cases which differ from one another in numerous ways. Even poetry and the drama do the same, although in keeping with their prime character as fine arts, they do it but indirectly and therefore perhaps also more effectively."²⁰

18. See Act I-words uttered by Śakuntala's two friends.

19. *ayaṃ nijāḥ paro veti gaṇanā laghucetasām
udāracaritānām tu vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam.*

20. Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy (1952) pp. 78-79

THE IMAGE OF MAN IN ANCIENT INDIAN LITERATURE

DR. VIDYA NIWAS MISRA

Civilization as a Western concept is essentially the culture of cities (Lewis Mumford, "Civilization is the art of living in cities"). The Greeks had an incorrigible interest in themselves as human. Their wish was always to understand themselves thus the extraordinary 'significance of their concept of the *polis*-the city state-which embraces all individual citizens and in reference to which the status of each individual was determined' (The Image of Man page 17).

Here a fixed measure *dike* preceded harmony. On the other hand harmony of mind, action and speech between not only man and man, but man and universe is the central point in early Vedic thought. It is not that *Rta* emanates from *Satya*, but both emanate from *tapas*-the primordial active energy. It is not an outward movement from plurality into the unity of a nation or into a single term of fixed borderlines, it is simultaneously an expansion from an intensive nucleus into vague unlimited forms of growth of indeterminate periphery-an inversion into the inner soul of existence. Urbanity was not the sole measure of civilization in India, but harmony was. Simultaneous co-existence of many worlds denies uniqueness or absolute value of any one of them, every appearance being just a facet of a crystal, none of them alone being able to give either a whole or a real picture. So we find an inherent interrelatedness than a necessary cause and effect relationship between Man and the Universe. As against *dike* there is notion of *Saumanasya*, oneness in thought in the Vedas—

"Enter here in good order, speak in good order, think in good order.

As the gods, before, in good order, gathered their gifts.

Let your discourse keep time, your judgements resolve.

As a soul, the thinker at one with his thought".

Rv. X. 191 (*Saumanasya Sūkta*)

Unlike Greek gods and their supplements-Vedic gods are the breaths, mind-born and mind-yoked, in them one sacrifices symbolically or metaphysically.

T. S. VI. 145

However, there is one common plane where Plato meets the Vedic seer---there is no real distinction of sacred from profane operations. The needs of body and the soul are satisfied together, 'But this should not be stretched too far. To the Greek his gods were his superiors' and his relation to his gods was *legal*, as such religious observation were like a civic duty. Zeus was the preceptor of moral laws (*themister*), as the purifier, as the guardian of both social and political order, where as Vedic gods are themselves coparceners in sacrifice, they stand on equal footing with the sacrificer "devo bhūtvā devam yajata" (One should offer to god after having become oneself the God), as they were the first sacrificers and their sacrificial act was a re-enactment of the primordial sacrifice of the *All Gods* (*Visvedevāh*). Gods are as much dependent on man as man on his gods whom he invokes through a creative process of word, *Vāk*, so that *Vāk*, the creative urge par excellence holds them together, Man and the Gods; Sacrifice is rejuvenation, a rebirth, a recreation as aptly described in "ātmānaṃ retobhūtaṃ śincati". (The sacrificer casts himself in the form of seed into the household fire.) It is within *Man* that the deity is hidden (*guhāyaṃ nihitam*). It has to be invoked by divine speech, a twofold process of self-emptying out (*Sa jāto atyaricyata*) and a process of reidentifying with the invoked God, in other words re-emerging as God.

Puruṣa Sūkta RV-X-90

When Gods made sacrifice, The Puruṣa their offering.

He was steeped in spring, kindled by summer, consumed by fall.

The Gods, performing that rite made Him their gift ; this was the personal accord.

Potent, They thus reached Heaven, the mansion of Sādhyas, of ancient Gods.

Vedic Gods are not anthropomorphic ; they are measured by the latent power of prayer, they are not fixed, they change with the new and the ancient Uṣas described as "navam, navam jāyamānā". They have both benign and terrifying aspects as has *Man*. But *Man* invokes *Light* as much as *Darkness*, the manifest as much as the unmanifest, the *Gauri* as well as the *Kali*. The Night hymn and the Araṇyāni hymn clearly bring out Vedic *Man*'s inner struggle against something which does not reveal itself and poses a challenge. Araṇyāni the presiding deity of the wood-land is invoked by the Vedic seer as the soothing spirit of the dark, *Araṇyāni*, "Araṇyāni, always shifting back and why do you turn away from the village. It could not be fear. Sweet with the scent of the dark, served without tilling the ground, Mother of all world things. 'Now I have sung you, Araṇyāni.'

The Night hymn invokes the radiant aspect of the dark, "Undying, filling up empty places, filling up heights and depths containing the dark with your (Night's) radiance". The Vedic Seer resolves this struggle in the famous *Nāsadiya Sūkta*. 'The creation hymn', where he transcends the possibilities of both Being and Non-Being in the beginning and even challenges the Highest Universal Being to come out and say, 'I know-

"Death was not there, could immortality be ?
No night, no day, no line between night and
day. One thing only breathed in the absence of
air. It breathed of Itself, there was nothing but
It so breathe."

For what matters is not really a rationalization of the order of *Being* and the Non-Being, but an awareness of freedom from both-which falls in the void created by their simultaneous exit. Santisa, a Siddha poet of the early medieval era echoes the same absolute awareness—

"Tell me to whom I should explain And precisely
in what manner when the real is neither true nor
false like the moon given back from water."

Kambalambarapada, another Siddha poet employs an apt figure to describe this filling process—

The gold and wholly filling Zero
Fills my boat of *Karuna*
There is no room on board for even
the silver flood of form.

The following stanzas from the creation hymn describe beautifully the involution of the Great Creator and knower into the redoubting man, thus shifting from one centre to the other without breaking the circle—

Who can say for sure that he knows how it come about.
And, even knowing, can put in rightly in words.
This darkness over creation, behind creation.
Surely the gods appeared after. But who had
Surely He knows this secret for He has contrived.
He controls it from Heaven. He the first thrust
of creation, who parted being and absence of Being-
Or may be He does not know what He's done or how.

Here I must remind you of one basic characteristic of Indian thought that Man does not stand at the top of his Universe, nor is the rest of existence subservient to him. There is not one apex, nor one centre. It is multi-centred and multi-apex Universe. It is interesting how this was carried out in many areas. It is often assumed that the development of perspective was a technical advance but it is now seen that this could have only been developed in an atmosphere where man sets himself against God. In perspective the centre of space passes directly through Man.' (Arnheim-Art and Visual Perspective) The Indian thought assumes an inherent correspondence of macrocosm and microcosm. 'Yonder world is in the likeness of this world, (anurūpa) this world in the likeness of that.' (Aitareya B-VIII-2). It is a multi-centred concept. This is further developed into the Tantric idea of "Yat pīṇde tat brahmāṇde yat brahmāṇde tat pīṇde. As such unlike Man in the West, Man in Indian Literature is simultaneously operating on two planes, the one that is situate in time and space and the other that transcends time through its projection in its progeny and transcends space through its identity with not only the Nature around but all the Beings-Sarvabhūteṣu yenaikam bhāvamavyayamīkṣate-become that one *becoming* which never exhausts itself and is simultaneously operating on all the Beings is the proper perspective or rather independence from perspective for *Man* trying to be the Universal Man. So time, particularly the divisible Time is a quasi-real dimension of Man in Indian Literature and is merely a model appearance of the creative process. According to Abhinavagupta, the main exponent of Indian aesthetics, Being is neither merely an atemporal visualization of itself nor an absolute separation from time and space, but is the realization of itself as a separate entity on one plane and the potentiality of being involved in time and space on the other¹. The Indian view does not reject history, it transcends it, and differs from the primitive cyclic notion of time in as much as it is not confined to a mere process of periodic abolition of the creation and of going back to the atemporal instant of the beginning and it differs from the Western preoccupation with the notion that life and reality are history and history alone human. In short, where as in Indian thought human existence is at the same time atemporal or timeless and temporal or placed in Time, in Western thought man is historically situated and in time or in other words the historical aspect of human existence is charged with significance for men, because human life is under the shadow of Time. This aspect of Indian thought becomes very much relevant particularly in the modern predicament confronted with the depersonated aspect

1. V. N. Misra—Time in Modern Hindi Poetry (Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of Orientalist).

1. Ibid.

of technology. Modern man has received the impression of losing his footing, of finding himself without support and has known a panic terror and 'believed himself to be sinking, making ship-wreck in the void¹. If a solution of this predicament is to be found, it is not in reassertion of freedom from the physical or the natural forces², this is likely to lead to further chaos and confusion for neither the pace of science can be stopped nor human mind can be restrained from searching new horizons and denial of this hard reality will take us no where ; this solution is to be found in a system of thought which can adjust itself to both intellectual as well as emotional needs, to growth of science and to furtherance of universal humanism, to infinite Time and to segmented Time and finally on the metaphysical plane to the macro-cosmos and to the micro-cosmos. Such a system of thought could only emanate from the Indian material. The Western thinker can find it hard to reconcile that Christ is the Son of God and at the same time a historical figure, he is the very personification of the fulfilment of a great historical purpose and he is the very cessation of history, but for an Indian thinker, it is a very simple matter, the Christ as Saviour is an atemporal reality and the Christ as an individual is a historical event more relevant to the recorder of facts than to mankind in general. Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are real as living reality, a reality which is ever-evolving, a reality which is happening within man (and not within a chosen people) and within Universe simultaneously and they are completely unreal as historical events, as historical figures they are mere shadows and are no great concern of the people. The corresponding word for history, *itihāsa* means 'so it has been' and not 'so it was', for the 'so it was' aspect is neither relevant nor real, utmost it can be a reconstructed point in a continuum, but the 'so it has been' is relevant and real. This attitude towards history makes the Indian Society a tradition-bound but free society, free from inhibition of race³ (race declared as indeterminable and therefore irrelevant in a human context⁴), creed, nationality and subsequently historical obligations. Obligations there are, but they are to the Cosmic being at one end and to the immediate ancestors at the other, obligations to the seekers of Truth and to the dynamic aspects of the cosmic being intervening between the two .⁵

1. Jose Ortega Y Gasset-History as a system. pages, 182-183.
2. Ibid page 160.
3. For detailed discussion see 'Earliest Christianity' (The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East), page 205-214.
4. Mbh: Jātiratra mahāsarpa duṣparīksyeti me matih.
5. V.N. Misra: The Social aspect of the Bhakti Movement (Man kind Vol. X-2) page 27.

Man's preoccupation with Nārāyaṇa does not absolve him from his social obligations. To use a linguistic term Man as individual is an allo-element minimal *emic* element called *family*, the family expanding into a *grāma*, a term signifying an organic composition, at all levels, be it the level of social autonomous organisation or at the level of a musical composition. *Matanga* describes *grāma* as “yathā kuṭumbinah Sarva ekībhūta vasanti hi ! Sarvalokasya Sa grāmo yatra nityam vyavasthīti !!.

This concept of family is based on the notion of *Śapiṇḍatā*, of sharing a common piṇḍa which is food at the physical plane and *jīva* at the metaphysical one. The concept of four fold obligations; obligation to ancestors (the enumeration does not go beyond 3 preceding generations) to be fulfilled through the life of a householder with a view to take forward the tradition of the family; obligation to seers through a life devoted to intellectual pursuit of knowledge; obligation to gods through a life withdrawn into oneself and finally obligation to the All Beings (Men included of course) through a life emptying itself out for the fulfilment of the void life around, a life pulsating with All-Breath rather than one's own. In four gradual stages of life this transition from a distinct home to no home is neither incongruous nor in contradiction with each other. In fact the feeling for home for the cosy and the warm health, for the Fire God-the embodiment of all that is manifest, concrete, intimate and human is the starting point for an ultimate culmination in a great reverence for the nebulous Universe, for the immeasurable infinite, for the great substratum of the seed of creation-the Cosmic waters-for the unseen *Vāk*, for the *Bindu*, the embodiment of abstraction, universalization and comprehension of the unknown. Lotus and swan, motif, in Indian art, fire and water in Hindu ritual, Nara and Nārāyaṇa in Indian Mythology and light and sound in Indian Sādhana are representations of this interweaving of seemingly two extreme ends. There is no incongruity, because it is not *Nara* man alone who is dependent on *Nārāyaṇa*. *Nārāyaṇa* himself has to descend as *Man* in order to fulfill his obligation to man in his service (vide Bhāṅawata X) If light has to establish its significance, it has to make its target one, who is groping in the dark. for light—

Light bolted darkness down
and put out
the visible world.
Alone inside
I groped in the light
and it struck me then
O Lord
I was Thy target
Thy quarry.

(Allama, Tr. Rāmānujām)

The medieval Bhakti movement starting from the South and permeating the entire northern India in a course of two centuries deified the human body, a body coveted by the gods because through it alone can a human relationship be established between man and the Universal being. So that the entire concept of body as a product of original sin is wiped out by a total involvement of man to the limit of offering his vilest and darkest corner of the mind to Him, so that he cannot refuse this offer and—

When space herself goes naked
Where is the apparel
to cover the cosmic shame?
When the salt of the earth
Thy own, my Lord,
take the taints of the world
where is corruptions adequate image?
(Allama).

This was certainly a big leap from the image of Puruṣottama, the Dhīrodātta hero, the hero whom even the Gods feared (Kasya bibhyati devāsca jātaroṣasya saṃyuge) but is not basically opposed to that, because even the earlier image of epic hero, whom even the gods feared, not because of his physical valour, but because of his overpowering compassion. The highest virtue according to *Yudhiṣṭhira*, the *Mahābhārata* hero is āṇṣansya (Compassion for all, foe and friend alike). It is a leap forward in the sense that it impregnates the lowliest of the lowly with the seed of the greatness of the great, it transcends hierarchies of caste, class, creed, age and personal achievements other than realization of this sublime truth that final emancipation for oneself has no meaning at all, if you cannot of your own accord choose to dispel the darkness enveloping the entire beings around you. The ideal of the *Saint* is beautifully summed up in these lines—

To us all towns are one, all men our kin. Life's good comes not from other's gift, nor ill Man's pains and pain's relief are from within. Death is no new thing; nor do our bosoms thrill when joyous life seems like a luscious draught; when grieved, we patiently suffer; we deem this much praised life of ours a fragile raft borne down the waters of some mountain stream, that our huge boulders roaring seek the plain.

(Puranānūru).

This search for the *plain* becomes the cherishable ideal of the medieval literature, which of course was to a great deal inspired by the Dravidian sources.

This search for *plains* is not a negative ideal, it is simultaneously a search for joy in common day to day life. No part of the day is dull, no activity is despicable, no *pain* unbearable and no moment unenjoyable, because every thing becomes surcharged with a deeper significance—living for All life. The so-called secular poetry or the folk poetry of the earlier centuries is rechannelised to depict the different aspects of divine-love. On the same stage are enacted two dramas, the characters change, but not the parts, there is the *nara-līlā*, the voluntary sporting of the universal Being in Man on one plane and there is the *Nārāyaṇa-bhāva*, the becoming of Man as the Universal Being on the other. The Greek concept of man was that of a subservient to Nature, man standing in a partnership relationship with nature, but nevertheless seeking glorification in a defiance of this relationship and that was Greek humanism. The pre-renaissance concept of man is that of a care-taker for God and thus imposes a grave responsibility on man, who seeks strength in bearing this burden and inflicts on himself the misery of the ignorant sinning human race. The renaissance made man the promised master of the World. But throughout this development in the concept of humanism, man remains the fixed centre and that is why to a Westerner the medieval Bhakti movement appears to be non-humanistic movement, because it seeks emptying out of man and filling of the vacancy by an over-powering and yet very soothing light as shown in the character of Bharata by Tulsīdās—

‘Day by day his body grew thinner and his vigour and strength declined, but his face lost none of its beauty. Ever renewed was his resolute vow of devotion to Rāma the tree of his righteous life sent forth fresh shoots and his soul knew no dark despair. As water falls low, when the autumn sky is bright, but the reeds and glad and the lotuses blossom forth, so in the clear sky of Bharata’s heart shone forth the stars of continence and self control, restraint, austerity and fasting. His confidence was like the Pole star, the period of Rāma’s absence the full moon, the remembrance of lord the brilliant milky way; his love for Rāma was like the moon, unmoved and spotless, ever shining clear and bright amid a galaxy of stars (Mānasa, Ayodhyākhaṇḍa).

Indian or rather Bhakti humanism surcharged with the Universal Being operates simultaneously on two levels as rightly observed by Zahner (Hinduism, page, 191).

Mokṣa or *freedom* is both individual and universal, it is the fruition of the *dharma* of every man, through the sacrifice of that very *dharma*, in the *dharma* of the community, and through the community in the *dharma* of all the whole created world and this leads to perfect *liberation* and freedom of the spirit (as well as of body) in which Man pours himself unstintingly into the one ocean of Truth, which is at once both the One and the All.

In the other words this concept is non-human only so far as it is not confined to an individual or to a particular defined group of individuals and so far as it refuses to succumb to the hopelessness of being bound to historical obligations and without rejecting both the individual or the collective group transcends them. This is something which is yearned by the modern man. Karl Jaspers in his 'Man in the Modern Age' sets forth this yearning.

But what is requisite is that a man in conjunction with other man, should merge himself in the world as a historically concrete entity, so that, amid the universal homelessness, he may win for himself a new home. His remoteness from the world sets him free to immerse his being. This remoteness is not achievable by an intellectual abstraction but only through a simultaneous getting into touch with all reality.'

The following few lines from Basavanna, a medieval saint poet from Karnataka, would bring the anguish and the undaunted optimism of Man—

Like a harlot's son
I scan the face of every man
for signs of fatherhood.
Father, show Thyself.

How much relevance this anguish and this optimism have in the modern predicament of Man, is a point to be restudied.

SANSKRIT LITERATURE AND WORLD PEACE

JATIN PANDYA (M.A.)

Ours is an age of Science and Technology. Man has landed on the moon and begun to bite its face which once inspired the hearts of the poets all over the world as a thing of beauty and joy for ever. It has now become an object of tests and experiments. In this vast explosion of knowledge, the classical languages like Sanskrit have been neglected as useless for life in the new age. Sanskrit is termed a dead language. It is thought that studies in classical languages and literature is out of date and has no value and utility in modern times. Consequently, there are growing complaints from the discerning about the declining interest in the studies of Sanskrit literature and thought.

These are not recent complaints. Twenty three years back, in 1948-49, the University Education Commission regretted the fact that the importance of the study of classics in our languages has not been sufficiently realised.¹ The Sanskrit Commission in 1956-57, in its report notes the deteriorating position of Sanskrit learning, both in the traditional style as well as in the schools and Universities.²

During the last few years the number of students opting for Sanskrit at the secondary schools and universities has fallen so rapidly that Sanskrit departments have begun to be closed in colleges one after another. Sanskrit teachers are being relieved in the name of economy. Apart from the question of unemployment facing Sanskrit—scholars the greater danger of the very tradition and continuity of Sanskrit study being cut off, looms large over the horizon. The bulletin No. 1 of the international Sanskrit Conference also states, “it has been observed recently that owing to marked increase in the subjects of modern knowledge the classics have begun to decline and the younger generation is unfortunately losing the benefits of a branch of study, which has great formative force.”³

This attraction towards the modern subjects and branches of knowledge is due to their utilitarian value. On the same ground, many of the modern educationists sitting in the Government departments as well as those actually working in the field of education i.e.

teachers in schools and colleges or universities are committing the fallacy of discounting the valuable treasure of classics in the name of science and scientific age. But, if unquestioned acceptance of everything old is superstition the unexamined discarding of the same is arrogance which according to Tulsi - the great Hindi Poet — is the root of all evil⁴ and therefore of fall. The real scientific attitude is to examine everything that comes by, accept what stands the test, discard what fails it and march forward on the basis of and making use of all proved data. सन्तः परीक्ष्यान्यतरद् भजन्ते ।⁵

The educationists had been lured away by the fallacious argument of quick dividends. Let us not forget that even in applied sciences dividends are earned after a long period of patient research and experiments. If the exploration of the moon's surface is justifiable the study of classics is more so. Conquests of the summits of the Himalayas, under-water search of oil, sending rockets to Mars and taking its photographs and hundreds of other research projects in the laboratories world over are certainly not trading in quick dividends.

The knowledge that man has acquired today is the result of his long struggle for existence and survival. It is a long story of trials and errors, and accumulated experience. During the long history of the march of mankind, there were several periods of glorious achievements and progress in all walks of life and also periods of dismal failures. A continuous narration of this fascinating story for the last twenty five centuries and more are recorded in Sanskrit literature. The great minds in the past have narrated their experience and experiments for the benefit of future generations, but the tragedy is that men and women of the present generation refuse to avail themselves of the wisdom of their forefathers. In India this anomaly becomes more glaring when viewed in context of the fact that several foreign universities have begun to take increasing interest in this very subject. If, as the Sanskrit Commission says, "the present is after all a continuation of the past"⁶ the future is the continuation of the-present and as such in India, the study of Sanskrit must be admitted as a supreme necessity.

Even from the utilitarian point of view there are a number of subjects in Ethics and Psychology, in Mathematics and Astronomy, in Medicine and Eschatology to which the ancient lore can contribute greatly. Such fascinating topics as Kāyotsarga, Psycho-anesthetics and Psycho-theraphy of Yoga, cures by Prāṇāyāma, ethics of economics and high finance invite students and scholars for study. The Sanskrit Commission in its report has also established the importance and usefulness of Sanskrit studies in different branches of knowledge even in modern context⁷. The treasury of the past experiences, experiments

teachings and knowledge serves us as the guiding light-house for the solution of our present problems and future progress. I have chosen to discuss in this paper the most vital and pressing problem facing the world today-the problem of peace, and what Sanskrit literature has to offer us by way of aid to its solution.

It is a strange paradox that in search of survival and self-existence man has developed some branchess of knowledge leading to just its opposite, namely, the over-all destruction of the human race. Let us first analyse the causes of war. Briefly they are : (1) Personal ambitions and arrogance, (2) racial pride due to the sense of superiority either in religion and culture or strength or prosperity and (3) economic necessity and commercial interest. This is a gradual development of the same tendency of efforts at survival and progress at the cost of others. This tendency creates conflicts between classes as well as peoples resulting into wars. As a result the world had to witness such wars as the invasions of Alexander, the Crusades, Napoleonic wars and so on. At the top of all we have witnessed two world wars in the first half of this century-the same period when the scientific and technological progress was fastest in the history of mankind. This progress has accelerated in the post-war period and is in the highest gear today. But the result ? Is peace any way nearer ? Instead, mankind lives in the danger of the third world war breaking out any moment and it would be certainly more disastrous than those two. Large-scaled destructive preparations now challenge mankind to solve the vital problem of survival-a point from where it started originally.

The people of different nations have already realised the supreme necessity of peace. At the end of the first world war, the League of Nations came into existence to serve this very purpose, but it failed and the second world war broke out within twenty years in 1939. Another effort for peace was made at the end of the second world war. UNO is the material monument of this effort. But even after twenty five years we are not any the nearer to the solution of the problem. Wars on small scales are still going on in different parts of the world. Western politicians have elaborated the theory of balance of power which grants at the best an uneasy peace. Slightest change disturbs the balance and the diplomacy starts anew to win the race of power which leads to conflict. Communist ideology seeks the remedy in economic and social equality but as it is based on class conflict it also fails to solve the problem, If the modern age has nothing better to offer for the establishment of peace on our planet than unending wrangles at UNO, stalemate on talks on desarmaments and 260 times more destructive bombs than that dropped on Hiroshima, we should be more humble and be willing to listen the words of wisdom of other ages. The great thinkers of India have throughout the ages thought in terms of peace and so can teach us much

in this matter. From the times of the Vedas, India has actively searched for peace. The Yajurveda, for example says :

द्यौः शान्तिरन्तरिक्षं शान्तिः पृथिवी शान्तिरापः शान्तिरोषधयः शान्तिः ।
वनस्पतयः शान्तिर्विश्वेदेवाः शान्तिर्ब्रह्मा शान्तिः सर्वं शान्तिः शान्तिरेव शान्तिः सा
मा शान्तिरेधि ॥⁸

At the end of every religious service there is the recital of śāntipāṭha wishing peace and prosperity for all.

At the root of the causes of war enumerated above, there is always a feeling of 'otherness'. When one thinks oneself different from another person or community—Ahaṁkāra—Ego and vijigīṣā—Ambition to conquer the rest out of superiority complex or Bhaya—fear and—Vyapadeśa Strategems along with the falsehood and hypocrisy due to inferiority complex instigate mankind to increase and to show strength and power leading to war. The first necessity to prevent war is, therefore, to abolish the sense of otherness between man and man.

It is only in Sanskrit literature that we hear the first loud proclamation of the basic unity of man, albeit the whole creation. The Vedānta has provided this basic ideology of oneness. ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः ।⁹ Realisation of the fundamental oneness of all animate and inanimate objects completely changes the outlook of the People. 'एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ।¹⁰' Says Kāthopaniṣad, giving illustrations of Agni—Fire,—Vāyu—air, and Sūrya—the Sun and concludes,

एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा
एकं रूपं बहुधा यः करोति ।
तमात्मसंस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरा-
स्तेषां सुखं शाश्वतं नेतरेषां ॥¹¹

If all of us are the manifestations of a single entity there is no basis for any quarrel. For the question is. 'कः केन युज्येत ।¹² We all have to think in collective terms for peace, progress and prosperity. Unfortunately, overpowered by—Māyā—illusion or cosmic ignorance, we overemphasise outward diversity of the objects of the world and ignore their ultimate unity with the result that the world seems to us to be a complex mass of objects of opposite characteristics like light and darkness.¹³ But realisation of अहं ब्रह्मास्मि ।¹⁴ and तत्त्वमसि ।¹⁵ ends the sense of distinction of 'I, and 'you' and thereby all and hence promotes better chances for cessation of all conflicts. Svetāśvataropaniṣad says :

एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः

सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा । 16

and that only those who can see this unity can attain lasting happiness.

एको वशी निष्क्रियाणां बहूना-

मेकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति ।

तमात्मसंस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरा-

स्तेषां सुखं शाश्वतं नेतरेषाम् । 17

And so he who sees himself in all the objects and all the objects in him does not feel disgust or enmity towards anybody or anything. After realising this unity there cannot be any delusion or grief. This is clearly stated by Isāvāsyaopaniṣad in the following words.

यस्तु सर्वाणि भूतानि आत्मन्येवानुपश्यन्ति ।

सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं ततो न विजुगुप्सते । 18

यस्मिन्सर्वाणि भूतानि आत्मैवाभूद् विजानतः ।

तत्र को मोहः कः शोकः एकत्वमनुपश्यतः । 19

The fruit of the realisation of the fundamental unity is thus clearly mentioned in the Upaniṣads themselves. We have to sow the seed of this basic ideology in the human society at large to promote eternal peace and happiness. All our effort to establish peace must be based on this sense of ultimate unity and not on the apparent dualism. Then we shall definitely achieve real world peace.

We cannot discard this philosophy of ultimate unity as mere idealism without any sound base of reality. Yājñavalkya was a thorough realist. In his spiritual sermon to his wife Maitreyī, the first lesson he gives is,

“ न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति । न वा अरे जायार्ये (याः?) कामाय जाया प्रियाभवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति ; -0

Husband is not dear for the sake of husband but he is dear (to wife) for her own self only. And so the wife is not dear (to the husband) for herself, she is dear for his own self only. So is the case with the sons, wealth, animals, Brāhmanas, the Kṣatriyas, the world's deities, knowledge objects and everything. But he does not stop in the way. With sound logic he deduces the pragmatic utility of a thorough study of this Ātman.

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।²¹ with the result that आत्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञात इदं सर्वं विदितम् ।²² We love and hate the objects of the world not for the sake of those objects, but for our ownself. Naturally, therefore, one should realise this 'self', and by knowing 'self' everything becomes known.

This self can be contracted and expanded to any extent, Yājñavalkya further explained this to Maitreyī in the following words: ब्रह्म तं परादाद् योऽन्यत्रात्मनो ब्रह्म वेद, क्षत्रं तं परादाद् योऽन्यत्रात्मनः क्षत्रं वेद, लोकास्तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो लोकान् वेद, देवास्तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो देवान् वेद, वेदास्तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो वेदान् वेद, भूतानि तं परादुर्योऽन्यत्रात्मनो भूतानि वेद, सर्वं तं परादाद् योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद ।²³

If we think ourselves different from anything else the latter also treats us in the same way. If we identify ourselves with the other things the latter have no other way than to identify themselves with us. One generally identifies oneself with one's body only. But there are occasions when one puts aside, nay, forgets this narrow identification and becomes ready to sacrifice this narrow-self for the sake of another fellow, family, locality, co-workers, society, nation and so on. Hence this self is also described thus, in Chhāndogyaopaniṣad. एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदयेऽणीयान्नीहेर्वा यवाद्वा सर्पपाद्वा श्यामाकाद्वा श्यामाकतण्डुलाद्वैप म आत्मान्तर्हृदये ज्यायान्पृथिव्या ज्यायानन्तरिक्षाज्ज्यायादिवो ज्यायानेभ्यो लोकेभ्यः ।²⁴ 'Svetāśvataropaniṣad describes it as follows:

अणोरणीयान्महतो महीया-

नात्मा गुह्यायां निहितोऽस्य जन्तोः ।²⁵

and Isāvāsyopaniṣad says:

तदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य

तदु सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः ।²⁶

So self can be contracted to one's body or its smallest molecule and be expanded beyond the universe as it is described in Puruṣa Sūkta as follows :

स भूमिं विश्वतो वृत्वात्यतिष्ठद् दशाङ्गुलम् ॥²⁷

So let us realise first that इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा ।²⁸

Inspite of our day to day experience of diversity and that of being other from the rest, there are many occasions when we feel a sense of

unity with equal force. Apart from the high spiritual point of view, we can illustrate this even by coming down to a lower category of most common experience. A Cricket team of one country wins a test match with another country and all the compatriots of the winning team feel as if they have won the game. Or again, when Mr. Neil Armstrong, an American, wholly unknown to the outside world puts his first step on the moon, the whole mankind takes pride as if they themselves have reached the moon. Out of these two contradictory experiences—one that of unity and the other that of diversity—we have to find out which one is true and which is delusion. The theory of evolution put forward by Mr. Darwin also points towards the ultimate unity of all creation. The scientific researches also take us nearer to the Principle of unity and the field of diversity is getting narrower and narrower. Indian thinkers, then rightly visualised the fundamental unity of all and this realisation has immense psychological force to establish real world peace.

We have evidence of the history that whenever man at the helm has experienced this *Ātmaupamyabhāva*, peace prevails in society. After a highly destructive war in Kalinga, Aśoka realised the futility of war and was converted to Buddhism. He eschewed war and instead of armies he sent peace missionaries to different countries. There are many episodes in Sanskrit Paurāṇika literature of men of peace, non-violently fighting the forces of evil e.g. that of Vasiṣṭha, Viśvāmitra. Mahātma Gandhi also fought his battles of independence non-violently. Such persons acquire the strength from the realisation of this ultimate unity.

But the idea of unity and peace is not given to man ready-made. He has to work for it, cultivate it. Both individual and society have to be trained in it. Gandhiji also emphasised this need of training. In this connection Mr. Grage has pointed out in his “power of non-violence” that strenuous and expensive training is necessary for fighting violent battles. Big armies have to be raised and maintained and constantly kept trimmed at a huge cost; while training for nonviolence is comparatively easier and cheaper. But mere talk does not help much. We have to sort out the Practical measures of this training and its form. Here again the utility of the study of Sanskrit literature is manifested. To instruct us in the discipline necessary for the realisation of the idea of unity we have the system of Yoga. Those who went under the discipline of Yoga found it so effective that all the systems of Indian thought—Brāhmanical, Bauddha and Jaina—forgetting their schisms have adopted it for their goal of self realisation. Yoga has stood the test of modern logic also and the great Indian thinkers like Ramakrishna Paramahansa and Swami Vivekananda, Maharshi Aurobindo, Swami Yogananda and Swami Shivananda have preached it in one form or another. Many westerners like Maxmüller, Oldenburg and Evans Wentz also have spoken approvingly of it.

The Chief aim of Yoga is the realisation of the highest truth, as Vācaspati, the famous commentator on Yogasūtrabhāṣya of Vyāsa says, सत्यं व्युत्पाद्यमानतया योगः प्रस्तुतः ।²⁹ For this realisation Yoga lays down in details the process to control the mind. Patañjali, defines योग as चित्तवृत्ति निरोधः ।³⁰ If it is true that all wars have their beginning in the minds of men, the study of a science which teaches the method of controlling the mind is necessary to prevent wars. We have already noted two useful ideas contributed by the Vedānta—namely the fundamental unity of all creation and the flexibility of 'self'. Now Yoga tells us that there are Avidyādi Kleśāḥ³¹ and different Cittavikṣepāḥ³² which raise obstacles in realisation of the fundamental truth of 'self'. Yoga's great contribution which is shared by the Buddhists and the Jinas as well, is that 'Samyak Jnana' is possible only on the destruction of all these impurities. Different schools lay stress on different impurities, but all accept this cardinal principle that impurities of the mind vitiate judgement and obstruct the realisation of truth. The Yoga lays down and elaborates a discipline for the removal of these impurities.

In Yoga sūtra, Patañjali asserts, योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिरा विवेकख्यातेः ।³³ i.e. by practising different Aṅgas of Yoga impurities are washed away and right knowledge is manifested. There are eight Yogāṅgas यम नियमासन प्राणायाम प्रत्याहार धारणा ध्यान समाधयोऽष्टाङ्गानि ॥³⁴ the first of which is Yamah. That is अहिंसा सत्यास्तेय ब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहः ।³⁵ It is interesting to note that these very controls are necessary for the establishment of peace, for contraries to these which are known as वितर्काः हिंसादयः ।³⁶ give rise to five great reasons for wars—namely हिंसा, असत्य, स्तेय, काम and परिग्रह. Of all these five Hinsā—violence—as Bhojadeva Vṛtti on this sūtra says, is the cause of all evils. सा च सर्वानर्थ हेतुः ।

In the discussion that follows Patañjali teaches us several aids to peace which are elaborated by later Yogic schools, either Brahmanical or Buddhist or Jaina. A bare mention of only a few is possible in this short paper.

The five-fold self controls including Ahinsā to be effective have to be observed under all circumstances. जातिदेशकाल समयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्वभौमाः महाव्रतम् ॥³⁷ and Vācaspati explains it as सर्वथा परिपालनीयाः ।³⁸

Secondly, if an erroneous thought e.g. to commit Hinsā, arises one should concentrate on arguments to the contrary. वितर्कबाधने प्रतिपक्ष भावनम् ॥³⁹ This is finely depicted in the incident known as Pūrāṇa Parikṣā or the test of Pūrāṇa. There is another episode also about Lord

Buddha-how he prevented war between Sākya and Koliyas. It provides a beautiful illustration of concentrating on argument to the contrary. Shri Ananda Coomaraswamy in his "Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism" narrates it thus : "... there arose a dispute between the Sākya and the Koliyas regarding the water of river Rohini, which, because of a great drought, did not suffice that year to irrigate the fields on both the banks. The quarrel rose high, and matters came nearly to battle, when the Buddha proceeded to the place, and took his seat on the river bank. He enquired for what reason the princes of Sākya and Koliyas were assembled, and when he was informed that they were met together for battle, he enquired what was the point in dispute. The princes said that they did not know of a surety and they made enquiry of the Commander-in-chief, but he in turn knew not, and sought information from the regent; and so on the enquiry went until it reached the husbandsmen, who related the whole affair. "What then is the value of water?" said Buddha. "It is but little," said the princes, "And what of earth?" "That also is little," they said. "And what of princes?" It cannot be measured," they said. "Then would you", said the Buddha, "destroy that which is of the highest value for the sake of that which is little worth?" ...The princes now reflected, that by the interposition of Buddha much bloodshed had been avoided and that, had it not been so, none might have been left to report the matter to their wives and children".⁴⁰ Had Kaiser and Hitler been made aware beforehand, of the disastrous results of war for their own selves, their own countries and the world at large, they would have been deterred from starting the respective adventures.

Thirdly, it should be noted that by following Yoga one attains Samadarśana. Bhagvad Gītā defines Yoga as समत्वं योग उच्यते ।⁴¹ It also states:

सर्वं भूतस्यमात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि ।
ईक्षते योगयुक्तात्मा सर्वत्र समदर्शनः ॥⁴²

He thus attains Ātmaupamyabhāva, and never practises violence. Hemacandrācārya, a profound Jain scholar in his Yoga Śāstra says,

आत्मना सर्वभूतेषु सुखदुःखे प्रियाप्रिये ।
चिन्तयन्नात्मनोऽनिष्टां हि सामान्यस्य नाचरेत् ॥⁴³

Then again Yoga sūtra says, अहिंसाप्रतिष्ठायां तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः ।⁴⁴ By practising non-violence the very feeling of enmity is rooted out. The Bhāṣya Kāra Vyāsa adds सर्वप्राणिनां भवति ।⁴⁵ We have a vivid description of this effect of Vairatyāga in Kādambarī of Bāna Bhaṭṭa. In the desc-

ription of the hermitage of Sage Jābāli, we read, “अत्र हि शाश्वतिकमपह्राय विरोधमुपशान्तात्मानस्तिर्यञ्चोऽपि तपोवन वसतिमुखमनुभवन्ति । तथा हि—विशति शिखिनः कलापमातपाहूतो निःशंकमहिः । आपिबति कुरंगशावकः सिंहीस्तनम् ।¹⁶ By the practice of non-violence all fear is liquidated and by the cessation of sense of antagonism peace rules supreme. Hemacandrācārya says,

यो भूतेष्वभयं दद्याद्भूतेभ्यस्तस्य नो भयम् ;
यादृग्वितीर्यते दानं तादृगासाद्यते फलम् ॥¹⁷

Abhaya is the natural result of Ahinsā. Yoga teaches us to give others Abhaya and to have it from others there by. Out of fear, we increase our military strength and provoke others also to do so. Our approach is based on dualism. But the realisation of ultimate unity leads us towards Ahinsā and Abhaya. आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्न विभेति कदाचन .¹⁸ Gandhiji could go to Noakhali and Acharya Vinoba Bhave to Telangana because they were men of peace. The Gītā characterises such a man in the following words :

यस्मान्नोद्विजते लोकः लोकान्नोद्विजते च यः ।¹⁹

So Abhaya is also one of the important factors for the establishment of peace.

This is not a plea to start Yoga Gymnasiums round the world. Let there be no misunderstanding. I do not mean to say that peace is possible only if the whole mankind becomes philosophic. But it must be admitted that those who rise to the status of a sage must have a major voice in all affairs of life including politics. Plato wanted the philosophers to be rulers. But Sanskrit literature gives us a more practical idea of rulers guided by philosophers. Shri Arunda Cochraraswamy rightly states, “it is a positive social and moral advantage to the community that a certain number of its finest minds leading a life that may be called sheltered, should remain unattached to social activities and unbound by social ties. And notwithstanding that it is not the purpose of the hermit to establish order in the world, let us remember that the onlooker sees most of the game, it is not without reason that it has become an established tradition of the East that the ruler should be guided by the sage.”²⁰

The Vedānta and the Yoga ideologies are useful in training the individual, and the supremacy of such persons who have undergone such discipline is useful for training the society. Whenever this supremacy was accepted peace was established and maintained. This needs no argumentation as it is obvious from the Indian mythology and as well as history. We read in the Mahābhārata an episode in which Viśvāmitra,

the King, out of arrogance tried to fetch away by force the cow-
Kāmadhenu—Nandini of Vasiṣṭha, but he failed and realised :

धिग्वलं क्षत्रियवलं ब्रह्मतेजो बलं बलम् ।⁵¹

The word 'Gau' is used in the sense of 'land' also, and the significance of this episode is quite apparent—that people blessed with nonviolent leadership would be better able to cope with the aggressor.

The second idea useful for the society is Varnāśrama Dharma. In modern times, the concept of Varna is not much relevant. But Āśrama Dharmas are still as much useful as before. Kālidāsa describing the characteristics of Raghu dynasty says :

शैशवेऽभ्यस्त विद्यानां यौवने विषयैषिणाम् ।

वार्धके मुनिवृत्तीनां योगेनान्ते तनुत्यजाम् ॥ ५० ॥ रघूणामन्वयंवक्ष्ये ॥⁵²

There was a healthy tradition in the Raghu dynasty to go to forest for penance in the advanced age after handing over the throne to the eldest son. Because of this accepted tradition the father and the son never quarrelled for throne as they did in a similar renowned dynasty of Moghuls. Non-implication of ten years rule passed by the Bhavnagar session of the congress before general election of 1962 led to conflict and split in the organisation. The lesson is clear. The man at the helm should know when to retire gracefully from the post of power and position.

The next useful idea is that there is no evil as such. Kalpasūtra states in Dvītiya Bhāga, यथा शुभा अशुभा वा परिणामाः भवन्ति सा शक्तिरवश्य-
मेव षणीयैव ज्ञातव्या यथावान्मानां स्वाह्वपक्वान्नतया पाचने, अनकोपयोगि वस्तूनां भस्म
राशीकरणे च समर्था शक्तिरेकस्मादेवाग्नेः समुद्भवति तथा शुभाशुभ कर्तव्य परायणता
शक्तिरात्मन एकस्मादेवांशादुद्भवति । येषु पुनरात्मबलशौर्यादिकं भवति ते शुभेऽशुभे
वा पर्याये भवन्तु, एषणीया एव, सा शक्तिः नियतं प्राप्य यथेष्टं परिवर्तितुं शक्यते,
अतस्तत्र गमने लाभ एव ।⁵³

Applying this idea to human relations we realise :

न कश्चित्कस्यचिन्मित्रं न कश्चित्कस्यचिद्विपुः ।

व्यवहारेण मित्राणि जायन्ते रिपवस्तथा ॥⁵⁴

The politician must learn this alchemy of turning enemies to friends. Candragupta's minister Cāṇakya knew this alchemy well. He persuaded Rākṣasa, his prominent opponent to accept the ministership of Candra-

gupta. Viśākhadatta has described this in his famous play *Mudrārākṣasa* bringing out three useful characteristics—(1) appreciation of good qualities of the opponent, (2) minimum coercion and maximum persuasion and (3) everreadiness for cessation of conflict. The grudge that Viśvāmitra bore against Vasiṣṭha was similarly removed when he overheard Vasiṣṭha acclaiming his (i.e. Viśvāmitra's) penance as even more glorious than that of the light of the full moon. Writing about Gandhiji Mr. Clare and Mr. Harris Wolford mentioned in 'India Affair—When Mahatma Gandhi was held incommunicado and without trial as a world war II traitor to the British Empire, Jan Christian Smuts—the first man to jail Gandhi in South Africa visiting the last such man, Winston Churchill—the Prime Minister of England, told 'It is sheer nonsense to talk of Gandhi as a fifth columnist. He is one of the great men of the world and he is the last person to be placed in that category.'⁵⁵ Personal or communal enmity can be pacified by nobility of heart which is the test of real greatness. Hitopadeśa rightly states :

अयं निजः परो वेति गणना लघु चेतसाम् ।

उदारचरितानां तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् ॥⁵⁶

In this connection one more point remains to be thought about. When some war-mongers are out to destroy peace or the basic principles of society are involved, at times, battles become inevitable. How it should be faced ? Here the *Bhagavatgītā* comes to our help. It unequivocally declares that under the circumstances fighting becomes a duty-Dharma and should not be shirked—Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna.

अथ चेत्त्वमिमं धर्म्यं संग्रामं न करिष्यसि ।

ततः स्वधर्मं कीर्त्ति च हित्वा पापमवाप्स्यसि ॥⁵⁷

But this does not mean that the *Gītā* teaches violence. As Dr. S. Radhakrishnan writes in "Introductory Essay"—a preface to his book "The *Bhagavatgītā*", "when Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna to fight, it does not follow that he is supporting the validity of warfare. The ideal which the *Gītā* sets before us is 'Ahimsā' or non-violence and this is evident from the description of the perfect state of mind, speech and body in chapter VII, and of the mind of the devotee in chapter XII. Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna to fight without passion or ill-will, without anger or attachment ⁵⁸ युद्धं स्व विगतज्वरः .⁵⁹ For if we do not resist in such circumstances it is our spiritual defeat and it encourages the aggressor for further aggression. In our age, Mahatma Gandhi himself a staunch devotee of the *Gītā* successfully experimented with a new synthesis for meeting the evil by non-violent resistance. Dr. Radhakrishnan says, "we

have to act in the world as it is, while doing our best to improve it. We should not be defiled by disgust even when we are plunged in every kind of loss, bereavement and humiliation. If we act in the spirit of the Gītā with detachment and dedication, and have love even for our enemy, we will help to rid the world of wars.⁶⁰

On the whole, Sanskrit thinkers have always preached for peaceful co-existence. If under exceptional circumstances one is forced to raise arms one should bear in mind आर्तत्राणाय वः शस्त्रं न प्रहर्तुमनागसि ।⁶¹ Use of arms is for Dharmasansthāpana only, and that too without any attachment or enmity. In fact Sanskrit ideal seeks highest good of all.

सर्वेऽत्र सुखिनः सन्तु सर्वे सन्तु निरामयाः ।

सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु मा कश्चिद् दुःखभाग्भवेत् ।⁶²

The Sanskrit Commission has said, "if literature is for humanising the spirit of man, Sanskrit literature has done immense service in this direction."⁶³ Generally all the literature and philosophy including religion have similar say in the matter of humanising the spirit of man or establishment of peace. But Sanskrit literature and thought because of its appealing tone and logical treatment has special importance. There are many ideas put forth by Sanskrit literature and thought which are useful for the establishment of world peace. It is not possible to present a thorough study of these ideas in this short paper and I have to be content with drawing a bare outline. But, I hope, the random references made here are enough to indicate that a detailed study of this literature has a great utility even today in securing peace in the world and making human relations smooth. The utility of studies in Sanskrit literature and thought is thus beyond doubt in the modern world context also. In my opinion in the light of the above discussion of the principles enshrined in Sanskrit literature for safeguarding peace a revaluation of the policies of UNO and International politics would prove both interesting and useful. The conferences like this should stress this utility of Sanskrit literature for the solution of our modern problems. If this conference can chalk out a definite programme in this direction it shall be its special and most useful contribution to the uplift of studies in classical language and "promotion of International understanding"⁶⁴ expected from this type of conferences.

Let us not forget that the aim of all knowledge and progress is peace and happiness all around. The Upaniṣads have always emphasised it by invoking peace in the beginning and at the end. Let me also end this paper by a Vedic prayer wishing peace and prosperity for all :

यानि कानिचिच्छान्ति लोके सप्त ऋषयो विदुः ।
 सर्वाणि शं भवन्तु मे शं मे अस्त्वभयं मे अस्तु ॥
 पृथिवी शान्तिरन्तरिक्षं शान्तिर्द्यौः शान्तिरापः शान्तिरोषधयः शान्तिर्वनस्पतयः
 शान्तिर्विश्वे मे देवाः शान्तिः सर्वे मे देवाः शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिभिः ।
 ताभिः शान्तिभिः सर्वं शान्तिभिः शमयामोऽहम् ।
 यदिह घोरं यदिह क्रूरं यदिह पापम् ।
 तच्छान्तं तच्छिवं सर्वमेव शमस्तु नः ॥⁵⁵

ओ३म् शान्तिः । शान्तिः ॥ शान्तिः ॥

FOOT NOTES

1. Report of the Sanskrit Commission 1956-57 P. 3.
2. Ibid. P. 25 and 7, 11, 19, 20, 29, 31, 47, 53, 65, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 107 etc.
3. Bulletin No. 1 (Publication number 936) of International Sanskrit Conference P. 2
4. पाप मूल अभिमान
5. Mālavikāgnimitram 1/2. Kālidāsa.
The wise men accept or reject after examining it.
6. Report of the Sanskrit Commission 1956-57 P. 90.
7. Ibid. P. 4, 8, 9, 11, 18, 22, 23, 50, 76 to 91, 95 96, 98, 99, 102, 112, 116, 125, 126, 192, 197, 198.
8. "Sukla Yajurveda 36/17.
Let peace prevail in Heaven, in the sky and on earth, in water and vegetation. Peace may prevail in woods and Viśvedevas, Brahman and all. Peace and only peace. Let that peace be mine.
9. Brahman is the only truth, world is illusory.
Individual soul is (also) Brahman and not (a), separate (entity).

10. Kathopaniṣad 2/2/9-10-11.

Even so the inner "self" of all created things is one.

11. Ibid. 2/2/12.

The Self-controlled inner 'self' of all created things is one which manifests its one form severally. The wise (men) who see Him residing in 'self' get lasting happiness, none else.

12. Who would fight (and) with whom ?

13. Brahma-Sūtra Sāṅkara Bhaṣya. 1/1/1

14. I am Brahman.

15. Thou art that.

16. Svetāśvataropaniṣad. 6/11.

One God, omnipresent, inner self of all creation is concealed in all objects.

17. Ibid. 6/12.

One who turns the one seed of many inactive (souls) into several is (really) single (and) self controlled. The wise (men) who see him residing in 'self' get eternal happiness and none else.

18. īśāvāsyopaniṣād. 6.

He who sees all this creation in one 'self' and one 'self' in all creation does not feel aversion.

19. Ibid. 7.

In the state in which one who knows 'self' to be all created things how can there be any delusion or grief to one who sees unity (in all).

20. Brhadāranyakopaniṣad. 4/5/6.

Oh, indeed not for the sake of husband that the husband is dear but husband is dear for the sake of her own self. Not indeed for the sake of wife is wife dear but wife is dear for the sake of his own self.

21. Ibid. 4/5/6.

The 'self' should be seen, heard, meditated upon, and deliberated.

22. Ibid. 4/5/6.

Indeed, by seeing hearing, contemplating and knowing, 'self' all becomes known.

23. Ibid. 4/5/7.
 Brahman leaves one who thinks oneself different from Brahman.
 Warrior leaves one who thinks oneself different from the warriors.
 The worlds leave one who thinks oneself different from the worlds.
 The deities leave one, who thinks oneself different from the deities.
 The Vedas leave one who thinks oneself different from the Vadas.
 The elements leave one, who thinks oneself different from the elements. All leave one who thinks oneself different from all.
24. Chhândogyopaniṣad. 3/14/3.
 This myself (residing) in heart is smaller than a grain of rice or a seed of barley or a grain of Śyāmāka or husked Śyāmāka. This myself (residing) in my heart is bigger than the earth, bigger than the sky, bigger than Heaven, bigger (even) than these worlds.
25. Svetāśvataropaniṣad. 3/20.
 'Self' is kept in the cave of this living being is smaller than the molecule and bigger than the big.
26. Iṣāvāsyopaniṣad. 5.
 It is inside all and even outside all.
27. Ṛgveda. X/7/90/1.
 Covering the universe from allsides He stood over-filling it by ten fingers.
28. Brhadāranyakopaniṣad. 4/5/7.
 All this is (what) this 'self' (is).
29. Yogasūtra. 1/1.
 Yoga is proposed because of its efficacy to instruct truth.
30. Ibid. 1/2.
 Yoga is the control over mind-behavior.
31. Ibid. 2/3.
32. Ibid. 1/30.
33. Ibid. 2/28.
 By practising the discipline of Yoga on the decay of impurities, knowledge is manifested and discretion is achieved.
34. Ibid. 2/29.
35. Ibid. 2/30.

36. Ibid. 2/34.
37. Ibid. 2/31:
38. Always to be observed.
39. Ibid. 2/33.
40. Page 52-53.
41. Bhagavad Gītā 2/48.
Evenness (of mind) is called Yoga.
42. Ibid. 6/29.
He whose self is harmonised by Yoga sees the 'self' residing in all beings and all beings in the 'self'; everywhere he sees equality.
43. Yogaśāstra 2/20.
One who meditates upon the pleasure and pain, likes and dislikes of all being as of self does not commit violence which is an evil for one's own self.
44. Yoga sūtra. 2/35.
By establishment of non-violence (all) enmity ends.
45. Of all creatures.
46. Here, indeed, even the animals, forsaking their enmity and with their souls pacified enjoy their residence in the penance Grove. Even so, the serpent troubled by the rays of the sun enters the (shade of) peacock's feathers without any misgiving; the young one of the deer suck the breast of the lioness.
47. Yoga Śāstra. 2/48.
He who gives a sense of security to (other) beings has no fear from them. As is the gift, so is the reward.
48. Knowing the joy of Brahman (he) never gets frightened.
49. Bhagavad Gītā. 12/15.
By whom the worlds are not grieved and by the worlds who is not grieved.
50. "Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism" page-128-29.

51. Fie upon the strength of the warrior, the strength of the Brāhmana is the (true) strength.

52. Raghuvansām. 1/8.

I shall tell of the dynasty of the Raghu-Kings, who took to study in childhood, to enjoyment of (worldly) objects in youth, to hermit life in old age and gave up their bodies by Yoga at death.

53. Surely, the potency from which there result either good or evil should be considered as desirable. As the power to cook unripe food (and) turning it to sweet dish as well as the power capable of burning down various useful things proceed from one and the same fire, even so, the potency to engage in action auspicious and inauspicious of the spirit. Those from which again spiritual strength, valour etc. are effected, whether they be auspicious or inauspicious means, are certainly to be desired. That potency, is capable of being transformed as desired by acquiring (suitable) instruments. Hence getting there is profitable only.

54. Hitopadeśa. Mitra-lābha,⁷¹.

None is one's friend and none one's enemy. Friends are made according to (their) practice and so are enemies.

55. Page. 155.

56. Hitopadeśa-Mitralābha, 70.

Considerations like 'this is mine' or 'not-mine' belong to the narrow minded. For man with a generous heart the (whole) world is one family.

57. Bhagavad Gītā. 2/33.

If you do not engage (yourself) in this lawful battle you will incur sin having lost your righteousness and reputation.

58. The Bhagavad Gītā. Introductory Essay. P. 68.

59. Bhagavad Gītā. 3/30.

Fight being freed from (war) fever.

60. The Bhagavad Gītā. Introductory Essay. P. 69.

61. Abhijñāna Śākuntalam. 1/11. Kālidāsa.

Your weapon is to protect the oppressed (and) not to attack the innocent.

62. May all be happy, may all be free from disease, may all be blessed with good in this world. May none be afflicted.

63. Report of the Sanskrit Commission. 1956-57. P. 78.

64. Bulletin No. 1 of International Sanskrit Conference. P. 2.

65. Atharvaveda 19/1/9/13-14.

Whatever in the world, the seven sages know as pacific, may they all become benevolent to me. Let prosperity be mine, fearlessness be mine. May peace prevail on earth, may peace prevail in the sky; may peace prevail in the Heavens, may peace prevail in the waters, may peace prevail in the herbs, may peace prevail in the vegetation, may the Visva-devas (universal gods) be peaceful to me, may all gods be peaceful to me. Peace (and nothing but) peace prevails by means of (these numerous kinds of) peace. May we pacify by (those numerous kinds of) peace everything—whatever is here heinous, whatever is here cruel, whatever is here sinful. All that being tranquil, all that being benevolent may be propitious for us.

KALIDASA'S INFLUENCE ON THE WEST

By Dr. S.R. Sehgal

Since the revival of Arts and Letters in the 15th Century in Europe, Western scholars have been drawn to Oriental thought and way of life. From the 16th Century onward missionaries have visited India and drunk at her fountain. Abraham Roger actually translated into Dutch the THREE ŚATAKAS OF BHARTṚHARI as early as 1651.

With the establishment of the East India Company in our country Sir William Jones was sent to Bengal for administrative purposes. Along with the many sided activities he was absorbed into the study of Sanskrit and impressed by the language he soon threw himself into an English translation of the ŚĀKUNTALAM of Kālidāsa. This rendering into first European language was hailed by eminent poets in all parts of the continent. Prof. Herder paid the highest tribute to the genius of this great poet of India. At one place he has observed "Do you not wish with me that instead of religious books like the Vedas they would give us more useful and agreeable works of the Indians and especially their best poetry of every kind ? It is here that the mind and character of a nation is best brought to life before us. I have received a truer and more real notion of the manner of thinking among the ancient Indians from the ŚĀKUNTALAM than from all their ancient works". It is indeed true that the works of Kālidāsa have depicted our national life and culture in bright colours.

GERMANS' TRIBUTE

The First English rendering of the ŚĀKUNTALAM appeared in 1789. Immediately after two years the play was translated into German by Prof. Forster. His words cannot be antiquated which he wrote in the introduction to his translation—

"How poor we would remain, if we confined ourselves to our own German or European culture. Every country has its peculiarities, which influence the spiritual powers and organizations of its people. If we compare these varying individualities and separate the general from the

local, we shall arrive at the right understanding of mankind. . . Here an entirely new vista of thought opens up before our mind and imagination, an extraordinary beautiful individuality of the human character. . . It is necessary that to set out clearly how the differences between Indian mythology, history and customs and the Greek, for instance, exhibit works of that country in an unusual form and appearance to us, but also to show how the significant thing about such works is not whether it consists of five or seven scenes, but that the most delicate feelings which the human heart possesses can be just as finely expressed on the Ganges by the dark brown people as on the Rhine, or the Tiber by our white races”.

This translation fell into the hands of Goethe the greatest poet of Germany. Like Dr. Tagore in India he wielded overwhelming influence in the West. He was greeted by Napoleon as the leader of the European literature. In the 18th century the German poet modelled the prologue of his celebrated Play FAUST on the pattern provided by the ŚĀKUNTALAM. For years he was struck with admiration for this unique work. He found in it the universal human content, women's purity and innocent submission, man's forgetfulness, mother's loveliness, father and mother united through their own offspring. He called the play the meeting point of 'HEAVEN AND EARTH'. His tribute is not an exaggeration born of sentimentalism but the matured judgement of a true critic. He has clearly brought out the point that beauty goes hand in hand with moral law. Beauty upheld by the halo of goodness is eternal. The love of man and woman is neither beautiful, nor lasting so long as it remains self-centred, so long as it does not yield fruit, so long as it does not diffuse itself in the society over son and daughter, guests and neighbours.

Another great savant of Germany who learnt Sanskrit for the study of ŚĀKUNTALAM in original was Prof. Schlegel. He loved to stay in Paris to study the language under the French Sanskritist Chezy. Dr. Sten Konow, a Norwegian Indologist has given a statistical account of translations of ŚĀKUNTALAM into European languages. In German language this play has been translated nearly more than thirty times. Similarly French, Dutch, Italian, Polish, Russian, Swedish, Spanish, Hungarian scholars enriched their literary wealth by translation and frequent adaptations. A special feature of these renderings lies in the fact that almost all translations appeared in the nineteenth century. Critics and Scholars were enticed by the lofty ideals and human appeal, the play abounds in.

Latest researches have proved that the fact that Shelley had read the English translation of Śākuntalam by Sir William Jones and was pro-

foundly influenced by the intrinsic beauty of the play. His poem on Skylark contains echoes of Kālidāsa's characteristic feature of pearless upamā' (pūrnopamā) in not less than five couplets. Scholars and poets like Zoken Palit and Tagore felt that Shelley, the exponent of intellectual beauty must have tasted sweet, fresh and soothing honey of Kālidāsa's poetry. His bewitching portrayals of women must have provided inspiration to the kindred soul. His poem 'The Sensitive Plant' has pointed references to the blossoming of Asoka tree at the touch of a lovely woman's gentle feet. To quote the haunting lines.

'I doubt not the flower of that garden sweet,
Rejoiced in the sound of her gentle feet,
I doubt not felt the spirit that came

From her glowing fingers through all their frame,
And Indian plants, of scent and hue.
The sweetest that ever were fed on dew.
Leaf by leaf, day by day,
Were massed into common clay.'

The echo fount of these lines of Shelley is found in Kālidāsa e.g.

The Asoka tree with sweetly dancing lines,
The favourite Bakul tree are near the bower
If amaranth-engirdled jasmine-vines,
Like me they wait to feel the winning power
Of her persuasion ere they blossom into flower

(Megh Duta/II, 18)

Keats, minstrel of immortal songs of beauty was too influenced by Kālidāsa. His various poems especially Endymion contains echoes of the Śākuntalam. The seventh act of this most famous of Sanskrit play has beautiful description of the chariot of the god Indra which has found articulate expression in Keats's Endymion. The images of Kāma and Brahma in the same poem reveal remarkable similarity to these in Kālidāsa. Enlightened scholars like Abercrombie and Rawlinson have endorsed the view that Keats must have looked into English translation of the Śākuntalam by Sir Jones. To quote the original words of Kālidāsa :

"Plovers that fly from mountain caves
Steeds that quick-flashing lightning leaves,
And chariot-wheels that drip with spray—
A path O'er pregnant clouds betray.'

(Śākuntalam 7. 7)

‘A silver car air-borne,
Whose silent wheels, fresh wet from clouds of morn,
Spun off a drizzling dew,
(II, 518-520)

Abercrombie, the critic and poet writes on this affinity in his book *Theory of Art*. ‘Inspired realization of this kind is perhaps the commonest as it is also perhaps the most useful of the workings of genius in poetry. There is a fine example in the beautiful Indian drama : The chariot of the god Indra driving through heaven passes over a cloud and at once the wetted rims of the wheels begin to spin moisture of the sparkling showers off course : that is just what would happen. Keats has the very same thing in *Endymion* but he may have looked into Sir W. Jones’s version of *Kālidāsa*..

Sir Monier Williams who graced the chair of Boden professor of Sanskrit at the university of Oxford translated into English the *Śākuntalam* in 1872. At one place he has recorded that at an international seminar of books held in Europe in the nineteenth century this masterpiece of *Kālidāsa* figured prominently in the hundred best books of the world.

Amongst the scholars who worked enthusiastically on the celebrated play, to mention a few of them, are Drs. Otto Boehtlingk, Cappeller, Chezy, Pischel, Burkhard and Monier Williams. They have left landmarks in the discovery of the four versions of this drama found in various parts of the country.

Another work of *KĀLIDĀSA* which had won the hearts of Europe in general and Germany in particular is the *MEGHADUTA*. Goethe knew this work through the translation of H.H. Wilson in 1813. His heart burst into a tribute :

What more pleasant could man wish ?
Śakuntala, Nala, there must one kiss,
And Meghadūta, the cloud messenger
Who would not send him to a soul sister
Who would not send him to a soul sister

The versatile genius of *KĀLIDĀSA* fascinated Schiller, the great lyricist writer of Germany. He was influenced by this unique composition of the *Cloud Messenger* which is visible in his celebrated work *MARIA STUART*. Shelley’s well known poem ‘*Cloud*’ contains echoes of *Kālidāsa*. It appears that the Romanticists of English Literature had deep influence of *Kālidāsa* whose English translations by Sir Jones were

purchased by some of them. In 1826 W. Von Humboldt a savant and statesman extolled this composition for its idyllic descriptions of the advent of rainy season, when the first clouds come up from the south. This was followed by C. Schwyz's translation in prose and in verse by many forgotten poets. In 1833 Ruckert, the great German poet, out of his high regard for the genius of India rendered the Elegy of Aja from the RAGHUVANŚA which set up new literary form. India will cherish the memory of this great writer for his beautiful poem in German language—the wisdom of the Brāhmans which was hailed by experts more rich in thought and more perfect in form than even Goethe's West Osllicher Diwan.

INFLUENCE ON RUSSIA AND AMERICA

Dr. N. Karamzin the famous Soviet historian translated some acts of the ŚĀKUNTALAM in 1792. This work appeared under the title—SCENES FROM ŚĀKUNTALAM, Indian Drama. Again in 1879 a complete translation of this play was undertaken by Prof. Alexei Putyata.

In America this play was published in the original as early as 1892. This was nobly edited by Dr. Pischel and nicely brought out in the Harward Oriental series. The best English translation ever appeared is from the facile pen of Prof. Ryder who has laid India under a deep debt of gratitude. The great American critic evaluated the works of Kālidāsa in the most generous ways. While paying his tribute to the son of Saraswati, Prof. Ryder remarks 'It is interesting to observe that the centuries of intellectual darkness in Europe have some time coincided with centuries of light in India. The Vedas were composed for the most part before Homer. Kālidāsa and his contemporaries lived while Rome was tottering under barbarian assault.' At another place the same authority adds 'Rarely has a man walked on this earth who observed the phenomena of living nature as accurately as he, though his accuracy was of course that of the poet, not that of the scientist. It is Kālidāsa who for the first time in world literature wrote CLOUD MESSENGER whose theme is that of the creative artist.

Thus the study of Kalidasa has exerted a great influence on the mind of the West. In Germany and France he has been deeply studied in the original and enthusiastically admired in translation, not the orientalist mere, but the poet, the critic, the natural philosopher, a Goethe, a Schlegel, a Humboldt, having agreed on account of his tenderness of feeling and his rich creative imagination to set Kālidāsa very high among the glorious company of the sons of song.

IMAGES OF THE CLOUD AS VISIONED BY

KĀLIDĀSA AND P. B. SHELLEY

Sharma Budh Dev, Gurukula Kangri University.

Image is the mirror of thought even though it may be emotive or scientific kind. Both these poets are masters to balance these two to their propriety of communication. The cloud has been transformed on the basis of thought in many beautiful and ugly forms. Ugliness in poetry consequently is beautiful as an Indian Alankāra is beauty.¹ Transformation is a natural process and not an artificial one which ancient Alankāraśāstrins connect with the material form of Śabda and Artha. Beauty is a concept of the Soul, not the material body of the Śabda and Artha. This clue must be again a subject of scrutiny in this age of revaluation. Let us go above the Śabda and Artha that is symbolism which is akin to Dhvani. Psychology plays a major part in the formation of these images – for instance red colour according to psychology denotes sex but we find redness in Japā flower denoting devotion² towards the lord Śiva. Kālidāsa has used this popular flower but only once.

Emotive touch of the poet makes beautiful and ugly images from any object of comparison. Such is in the case of the cloud. It is an art but without imitation.

The cloud though materially is a mixture³ of smoke, light water and wind but in bereavement the yakṣa personifies it a messenger which is purely an emotive transformation. Shelley personifies it sometimes in the first person⁴. Images make these poor words very rich with beautiful senses.

१. सौन्दर्यमलङ्कारः

२. सांध्यं तेजः प्रतिनवजपापुष्परक्तं दधानः Megh. I 39

3. Megh I-5. 2,

4. I bring showers of thirsting flowers

From the sea and the streams (The cloud. L. 1-2)

The cloud has many coloured shapes red¹, white in the autumn, black², orange and yellow besides rainbow in it. The most important analogical factor that dominates in these poets is the liquidity³ of the cloud to express joy and sorrow. Lyrical poetry without liquidity of thought is tasteless. Images of the cloud are found to be befitting. The cloud changes its garb with the seasons, so variety prevails in their poetry.

One can easily measure the feelings of the poets by the images of the cloud from the rating of the form of it.

Kālidāsa repeats images from place to place in his poetry to express variety of thought whereas Shelley profusely uses them to exhibit sorrow-often hope. Comparatively this shows the masterly tackling of the poetic scenes in his poetry. Shelley sometimes surpasses Kālidāsa in depicting the climax of sorrow of death. Kālidāsa in his poetry may be lacking in this respect due to the mania for the traditional censure of inauspicious scene but sometimes his daring descriptions¹ have been noticed where the ruins have been described as clouds torn in the evening on account of strong wind. This scene leaves an impact of acute feeling of sorrow on the mind of the reader. Lightning is the wife of the cloud⁵ in Kālidāsa but in another place death scene is presented from the mouth of mourning Rati.⁶ Similar is the vision of Shelley where sorrow⁷ overpowers happiness.

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१. रक्तपीतकपिशः पयोमुचां कोटयः Kumar Sam. VIII-45
बलाहकच्छेद विभक्तरागामकालसंध्यामिव धातुमत्ताम् । Kumar Sam. I-4
 २. वर्णमात्रं कृष्णः Megh. I-52
श्यामः पादो बलिनियमनाभ्युद्यतस्येव दिष्णोः । Megh. I-60
 ३. प्रायो सर्वो भवति कृष्णावृत्तिराद्रन्तरात्मा Megh. II-33
I sped like some swift cloud.....
.....Scattering the liquid of joy of life.
Prometheus Unbound. Act. I 764-66
 ४. अस्तनिमग्नसूर्यं दिनान्तमुग्रानिभिन्नमेघम् Raghu. XVI-11
 ५. खिन्नविद्युत्कलत्रः Megh. I-41
 ६. सह मेघेन तडित् प्रलीयते Kumar. IV-33
 7. Like a torn cloud before the hurricane
As one that in a silver vision floats (Alastor. L 315-16)

Kālidāsa is a poet of auspicious tradition which represents Ancient Indian culture but Shelley everywhere seems to be revolutionary that is why we find in his images broken traditions and creation of a new world of peace and happiness. After all peace and happiness is a common search for both. For Kālidāsa divinity is religiously bound that constantly conditions his mind where as for Shelley divinity (no God) lies in nature, that is why he is practical son of the nature¹ where mythological images are rare. In both these poets concept of beauty of life has a dominant feature. Kālidāsa combines repeatedly lightning and cloud as pair of Indumatī and Aja,² Rati and Kāma, and Yakṣa and Yakṣini. Here we find a combination of activity and life as the attribute of the lightning and the cloud.

Moon has been looked as a symbol of beauty and peace in every literature on the earth but when it is stained with the cloud³ sometimes

“And I became at the last the even as a shade,
A smoke, a cloud on which the winds have preyed.”

(Revolt of Islam. L.3058-59)

1.it hung
Upon his life, as lightning in a cloud
Gleams, hovering ere it vanish, ere the flood
Of Night close over it. (Alastor L 416-18)
२. अन्योन्यशोभापरिवृद्धये वां योगस्तडित्तोयदयोरिवास्तु Reghu. VI 65 and Cf. Kumar IV 33, Megh I 41, II,1,17,55.
3. Of spirit piercing joy, whose light
Like the moon struggling through the night
Of Whirl-wind-rifted cloud, did break (Rosalind And Helen
L. 1057-59)
And then I saw and felt. The moon was high
A cloud as of a coming storm were spread
Revolt of Islam (L. 2665-66).
Then yon dim cloud now fading on the moon
Even while we gaze, though it awhile a rail
To hide the orb of Truth (Revolt of Islam) (L. 3271-74).
And compare also Hellas. L. 337-38 Early poems
of Shelley L. 1-2 Epipsychidion and A Roman Chamber L.5
शरत्प्रमृष्टाम्बुधरोपरोधः शशीव पर्याप्तकलोललिन्याः Raghu VI 44
वर्षात्ययेन रुचमभ्रघनादिवेन्दोः । Raghu XIII 77
Also compare Raghu XIX 39.

Both these poets regard the cloud as Cayātma or a shade, so it has light and speedy gait shows the irresistible spirit¹. In Kālidāsa the speed of the cloud cannot be obstructed even by mountain and it is also compared with the unchecked army. It can pervade the sky suddenly with the force of the wind. Shelley wings the cloud² in his poetry; Kālidāsa though mythologically does the same to show the unobstructed and pervading speed in his poetry. These are the beautiful images of the cloud to communicate the idea more forcibly than poor words.

The cloud has terrible and harsh sound³. Kālidāsa transfers the sound to melodious sound of the tabor⁴. Here the deep and melodious sound serves the purpose of music for the lord Śiva worship. Sometimes tabor's sound for victory has been used to convey the sense of pride. Shelley compares the sound with knell.

Lightning, storm, hail-stones and strong rain are the weapons of the cloud. To tranquil wild fire it is used for torrential showers⁵. At the same time see the ugly form of wielding hailstones when used in very hard and terrible sense of order⁶ for the banishment of Sita.

1. I sped, like some swift cloud that wings the—
wide air's wildernesses (Prometheus unbound Act. I L. 764
मसत्सखस्येव बलाहकस्य गतिर्विजिघ्र्ये नहि तद्रथस्य ॥ Raghu. V 27
दृष्टो हि वृषवन् कलभप्रमाणोप्याशाः पुरोवातमवाप्य मेघः ॥ Raghu. XVI 25
Compare also Raghu. XVIII-38
2. Third Image was dressed
In white wings swift as clouds in the winter skies;
Revolt of Islam L. 2165-66.
स्थानादस्मात् सरस निचुलादुत्पतोदङ्मुखः खम् । Megh. I 14
३. क्रीडालोलाः श्रवणपरुषैर्गजितैर्भाययेस्ताः । Megh. I 64
४. निहृदिस्ते मुरज इव चेत् कन्दरेषु ध्वनिः स्यात्
संगीतार्थो ननु पशुपतेस्तत्र भावी समग्रः । Megh. I 59
compare also Megh. I 37, II 1, 5 Raghu. IX 11 Kumar, VI 40
Malavik. 1-21, Adonais.
५. तं चेद्वायौ सरति सरलस्कन्धसंघट्टजन्मा
बाधेतोल्काक्षपितचमरीवालभारो दवाग्निः ।
अहंस्येनं प्रशमयितुमलं वारिधोरासहस्रैः । Megh. I 56
६. औत्पातिकं मेघ इवाश्मवर्षं महीपतेः शासनमुज्जहार ॥ Raghu. XIV 53
Compare also युधिबज्रघोषः Raghu. XVIII 21

Surprising enough these hailstones have been used to end cruelty¹ of Sarabha. Again see the elastic image of the cloud which possesses rainbow as its fearful bow, the showers as the arrows and the lightning as bow string² to denote king's sexual unsatisfaction because it was before with Urvaśī a very fine scene. Again the cloud possessing these weapons has been compared with a king to show his chivalrous³ form when he confronts a lion. The showers have been compared with arrows so profusely used that rain of arrows have come to become an idiomatic expression.⁴ This image is further developed when compared with Arjuna⁵, arrows with showers and the warriors' faces with the lotuses. Kālidāsa is fond of developing the image everywhere to express so many senses. It shows Meghadūta is a matured work of Kālidāsa. Shelley creates a cloud⁶ more ugly than Kālidāsa. Speech that shows cruelty⁷ is beautifully furnished. Shelley depicts better feelings through these images. The cloud has got another weapon in Shelley as smoke

५. तान् कुर्वीथास्तुमुलकरका वृष्टिपातावतीर्णान्
के वा न स्युः परिभव पदं निष्फलारम्भयत्नाः ॥ Megh. I 57
६. नवजलधरः सन्नद्धोऽयं न दृप्त निशाचरः
सुरधनुरिदं दूराकृष्टं न नाम शरासनम् ।
अयमपि पटुर्धारासारो न बाणपरंपरा
कनकनिकषस्निग्धा विद्युत् प्रिया न ममोर्वशी ॥ Vikra. IV 7
१. अथ नभस्य इव त्रिदशायुधं कनकपिङ्गतडिद् गणसंयुतम् ।
धनुरधिष्ठ्य मनाधिरूपादे नरवरो रवरोषित केसरी ॥ Raghu. IX 54
२. नाराचदुर्दिनम् Raghu. IV 41
अति प्रबन्ध प्रहितास्त्र वृष्टिभिः Raghu. III 58
३. राजन्यानां शितशरशतैर्यत्र गाण्डीवधन्वा
धारापातैस्त्वमिव कमलान्यभ्यवर्षन् मुखानि ॥ Megh. I
4. his eyes
Which gazed on the undazzling sun, now blinded
By the white lightning, while the pondrous hail
(Prometheus unbound) Act III scene II L. 13-15
To speak in thunder to the rebel world
Like sulphurous clouds half shattered by the storm
compare-Hellas L. 301-303
5. Hellas L. 624-29. Pater omnipotens L. 4-6 The fugitives L. 23-30

to overpower infant wind (weak soul). Smoke as compared with cloud has been used as symbol of acute frustration. Shelley's works are full of such images.

Poets create an environment of horror with the help of ugly devilish form of the cloud.¹ Kālidāsa rarely accepts such scenes whereas Shelley has got mania for such images due to his life-long struggle. Rainbow is sound to eyes but it has been crimsoned with blood to show horror. Kālidāsa compared the cloud with goblin² which was before beautiful when he psychologically depicts the perverse condition of the king Pururavas.

Kālidāsa uses thunder of the cloud for terror for the love sport³ so the ugly feature changes to beautiful one. Shelley could not approach to that height of Kālidāsa of diverting such situations to beautiful one. Sanskrit poets generally connect the sight of the cloud with sex disturbance.⁴ I think the image of the cloud verily like an elephant⁵ may be for sex. The elephant is the most sexy animal because Kālidāsa compares the pair's sexual sport with the elephant pair in Raghu. XVI 68, 16,

१. छायाश्चरन्ति बहुधा भयमादधानाः

संध्यापयोदकपिशाः पिशिताशनानाम् ॥ Sak. III 24

Of the victorious darkness, as he fell
Like the last glare of the day's red agony
Which, from a rent among the fiery cloud.

Prometheus unbound Act III Scene II L. 6-8

Of safe assassination and all crime
Made stingless by Spirits of the Lord,
And blood red rainbows canopied the land.

Queen Mab VII 232-34

Compare Hellas L. 859-61

२. नवजलधरः सन्नद्धोऽथ न दृप्त निशाचरः । Vikra. IV 7

३. आचकाङ्क्ष घनशब्दविकलवास्ता विवृत्य विशतीर्भुजान्तरम् । Raghu. XIX 38

त्वामासाद्यस्तनितसमये मानयिष्यन्ति सिद्धाः

सोत्कम्पानि प्रियसहचरसंभ्रमालिङ्गितानि ॥Megh. I 22

४. मेघालोके भवति सुखिनोऽप्यन्यथा वृत्ति चेतः । Megh. 13

Compare also Raghu. XIII 28

५. वप्रक्रीडापरिणत गजप्रेक्षणीयं ददर्श Megh. I 2

XIX- 11 Kumar III 37 and clear picture in Vikra. IV 5,14,23,24,29, 44,47,62. Kālidāsa might have fixed the idea from there. Elephants generally fight for the herd of she-elephants. One elephant being defeated or wounded lives alone in the forest and becomes fierce out of sex irritation; Yakṣa is alone being separated from his spouse due to Śāpa may take the cloud as an elephant to express his unsatisfied sex. Similarly that the most abominable scene that Kālidāsa has demonstrated is to pre-suppose hate¹ and horror because of his belief in omens when Paraśurāma comes to confront Rāma that cloud is changed to the blood-red clothes of women like quarters in menstruation. I have not seen such an ugly image in Shelley; poetically it may be among the best images suggesting acute feeling of hate at this juncture. Again the she-goblin Tātakā⁶ has also been compared with the cloud wielding ornaments of skulls like cranes, shows rage and hate here also.

Disturbance and destruction³ abundantly described by Shelley in his poetry where the beautiful cloud has been uglified. Kālidāsa avoids such scenes but again we find mythological names of the cloud as Puṣkara and Āvartakā⁴ famous for the destruction of the universe. Mental condition due to frustration have been used as the sun dies⁵ in the cloud.

Kālidāsa seems to be bound to narrate according to the plot⁶ of the story where as Shelley is free to paint nature in connection with any free idea. Only once Kālidāsa takes up the cloud of the winter for the

१. श्येनपक्षरिधूसरालकाः सांध्यमेवरुधिरार्द्रवाससः

अङ्गना इव रजस्वला दिशो नो बभूवुरवलोकन क्षमाः ॥ Raghu. XI 60

२. ताटका चलकपाल कुण्डला कालिकेव निबिडा बलाकिनी । Raghu. XI 15

3. The Earth

Who all our green and azure universe
Threatenedest to muffle round with black destruction sending
A solid cloud of rain hot thunder stones
And splinter and knead down my children's bones.

Promethues unbound Act IV L. 340-43

Compare also Hellas L.648-58 and L. 957-64

४. जातं वंशे भुवन विदिते पुष्करावर्तकानाम् । Megh I 6

5. The witch of Atlas L. 65-68

death¹ scene of Meghanāda. Shelley's images are generally emotive whereas Kālidāsa has balanced emotive and scientific images. Shelley regards sometimes the cloud as a symbol of a perishable thing¹ where no body can deny the philosophical vision of this poet. Kālidāsa takes in the sense of disappearance³ due to transmigration system in his poems. The cloud has got another wonderful similarity with human being that it grows healthy when black and grows weak and then perishes when it had rained off-white and pale in the winter. Kālidāsa has personified it in Meghadūta⁴ which feeds on the water of streams, smells odour and sees the beauty of the nature.

In Adonais a pathetic scene appears which no body can forget describing death with the image of the cloud⁵. Both these poets expand

१. मेवस्यैव शरत्कालो न किञ्चित् पर्यशेषयत् । Raghu. XII 79

There late was one which whose subtle being
As light and wind within some delicate cloud
That fades amid the blue noon's burning sky,
Genius and death contended

The sunset, L 1-4

Compare also,—

We are as clouds that veil the midnight moon
How restlessly they speed and gleam and quiver
Streaking the darkness radiantly ! -yet soon
Night closes round and they are lost for ever:

Mutability L 1-4

2. Like things which every cloud can doom to die

The Witch of Atlas L 516

The moon beyond the clouds thou living form
Among dead

Epipsychidion.

३. अभिवृष्य मरुत्सस्यं कृष्णमेघस्तिरोदधे । Raghu. X 48

४. जानामि त्वां प्रकृतिपुरुषं कामरूपं मघोनः Megh. I 6

5. A phantom among men companionless

As the last cloud of an expiring storm
Whose thunder as its knell;

Adonais L 271-73

The fire for which all thirst; now beams on me
Consuming the last cloud of cold mortality

Adonais L 485-86

the image to that extent that idea becomes clear for the reader. It was their considerate attitude towards the reader. See the skill of the poet how he transfers the thunder sound to the sound of bell at the time of death.

The cloud has among the object of the nature, a rare feature of raining into drops of water which are analogically described as tears giving vent to the inner feelings of sorrow¹ and joy psychologically termed as Catharsis. In sorrow one becomes emaciated in form while weeping is a very pathetic scene.

Kālidāsa's expression of joy, sorrow and sympathy has striking similarity with his new poet-friend Shelley. In bereavement Rāma sheds tears with the cloud²; at another place these tears are of sympathy³ when the perverse condition of yakṣini causes the cloud to weep.

As far as ugly images of the clouds are concerned we find them in rage, sorrow, hate etc. unattractive to attract and beautiful images of love, sympathy etc. are attractive to attract a peculiar phenomena in poetry. Both these poets are matured artists.

1. Lost Angel of a ruined Paradise !

She knew not 't was her own; as with no stain
She fade, like a cloud which had outswapt its rain.

Adonais L 88-90

Rough wind, that monest loud
Grief too sad for song;
Wild wind, when sullen cloud
Knells all the night long;
Sad storm, whose tears are vain,

A dirge L 1-5

Compare--Fragments of An Unfinished Drama L. 185-195

२. नवं पयो यत्र घनैर्मया च त्वद्वियोगाश्रु समं विसृष्टम् ॥ Raghu. XIII 26

३. त्वामप्यस्रं नवजलमयं मोचयिष्यत्यवश्यं

प्रायः सर्वो भवति कुरुणावृत्तिराद्रान्तरात्मा ॥ Megh. II 33

Later vedantic philosophy is clearly seen to show nothingness of the physical body and change to subtilty of the Soul¹ that pervades the clean-hearted one. Love philosophy has been also pictured.²

Human wishes are transient³ like the sight of a rainbow though attractive. Kālidāsa adds divinity to the cloud which we don't find in Shelley when clouds shower flowers.⁴ The cooling shade of the cloud is also marvellously portrayed, which can serve.⁵

-
1. And I became at last even as a shade,
A smoke, a cloud on which the winds have preyed,
Till it be thin as air;
Revolt of Islam L 3058-60

गम्भीरायाः पयसि सरितश्चेतसीव प्रसन्ने
छायात्मापि प्रकृतिसुभगो लप्स्यते ते प्रवेशम् । Megh. I 43

2. The clouds that are heavy with love's sweet rain,
Prometheus Unbound Act IV L 178.
Winged clouds soar here and there,
Dark with rain new new buds are dreaming of:
'Tis love, all love!
Prometheus Unbound Act IV L. 367-69'
Compare Megh. I 26,27, 21 Raghu.XIII 27

3. Now Peter felt amused to see
Shades like rainbow's rise and flee
Mixed with a certain hungry wishes.
Peter Bell the Third Part VI-XXVI

४. सपुष्पजलवर्षिभिर्घनैः Raghu. XI 3
गन्धोदग्रं तदनुववृषुः पुष्पमाश्चर्यं मेघाः Raghu. XVI 87
... .. पुष्पमेघीकृतात्मा
पुष्पासारैः स्तप यतु भवान् Megh. I 46

५. छायाया व जलदाः सिषेविरे । Raghu. XI 11

Compare The Daemon of the World Part I L 232- 34

When they describe nature, beauty fountains forth when the cloud adorns the sky¹. Here too sense of delight is painted². The cloud is compared with sapphire on the river like necklace of pearls. These images show the genius and excellency of thought of the imaginative giants. Sometimes romantic image of sex³ is wonderfully expressed with the cloud looking like the dark nipple of the earth's mountain like breast. At another place it is also imaged as the locks of hair of a woman⁴ adorned with pearls (like showers).

The cloud with the rainbow in it is compared with the peacock's feather⁵ of the lord Viṣṇu. The river is imagined to the beloved one emaciated in bereavement of the cloud-which gives joy⁶ to her when united. The lightning with the cloud is compared with the golden streak on the touch-stone. The clouds with the evening look like stream⁷ (Sarayū in Kālidāsa). Both these poets think alike to make the rainbow as the arched gateway⁸ to show highest joy of imagination. Poet

1. Between the East and West; and half the sky
was roofed with clouds of rich emblazonary

Julian And Maddalo L. 70-71

अन्यच्च शुभ्राशरदभ्रलेखा रन्ध्रे ष्विवालक्ष्य नभः प्रदेशा । Raghu. XIII 56

२. एकं मुक्तागुणमिव भुवः स्थूलमध्येन्द्रनीलम् । Megh. I 49

३. मध्ये श्यामः स्तन इवभुवः शेषविस्तार पाण्डुः । Megh. I 18

४. मुक्ता जालग्रथितमलकं कामिनीवाभ्रवृन्दम् । Megh. I 66

५. बर्हेणैव स्फुरितरुचिना गोपवेषस्य विष्णोः । Megh I 15

६. सौभाग्यं ते सुभग विरहावस्थया व्यञ्जयन्ती

काश्यं येन त्यजति विधिना स त्वयैवोपपाद्यः । Megh. I 30

७. सन्धोदयः साभ्र इवैष वर्णं पुष्पत्यनेकं सरयू प्रवाहः । Raghu XVI
Compare Revolt of Islam L 496-99

Rosalind and Helen L. 539-40

८. दूराल्लक्ष्यं सुरपतिधनुश्चारुणा तोरणेन । Megh II 15

O sleep Does the bright arch of rainbow clouds,
And pendant mountains seen in the calm lake,
Alaster L 212- 13

reaches the realm of ecstasy when he earns an image. Kālidāsa wants the cloud heavy with rain¹ because it is for its greatness and modesty². Kālidāsa's imaginative grand and high palace of the cloud³ has women of lightnings with paintings of rainbows, tabors of rumbles, floors inscribed in sapphires of rainy drops. Kālidāsa's imagination is sweet and loving but Shelly makes heaven of cloud to denote abnormal state of mind. Kālidāsa soars high from the world where as Shelley's image builds heaven but falls on the rough ground of the earth. Kālidāsa sees the cloud as an elephant⁴ flowing ichor to show majesty but Shelley finds joy in adventure comparing it with dolphin. Kālidāsa's comparison of the cloud with the mountain develops it to pleasure mountain⁵ and

Behold !

The rocks are cloven through the purple night
I see cars drawn by rain bow wings
which tremple the dim winds.

Prometheus Unbound Act II Scene IV 128-31

१. अन्तःसारं घन तुलयितुं नानिलः शक्यति त्वाम्
रिक्तः सर्वो भवति लघुः पूर्णता गौरवाय ॥ Megh. I 20
Clouds that are heavy with loves' sweet rain
Prometheus unbound Act. IV L 178

2. Sak V 12

३. विद्युत्वन्तं ललितवनिताः सेन्द्रचापं सच्चित्राः
संगीताय प्रहतमुरजाः स्निग्धगम्भीरघोषम् ।
अन्तस्तोयं मणिमयभुवस्तुङ्गमभ्रलिहाग्राः
प्रासादास्त्वां तुलयितुमलं यत्र तैस्तैर्विशेषैः ॥ Megh II 1
There she would build herself a windless heaven
Of the cloud whose moving turrets make
The bastions of the storm
The Witch of Atlas L. 484

४. त्वमिव करिणो वृष्टिमन्तः प्रभेदात् Megh. II 13
Like Arian on the dolphin's back The Witch of Atlas L 484

5. Compare Megh II 13, 17
And shook heaven's roof of golden clouds
Poised on hundred azure mountain'- isles
Hellas L 491-92
Oh, bear me to those isles of jagged clouds
which float like mountain on the earth quake
Hellas L957-58

Shelley uses this comparison for war also. The swans¹ are profusely attached with it in Kālidāsa. Wonderful is the aesthetic sense of them who beautify the ugly dark form of the cloud, vide-Varṇamātreṇa Kṛṣṇaḥ with the white swans. It must be accepted that beauty when attached with ugliness is more beautiful vide Malinamapi Himānśor-lakṣma Lakṣmīm tanoti.

There are places where an atmosphere² attracts the attention of the reader, of calmness who will not take rest under the canopy of the clouds. Both the poets are keen observers of the nature and when they take up the image they take up scientifically.

It is also charming to see how memory of past when expressed in poetry rises above the memory into an art.

१. संपत्स्यन्ते नभसि भवतो राजहंसाः सहायाः । Megh I 11

Rose like the war cry of the northern wind
Which kills the sluggish cloud and leaves a flock
Of wild swans struggling with the naked storm
Hellas L291-93

2. Those clouds of aéry gold
That slapt in glittering bellows
Beneath the azure canopy,

The Deamon of the World Part I 232-34
O sleep? Does the bright arch of rainbow clouds
And pendant mountains seen in the calm lake
Alastor L 212-13

Whilst the lagging hours of the day went by
like windless cloud o'er the tender sky.

The Sensitive Plant Part I L 96-97

छायया च जलदा सिषेविरे Raghu. XI 11

अवृष्टिसंरम्भमिवाम्बुवाहम् Kumar III 48

३. पूर्वानुभूतं स्मरता च यत्र . . .

गुहाविसारीव्यतिवाहितानि मया कथं चिद् घन गर्जितानि Raghu XIII 21

There now the sun had sunk, but lines of gold
Hung on the ashen clouds,

The Sun Set. L 12-13

Hopes are like clouds. Shelley hopes for a heavenly world of liberty.¹ In Kālidāsa there are birds attached traditionally with the cloud which wait for the water of the cloud. They are pea-cocks and Cātakas. In Shelley thirsting flowers hope for the cloud for their blossoms.

Mythologically the cloud has been compared with the foot of the lord Viṣṇu¹ and His colour, the bloody skin of elephant-demon worn by the lord Śiva² the mass of mud³ on Nandi bull again of the lord Śiva, gem - studded flight of steps for Pārvati⁵ and the shower-bath for the celestial damsels are the most sublime divine images presented to the cloud⁶. Can we find such images elsewhere, though religious in character.

Thoughts have taken incarnation in the form of images. Lovely and ugly images are beautifully communicating ideas of hate, love, joy, sorrow, calmness and disturbance etc. Both these poets are great and nobody can venture to lessen the importance of them. Images have been flying like clouds with lightning in the firmament of imagination where there is no distance of time and space and both these poets are keen observers of the nature. Kālidāsa's comparison and Shelley's impositions in the images are worth keeping in memory.

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1. From a single cloud the lightning flashes
 Whilst a thousand isles are illumined around
 अम्बुगर्भो हि जीमूतश्चातकैरभिनन्द्यते Raghu. XVII 60
 Compare Raghu V 17

2. Megh I 49,60
3. Cf Megh I 39
4. Megh I 55
5. Megh I 63
6. Megh I 64.

THE CONCEPTS OF *KATHARSIS* AND *GUNA*-A COMPARISON

By

Shrikrishna Mishra

Aristotle's concept of *Katharsis* is the concept of the effect that tragedy or serious poetry produces on the readers or spectators. Plato banished the poets from the ideal state on two grounds. First, they are "imitators of the life of the visible nature and so paint an inferior view of truth". According to Plato the worldly objects are themselves imitations of ideas or eternal realities and poets imitating them are imitators of imitations. Secondly, "They feed and water the emotions and passions of men instead of restraining them by reason".¹ Of all the forms of poetry drama is especially bad, because "through it a man becomes many instead of one, it makes him lose his personality in a pantomimic instinct and so prove false to himself".²

Aristotle defended poets against both these charges. The first charge is met by replacing plato's transcendental reality by an immanent one, residing in a thing as its essence, as its unity in change, and making imitation idealisation. Zeller very well summarises the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on this point. "While, therefore, Plato and Aristotle agree in regarding art as a species of imitation, they draw very different conclusions from this account of it. Plato thinks of it only as the imitation of sensible phenomena and accordingly expresses the utmost contempt for the falsity and worthlessness of art; Aristotle, on the other hand, looks upon artistic presentation as the sensible vehicle

1. *Republic* x, B. Jowett's translation, Classics Club Colleges ed., p. 477. Cp. Butcher : "Through its tearful moods it (Poetry) makes anarchy in the soul by exalting the lower elements over the higher and by dethroning reason in favour of feeling". *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, 4th ed., page 246, and F.L. Lucas's Translation : "Poetry feeds and waters the passions, weeds that should rather be killed by drought". *Tragedy*, rev. ed., p. 56

2. Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 266; see also Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

chief end of serious poetry." There were effects, amusement and the like, desired from sensible appearance, scenic representation, style, metre and music.⁷ "Yet the higher and more valuable portion is due to that ideal content which, according to Aristotle, it is the function of Art to present".⁸

Now, regarding the purifying effect of art, and the conditions of its production, there is no unanimity of opinions, because though Aristotle promised to explain what he meant by catharsis more clearly in his treatise on Poetry,⁹ that part of *Poetics* is missing.

Butcher says that "A tradition almost unbroken through centuries found in it reference to a moral effect which tragedy produces through the purification of the passions," and that Corneille, Racine and Lessing, in spite of their different interpretations, agreed in assuming the purely ethical intention of the drama.¹⁰ He further says that in 1857 Jacob Bernays reopened the whole question by pointing out that catharsis was a medical metaphor and meant 'purgation' and denoted "a pathological effect on the soul analogous to the effect of medicine on the body. The thought, as he interpreted it, may be expressed thus. Tragedy excites the emotions of pity and fear-kindred emotions that are in the breasts of all men and by the act of excitation affords a pleasurable relief. The feelings called forth by the tragic spectacle are not indeed permanently removed but are quieted for the time, so that the system can fall back upon its normal course. The stage, in fact, provides a harmless and pleasurable outlet for instincts which demand satisfaction and which can be indulged here more fearlessly than in real life".¹¹

and deride our neighbours, and also the appetites of sex, the good gross earth at the roots of human nature". He adds: "The comic festivals of Athens with their phallic element gave an outlet like the Roman saturnalia and the medieval feast of fools, to all the Rebelais in men." (*Tragedy*, p. 45). See also Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks: *Literary Criticism : A Short History*, pp. 46-7.

7. F. L. Lucas : *Tragedy*, p. 46.
8. Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
9. See *Politics* VIII, 7, Bohn's Classical Library ed., p. 284.
10. *Op. cit.*, pp. 243-4.
11. *Op. cit.*, p. 245.

In such an interpretation, Beinays had the support of Milton who in his preface to *Samson Agonistes* said something similar "Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath been ever held the greatest, moalest and most profitable of all other poems, therefore said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terriour, to purge the mind of these and such-like passions, that measure with a kind of delight stirred up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated. Nor is Nature herself wanting in her own effects to make good his assertion, for so, in physick, things of melancholick hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sou, salt to remove salt humours." Thus tragedy is a form of homoeopathic cure of emotion by emotions of the like kind, but not identical.

There is no quarrel so far. The controversy is whether Aristotle meant by catharsis only this sort of homoeopathic cure or meant something more. Butcher's main complaint is that "Beinays transferred the *katharsis* of the *Politics* almost without modification of meaning to the definition of tragedy. He limited it's reference to the simple idea of an emotional relief, a pleasurable vent for overcharged feeling. This idea, no doubt, almost exhausts the meaning of the phrase as it is used in the *Politics*. It also expresses, as has been above explained, one important aspect of the tragic *katharsis*. But the word, as taken up by Aristotle into his terminology of art, has probably a further meaning. It expresses not only a fact of psychology or of pathology, but a principle of art".¹²


Butcher's whole essay is to consider catharsis as a principle of art and the meaning of 'purification' he derives from the metaphorical use of catharsis. "In the medical language of the school of Hippocrates", Butcher points out, "it strictly denotes the removal of a painful or disturbing element from the organism, and hence the purifying of what remains by the elimination of alien matter".¹³

Aristotle has not explained the nature of the purifying process. One has to work it out with hints left by him.

Catharsis meant, as has been explained above, expulsion of a harmful or disquieting element. In the *Rhetoric*¹⁴ Aristotle defined both

12. *Op cit*, pp. 252-53.

13. *Op cit.*, p. 253.



pity and fear as forms of pain, Fear was a species of pain arising from an impending evil of destructive or painful nature and persons threatened were ourselves. Pity was pain arising from evil of the same sort when it came to undeserving persons. According to Butcher, pity and fear in Aristotle are "correlated feelings". "We pity others where under like circumstances we should fear for ourselves. Those who are incapable of fear are incapable of pity."¹⁵ The essential tragic effect is produced by rousing both pity and fear. Though correlated, the one can exist without the other. Fear is primary of the two. It is only the inferior tragedy which produces only one emotion.

But these emotions are not the same in tragedy as they are in life. In tragedy we sympathise with the hero who is a man like ourselves. Though more elevated, more highly placed, he has weaknesses, imperfections, as we have. "His must be a rich and full personality, composed of elements which other men possess, but blended more harmoniously or of more potent quality, so much human nature must there be in him that we are able in some sense to identify ourselves with him, to make his misfortunes our own."¹⁶

While we sympathise with the tragic hero, who is both like and unlike us, elevated yet fallible, our emotions of pity and terror become impersonal. "The true tragic fear becomes an almost impersonal emotion, attaching itself not so much to this or that particular incident, as to the general course of the action which is for us an image of human destiny. We are thrilled with awe at the greatness of the issues thus unfolded and with the moral inevitableness of the result. In this sense of awe the emotions of fear and pity are blended."¹⁷

Pity, Bernays explains, is preserved from eccentricity and sentimentalism through its kinship with fear. Fear is made unselfish through its alliance with pity. The spectator forgets his own sufferings and identifies himself with the fate of mankind.

Butcher's interpretation thus comes to this. He explains purification of emotions like pity and fear on the principle of impersonalisation or universalisation which Aristotle takes to be the characteristic merit of poetry. The artistic treatment of pity and fear thus purges these

15. Butcher. pp. 256-7.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-61.

17. ...

emotions of their admixture of pain. "In accepting this interpretation'. Butcher says, "We do not ascribe to tragedy a direct moral purpose and influence. Tragedy, according to the definition, acts on the feelings, not on the will. It does not make men better though it removes certain hindrances to virtue".¹⁸ Aristotle thinks of the aesthetic function of art rather than that of the moral effect when he uses the term *catharsis* as the effect of tragedy, formerly applied by him and Plato to music only.

Zeller comes to a similar conclusion:...This at any rate seems obvious that according to Aristotle there is a kind of music which produces a *katharsis* although it possesses no ethical character, and may not, therefore, be used in the education of the youth, nor practised by the citizens, although it may be listened to by them—namely, exciting music but if this is so, the *catharsis*, while not without an indirect moral influence, yet cannot itself, as regarded from the point of view of its immediate effect, consist in the production of a definite character of will. That this is true also of the purification effected by the tragedy admits of less doubt owing to the fact that precisely those emotions with which it has to deal here expressly connected with excitement are i.e. pity and fear".¹⁹

Thus Butcher follows Zeller in interpreting the Aristotelian term *catharsis*. The main difference between them is that Zeller does not consider the difference between the two interpretations of *catharsis*, namely, 'purgation' and 'purification' as of vital importance. "It is of less importance", he says, "in point of actual fact, whether it is the religious or the medical meaning of purification, that is prominent in Aristotle's mind, since in either case alike we are dealing with a figurative expression, in the sense that the term does not admit of being transferred literally from the one sphere to the other, and we can only decide how far he means to extend the analogy contained in it by a reference to other passages and to the whole scope of his doctrine. It seems probably that he took *katharsis*, as we might use 'purgation', in the first instance to mean the expulsion from the body of burdensome or injurious matter,²⁰ but that in as much as he was here dealing with the application of this conception to states of emotions, he came to connect with it, as he went on, the idea of deliverance from pollution and spiritual disease as well—just as in general one readily combines

18. *Ibid.*, p. 269.

19. Cp. Zeller, *op-cit.*, note 2, vol. II, pp. 311-12.

notions connected with the same expression in a confused compound without clearly discriminating them from one another. This very notion of purgation, moreover, was one in which the ancients were unable to keep the ideas of healing and expiation distinct from one another.”²¹

Butcher notes three instead of two meanings of the word catharsis (a) the medical (b) the religious or liturgical, ‘lustratio’ or ‘expiatio’ and (c) the moral, ‘purification’, and says that there is difficulty sometimes in keeping them apart. But he does not agree with Zeller that it is not important whether the medical or the religious use of catharsis is primarily intended, for he says that the medical catharsis implies relief upon previous excitation, which is of vital importance for the argument.²²

Regarding emotions to be purified there is difference of opinion. Butcher translates that portion of the definition of Tragedy as “through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions”. F.L. Lucas says that the proper translation is “the relief of *such* emotions”, “of emotions of that sort”²³ and includes grief, weakness, contempt and blame among the feelings of that sort. Zeller says, “So much we learn from his (Aristotle’s) own utterance, that the purification consists in deliverance from some dominating excitement of passion or overwhelming mental depression, and accordingly we must understand by the expression in the first instance not only purification within the soul of permanent affection, but the removal from it of unhealthy ones”.²⁴

Zeller does not approve of those who interpret Aristotle to mean that art effects this removal by satisfying man’s innate need of experiencing, at times, more violent emotions by engaging in harmless excitement. He says that the peculiar character of the effect produced by art cannot be so easily explained. “Art” he says, “purifies and soothes the emotions in that it delivers us from such as are morbid or oppressive by

21. Zeller, *op. cit.*, vol II, pp. 312-14.

22. Butcher, *op. cit.*, fn. 1, p. 245, fn. 3, p. 246.

23. Lucas, *Tragedy*, p. 43.

24. *op. cit.*, p. 314. In *politics* VIII. 7. Aristotle speaks of enthusiasm as a form of excitement by which many persons are possessed and of which they are “as it were cured and purified” by means of orgiastic music.

exciting such as are subordinate to its law, directing them, not towards what is merely personal, but towards what is universal in man, controlling their courses upon a fixed principle and setting a definite limit to their force. Thus, for example, tragedy in the fate of its heroes gives us a glimpse into the universal lot of man and at the same time into an eternal law of justice, music calms mental excitement and holds it spell-bound by its rhythm and harmony". Zeller says that though Aristotle nowhere expressly says that this is how art purifies yet the mutilated fragments of his theory of art read in the spirit of the rest of his system makes such a conclusion inevitable.

In a nutshell, catharsis is purification of emotions by purging them of painful and disturbing elements, which is possible by impersonalizing or universalizing these emotions.

II

It is interesting to compare Aristotle's notion of catharsis as the effect of serious poetry with the concept of *Guṇa* in Indian poetics, which is essentially a concept of the effect of poetry on the reader and the spectator.

At the very outset we should say that the concept of *Guṇa* is not a very clear one in Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Bharata uses the word *Guṇa* apparently in two senses. In chapter seven, after enumerating the feelings, emotions and their expressions, he remarks that those when joined with the universal *Guṇa* produce *Rasa*,²⁵ the aesthetic delight that is the essential poetic content as well as the highest poetic purpose. It appears that Bharata conceives of one universal *Guṇa* as of one universal *Rasa*. He points out that the feelings, emotions and their expressions—*ethe*, *pathe* and *praxeis* of Aristotle—produce *Rasa*, with the admixture of *Guṇa*. The verse that he quotes is no definition of *Guṇa* but describes the effect of an admixture of *Guṇa* with feelings, emotions and their expressions. Unfortunately Abhinavagupta's commentary on this text is not available and he does not refer to this passage when later on in the sixteenth chapter he comments on the kinds of *Guṇa*. In *Locana*, commenting on this topic in the *Dhavanīyāloka* of Ānandavardhana who propogates

25. Ebhyaśca sāmānyaguṇayogena Rasā niṣpadyante, *Nāṭyaśāstra*, ch.7. vol. I. p. 348.

the view of three *Guṇas* now generally accepted,²⁶ Abhinava clarifies the concept of *Guṇa*. Among the three *Guṇas* one is common, of universal application and that is known as *prasāda*. This *Guṇa* is defined by Ānandavardhana after Bharata, though the words used are different. Ānandavardhana defines it as the poem's suggestiveness of *Rasa* of all kinds.²⁷ Bharata's descriptive verse (ch. 7, verse 7)^{27a} means that "the feeling conveyed by the meaning that is born of communion with the heart is a product of *Rasa*,²⁸ the aesthetic delight, (it is all embracing in its effect, in as much as even) the body is affected by it as the dry wood is consumed by fire".²⁹ Abhinava commenting on Ānandavardhana's universal *Guṇa* known as *prasāda* uses two images to explain the nature of *Guṇa*. One is the image of fire consuming dry wood used by Bharata, the other is that of water free from impurities. He uses the two images to denote two aspects of the universal *Guṇa*. One is suggestive of quick self-communion in the mind of the reader or the spectator. The other denotes freedom from impurities.³⁰

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26. It is unprofitable for the purpose of this article to deal with the refutation of the ancient theory of ten *Guṇas* held by Bharata, Vāmana and others. Now Ānandavardhana's three *Guṇas* have been finally accepted by all the later critics.
27. Samarpakatvam kāvyasya yat tu sarva-rasān prati
 Śa prasādo guṇo jñeyah sarva-sādhāraṇa-kriyah.
 Prasādas tu svacchatā śabdarthayoh. Sa ca sarva-sādhārano guṇah,
 sarva-racanā-sādhāraṇas ca vyaṅgyāpekṣayaiva mukhyatayā vyavas-
 thito mantavyah. *Dhvanyāloka*, Pattaḥhirama Shastri's ed. pp.
 212-3.
- 27a. योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः ।
 शरीरं व्याप्यते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निः ॥
28. The compound word, '*rasodbhavah*' is capable of just the opposite translation: "the origin of *Rasa*", and it would appear from the prose passage discussed above that this very translation is better, but the concept of the highest significance in Indian poetics is *Rasa*, without which as Bharata himself remarks, we cannot make a start in poetics. *Guṇa* is inherent in *Rasa*, but as its effect rather than its cause. See *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka* Pattaḥhiram Shastri's ed., pp. 208-9, and *Kāvya-prakāśa* with *Pradīpa* and *Udyota*, p. 389.
29. Yo'rtho hrdayasamvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavah;
 Śarīram vyāpyate tena śuṣkaṁ Kāṣṭhamivāgninā.
 Nāṭyaśāstra, vol. 1, ch. 7, p. 348.
30. *Locana*, pp. 212-13.

Quick apprehension of aesthetic delight and purification are thus the two characteristics of *Guṇa*.

This common *Guṇa*, the *sāmānya guṇa* of Bharata, known as *prasāda* in later poetics, is really an inherent characteristic of aesthetic delight (*Rasa*), its inherent quality (*dharma*). Mammata uses both the images of Abhinava in his definition of *prasāda* the universal *Guṇa*, though he emphasises only one aspect of *Guṇa*, its quick overwhelming of the heart with aesthetic delight (*Rasa*)³¹.

The difficulty, however, arises when it is said that *Guṇa* is related with *Rasa* as an effect of the latter.³² Abhinava explains *Guṇa* as a kind of deliciousness (*āsvādaviśeṣa*) but it has to be accepted as different from the deliciousness of *Rasa*. It appears that *Rasa*, the taste of the very secretion of the basic disposition that oozes when impregnated with the power of the eternal spirit, is the highest aesthetic delight. *Guṇa* is the peculiar condition of the heart at the time of such an impregnation. The heart in such a moment expands. *Vikāśa* or expansion is said to be the psychic nature of *Prasāda*. It is at the same time delightful and pure. Abhinava emphasises these points.³³

There are two other *Guṇas* known as “*mādhurya*” and “*Ojas*”. The psychic nature of the former is ‘melting’, *dṛuti*, as that of the latter is ‘blazing’, *dipti*. Mammata’s definition of the one universal *Guṇa*, *prasāda*, and Govinda Bhatta’s explanation of it show that ‘melting’ and ‘blazing’ are two specific ways in which *Guṇa* manifests itself. Abhinava’s explanation also leads to the same view, yet three *Guṇas* have been accepted. I think it will be better to state that there is one *Guṇa* which manifests itself in two forms, ‘melting’ and ‘blazing’, *mādhurya* and *ojas*. All artistic or poetic experience expands human vision and sympathy. This is done in either of the two ways. But sometimes both ways of widening the vision are used in the same poem. But to take such cases as examples of the generic *Guṇa*, *prasāda*, is to confuse matters.

From the texts referred to above and from *Nāṭyaśāstra* ch. 7, vol. 1, p. 358, where Bharata explains the common, universal or generic *Guṇa*, we can venture to say that there is only one fundamental *Guṇa* of

31. *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, ch. VIII, Kārikās 70-71.

32. *Locana*, p. 209.

33. *Locana*, p. 211-13.

serious poetry (that is, poetry which suggests *Rasa*), that widens our vision and sympathy. But this is done in either of the two ways : it is either in the form of melting or in that of exciting the heart. In one case the experience is like that of the sugar melting in water. In another case it is like burning of fuel in fire. These two experiences are possible only in cases of poetry of the first class. They beautify it all the more.³⁴ The expansion of vision or widening of sympathy is really never missing as an effect of our reading good poetry, or seeing a good drama.

It has been noted that this is the characteristic of great poetry (*Rasa*) only. Hence it is said by Mammata that *Guṇas* are invariably found³⁵ in great poetry (*Rasa*) only. Thus in the poetry of lower grade where there is no *Rasa*, there is no *Guṇa*.

Indian critics accept eight varieties of *Rasa* on the basis of eight basic feelings of the human heart, and the ninth *Rasa* is accepted as the one fundamental *Rasa* on the basis of the soul itself, which ninth is the primary *Rasa* giving light to the eight secondary ones. All these nine varieties of *Rasa* are poetry of the highest grade. All these purify the heart and expand our vision by bringing the heart in touch with the eternal spirit, the result of which is that a feeling analogous either to melting or blazing is generated. The result of both of these is simply purification of the heart which while attached to the worldly objects remains selfish and narrow and hence a hard knotty stuff.³⁶ In life, love is beset with jealousies. Poetry removes these impurities. Our sympathies are widened and our heart is purified. This purification is possible by the quality of the poem which quickly generates the reader's communion with his own infinite spirit and that is called *Guṇa*. *Guṇa* in Sanskrit poetics is both a quality of the poem and an effect produced on the reader or the spectator, primarily the latter and secondarily the former. The *Guṇa* as characteristic of a poem is the objective correlative of *Guṇa* which is primarily a characteristic of the heart in poetic experience.

34. Utkarṣahetaṃ Kāvyaaprakāśa, ch. VIII, kārīkā 60.

35. Acalaṣṭhitāyāh, *Ibid.*, ch. VIII. kārīkā 66.

36. Cp. Govinda Bhatta in *Pradīpa* on *Kāvyaaprakāśa* p. 391. *Drutiścetaso galitatvameva, dveṣādijanya-kāṭhinyābhāvah; tathā ca yadvaśena śrotur nirmanaskataiva sampadyate tadāhlādatvas-varūpam mādhyam ityarthah.*
It is to be noted that in almost all the important schools of Indian philosophy the highest delight comes only after subduing the *manas* or the empirical self.

Thus in short, the subduing of the empirical self (*citta*) by the eternal spirit is the main task of serious poetry that suggests *Rasa*. It appears as if the finite self is dissolved. The experience is like the melting of sugar in water or burning of fuel in fire. Sometimes in the same form we have both the experiences alternately. It depends upon the nature of the basic feelings roused by the poem. Thus, according to Abhinavagupta, in the case of the feelings of Love and Sorrow the heart melts and in those of Anger, Courage and Wonder it blazes. In the case of Aversion and Fear it blazes a lot and melts a little, in that of Mirth there is as much melting as blazing and in that of Peace melting and blazing are alternately predominant.³⁷

The quality known technically as *Guṇa* is suggested by the peculiar combinations of letters, compounds or other ways of composition and hence *Guṇas* are also said to belong to words and meanings of poetry, though *Guṇas* may be said to belong to these only secondarily.³⁸ In its primary sense, for example, *ojas* does not consist in the presence of compounds in the following fiery speech of Bhīma :

Cañcad-bhujabhramita-Canḍagḍābhighāta—

Ṣaṅcūrṇitoruyugalasya Suyodhanasya

Stāynāvabaddha—ghanṣṇitaśoṇapāṇi—

Ruttamśayiṣyati kacāns tava devi Bhīmah.

These long compounds are really the most natural verbal expression of an excited mind. *Ojas* is really the blazing of the heart which is an effect produced by its contact with the eternal spirit, its self-communication. The words that express the excited mind's feeling are the means with the help of which the reader gets a glimpse of that excitement. Thus *Guṇa* which itself is an *effect* of *Rasa* becomes a *cause* of a peculiar combination of words or letters which last is the effect in the concrete form. This is so when we think of how the poem came into being. But when we read and enjoy it, the peculiar combination of words or letters become the cause of our understanding the excited or melted state of the character's mind (*dīpti* or *druti*) which in its own turn suggests the universalized feeling impregnated with spirit or *Rasa*, which is the poetic essence.

37. *Locana*, p. 212.

38. *Kāvyaprakāśa*, ch. VIII, kārīkā 71.

III

The two concepts-Aristotle's *katharsis* and Bharata's *Guṇa* have thus many points of similarity. They both are the effects produced by great poetry. Wherever there is *Rasa* there is *Guṇa*.³⁹ And *Rasa* the highest aesthetic delight is characteristic of the greatest poetry only. Zeller says that catharsis is an effect only of serious poetry according to Aristotle.

Both are concepts of purification of the heart as already shown. Aristotle does not expressly mention how purification is brought about but such eminent authorities as Zeller and Butcher say that catharsis is brought about by universalization or impersonalization of emotions as has been shown above. The concept of universalisation or impersonalization is known also to the Indian critics for they say that all artistic or poetic feelings and emotions are impersonal. We do not consider artistic objects as either belonging or not belonging to us. We are not indifferent to them either.⁴⁰

Abhinava explains impersonalization produced by drama thus. The actor is dressed like Rāma and we therefore do not take him to be an actor, but our mind which knows that Rāma belongs to the past does not take him to be Rāma either. Thus we take leave of the consciousness of space and time, past and present. We are not even indifferent to the man on the stage, for we see expressions of some feeling like love or courage on his countenance and as we have these feelings latent in us, we think as if our own feelings are being portrayed.⁴¹ Thus the concept *Guṇa* in Sanskrit is not a concept of impersonalization, for the experience of impersonalization precedes that of *Guṇa*. Enumerating the stages of artistic apprehension. Gokulanāthā in his commentary on *Kāvya-prakāśa*, (p. 131), states that impersonalisation occurs before the experience of *Guṇa*. The gist of Indian Vedāntic schools is that nothing other than the spirit is pure and nothing can be purified without being impregnated with the eternal infinite spirit. *Guṇa* is a specific state of the heart when it is impregnated with the eternal infinite spirit, which is the essence of every human

39. *Rasam vinā ye nāvatiṣṭhante, pradeepa*; *yatra Rasaḥ tatra mādhyādikam astyeva, Udyota, Kāvya-prakāśa*, p. 383.

40. *Kāvya-prakāśa* (with *Pradeepa* and *Udyota*). p. 97.

41. *Abhinava-Bhārat* on *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Gaekwad Oriental Series, vol. I, p. 285.

being. The common characteristic of this state of the heart is that it is purified, that its sympathies and visions are enlarged.⁴² The experience takes either of two shapes, analogous to the melting of sugar in water and the burning of fuel in fire. As already explained the experience of melting or blazing depends on the kind of the feeling involved.

After the experience of impersonalisation, the reader or the spectator may be said to be stepping into the world of art or poetry.⁴³ Immediately after it there is the purification of the heart experienced as a widening of vision and sympathy, a sort of psychic expansion, which is a result of the contact with the eternal infinite spirit.

The thesis of Butcher, Bernays and Zeller is that the tragic catharsis is produced by the excitement of both pity and fear through artistic or poetic means. They say that pity or fear alone will not produce it. Again, Butcher explains that pity should not be understood as "the pure instinct of compassion, the unselfish sympathy with others' distress which most modern writers understand by pity", that "in psychological analysis fear is the primary emotion from which pity derives its meaning".⁴⁴

Here the fundamental difference between tragedy and poetry of the *Rasa* variety should be understood. Tragedy is a portrayal of a person whose emotions take a wrong turn owing to a flaw in his character. The tragic character is "betrayed by what is false within" as George Meredith pointed out. The plot construction of a tragedy is a story of this betrayal by the evil in the hero's character, which destroys him as well as others who come in contact with him. The evil in the tragic character outstrips the good in him and destroys him. The spectator is terrified by the tragic hero's ruin, because the spectator himself has a similar evil potential in his heart.

Fear, according to Aristotle, is "a trouble or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or

42. *Vikāsa* meaning 'expansion' and *Prasāda* explained as 'purification' (vide *Locana* p. 212) are the two words used in description of this state.

43. As has been so beautifully stated by Gokulanatha Upadhyaya. Vide his comments on *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, p. 131.

44. Butcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-58.

destory".^{44a} Pity is "a perturbation of the mind arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to himself or his."⁴⁵

Thus fear is apprehension of being hurt, and we pity others, because we know that we also suffer from the same weakness. The basis of the spectator's identification with the tragic hero is *hamartia*, or the tragic error, the evil element in him, which is fully developed in a tragedy. In an ordinary man's life it is suppressed or is not allowed to be fully developed. An ordinary man's life is a life of repressed emotions. Emotions are developed in serious poetry of both varieties, Tragedy and *Rasa*, with a consistency or inner necessity not found in ordinary life. The difference between tragic poetry and poetry of the *Rasa* variety lies in this that while we are afraid of developing our emotions like Macbeth or Othello, we like to develop ourselves like Rāma or Sita, Duṣyanata or Śakuntala. The reason of this difference is that tragedy describes the development of the hero's emotions as they should not develop. We should refrain from committing mistakes of Macbeth or Othello in our life. That is the lesson of tragedy. On the other hand, we should develop ourselves like Rāma and Sita. That is the lesson taught by the *Rāmāyaṇa*. What ought to be done is the emphasis in poetry of the *Rasa* variety and what ought not to be done is emphasised by the tragic writers.

The common element in both these varieties of great poetry is that poetry purifies our emotional life and so elevates us. In tragedy it is done by the removal of an evil potential; in *Rasa* it is done by developing a good potential.

The theory of *Rasa* is however, all-pervasive. It explains all types of poetry. Tragedy, according to Sanskrit poetics would be classed as a drama or poem where the central feeling of *nirveda* or quiet resignation, but that is not the feeling of the hero in the play from the beginning. The hero comes to realize this feeling of quiet resignation after having blundered in the opposite direction; after having done what should not have been done; after his struggles to make his life a worldly success and to shape things according to his heart's desire end in fiasco, because of the wrong course given to his emotions and actions, because of the choice of a wrong method. In short, Tragedy is the

44a. Thomas Hobbes' *Digest of Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ch. VI (Everyman's Library).

45. *Ibid.*, ch. X.

supreme attempt to teach the dreamy nature of mundane existence, futility of worldly possessions and pleasures. Total development of oneself is impossible with a flaw in one's character.

However, the method of entry into the esemplastic world of poetry is the same everywhere. We have to be one with the object of description. The hero, who is the objective correlative of the central feeling, the *vibhāva* of the drama, has to be sympathised with. How can we sympathise with evil in the tragic hero? We sympathise with him because we also suffer from the same evil element, although we suppress it. But suppression is not cure. It may develop as soon as it finds congenial soil and favourable circumstances. In tragedy therefore that evil is mingled with some of the noblest qualities of humanity. The hero is made a great man with very many good qualities. And it is shown how all his treasure of good qualities is destroyed by the one evil element, the *hamartia* in him. Without sympathy with the hero we cannot uproot our evil potential. The part played by pity therefore is no less important than that played by fear.

It is our oneness with the poetic hero, be he Macbeth or Rāma, that lifts us up to the poetic region. Only a *sahṛdaya* can enter the temple of the Muses and his essential qualification is oneness with the object of description. When we cross the barriers of space and time, we are identified with the object of description, which is possible only on the basis of a common feeling. There is a corresponding elevation of consciousness, which also becomes infinite. Thus our basic feeling or *ethos* is embraced by our infinite eternal self, which becomes transcendental at the moment of the poetic realization. In such a moment we realise the feeling of *nirveda* or quiet resignation. But in the journey to this height of poetic experience we pass through moments of experience of *druti* and *dṛpti*, melting and blazing of our heart, as our emotions of fear and pity are roused. Fear and pity are the most important fleeting emotions (*vyabhicāribhāvās*) in a tragedy.

As soon as we have the poetic experience the knotty nature of our heart, its rigidity, its narrow individual outlook is changed. We begin to take a universal view of things. As soon as this knot is opened or this deadlock is removed there is an experience of happiness due to freedom, which is the essence of all great poetry, whether *tragedy* or *Rasa*.

Western critics have failed to distinguish between the subtle differences in poetic experience which the Hindu critics have analysed under the concepts of *Guṇa* and *Rasa*. While the pinnacle of poetic experience is the esemplastic experience of the universal basic feeling by one's

TREATMENT OF PLOT IN SANSKRIT DRAMA AND IN

SHAKESPEAR'S ROMANTIC COMEDIES

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Aristotle's doctrine of Mimesis¹ and the theory of Anukṛti² in Sanskrit drama deserve a careful and detailed examination, because they form the very foundation of drama both in India and in the west. While defining the function of drama Aristotle says that it is the imitation of an action 'of a certain magnitude' with the aim of effecting a proper purgation of the feelings of pity and fear, and it is of course worthwhile to remember that according to him drama means tragedy only, although he refers to comedy also in his 'Poetics', but dismisses it almost in a few sentences. As tragedy is totally absent in Sanskrit drama, the Hindu theorists mean only comedy, frivolous or serious, when they refer to drama as visible poetry (drśya-kāvya), and they also, like Aristotle, define the function of drama as imitation (anukṛti) or, to be more precise, imitation of a certain condition of the mind (avasthānukṛtiḥ nāṭyam). The similarity of both these Indian and western theories is confined to the fact of the function of drama being imitative, and the crux of the matter seems to be found in what follows next, namely 'of an action of a certain magnitude' in the case of Aristotle and 'of a certain' condition of the mind' in the case of the Sanskrit theorists. This is a fundamental difference as it throws light on the very conception of drama both in India and in the West—a conception that could not but be deeply coloured and influenced by the temperaments, views of life and cultural and spiritual aspirations of the respective peoples. While the stress in the Aristotelean theory is quite obviously on the action or the physical action, it is in the Indian theory on the condition of the mind resulting from certain happenings. Both action and mental state are implied in both the theories, but what is significant is, while action takes precedence over feeling in the former, in the latter feeling is of paramount importance relegating action to a place of secondary importance. This seems to be the proper explanation for the methods of classifications of drama in India and in the West. Our classification is mainly on the basis of Sentiment or Rasa, Sṛṅgārārasa pradhāna, Virarāsapradhāna etc., and theirs is on the

basis of the culmination of the play, brought about by a certain type of action, Tragedy, Comedy or Tragicomedy.

This should not mean, however, that feeling in western drama does not have as much importance as action, and that feeling alone counts in Sanskrit drama to the exclusion of action. In fact, both action and feeling are interdependent, and one cannot exist without the other, as both in their turns can be cause and effect. Not all the Western plays are action-based or interesting only from the point of view of action. A play like 'Hamlet' or 'Antigone', for instance, is more interesting on account of the feeling displayed or the internal conflict raging on in the mind of Hamlet or Antigone, than on account of the action which, as is well known, is not of any special interest. So also not all Sanskrit plays are devoted to the depiction of sentiment alone, because we have some plays like those of Bhāsa or the famous play 'Mṛcchakaṭika' of Śūdraka, or even a Romantic comedy like 'Mālavikāgnimitra' or Ratnāvalī, in which action is as much interesting as the feeling, if not more. It only means that, broadly speaking, the Western drama is action oriented and the Sanskrit drama sentiment-oriented (Rasapradhāna), and this should accord well with the temperaments of the respective peoples, the one active, acquisitive and combative-according to what Max Mueller says in his 'Indian view of life', and the other passive, reflective and spiritual.

Another very important factor to be taken into consideration is the nature and purpose of drama in India and in the West. The Indian drama, or rather the ancient Sanskrit drama, reflects a highly cultured state of society and was intended for the amusement as well as edification of the highly cultivated strata of society, although it could have been appreciated by the less cultivated also on account of the familiarity of its theme and the liberal use of Prākṛit spoken by women and lowly persons in the play. And the Western drama is more democratic in its nature and function and was intended to give as much of pleasure to the groundlings as to those who were more educated and cultured. A rich fare of feeling or sentiment may win the admiration of the cultured and educated audience, but it falls flat on the commoners who can only appreciate something sensational or exciting, or a quick-moving action with a variety of incidents.

The plot is a very important element in drama forming, as it were, the very basement of the whole play. Aristotle is very clear about it, and says that the plot (muthos)⁴ is the soul and first principle of tragedy. A well-constructed plot, with the various incidents arranged in an orderly and logical sequence, is the most essential prerequisite for a play. Without it, the action would do clumsy and improbable, and the characters sketchy or even unconvincing, with the result that the play, intended to be

a spectacle of life with the aim of evoking a certain response from the spectators, would fail in evoking that response. We would perhaps be quite within our bounds, therefore, in assuming that in Western drama plot is given as much importance as character, and even Aristotle in an earlier chapter of the 'Poetics' says that character (ethos) as well as plot (muthos) is one of the six elements of tragedy.

The Hindus too attached great importance to plot (Vastu), but what is more significant is their classification of the plot into two kinds : Principal (Ādhikārikā), relating to the chief persons concerned with the essential interest of the play, and Accessary (Prāsaṅgika)⁵, intended for the furtherance of the main plot, which is concerned with persons other than the hero or heroine. And this accessary is again subdivided into Banner (Patāka) which indicates the progress of main plot from time to time (something like the Chorus in the Greek drama) extending sometimes to the very end of the play, and Episodic incident (Prakāri)⁶ of minor duration and importance in which the principal characters take no part. It seems that this episodic incident, Patāka or Prakāri, is of greater importance in the Sanskrit drama than its counterpart in Western drama (in which also there are episodes or subplots or underplots not vitally connected with the main plot), because while in the latter it has its independent existence, contributing to the main interest mostly as a contrast or counterpart in a different sphere to the main plot, in Sanskrit drama its connection with the main plot is vital, the main action is through the interplay of the main characters including the hero and the heroine, and it can be seen clearly in all the scenes in which they appear. Even if the episode is removed, the main interest is not impaired substantially, although it may be true that its interest is increased and its impact on the audience is rendered more powerful by its juxtaposition with the episode. But in the Sanskrit drama, dealing as it does with the evocation of a certain sentiment and its systematic development, the main plot, dealing with the principal characters, the hero and the heroine, is rather static from the view-point of action, because the scenes in which they appear are largely devoted to the evocation and development of sentiment, to lyricism, to revelation of the feelings and mental attitudes of the protagonists, and whatever progress of the dramatic action is indicated—and it is not much when compared with that in Western drama—it is indicated to a very considerable extent in these episodes only, in which the minor characters in the course of their conversation provide us glimpses into what has happened and what is about to happen.⁷ Therefore, this episode, Patāka or Prakāri, can be considered as an integral part of the plot in Sanskrit drama in so far as it helps the progress of the dramatic action by supplying the missing links in its continuity in spite of its not too close relation to the main dramatic action.

The plays of Shakespeare, in view of their amazing variety both in their style and content, of their representative character of the ancient classical tradition coming down from Aristotle, at the same time enjoying a considerable measure of independence from it with regards to the three unities, plot-construction, mingling of the serious with the comic etc., can be taken as fitting specimens for purposes of comparison with some of the best and most representative plays in Sanskrit. Such a comparison is not only interesting, but is bound to be revealing and profitable, as it throws light on the dramatic art as practised by the dramatists of India and those of the West, provided, of course, it is taken for granted that Shakespeare is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of the dramatists that represent the Western dramatic tradition. His thirty-seven plays include tragedies and comedies—and also tragicomedies, romances and chronicles, the most serious and the most frolicsome, and the most terrestrial and the most ethereal. Moreover, he belongs neither to the hoary past like the Athenian trio, nor to our immediate present, but stands between the two, more inclined towards the latter perhaps, but the fact that a huge gap of a thousand years or more separates him from some of our greatest Sanskrit dramatists is not a matter of much consequence on account of his being the best representative of the Western dramatic tradition. Moreover his dramatic work has such a wide range and universality that one or other of its aspects is always found that can render one or more other of his plays amenable to comparison with any drama written at any time in any language.

The Sanskrit drama, especially the 'Nāṭaka' and also the 'Prakarana' (Nāṭakam saprakaraṇam)³, bears a close resemblance to the Romantic comedy of Shakespeare, as both deal with the theme of romantic love or heroism or both. In both, the setting is romantic and the scene of action is laid in a far off country in the remote past. The romantic element is further intensified by the use of poetry, exquisitely lyrical, by the frequent introduction of song and music, by idyllic descriptions of nature in all her beauty and charm, and by an occasional employment of the supernatural. The atmosphere in both looks like that of a fairy land. Even the more serious type of Nāṭaka, like Kālidāsa's 'Abhijñānaśākuntalam', or Śūdraka's 'Mṛcchakaṭika' or Bhavabhūti's 'Uttararāmacarita', can be profitably compared with any one of Shakespeare's last plays, because all these are tragicomedies in which, the romantic element remaining the same, the tragic element in the theme of love is treated with greater seriousness which imparts to the theme a tragic sombreness.

Before proceeding with instituting a comparison between a few representative plays in Sanskrit with the Shakespearean romantic comedy or tragicomedy in respect of the treatment of plot, it is worthwhile to

note some salient features of both which are unique in as much as they represent the peculiarities of the dramatic technique adopted by Shakespeare on the one hand and the Sanskrit dramatists on the other. For instance, the Sanskrit play begins with a Prayer (Nāndī) which is followed by a conversation between the Director (Sūtradhāra) and an actor in the play about to be performed. This is the Prologue which is intended to acquaint the audience with the author of the play, and also with the theme of the play in a brief and general way. The play ends with a benediction (Bharatavākya). Both these are the unique features of Sanskrit drama, and apart from their significance in revealing its religious origin of essential connexion with religion, they in a way indicate the fact that Sanskrit drama always ends happily, because a catastrophic conclusion is incompatible with a prayer in the beginning in which the blessings of the Deity are invoked, and a benediction at the very close in which the wish of the author is expressed for the happiness and prosperity of his patron or of all in general. And the conversation of the Director with an actor in the Prologue, besides giving the audience an account of the play or playwright, serves the purpose of a transition for the audience from one plane of reality to another, from everyday world to the world of drama, to the world of poetry and imagination. But no such transition is provided in a Western play. And in Shakespeare, the play begins with its main action, and the audience sometimes finds itself suddenly drawn into its midst. Both the Sanskrit Nāṭaka and the Shakespearean romantic comedy are poetic dramas no doubt, but while in the former poetry is employed mainly in the depiction of sentiment or in the revelations of the mental state of a particular character, hero or heroine, or any other important character, in the latter it is used for both the purposes of portraying character and furthering the dramatic action. Moreover Sanskrit poetry enjoys a distinct advantage over its English counterpart in the abundant variety of its metre. Each metre that is used is in perfect harmony with the mood or emotional state of the speaker, and contributes a great deal to the generation of the intended sentiment in the mind of the audience.

Both the Sanskrit Nāṭaka, or its lesser form Nāṭikā, and the Shakespearean romantic comedy deal with the theme of love in an ideal state, often love at first sight, which comes to fruition in the end when the lovers are reunited after a temporary separation. In both reunion takes place as a result of some marvellous happening, a sudden change in situation or character. Whereas the Sanskrit play ends with the benediction uttered by a principal character, by the hero generally, the Shakespearean play comes to a close with a happy note, with song and music, or with an epilogue put in the mouth of a major character, as in 'As you Like It' in which it is uttered by Rosalind. Nevertheless, the

cheery note is there, the wish for the constancy of lovers, happiness and prosperity.

It is interesting that comedy which was originally a comedy of manners, a social satire, with laughter, ridicule and merriment, should have reached such a high degree of perfection in the hands of Shakespeare as a romantic comedy with its idyllic love and heroic sentiment, as to come very close to our Sanskrit Nātaka in its general tone and atmosphere. The accent is on atmosphere and situation rather than on character, and the incidents are so arranged as to provide a rich fare of romantic love and sentiment. So also in the Sanskrit romantic comedy the concentration of the dramatist is on the sentiment of love and its elaborate portrayal through the play, and this is achieved by providing opportunities for the lovers, the hero and heroine, to meet, by creating certain impediments in the way of their love so as to make them pine for each other with greater ardour, and finally by clearing those impediments to usher in certainty of success (niyatāpti)⁹ and then the happy denouement (Kārya)¹⁰ with the lovers reuniting and the play ending happily.

It appears that the unity of the plot in the Sanskrit play is better maintained than in the Shakespearean romantic comedy for the following reasons. First, the plot in the Sanskrit play is generally simple, the meeting of the hero and heroine as if by a chance and their falling in love with each other at first sight, the obstacles created by the hero's first wife or wives out of jealousy (the hero is invariably a much-married man in the Sanskrit romantic comedy) which prevent them from coming together, their pining for each other (the Erotic sentiment or Sṛṅgāra is generated here in all its abundance), the stratagem of the hero's friends, the Vidūṣaka being one of them, to bring the lovers together, and finally some important happening which makes the Queen relent and then reconcile herself to having another besides her to share her husband's love. Second, the Sanskrit dramatist scrupulously avoids all incidents that are not vitally connected with the main dramatic purpose, namely, the vicissitudes of love of the hero and heroine and the full evocation of the erotic sentiment that results therefrom. Even if a few incidents, introduced in the earlier part of the play, appear to be extraneous to the principal theme, they are fully integrated into it in the course of the dramatic action and their essential connexion with it and their indispensability in bringing about the happy denouement can be clearly seen towards the end of the play.

It may, therefore, be surmised that the very simplicity of the plot in the Sanskrit drama is in a way its strength. Attention is focussed from start to finish on the main theme, and nothing, no incident

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unconnected with it, diverts it (attention) from it (main theme). In fact there is nothing like a subplot or underplot in the Sanskrit drama. The seed (bija) is sown in the beginning, it becomes the drop (bindu)¹² spreading itself on the entire surface of the dramatic action, like a drop of oil on water, then it sprouts into a tree that weathers many a storm in the course of its growth finally to bear fruit in the form of the attainment (phalāgama) by the hero of his love for his beloved.

The same cannot be said of the Shakespearean romantic comedy in which there are a number of subplots developing alongside the main plot as the action progresses. It is not so much the feeling or sentiment, the love of the hero and heroine, that is important here as the wealth and variety of incident, and it is common knowledge that Shakespeare's romantic comedies have one main purpose, namely, to amuse us and excite our curiosity by a multiplicity of complications and by a skilful resolution of all of them towards the end in the interests of a happy conclusion. The aim of Sanskrit drama is also to amuse no doubt, but to amuse us not by giving a rich variety of incident, but by providing us a rich fare of sentiment, through an elaborate process of evocation and intensification in the course of the dramatic action, and by enabling us to enjoy it (Rasāsvādāna) to the maximum extent.

That Shakespeare's chief concern in his romantic comedies is plot-construction, that the dramatic interest is centred round the plot much more than character and sentiment becomes clearly evident as we examine some of his plays, like 'A Midsummer Night's Dream', 'The Merchant of Venice' and 'Much Ado About Nothing'. In each of these plays there are more than one plot and all of them seem to be equally important. In 'A Midsummer Night's Dream', though the plot dealing with the two pairs of lovers seems to be the central one, the other plots dealing with the Fairies, Theseus and Hippolyta, and the Athenian artisans, are given a degree of importance which is more than their due, thus detracting from the prominence which should legitimately belong to the central plot. In the 'Merchant of Venice' the central plot should be about the vicissitudes of Antonio as the title suggests, but the romantic love of Bassanio and Portia is treated with equal importance and the figure of Shylock seems to loom large throughout the play. And in 'Much Ado About Nothing', the Benedict-Beatrice plot shares our attention with the Claudio-Hero story which, of course, is intended to be the central plot. 'As You Like It' and 'Twelfth Night' seem to be better in this respect as the attention is largely focused on the plot dealing with the lovers, but there too there are distractions like the plot dealing with the banished Duke and his lords and the story of Pastoral love in the former, and the Malvolio episode in the latter. And in all these plays interest is not concentrated on one hero and one

heroine. But the Sanskrit romantic comedies like 'Mālavikāgnimitra' of Kālidāsa and 'Ratnāvali' of Harsha deal with one and only plot, the romantic love of the hero and heroine, every incident earlier or later in the play is perfectly assimilated into it. In the romantic comedy of Shakespeare it is the plot with its complication and their final unravelling that is important more than the generation of sentiment, and in the Sanskrit romantic comedy (Nāṭaka it is the generation and development of sentiment (Rasapoṣaṇa) that counts much more than the plot which is generally simple and straight, without being unduly complicated.

It is only when we come to Shakespeare's greater tragedies, and later on to his last plays, that we have quite a different experience which in many respects seems to be similar to the one we have while going through the more serious comedies in Sanskrit, like Kālidāsa's 'Abhijñānaśākuntalam', Bāṇabhūti's 'Uttararāmacarita', Sūdraka's 'Mr̥cchakatika' and also Harsha's 'Nāgānanda'. It seems that as Shakespeare passes from his romantic comedies to his great tragedies, as his genius matures, his attention acquires concentration on characterization rather than plot, and as he passes from his tragedies to his last plays, he shifts the emphasis with consummate dramatic skill from situation to sentiment, from character to idea. Plot is necessary for drama of course, but now for Shakespeare in its bare essentials only. There is no need to introduce unnecessary, uncalled for complications, and then skilful resolution of them all to render the plot more dramatically interesting, because for him what is of utmost importance and interest in drama is not plot, but human nature in all its infinite variety, and human values that can render life worth living. And particularly in his last plays Shakespeare transcends his age and his national boundaries and becomes the poet of all men, of all times.

In his last plays—because it is with them only that the Sanskrit Nāṭaka of the serious type can be compared, tragedy being completely absent in Sanskrit drama—Shakespeare's plot as a rule is very simple without any incident that is sensational or suddenly brought in. This can be clearly seen in 'The Winter's Tale' and 'The Tempest', and in both all events introduced have their utility in so far as they help the progress of the dramatic action, and illumine the central dramatic purpose. For example, the episode dealing with the conspiracy hatched by Caliban and Stephano in 'The Tempest' against Prospero's life, or the pastoral element introduced in 'The Winter's Tale', is more closely related to the main plot of the play than any such episode in an earlier romantic comedy, like the Malvolio-affair in 'Twelfth Night' or the story of the pastoral love of Phoebe and Silvius in 'As You Like It'—

the one illumining the character of Prospero by illustrating his supernatural powers, and the other revealing the life led by Perdita among the shepherds and her love for Florizel, an event of great importance as the lovers are an instrument in the final reconciliation. Even in 'Pericles' the plot is homogeneous from the beginning of Act III to the end, although the events in the first two Acts, suspected to be spurious,¹³ are neither quite necessary to, nor well integrated with, the main plot dealing with Pericles' misfortunes and his final reunion with his wife and daughter. It is only in 'Cymbeline' that a number of motives other than the main one, the love of Imogen and Posthumus, are introduced, but it is creditable on the part of the dramatist to have attempted their integration with the main motive in the closing scene of the play.

In the Sanskrit tragicomedies¹⁴ also there seems to be an attempt on the part of the dramatists to economise in the matter of plot-construction. Unlike in the more frivolous and less serious romantic comedies, the concentration here is on sentiment and its thorough and systematic evocation, but not on rendering the story interesting or fanciful by introducing incidents not quite indispensable to the main purpose, the evocation of Rasa. Bhavabhūti's 'Mālatīmādhava' deals with the romantic love of Mālati and Mādhava and of another pair also, the friends of the heroine and hero respectively¹⁵, and the chief interest here lies in the multiplicity of events, marvellous and also fearful sometimes¹⁶. But in his mature play 'Uttarāmacarita', Bhavabhūti is chiefly concerned with the sentiment of Pathos (Karūṇa) and its full and systematic development, and hence the comparative simplicity of the plot here. The plots of all the three plays of Kālidāsa are uniformly compact and well-integrated, but from his earliest romantic comedy 'Mālavikāgnimitra' to his latest, 'Śākuntala' there is discernible on the part of the dramatist an increasing tendency to dispense with superfluous details, a progressive attempt at succinctness and closer integration.

In its wealth and variety of incidents, and, notwithstanding them, in its sustained interest throughout with attention solely concentrated on the fortunes of the hero and heroine, Śūdraka's 'Mr̥cchakatika' stands supreme in the whole range of Sanskrit dramatic literature. This is a long play, a Prakaraṇa in ten Acts but such is the dramatic skill of Śūdraka, his sure and unerring dramatic instinct, that its length is lost sight of in its quick-moving action and vivid characterization. Here is a variety of incident as well as a variety of motive and character. Although not so well integrated in its plot as this play, Shakespeare's 'Cymbeline' may be profitably compared with it. The romantic love of Lārudatta and Vasantasenā is similar to Posthumus-Imogen love motive, though the latter is not so pure and enthralling as the former, being

perverted by suspicion and jealousy, and the Vasantasenā-Samsthānaka relationship has as much tragic irony in it as the Imogen-Cloten relationship-Samsthānaka being as crude, vain and stupid as Cloten. The tribulations of Vasantasenā are imbued with as much delicate pathos as those of Imogen, and the political revolution in Ujjain is of the same importance as the Roman invasion in 'Cymbeline' in its impact on the dramatic denouement-the succession of the vicious Pālaka by the generous Āryaka being very closely analogous to a more relenting, ennobled Cymbeline emerging out of the original impulsive and weak-willed tyrant.

The plot in 'Śākuntalam' is as compact as that in 'The Winters Tale' with this difference that in the former, which is more a romantic comedy having less of the tragic element that characterizes the latter, the first three Acts are devoted to the romantic love of the hero and the heroine. In both these plays the climax of the dramatic action is reached somewhere in the middle, in Act V in 'Śākuntalam' in which Śākuntalam is repudiated by Duṣyanta, and in Act III Sc. 2 in 'The Winter's Tale', in which Hermione is indicted by her husband Leontes. A comparison of these two climaxes reveals the superb dramatic art of the respective dramatists. In both the scenes, keyed to a high emotional pitch, the fates of the heroines hang in the balance, creating in us an inevitable feeling of tragic urgency. While the mind of Leontes is darkened with jealousy and suspicion, Duṣyanta's mind is clouded with oblivion. While the former rages on like a lunatic heaping accusations one after another on his innocent wife, the latter looks bewildered when pressed by the hermits to accept his lawfully-wedded wife, and even reacts strongly when accused of treachery and falsehood. While we hate Leontes for his mad jealousy, baseness and unmitigated cruelty, and admire Hermione for her calm, dignified bearing, we cannot even blame Duṣyanta for not accepting his wife, though our hearts may bleed at the sight of Śākuntala's helplessness. It is difficult to find throughout the whole range of dramatic literature a similar situation so tense and so tragic, yet so skilfully manipulated, that our sympathies are almost equally divided between the accuser and the accused, between the wrong-doer and the wronged one.

From the climax to the denouement the transition in both these plays is gradual and smooth, and no incident is introduced in either which is exciting or sensational. In fact, the happy ending, the reunion, of the husbands with their wives, and of the parents with their children, is even forestalled in a way in both the plays, by the arrival of Mātali, Indra's Charioteer in 'Śākuntalam' at Duṣyanta's palace to take him to fight against Indra's enemies, a circumstance that should be accompanied by a reward by the king of gods to Duṣyanta for his service in the

form of restoration of his happiness, the happiness of his reunion with his wife and son, by the love that develops between the children of the parted friends in 'The Winter's Tale' that should naturally pave the way to the harmony of reunion. The fact that Hermione is alive and hidden in Paulina's chapel, as if waiting to be reunited with her husband also should point to the final reunion. otherwise her very concealment would be without a purpose. And the denouement in both the plays is fraught with great psychological significance, as Dusyanta vacillating between doubt and certainty realises at last that the boy he has been fondling is no other than his own son, that the sad and serene lady who arrives on the scene is no other than his own wife, and as Leontes looking at Hermione standing like a statue and taking her to be a statue realises at last that she is his own wife in flesh and blood.

While in 'The Tempest' the transition from climax to denouement is sudden on account of the fact that the latter follows the former almost immediately as Prospero with rare generosity forgives his enemies even at the very moment when they are grovelling under the spell of his magical powers, in 'Uttararāmacarita' Bhavabhūti delays denouement, rather inordinately, in order to develop further the sentiment of Pathos so exquisitely evoked at the climax in Act III by supplementing it with the grief of Janaka and Kausalyā in the following Act, and also to give an outward manifestation to the heroic sentiment in the play implied in Rāma's fortitude in the midst of his suffering, by bringing about a martial confrontation between Candraketu and Lava. But the delay is more than compensated by the extremely artistic manner in which the denouement is brought about by the dramatic show arranged in the final Act depicting Sitā's travails at child-birth so as to provide an opportunity to Rāma and also to the people who have suspected her chastity to realize the wrong they have done to her wittingly or unwittingly. And the denouement in 'Mṛcchakatika' is assuredly one of the most exciting in all dramatic literature, as Cāru-datta is in the very last moment literally snatched away from the jaws of death. While the climax is reached here in Act IX in which all evidence is turned against the hero who consequently is condemned to death, the denouement follows close on its heels in Act X, the last Act of the play, a fitting culmination to a plot so varied and so well-knit, perhaps the most dramatic in all Sanskrit dramatic literature.

One of the most distinctive features of the last plays of Shakespeare as well as Kālidāsa's 'Śākuntalam' and Bhavabhūti's 'Uttararamacarita' (also the last plays of these dramatists) from the point of view of plot-construction is, apart from their simplicity and compactness, the fact that the nature of the denouement is indicated in a very subtle way even at the time when the tension is at its height, in the climax itself, or

closely preceding or following the climax. Thaisa's revival in the hands of Cerimon and Marina's escape from the murderer in 'Pericles', the escape of Imogen in boy's clothes in 'Cymbeline', the rescue of Hermione's infant-daughter by the old shepherd in 'The Winter's Tale', Śakuntalā's being carried away by her nymph-mother instead of sinking down into the earth as per her wish. Sitā's presence by the side of her lamenting husband, though invisible, and also Rāma's meeting with his son Lava later on not knowing him to be his son—all these are in close proximity to the climax in point of time and are like gleams of hope in the surrounding gloom.¹⁷

Harsha's 'Nāgānanda' is a tragedy of self-sacrifice which in some respects resembles 'Antigone', but for its happy ending which can be clearly seen as something forced upon it just to comply with the Hindu dramatic theory that forbids tragedy. Its plot is unique as being a strange combination of the romantic love in the first three Acts between Jimūtavāhana and Malayavati, hero and heroine, and the heroic self-sacrifice of the hero in the last two acts. But the transition from romantic love to self-sacrifice is as natural as the flower becoming the fruit, because Harsha has portrayed the character of the hero in such a way that it is possible for us to anticipate even in the earlier part,¹⁸ what the hero is upto and what nobler things he is capable of in spite of his being a romantic hero. The theme of 'Nāgānanda' is the theme dealing with the sublimation of romantic love into self-effacing compassion for all, man and beast alike. The climax of the plot is the resolve of the hero to sacrifice himself to save the life of Sankhacūda, and the denouement is his death which closely follows, but which is transformed into life by Gauri for the sake of a happy ending.

Shakespeare's usual method of weaving fantasy and realism into a fine web of dramatic plot—one of the very common characteristics of his romantic comedies—was not the method of the Sanskrit dramatists in general, who concerned themselves with introducing only those incidents that were relevant to their dramatic purpose, namely, the evocation and development of a sentiment. But there are a few exceptions. It should be considered as truly creditable on the part of Sūdraka and Kālidāsa that they have not only used this method, but used it to its best advantage. The romantic love of Cārudatta and Vasantasenā in 'Mṛcchakaṭika' gains in its charm of idealism when contrasted with the down-to-earth conversation of the gamblers and watchmen¹⁹, of Samsthānaka and also of the Vidūṣaka sometimes. Similarly in 'Śakuntalam' the Vidūṣaka's professed predilection for cakes and sweetmeats, his concern for his personal safety and comfort which he thinks are in jeopardy in the penance-grove, his likening of the king's love for Śakuntalā to the longing of one for tamarind after being tired of eating

dates²⁰—all these, it must be admitted, are amusing without offending our taste, at the same time serving as a foil to the high romanticism of Duṣyanta's love and the surrounding idyllic atmosphere. And the scene in which the fisherman is interrogated about his possession of the king's ring, reminds us of the scene in 'Much Ado About Nothing' (Act IV Sc. 2) in which Don John's men are interrogated by Dogberry and Verges. Both are pictures of contemporary manners with this difference that, while in the former the poor fisherman is at the mercy of the tyrannical police, in the latter the foolish police officer seems to be at the mercy of the recalcitrant rogues.

Among all the Sanskrit dramatists Bhāsa stands out supreme as the author of thirteen plays—a figure which is rather imposing in view of the fact that no dramatist has to his credit more than three—and the variety of their themes is itself a testimony to 'the activity and originality of his talent'.²¹ Being the earliest of all these dramatists and also not so much influenced by theory as enunciated by Bharata's 'Nāṭya-śāstra' which must not have acquired such a strong hold on practice by then as it evidently did later on, Bhāsa could afford to work in greater freedom than any latter dramatist, and hence the comparative originality and also primitive simplicity of his art. Except the three plays based on the 'Rāmāyana' which betray some imperfections, the dramatic work of Bhāsa on the whole is unique in its variety and rapidity of action, and what is more, even the verse which is normally used by his successors for lyricism, he uses to further the dramatic action;²² a fact that proves that for him action, quickmoving action is more important than anything else, including sentiment. Even Sūdraka who is more a dramatist than Kālidāsa or Bhavabhūti in the matter of plot-construction and rapidity of action indulges now and then in descriptions that impede the action, like the Vidūṣaka's tedious, though vivid, description of Vasantasenā's mansion in Act IV, or even the long drawn out lamentations of Cārudatta in Act X as he is being led to the place of execution. The latter may be justified on the ground that it helps a thorough evocation of the sentiment of Pathos, but the fact remains that it somewhat impairs the denouement so imbued with tension and excitement by delaying it to some extent. Bhāsa's plays are generally action-motivated and in this respect he seems to come closer to Shakespeare than any other Sanskrit dramatist. And Viśākhadatta's 'Mudrārākṣasa' is undoubtedly a great play with its closely knit plot pertaining to a political intrigue, with its quick-moving action of neverflagging interest and its masterly and vivid characterization, especially of Cānakya and Rākṣasa who are admirable foils to each other, and although it does not conform to the normal model in the field of Sanskrit drama on account of its unique theme that does not permit a thorough evocation of any single sentiment, from the point of plot-construction and dramatic

interest it can successfully vie with any masterpiece in the Western dramatic literature.

To sum up, it may be said in the end that Sanskrit drama, intended as it was for the enjoyment of a cultured few, is more concerned with sentiment or *Rasa* than with physical action which, when represented in its range and variety, necessitates an elaborate plot, in which are included sometimes motives and incidents of divergent interest. To reconcile the irreconcilables, to resolve in the end all complications, introduced from time to time in the course of the dramatic action, just to excite the curiosity of the audience, to establish a sort of unity throughout, a unity of impression or dramatic experience - these are considered to be the hallmarks of a truly great dramatic art that is based on action rather than on sentiment. Shakespeare, as the author of his romantic comedies (excluding his last plays) may be credited with the possession of this ability. A mature dramatist cares more for higher things, like the incorporation of his own vision of life in his play, portrayal of feeling and treatment of certain values of life, than for plot, built with multiplicity of incidents. Shakespeare's last plays have simpler plots when compared to his earlier romantic comedies, because they are richer in sentiment. Similarly in the more serious *Nāṭaka* of Sanskrit drama, the dramatic interest is concentrated on sentiment with the plot well-knit, but direct and simple. The plot is the body of drama and the sentiment its soul, and the richer the soul, the simpler and thinner is the body.

NOTES

1. The reference is to his celebrated definition of tragedy in his 'Poetics', Chapter VI.
2. The *Daśarūpa* (tr. by C.O. Haas), Columbia University (1912), p.3.
3. Ibid.
4. 'Poetics, Chapter VI.
5. The *Daśarūpa* (tr. by C.O. Haas), p.6.
6. Ibid. p.7.
7. Bhavabhūti's 'Uttararāmacarita' may be taken as an example, in which the progress of the dramatic action is mainly indicated in Prologues to Acts II, III and IV.

8. The Daśarūpa (tr. Haas), p.4.
9. Ibid. p.9.
10. Ibid. p.8.
11. e.g., the part played by the Vidūṣaka in Kālidāsa's 'Mālavikāgni-mitra' Act IV and Harṣa's 'Ratnāvālī' Act III.
12. The Daśarūpa (tr. Haas) p.9.
13. Derek Traversi, 'Shakespeare :The Last Phase', p.19.
14. In fact, the application of this appellation 'tragicomedy' to any play in Sanskrit is a misnomer, as the classification of drama is not on the basis of the nature of the theme, comic or tragic, and tragedy is completely absent in Sanskrit drama. But the Nāṭaka which is serious, with tragic element in it in spite of its happy ending (Viṣādabhūyiṣṭhasukhānta) resembles the English tragicomedy.
15. Madayantikā and Makaranda. 16. in Act V dealing with mystic rites and human sacrifice, in Act IX Saudāminī's magical powers, flight in the air etc.
17. Thaisa's revival is close to the climax in relation to the dramatic action only. In fact, it takes place fifteen years before Pericles is informed of the death of Marina in Act IV Sc. 4 which is the climax.
18. 'Nāgānanda', Act III. 17.
19. Acts II and VI.
20. Act II.
21. A. B. Keith, 'The Sanskrit Drama', p. 105.
22. Ibid. p. 114.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE SANSKRIT LITERARY CRITICISM

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Common experience teaches us that each phenomenon consists of the essence and of non-essentials. The ancient Indian theatre and its dramatic literature is no exception to this rule. Elsewhere I have tried to find an answer to the question concerning its essence. This answer in its final form is brief: nāṭya is yajña in as much as life is yajña and all whatever is-is yajña. Thus, I hope, I have got a key to understand the essence of the ancient Indian theatre and of its literature, i. e., drama. All this granted, still I have been left with a tantalising problem of such "essential" non-essentials as the long list of Sanskrit dramas and their proper evaluation. New years of teaching the Sanskrit drama at the Department of Indology, University of Warsaw revealed to me a weakness of the exposition pattern of its history. This pattern has been so forcefully established by such scholars like M. Winternitz, A. B. Keith, S.K. De and others, that it is now by no means easy to challenge it. Yet I am fully convinced that the time is ripe for it. The battle, according to me, should be fought for the new or at least substantially modified criteria of the evaluation of a dramatic literary work. My principal objection to those hitherto applied is that they are haphazard, inadequate, emotional, often incongruous and mostly utterly subjective. Below I shall try to substantiate this view, as well as offer some positive suggestions. May be these remarks will also have some relevance for the entire field of the Sanskrit literary criticism which, as it is commonly accepted developed out of the theoretical study of the dramatic literature.

A well known Polish scholar J. Krzyzanowski writes in his "Science of Literature" that: "Literary criticism which is unable to be so fresh and sensitive as to view literary works of art through the eyes of their first critics is not worth much". This formula applied to the literary criticism which has accumulated itself round the Sanskrit drama could lead, may be to too stern a conclusion. The enunciations regarding this problem of such scholars as Winternitz and Keith remain

altogether unproved by what these scholars have to say later. Certainly Winternitz stresses that in order to properly estimate an Indian literary work of art it is necessary "to immerse oneself in the spirit of India, if only for a while and believe all that Indians do believe". But while discussing Indian aesthetics the same scholar seems to basically contradict the earlier statement. For he says with regard to the Nāṭyaśāstra that "we have in front of us decidedly barren science which is dealing more with classification and schematisation than with investigation of facts and formulation of principles." When it is no more a question of paying lip-service to the Indian literature but the need of real change in the manner of reasoning, it is exactly in this way that Winternitz understands his "immersing in the spirit of India"! Nevertheless it would have been unjust to discredit the entire hitherto existing criticism only because it is crippled. Let me then try, before I shall restate my reservations, to find out what are its unchallenged merits.

As a starting point let a very crisp formulation of the criteria of literary criticism given by Krzyzanowski serve us. In Chapter VIII of his "Science of Literature" he says that the criticism of a literary work of art in its entirety must apply sociological, historical, aesthetic (or formal), and ethical criteria. By sociological criteria Krzyzanowski understands "the duration in time and territorial range of the appreciation" By historical—"the problem of originality and setting a writer against the background of the literary tradition, as well as defining his attitude towards it. "But since, according to Krzyzanowski, "it is necessary to consider a historical indicator, i. e. the fundamental attitude of the epoch towards the literary tradition and the way it understands the problem of originality, therefore in case of the Sanskrit drama this group of criteria has to be applied very cautiously indeed. Further by aesthetic criteria the same author understands "the aesthetic peculiarities of formal nature" and "the factors which shape the outer form of the literary work of art in relation to its inner structure". Finally by ethical criteria he understands "the appreciation of the literary work of art based on the assumption that it always is an expression of some reactions to life. The more they are general, universal, unconnected with exigencies of a particular moment which has given birth to the work in question, the broader, deeper and more universal will be the response they evoke".

Out of the confrontation of these formulæ with the criticism which has grown around the Sanskrit drama the following conclusions clearly follow; traditional criticism operates mainly with sociological and before all historical criteria, quite often ignoring the indigenous literary tradition and its way of comprehending originality. The

ramining two groups of criteria, if they are at all applied- are applied haphazardly and mostly from the modern, western point of view in case of European scholars and in case of Indian scholars either in unison with the western way or while entering into polemics with it and thus accepting the same general platform of approach. It can be safely said that in case of western scholars the achievements of the ancient Sanskrit literary criticism go largely unnoticed or even right away discarded after a very inadequate enquiry. Albeit in case of some Indian scholars they are applied in a fragmentary and disorderly fashion while some of them have been in complete disuse. It is interesting that such scholars like H. H. Wilson, M. Winternitz, A. B. Keith, S. K. De and some others while making a detailed study of aesthetics (often in separate, handsome volumes) fail to apply its criteria in their evaluation of drama which they are discussing elsewhere. The remarks to that effect of Winternitz or Keith seem to point to the fact of certain non-comprehension of some aspects of traditional aesthetics. On the other hand De makes an impression of somebody who having not noticed its utility does not find it necessary to disown its achievements. This state of affairs in the field of Sanskrit dramatic criticism serves proof to its sociological and historical bias being equally characteristics of both Indian and Western scholarship. Yet, this being so, I have to stress with equal strength that due to that bias a lot has been achieved in those spheres of criticism which did not earn much interest of the traditional Indian scholarship. Exactly that duration in time and territorial range of the appreciation of all important works, as well as chronology and the degree of originality of the authors have been carefully and painstakingly investigated. It was with this purpose that that very precise linguistic and historical analyses of the dramatic literature have been embarked upon. And if today we can attempt a chronological presentation of the Sanskrit drama it is because of that historical and sociological bias of the contemporary criticism. But if we still cannot-especially in the west reconcile ourselves to the peculiarities of style, diction, ethics and behavioural patterns pictured by the Sanskrit dramas, it is because we still are, it seems, unable to look at them through the eyes of their first critics, all the time admitting that such an attitude is necessary and yet rejecting "the eyes" which in the form of the ancient aesthetics they have left to us. Consequently such confessions like the quoted opinion of M. Winternitz about immersing oneself in the spirit of India, make an impression of an exclusively emotional declaration.

In order to make my point clearer, let me try - at least very briefly - to review the opinions of the acknowledged authorities about one of the Sanskrit dramas. Being true to my earlier enunciations the choice of such a work I shall make following the opinion of, if not contemporary then at least less distant in time, critic: "Kāvyeṣu nāta-

kam ramyam tatra ramyam Śākuntalam . . ." H.H. Wilson does not especially discuss "Śākuntalam" in his "The Theatre of the Hindus". But while considering other plays he says that "Śākuntalam" cannot give a proper idea of the Indian theatre. According to him it is a mythico-pastoral play which he praises for frank descriptions, tenderness of feelings, delicate beauty of thought and the highest elegance of style. Finally he remarks that the heroine of this drama is interesting. A. Macdonell in his turn even more generously showers similar epithets upon this drama praising it for "the richness of creative fancy . . . skill in the expression of tender feeling . . . , undisturbed harmony of the poetic sentiment . . ." Besides he says that in the drama "every passion is softened without being enfeebled. The ardour of love never goes beyond aesthetic bounds, it never maddens to wild jealousy or hate. The torments of sorrow are toned down to profound and touching melancholy. It was here at last that the Indian genius found the law of moderation in poetry . . . Kālidāsa stands highest in poetical refinement, in tenderness and depth of feeling . . ." concludes Macdonell. M. Winternitz sets to the task with great precision. He first discusses the reception of the play in Germany and then he remarks that Kālidāsa is the greatest poet. In this context he quotes Goethe's opinion which in itself is the best example of what we could call "critical impressionism". It is to Goethe that we owe such resounding expressions like unphathomable depth, summit of talent, presentation of natural order, the best way of life, the purest moral endeavour, the most deserving sovereign, the most sober divine meditation, etc. Further Winternitz analysing the sources of the story holds that it is the finest work of art that man can imagine. The remarks concerning the popularity of the Śākuntalam in India follow and then the critic submits that in Kālidāsa's poetry there is no dramatic element, such as it is understood by the people of the West. Next he adds that whoever would try to measure the depth of this consciously attempted fable like drama with a yard-stick of the Greek tragedy (sic!), he will be altogether unable to acknowledge its unequalled beauty. Alas, all these superlatives are very feeble since the critic in spite of what he professes earlier, does not apply any other yard-stick and only persistently implores the reader to believe that it is a magnificent work of art. Finally after saying that "Śākuntalam" has to be a narrative drama, he crosses over to a safer ground of the European reception of the play and of listing its Indian versions. All these remarks are of course preceded by an exhaustive discussion of historical aspects while dealing with Kālidāsa's other works. An Indian scholar, S. K. De begins his remarks about "Śākuntalam" by writing that among other works of Kālidāsa it "reveals a rare balance of mind, which harmonises the artistic sense with the poetic, and results in the practice of singular moderation." Besides, according to him "Śākuntalam" is the full blown flower of Kālidāsa's genius and in it we have a

unique alliance of his poetic and dramatic gifts. "As a dramatist Kālidāsa succeeds mainly by his poetic power in two respects: he is master of poetic emotion which he can skilfully harmonise with character and action, and he has the poetic sense of balance and restraint which a dramatist must show if he would win success..." Then De offers one of his most bombastic remarks: "...we see to best effect Kālidāsa's method of unfolding a character, as a flower unfolds its petals in rain and sunshine...there is temperance in the depth of passion, and perspicuity and inevitableness in action and expression, but above all this drama surpasses by its essential poetic quality of style and treatment." These and many more sonorous adjectives are used in order to describe this drama. Let us then see what is in this case the opinion of A.B. Keith. He opens his analysis of the Śākuntalam saying that "it certainly represents the perfection of Kālidāsa's art." After this statement the critic summarises the play and then discusses different Indian recensions of it. He ends with a handful of following arguments: "Śākuntalā's dawning love is depicted with perfect skill...The king is a worthy hero...His love for his son is charmingly depicted... Śākuntalā has suffered tribulation of spirit and gained in depth and beauty of nature...The other characters are models of skilful presentation...Kaṇva is delightful figure...The companions of the heroine are painted with delicate taste, both are devoted body and soul to their mistress, but Anasūyā is serious and sensible, Priyamvadā talkative and gay... Kālidāsa excels in depicting the emotions of love... he is hardly less expert in pathos... the fourth act of the Śākuntalam is a model of tender sorrow and the loving kindness... The humour of the Vidūṣaka is never coarse. Finally the critic writes, "Admirable as is Kālidāsa's work, it would be unjust to ignore the fact that in his dramas as in his epics he shows no interset in the great problems of life and destiny... he was incapable of viewing the world as a tragic scene, of feeling any sympathy for the hard lot of the majority of men, or appreciating the reign of injustice in the world. It was impossible to him to go beyond his narrow range..." It has to be admitted that side by side Keith analyses with an expert knowledge (from the European point of view) the style and language of the Śākuntalam accepting even certain elements of the Indian rhetorics but only as much as he has to because of the very nature of Sanskrit language. Yet a strong feeling persists that somewhere the critic must have missed the point. Unhappily one of the most recent popular studies of the Sanskrit literature which we owe to Krishna Chaitanya offers equally general statements, as for instance: "The play opens with the picture of exultant manhood... Her beauty is tender, fresh and unspoilt like the woodland creepers; she affectionately tends every day...Kālidāsa's poetic powers are at their best in this play...they are conserved and blended with profoundly moral perception...The situation does not seem to be different in the sphere of

Hindi language. For instance the very popular with college students book of B. Upadhyaya adopts a similar approach. The most important point at which it differs from the criticisms written in English is the question of the date of Kālidāsa. Apart of that some other difference may yet be quoted to the advantage of Hindi criticism. This is before all a general way of arguing based substantially on the categories of the traditional aesthetics and to certain extent ethics. Although the judgement from the point of view of current ethics seems to outweigh other remarks (for instance-gāndharva vivāha). The advantage of arranging the whole criticism under certain captions like plot (kathāvastu), characters (caritra-citraṇam), beauty (saundarya-bhāvanā), sentiment (rasasiddhi) and message (sandeśa) is nullified by the subjectiveness of the opinions expressed under each of them.

Let me close at that this very brief and most obviously incomplete review of more commonly known, comprehensive works in the field of the Sanskrit drama or the Sanskrit literature in general. I feel that this is a prevailing tendency, the exceptions from it, if any, only will make the problem still more dramatic.

The remarks made at the beginning can now be restated with greater conviction. A lot has been done in the sphere of the sociological criteria and of the historical ones. These aspects need not be discussed here in detail since they are self evident. One can even say that almost everything has been done and further progress take place only if any new source material comes to light. But in the fields of aesthetic and ethical appreciation there rules a bombastic generalisation, affected "impressionism", sentimental effusion and, at places tedious journalism.

So far only negative aspects of the entire problem have been dealt with. But now the question arises : what are the positive proposals regarding it? Since hitherto Śākuntalam has been our testing-stone, I shall therefore try to show taking this play as an example but considering the size of this paper, rather in a sketchy way, what in my opinion should be the proper approach in these spheres.

The tools for the formal evaluation of a play have been ready at hand since quite some time. Occasionally and at random they used to be picked up by different critics. Yet I am not aware of any effort to apply them with consistency and with consequence. The most important of them is in my view the concept of the five sandhis. It seems that this concept has been slightly miscomprehended as far back as the Daśarūpaka. This is, of course, not a proper place to discuss this problem in detail. I have done it elsewhere. Suffice it to say that sandhis are the spans of the itivṛtta and in such context, what should be investigated, is their inter-relationship, the way they have been bound

together into one whole and their relative importance in the play. Here is the most convenient yard-stick with which to test the harmony of composition of a particular play. Very intimately, indeed, connected with this problem is the concept of *rasa*. It was Bharatamuni who said that the *sandhyaṅgas* should be applied by a poet while keeping in view their function of evoking the aesthetic taste. Thus the *rasa* aspect of a play should be discussed after the *sandhis* (or along with them) and only after its dependence on the *sandhis* is clearly understood. It should by no means be discussed while picking at random different text-fragments. But it has to be discussed as a lasting experience changing itself while the *itivr̥tta* of the play progresses. Only after these two aspects are well investigated the critic is entitled to proceed further and try to find out with what other formal means the author achieves his result. Now time comes in my opinion for investigating the style (*vr̥tti*) of a play and its merits (*guṇa*) and shortcomings with a particular consideration for the embellishments (*alampāras*). Now the question remains opened whether apart of these more or less universally accepted since the *Nāṭyaśāstra* means of criticism, the play should also be criticised from the particular points of view of different ancient Indian aestheticians, as for instance from the point of view of the *dhvani* theory? I would say "yes" to this question but provided the critic shares himself the particular view. Then it will be his subjective opinion and it should take place only after an objective method had been fully applied.

There is just enough space in this paper to present only some of the results of such an investigation of the *Śākuntalam*. Without presenting the whole critical apparatus they may sound less convincing. Yet I would insist that even in such a case they are less ephemeral than purely subjective impressions and first of all they can easily be checked, rechecked and corrected if necessary by applying the same concepts provided, of course, that the critics will agree what is their particular nature.

But let me now try to give substance to the above assertion. Thus a desire (*autsukya*) of the hero to attain the goal is the dominating motive of Act I. We get to know about the particular nature of this desire and this goal through the words of the two hermits who bless the king wishing him a son, who will be the universal ruler. The appearance on the stage of *Śākuntalā* and her meeting with the hero intensifies this motive adding to it a distinct erotic hue. Thus begins a play which is not so much a love-comedy but a drama of unfulfilled fatherhood. Act II continues the same motive but simultaneously introduces another one which sprung out of the initial desire, namely the motive of effort (*yatna*). And here we enter the second *sandhi*, i.e., *pratimukha*. The

king either through his own initiative or through a suitable coincidence undertakes a concrete effort in order to fulfil his and by now also Śakuntalā's desire. He decides on his "incognito", sends back home his companions and in order to defend hermits from evil demons remains in the hermitage. The effort made on the part of Śakuntalā is very delicately embodied in her letterwriting. Only the man who has never written a love letter without being sure of its reception can question this being an effort! This motive will very distinctly last till the interlude of Act III when from the conversation of her friends it transpires that the gāndharva marriage has been contracted and that Śakuntalā has found a deserving husband. In this way the second sandhi ends and the third garbha begins bringing in these moments of action the leitmotif of which is the hope of the attainment (prāptyāśā). The hero and the heroine had married. Śakuntalā conceived. Her foster-father Kanva accepted the union, blessed it and sent off the pregnant heroine to join her lawful husband. Somehow this span of action has been anticipated earlier by the blessings of the hermits. But now it is the most prominent motive and it lasts till the second scene of Act V when the king constrained by the curse of Durvāsas, on seeing the pregnant heroine asks bluntly: "kim idam upanyastam?" Now the third sandhi ends and the sequence of situations which are dominated by the suppression of the attainment (niyatāpti) begins. As I have mentioned the morbid anticipation of it was the Durvasasa's incident. Initial slight apprehension, now grows into a real despair. Left to herself Śakuntalā dies, though the Indian tradition shows it under the garb of taking refuge in heaven. The interlude of the fisherman and the recovery of the ring which restores memory to the king thrust him down to the very bottom of an abyssmal despair. The king starts wailing and there is no end to it till almost the end of Act VI when a messenger of heaven Mātali appears and implores the king to come to the rescue of gods in their fight with demons. He invites him to mount the chariot of Indra. Once again here under this discrete camouflage there hides the deepest tragedy of the situation. For if we remember that dying Duryodhana of the Urubhaṅga had a vision of a heavenly chariot of heroes coming to fetch him to heaven and that Daśaratha of the Pratiṃānātaka having heard the rumbling of a chariot takes it for the chariot of death, then the hidden intention of the author of Śākuntalam becomes clear. But this is a typically Indian tragedy. For the end of earthly existence does not mean man's final defeat like in the Greek tragedy. Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta will unite in heaven and reincarnate on earth to fulfill their cycle of existence so cruelly interrupted by adverse fate. Act VII delivers the action of the play out of the tragic impasse and the series of situations of this act constitutes the fifth sandhi-nirvāhana in which the principal motive is the attainment of the goal (phalāgama). Duṣyanta (though we tend to forget that only in heaven)

finds back his wife and comes to know the tender desire of his heart his son. The blessing of the hermit has proved true and the play ends in the integration of the desiring and the desired ! "Śākuntalā" is one of the most harmoniously built dramas. The sandhis do never end abruptly but wane into each other with perfect smoothness. This makes that each sandhi carries impressions of the remaining four thus avoiding univocality, so to speak, but making the play into a succession of beautifully harmonised chords.

The emotional reactions evoked by a harmonious *itivr̥tta* will most obviously be as harmonious as the play itself. Now since the most pronounced feature of the first sandhi of the Śākuntalā is a desire to beget a son, although it is not formulated by the hero himself busy chasing a substitute of a goal of life in the form of a deer. It is only the hermits who in their blessing formulate it. Practically speaking any situation charged with any emotion can frame the idea of desire to achieve a goal of yearning. Kālidāsa chooses two spheres of emotional response: heroism (*vīra*) and love (*ṣṛṅgāra*) with the light admixture of mirth (*hāsyā*). Only now I could repeat after Krishna Chaitanya that the play opens with the picture of "an exultant manhood" although somewhat deluded by a flying away deer as once before Rāma had been similarly deluded. In the Śākuntalā a rapid stream of heroic emotion comes to an abrupt stop at the outskirts of the hermitage. Before the next dominant emotion sets in with full force there comes about an emotional hiatus which makes its on-coming even more dramatic. The two further sandhis witness the growing in strength of the emotion of love. Yet there is an under current of apprehension all the time which culminates in Durvāsa's curse: a lightning-like streak of violent sentiment (*raudra*), which seems to anticipate emotionally later developments. By the end of the third sandhi the action steadily increases in pathetic sentiment (*karuṇa*), especially stressed in the scene of Śākuntalā's departure. In the meantime the sentiment of mirth wanes only to appear occasionally at places. By its very nature the fourth sandhi demands an abrupt change in its emotional charge. In the Śākuntalā this change is achieved in the scenes at Duṣyanta's court and consists of a very rapid intensification of the pathetic sentiment. It reaches later twice its pitch: once in the angry words of Śākuntalā and second time in the wailing of the hero but only after the pathos of these scenes had been purposefully contrasted with mirth of the fisherman's interlude. Last sandhi witnesses the slow rise of the marvellous sentiment (*adbhuta*) which as Bharatamuni wills ends the play to the accompaniment of pathetic and once again heroic.

The above analysis is too brief to be more than a suggestion regarding the method of criticism. It may and should be questioned and

corrected. But I would argue that once the method is accepted, further discussion will not only be limited to an exchange of subjective opinions but will lead to ever more precise and minute analysis and description of the emotional content of the play.

Not being as yet quite ready to undertake the detailed discussion of the styles (*vṛttis*), the merits (*guṇa*), the blemishes (*doṣa*) and the embellishments (*alaṃkāra*) as the criteria of literary criticism I am omitting them for the time being, also under a presumption that at least the last three of them do not require special investigation as being in continuous use since centuries. The only remark which I would venture at this stage is that these aspects should not only be exemplified by at random chosen text-places but there should be at least one larger portion of the text investigated from the point of view of its saturation with merits, blemishes and embellishments. If necessary such an analysis should be undertaken for the entire text.

It is now time to consider the last group of criteria, i.e., the ideological ones. The first and foremost task here is to find out what constituted a corner-stone of life understood as way to human fulfillment. If we survey for this purpose the entire sphere of the Hindu dharma – for there I believe one has to look for that corner-stone – we shall find there a concept of the capital importance for the literary criticism. It is the concept of the four *puruṣārthas*. Now one may ask why this particular concept should serve as a touch-stone of the literary criticism? In as much as the *itivṛtta* constitutes the back-bone of a Play and in as much as *kārya* is an essence of the *itivṛtta*, in so much it will have to express itself in the terms of the four *puruṣārthas*. *Kārya* is an action prompted by desire, carried on through an effort, bringing about the hope of an achievement, undergoing its suppression and ending in fulfillment. Only a being endowed with consciousness, personality, will and freedom can embark upon such an action. Thus for all practical reasons only man or personified God can be an actor of this type of action. Whatever man does should be judged in the light of its relationship to one of the four *puruṣārthas* for they express fullness of human life. Therefore the traditional “*upadeśa*”, i. e., the moral and ideological import of a play should be judged by the intensity, extent, power and place which it accords to the realisation of one or more *puruṣārthas*. Making these remarks more concrete let us once again take recourse to the *Śākuntalam*. The achievement of this play – the common opinion invariably says – is fulfillment of love in the union of *Śākuntalā* and *Duṣyanta*. Yet the case be so, then why the play does not end with the *gāndharva vivaha*? Emotionally speaking the first consummated meeting of the lovers is a climax of an action having as its sole purpose union of lovers. Thus the achievement of this play must be different

and it is not enough to say that love has to be purified by suffering, for suffering could as well take place before the gāndharva vivaha. As I have said above a son of which Duṣyanta has been so far deprived seems to be the ultimate object of the play fulfilled only at the very end of it. Thus a climax comes exactly when it should come, i. e., at the nirvahaṇa sandhi. Therefore we can now define finally this play from the view point of its achievement as a drama of unfulfilled fatherhood. If then putralābha is the goal of the play, there can be little doubt that the first puruṣārtha—dharma is the principal one in this case. Yet at the same time it is quite evident that the principal factor through which this is achieved is love. Consequently we may describe the play in question as being dharmapradhāna and kāmāśrita. Now having defined in these general terms our play we may try to determine the attitude which the play-wright manifests towards such a goal. Till the arrival of the heroine at Duṣyanta's court little happens out of ordinary. Both the departure of Śakuntalā from her father's house as well as an apparent neglect of her by the royal aristocrat seem to indicate ordinary love-story. It is only with the rejection of the hermit's daughter that the action takes a very unexpected and meaningful turn. Śakuntalā dies out of despair! No amount of soft-peddalling will conceal the fact. But what is death for those who believe in reincarnation? ! It is an interim svargavāsa. This is exactly what happens to Śakuntalā. But not only to her. Despairing king is also invited to heaven by the gods and a symbol of final departure known so well from elsewhere, a chariot of the gods is despatched to fetch him. True to Bharatamuni's injunction Kālidāsa does not show death on the stage but only departure to heaven! It is then and there that both Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta will enjoy the fruit of their union. So in this light how can we finally describe the message of the play?—To repeat: the end of earthly existence does not mean an ultimate defeat and if man is engaged in the pursuit of his dharma, he will overcome not only an adverse fate but the very death as well !

TWENTIETH CENTURY SANSKRIT LITERATURE:

THE QUESTION OF MODERN SENSE

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There can be no doubt that a considerable literature has been produced in Sanskrit during recent times, which is not lacking in quantity in comparison with the literature of modern languages. The references to the Sanskrit works written in this age have been made by Dr. Raghavan in his small book 'Modern writings in Sanskrit',¹ in his article in 'Contemporary Sanskrit Literature' published by Sahitya Academy and in some other articles;² and by Dr. Ramji Upadhyaya in 'Sanskrit Sāhitya kā Ālocanātmaka Itihāsa' a volume in Hindi which has a chapter on Sanskrit literature from 16th century to 20th century³; and by Śrīdhara Bhāskar Varnekar in his Marathi thesis on Modern Sanskrit Literature; and by Kṛṣṇamacariar in 'History of Sanskrit Literature'; and also by Dr. Hiralal Shukla in his book 'Renaissance in Modern Sanskrit Literature'⁴. In spite of the work done by these scholars on the contemporary Sanskrit writing, the literature produced in Sanskrit in our age could not win recognition at large. Is it due to the fact that the present writing in Sanskrit does not deserve attention or does not come up to the modern tastes and new standards of criticism? The present author feels that the discussions which Dr. Raghavan and other learned scholars have initiated on this subject do not make a clear assessment as to how far the contemporary Sanskrit literature is imbued with the sense of Modernity and how far the Sanskrit authors

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1. Adyar, 1956.
 2. See 'Sanskrit writings in the first half of present century' Journal of Asiatic Society, IX. 3—4, 1967; Sanskrit Literature (1700-1937), Journal of Madras University, Centenary Number.
 3. Allahabad, 1961
 4. Aloka Prakashan, Raipur, 1970

who wrote or are writing in this age-old language at present have grasped the spirit of our age. It has been indicated that the present writing in Sanskrit has adopted new styles, new forms and new branches of literature and also new subjects. But the question is : is it so that a literature represents the age only by adopting new forms, styles and subjects relating to the contemporary period ? I think that there is some thing more, which makes a literature endowed with contemporaneousness and that is the clear understanding of and presentation of the contemporary period; the aspirations and hopes and visions of the age at large should be visualised through the literature and not only the clear understanding and presentation of these, because by modernity I do not mean that an author should be so absorbed in present to forget traditions or to loose sight of his vision which enables him to interpret past in the context of the present and to foresee the future, but a broad outlook and a sort of detachment is also needed to make the author rise from the distractions of the present. I do not refute the change of style, forms or subject with the relative change of time, but the most important thing is the clear grasp of the spirit of age and if it is there—forms, subjects and styles etc. immediately become subsidiary. Some times it may happen that even if a contemporary author writes on an age-worn theme, he endows it with a new significance, suitable to the environment in which he writes; similarly forms and styles may be old or classical, but if the genius of the gifted author is steeped in his age, he will make his work interspersed with modernity. In the light of this thinking, I propose to examine the contemporary Sanskrit literature.

THE MAHĀKĀVYA

Mahākāvyas have been written in Sanskrit in greater number than other forms of literature. But almost all of them are on classical pattern. It is true that the Sanskrit Poets of this age have adopted contemporary themes for the Mahākāvyas; it is also true that some of these writers have made a happy departure from the ancient style and manner without forfeiting the attractiveness of classics, but all the same the old classical spirit has not gone through a transformation. Instead of the heroes of Purana or epic legends, the modern Sanskrit poet would take Gandhi, Nehru, Subhash, Vivekananda or Dayananda etc⁶. but these Mahākāvyas roam in the same ancient world of

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6. There are several Mahākāvyas written on these national heroes. Gāndīcaritām has been attempted by so many poets, besides—Nehrūmahākāvyam by Brahmānanda Śarma, Subhāṣa—caritām by V.K. Kṣatre, Vivekānandacaritām by K.S. Nagarajan may be mentioned, but all of them are consumed by the spirit of hero worship and exaggeration.

heroworship and exaggerated glorification. For example, Gāndhi-caritam, by Sādhūśaraṇa Miśra or the three Mahākāvya of Svāmi Bhāgavadācārya, namely, Bhāratapārijāta, Pārijātasaurabha and Pārijāta-pahāra- glorify Gandhi as the God incarnated and they merely touch the fringe of the aspirations of a man who belongs to our age ; one would be despaired of seeing here the personality of that Gandhi which emerges through Gandhi's own autobiography. Out of several poems written on Gandhi, with the exception of three Mahākāvya⁷ by Pandita Kṣama Rao, there is hardly any which cuts off the ageworn feathers of classicism and makes clearly a modern approach.

I do not say that Mahākāvya with a classical pattern should not be written. But even if a contemporary poet adopts old themes and patterns, he has to invest them with a new significance and new impressions which the contemporary environment makes on his consciousness. In the modern languages like English etc. we have such pieces which redeem a classical theme with a new significance, as in 'The Faust' of Goethe or in 'Prometheus Unbound' of Shelley or in Hindi Mahākāvya 'Urvaśi' of Ramadharisingh 'Dinakara'. But out of a big number of Mahākāvya written in Sanskrit in this age, there are very few which show the tendency of interpreting past in terms of present and thus opening new vistas of imagination and creative thinking. On the contrary they retreat towards the past even when dealing with the happenings of present. Luckily there are exceptions how soever few they may be. Dillimahotsavamahākāvya by Srisvara Vidyālakara⁸, which Dr. Raghavan does not mention in his learned article in 'Contemporary Indian Literature' (CIL) depicts the contemporary events with spirit of realism and even if it indulges in praising the foreign rulers, it shows an understanding of the problems of the downtrodden people and their status, rarely seen in Sanskrit Mahākāvya. But I could find only one Mahākāvya which deals with the ancient theme of the epics and yet happily endows it with a new significance, and with the grandeur of classicism, it successfully touches the very core of the consciousness of the modern reader. And this poem is 'Mahāprasthānam' a Mahākāvya from the pen of Annadācarāṇa, who flourished in the last decades of nineteenth century. It begins with the pathetic description of the tragic gloom, shadowing the human life and the sad mentality of Yudhiṣṭhira after the Mahābhārata war, when he feels himself frustrated like the modern man, in the disturbing

7: Satyāgrahagita (Paris—1932, Bombay—1948), Uttarasatyāgrahagita (Bombay—1948) and Svarajyavijayamahākāvya (Bombay—1962).

8. Kakina (Bengal) 1903

atmosphere of chaos. The author has so deeply dipped in the spirit of modern consciousness and yet is able to rise above from it and seek the burning problems of life and duty that the lore which he sings, at once becomes appealing to the conscious mind and sensitive heart of the reader of our age. The poet has not dissociated himself from the present, he has it before his eyes, and yet he can visualise something more which gives a real solace to the modern man, and this thing is not presented by the poet through the preachings of sage Vyāsa, which although he duly gives to Yudhiṣṭhira, but it is shown in a developing attitude of Yudhiṣṭhira and his colleagues towards life, which impresses a man to seek solace in nature and be as happy as the nature itself in between the complications of life. The poet gives the massage of return towards nature like Wordsworth, but not by propounding any philosophy, but by really visualising it like a prophet and yet he does not soar far above in the sky of mysticism to lose the sight, the environment in which he writes, and to be far away from it; and thus happily combines the classicism together with the new spirit. ...

There are many Mahākāvyas in Sanskrit written in recent years, but none reaches the height which the above mentioned poem attains. Not only this, some of them are written in the vein of Māgha or Sri Haṣa, where the poet has no leisure to come out of the narrow shell of old traditions and standards; rather, he seems to be so deeply absorbed in them. Pārijātaḥaraṇamahākāvya of Umapati Dwivedi for example, can be mentioned. Dr. Raghavan also, in his article in CIL has pointed out that several poems, purely on traditional pattern, have been composed and still are being written in Sanskrit in this age, where the verbal jugglery and makeshow of the scholarship and command over language merely counts⁹. This sort of literature which ignores modern trends and languishes only in the old methods and approaches, cannot in any way be called a living literature, and Sanskrit literature in this age shows this tendency.

It seems to me that whenever a Sanskrit author begins to write, the classicism intrudes in his genius, because he lacks the understanding of present and the latest movements in the world of art and literature. Thus, Pandita Kṣamā Rao, who successfully created really modern pieces of literature by her Satyāgrahagita and Uttarasatyāgrahagita and Svarājyavijaya, cut herself off from that sort of approach in her later

poems-namely-Mitrālahari¹⁰, Tukārāmcaritam¹¹ Rāmadāsacaritam¹² and Jñaneśvaracaritam¹³. These poems soar in the ethereal atmosphere of medieval Bhakti cult and several supernatural phenomena, quite alien to the modern tastes. In the same way Gangāsāgariyam by Vishnudutta Śukla, Sītāsvayamvara by Batukanātha Śarma and also by K. S. Nagarajan, Jānakīcaritāmṛta by Ramasnehidasa (all of them not mentioned by Dr. Raghavan in CIL) are pomes¹¹ which live in the atmosphere of unreality, heroworship and these authors are ungrudgingly bound by the atmosphere of timeworn traditions or old patterns at their own will. Sītācaritam¹⁵ by Revaprasada Dwivedi has some new ideas incorporated in the ancient theme, but there are very few poems who bear even this much attempt.

Drama

Like the Mahākāvya, we can find a large number of dramas written in the traditional lines in Sanskrit in this age. Most of the dramas which Dr. Raghavan mentions in CIL¹⁶, do not come up to the modern standards. They do not exhibit the sympathetic understanding of the present and the broad outlook which a contemporary writer must possess. Some of them are written with a spirit of propagandaism, like Sivasanjivaninātaka on Ayurveda by C. Venkataramayya¹⁷ and Girvaṇavijaya by Nilakantha Śarma.¹⁸ The Adharmavipākanāṭakā of

10. Bombay, 1940

11. Bombay, 1950

12. Bombay—195

3. Bombay, 1955

14. Sanskrit Sahitya ka Alocanatmaka Itihasa—Dr. Ramji Upadhyaya
p. 184—193

15. Sagar, 1969

16. p. 234—236

17. CIL p. 234

18. CIL p. 234

Appa Sastrī,¹⁹ Bhaktasudarśana and Bhūbhāroddharaṇa by Mathura-prasada Dikṣita and so many other dramas recently written like Nārījāgarāṇam²⁰ and Pāṇiniyāṇātaka²¹ by Gopalasastrī are steeped in the unreal atmosphere of Gods and have been composed with a spirit of moral preaching or propaganda. Similarly there are dramas like Śṅgāranārādiya²² of Mahalingaśāstrī or Sāmavataṁ²³ of Ambikadatta Vyasa which are full of so many unnatural happenings which seem almost absurd to the modern reader. There are several dramas which are bare imitations of old classics, like Kaumudisudhākara of M.M. Candrakanta Tarkalankara²⁴ which imitates Bhavabhūti's Mālatīmādhava, or the Mukutābhīṣeka of Narayana Dikṣita²⁵.

But it must be accepted that some of the Sanskrit dramas written in this age come nearer to the modern taste and there are some dramatic pieces which a contemporary reader will not deplore. Sanskrit dramatist could not always remain aloof from political, social or economic conditions which surrounded him and the Śnuṣāvijaya by Sundararaja Kavi²⁶ interspersed with realism and satire, shows a deep acquaintance with the family-life in a middle-class society. There are a few dramas which, making happy departure from the canons of Sanskrit dramaturgy adopt new technique and even if they deal with the themes relating to past, they appeal to the modern reader due to the depth of human feeling. Thus, three plays in Sanskrit by V-K. Thampi²⁷ are replete with the medieval atmosphere of Kings, Knights and their gallantry, but the psychological repercussions of the human-heart are so

19. Sanskritcandrikā (Monthly) vol, 5

20. Chowkhambha, Varanasi, 1966

21. Ibid, 1966

22. Madras, 1957

23. Kashi, 1947

24. Calcutta, 1888

25. Chennapuri, 1912

26. Ed. Dr. V. Raghavan, in Annals of Oriental Research, University of Madras—7, 1942—43.

27. Siddha Bharati Hall, Trivendrum, 1924

vividly and naturally portrayed in them that they at once become exquisite pieces of art in the opinion of a modern critic. Bhārativijayam of Mathurānātha Sastri unlike his play 'Gandhivijayam' is really genuine because it succeeds in arousing the feelings of patriotism without indulging into exaggeration, in an original manner. Here we find the social and political consciousness of the author given vent to without ambiguity. 'Lilāvīlāsaprahasana'²⁸ of K.L.V. Sastri may also be mentioned, although it is not totally devoid of the absurdity and vulgarity of the latter Bhāṇas and Prahasanas of Sanskrit, but it brings out a social problem of the marriage of a daughter with undesirable persons by her parents without her approval. Similarly S.S. Khot has written some amusing one-act plays, which rotate in the modern atmosphere and present such characters as can be seen in our own contemporary society. These examples show that Sanskrit dramatists can write in the vein of a modern author, but not all of them come up to modern standards. There are a large number of dramas written on historical or Purāṇic theme but very few of them deserve criticism. The historical plays of Haridāsa Siddhantavāgiśa, Mathurānātha Dikṣita and M.M. Yājñika are good pieces from the point of view of dramatic technique, but their authors are not fully successful in touching the core of human heart and arousing feelings which are common to the readers of all ages or visualising the spirit of the age which they deal with and interpreting it in terms of present, and some how they are still clinging to the old tradition and classicism unnecessarily. For example in the V act of Virapratāpanātaka of Mathuraprasada, the piśacas appear in the battlefield. The unnecessary use of verse where prose ought to have been used also mars their beauty in the eyes of a modern reader. Mahalinga Śastri has also attempted some plays on epic themes. His 'Pratirajasūyam' bears great impact of classical technique, but has little interest for us, in spite of its very successful dramatic art, in which it equals the great classics like Mudrārākṣasa. The only interesting episode in it is the revolutionary spirit of Sudarśana, an imaginary character, who is very near to us, the people of this earth, and the satirical depiction of the hypocrite Kakkutācārya. Little value can be attached to his 'Udgāṭṛdaśānana' in spite of its freshness and originality of plot. But Mahalinga comes with a new apparatus in his Adikāvyaodayam, which is unique, because through it Mahalinga not only launches a new experiment in the realm of Sanskrit drama and presents the Rāmāyaṇa story in a very new and original way, but for the first time in the Sanskrit drama he brings the audience directly in touch with the masses—the common public—and the spirit and joy of the people of Ayodhyā is so vividly and happily depicted in this drama

that although it is really a Rāma play, it is greater as the play of the people, whose mirth and joyous spirit makes the Rāma story a reality to the reader. In spite of some flaws and some insipid scenes which this drama has, it is of great value to the modern reader, as it presents something genuine and unachieved so far in the field of Sanskrit drama and delights us by bringing us into contact with people like ourselves, in spite of the fact that it presents the story of the classics. But it is to be regretted that the Sanskritists have given us very little of this sort of creative writing in our times; instead they followed the beaten tracks of the classical theatre. It is true that the style and language and the technique of these later dramas have comparatively changed but their spirit and undercurrents have not much changed. This can be seen in the dramas of J.B. Choudhury²⁹, who makes the real debut in only one or two of his dramas like the 'Niṣkiñcanayasodharma'. In rest of them, he is absorbed into the same atmosphere of Bhakti, heroworship or themes which have little significance to the modern reader. There are a few more dramas which deserve a mention from the view—point which I have explained in the beginning of this paper. Among the latest publications, 'Pādadaṇḍa'³⁰, of Vanamala Bhāvāṅkara, is a drama of absorbing interest for a modern reader. It deals with the theme of love in the context of contemporary events: Chinese aggression etc. and due to the human interest unfolded in it, at once becomes a thing of abiding interest. 'Punarunmeṣah'³¹ by Dr. Raghavan is also on contemporary theme; and although its technique is somewhat propagandaic, it bears an important place among the modern dramas of Sanskrit, because it keeps the torch of human faith burning brightly amidst the present atmosphere of disturbance and chaos. Susamhatabhāratam³² by Ramacandrudu again deviates from the norm, and although its presentation is not very illuminating, it gives us an inspiration and spirit to look forward to the bright future of an integrated India. 'Kāmaśuddhih' by³³ Dr. Raghavan is also of some value as it invests the Madanadahana legend with a new significance, not to be ignored in the world of today, and its presentation speaks

29. Author of more than 21 dramas, all of them have been published or being published from Prācyavani, Calcutta.

30. Sagar, 1966

31. Sanskrit Ranga, Madras, 1963

32. Sagar, 1966

33. Sanskrit Ranga, 1963

of the originality of the author. A very sympathetic understanding of the frustration and chaotic attitude of the restive youth of today is successfully presented in 'Sākṣātkārah'—a monologue by Sivaprasāda Bhāradvāja³⁴ 'Pariṇāmah'³⁵, a full fledged drama by Gūdanātha Rāya also successfully brings out the lapse of moral in society today.

Lyrics

Modern lyric is written to express the rupturous emotions of the poet and it immediatly appeals to the heart. But in Sanskrit we find a vast number of short poems which are written without inspiration, to propagate some idealism like 'Bhāratagitikā' of M.M. Rāmavātāra Śarma or the collection of verses in 'Dīvyajyotih' and 'Rāsmimālā' by Mangaldeva Śastri. The Sanskrit poet can very easily make verse after verse on such topics as importance of Brahmacharya, Ahimsā or religion etc.³⁶ without inner inspiration and he can easily describe any phenomenon whether it be the natural beauties of the seasons etc. or it be any thing like Radio or television³⁷ and he can compose didactic verses very easily, wisely advising his readers about morality and good virtues etc.³⁸ and he can also construct metres in praise of any god³⁹ or he can write his observations on the socio-political events in a dry style or he can indulge in describing the amorous physical pleasures with a sort of lavish attachment, which he has inherited from the medieval

34. Viśvasamskritam (quarterly) vol. II. I

35. Kathmandu, 1959

36. As in Brahmacharyasataka of Medhavrata.

37. As in Prakritivilasa of Subrahmanya Ayyar, Mandormimala of S.B. Varnekar, Sāhityavaibhava and Jaipura Vaibhava of Bhatta Mathurānātha and several other collections referred to by Dr. Raghavan in CIL. p, 229—231

38. As in 'Caturvargacintamani by Meghasri Narayana Sastri (CIL. p. 231)

39. As in some poems and collections mentioned in footnote 37, or in Kāvya-mālīka (Delhi—1968) by Cintamani Deśamukha.

poets⁴⁰, or in praise of any person⁴¹. This is what a large number of lyrics in Sanskrit of this time reveal.

We now come to discuss some genuine lyricists of contemporary Sanskrit literature, who wrote with real inspiration and feeling, and whose writing will ever remain fresh for its lyric qualities, although the number of such poets is very meagre. Appā Śāstri was among those few poets. In his best lyric like 'Pañjarabaddhah Śukah' or 'Tilakamahāsayasya Kārāgrhavāsah' he touches the burning problems of the present and his emotion is real and is expressed with a natural fervour. His poems at once touch the core of our heart. Annadācarāṇa is of course another great lyric poet. Only lucid and simple style and treatment of modern themes have not made him worthy of being so; that he has found the inner source of expression in his genius instead of catering for subjects or imitating the classics—is the remarkable thing which enshrines him as one of the best lyricists of Sanskrit. In his earlier poems, the search for subjects and the tendency to imitate is of course evident⁴², but gradually the poet has reached the heights where he is not to search for the subjects, Idioms and expressions, but they come to him themselves in abundance³. This is surely a sign of the great lyric poet, which Annadācarāṇa strived to be. But one still greater name in the field of Sanskrit lyrics is that of Haridatta Palivala 'Nirbhaya' who wrote with a fiery impetus and inspiration, which gave an appealing charm to his poems. It is a thing of surprise that this poet, who really deserves a place amidst the modern poets, went unnoticed from the searching eyes of Dr. Raghavan, who has taken great pains to collect information about so many authors of Sanskrit belonging to our age (Few of them really deserve that labour), and left that poet who has created a landmark in Sanskrit poetry, and completed the task of Appa Sastri and Annadācarāṇa, while most of his successors or contemporaries (Sanskrit poets did not even look towards the new horizons which he set in the literary world of Sanskrit. A large number of his poems were written in the days of foreign rule and they are brimming up with the spirit of Patriotism and faith in freedom, but they are really offsprings of the inspired soul which sings with a rupture and abandon. We have discussed several poets so far,

40. As in some of the lyrics of Lalitagitalahari by M. Sharma published in Śaradā (monthly) vol. IX. XIII, also published seperately.

41. As in Indancaritam of Nārāyaṇachandra (Calcutta—1882)

42. As in R̥tucitram (Noakhali, 1306—Banga Year)

but it is only in this poet that the consciousness and the spirit of the age found full expression.

This thing has not been achieved by other poets of this age who have adopted Sanskrit as the medium of expression. But in the poems of Dr. Raghavan, in some pieces of recently published collections like the 'Śinjāravah' ⁴³ of Śrikriṣṇalāl, 'Jāgaraṇam' ⁴⁴ of Sivaśarana Śarma and the 'Kavitāvali' ⁴⁵ of Haripada Datta, the sense of modernity is consciously revealed.

Novel

Dr. Raghavan has referred to more than two dozen novels in Sanskrit in CIL (p. 227). But a modern critic would hesitate to call them novels, except for two or three of them. Almost all of them are full of verbal juggleries with the prose of old classical style, repeating the theme of love or heroworship. I am not against romanticism in literature, but it should make a direct and daring approach to the realities of life. Pt. Ambikādatta Vyāsa made a very good start in the field of writing Sanskrit novels, by his "Sivarājaviṇaya", which has become a classic, and is really a fascinating novel inspite of some unnatural happenings and too much emphasis on chance in life. But unfortunately, the tradition was not rightly followed, and it is a fact that we can hardly mention any work in the enormous profusion of present writings in Sanskrit, which could advance the task of Ambikādatta Vyāsa as a novelist and improve upon its technique to make the Sanskrit novel stand in comparison with the novels of other languages. Instead, the other authors who attempted to write novels in Sanskrit either sunk into old mannerisms of Bāṇa and Subandhu, or even if they chose to write in a simple and easy manner, they were unable to absorb the spirit of the modern novel, and their treatment of the theme was as old as the classics. Happily, there are a few exceptions like "Saraḷā" of Haridāsa Siddhānta-

43. The poems collected in "Sumanonjalih" (Noakhali, 1308B. Year), for example.

44. Delhi, 1970

45. Damoh, 1063

46. Birbhum, 1970

vāgīśa.⁴⁷ But in the last two centuries, it is to be regretted that Sanskrit could produce only one work, which really deserves a place among the best novels of all languages. That is “Kusumalakṣmīh” by Ānandavardhana⁴⁸. Although it is a tale of youthfull love and its tragedy, but the author has successfully made it very appealing to the modern reader due to his deep insight and touching portrayal of human feelings and the depiction of modern environment.

Shortstory

In the few decades, shortstories were written in Sanskrit in a very large number. If it were mere quantity by which one could judge the standard of the literature, then we could have easily said that shortstories in Sanskrit are as good as those of any other language. But the truth is that among the large quantity of shortstories written in Sanskrit, which are published in several magazines and journals of Sanskrit, there are few which can vie up with the rapid advancement which short story has made in other literatures, and new horizons which it has explored through continuous process of experiments. The Sanskrit short story is still lingering behind in remote times. Some collections of shortstories which Dr. Raghavan mentions in CIL, (p. 232-33) may be useful in prescribing as text books in secondary schools but they are of no value as literature. I accept that new technique and style has been adopted in sanskrit short story but the spirit remains the same. “Divyadr̥ṣṭih” by Nārāyaṇa Śāstri Khiste can be cited as an example,⁴⁹ which shows the impact of new technique in its treatment, but it is written to propagate the author’s personal faith in Yogic powers etc.

Dr. Raghavan mentions some stories published in Sanskrit magazines, in some of them modern technique of short story has been adopted successfully and also they present the environment and spirit of age, but in the whole range of the short story literature, if one somehow finds a few stories which are genuine pieces of literature, then it does not clear the charge levelled against the Sanskrit story being unprogressive and unsuccessful in visualising the new trends and modern spirit.

47. See History of Classical Sanskrit Literature by Krishnamāchariar, p. 673

48. Delhi. 1961

49. Master Khelarilal & sons, Kashi, 1956.

So, instead of judging the whole short story literature on the basis of a few stories, let us see if Sanskrit has produced any such prolific writer in our age who can be called to have created really modern fiction. Kṣama Rao could have become one of the modern short story writers if she did not indulge in the mannerisms of Bāna and Subandhu or could leave the temptation of classical style, and would have kept her power of minute observation of and the deep concern for the present or contemporary environment. Four or five of her stories, out of several that are collected on Kāthamuktāvali⁵⁰, Kathāpancakam⁵¹ and Grāma-jyotiḥ are genuine but Kṣama Devi could not keep that standard always. Bhatta Mathurānātha, whom Dr. Raghavan does not even mention as a story writer in CIL, and whose nearly forty stories were published in Sanskrit Ratnākara (Monthly) and Bhārati (Monthly), has successfully adopted the technique and the spirit of modern shortstory. Several collections of shortstories have been published in Sanskrit, but the number of really worthwhile stories is very meagre. They only present the Sanskrit short story struggling to assert its existence, but unsuccessful to overcome its limitations.⁵²

Biography and History

Dr. Raghavan has referred to some biographies written in Sanskrit.⁵³ Some of them like "Lokamānyatilakacaritam" by K. V. Citale and Śāhucaritam by V. A. Latkar can be called suitable to the modern literary test. "Gurugovindasinghcaritam" of Satyavrata is written in very flowing and limpid style but it does not present the personality of Gurugovindsingh in its various aspects and does not make the desired effect on the reader by a thorough visualisation of the personality of the great hero. Pt. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā, although he fails as a poet, made a good debut by writing "Bhāratīyamitivr̥ttam".

50. Bombay, 1955

51. Bombay, 1933

52. Such attempts are seen in collections as "Galpakusumānjali" by Kālīpādatrkācārya (Published in 3 vls. from Ayodhya), Abhinavakathanikunja (Ed.—Shivadatta Sarma Caturvedi, Varanasi—1968)

53. CIL p. 208

A good biography should present the comprehensive study of the life and personality of a man and should make the readers' mental horizon wider by making him share the experiences of that man. This trait of a good biography is not followed on all such works published in Sanskrit during last decades. Besides some works mentioned by Dr. Raghavan, such as "Goswāmitulasidāsacaritam" by Hariprasada Dwivedi, "Sāvitricaritam" by Atmārāma Śāstri⁵⁴. "Śrīkṛṣṇacaritam" by Damodara Śārmā,⁵⁵ "Śrīśivakaivalyacaritam" by T. G. Varadacarya⁵⁶, "Śrīdhanvantarivijayāmṛtam" by Prabhudatta Śāstri, "Prahādacaritam" by Śrīparikṣita⁵⁷ "Vivekānandam" by Sūryanā-āyana Śāstri, "Rajendra-prasādābhyudayan" by Kṛṣṇan.ūrti Śāstri - all these works which attempt to sketch the life of some ancient or modern hero, are characterised by the spirit of exaggeration, heroworship and they do not make us impressed by the personalities of great men they deal with.

Autobiography is very rare in Sanskrit, while in other languages it is a flourishing branch of literature. This indicates that Sanskritists have not yet really grasped the spirit of modern literature. Writing Autobiography today does not indicate the self-centredness or ego of an author. It means that the author in his autobiography has to make study of himself and present it in such a vivid and graphic way so that it is generalised and the readers can share the experiences of the author.

Essay

With the advent of prose in the literature for the last few centuries, prose in Sanskrit was also adopted as a chief vehicle to express contemplative ideas. Ideas on current socio-political problems were expressed by Sanskrit authors like Appā Śāstri, Rāmāvatāra Śarma and others. But Essay literature in Sanskrit is not very rich. Three or four collections of Sanskrit essays published in this century, which Dr. Raghavan mentions in CIL (p. 223) are written for the students of B. A., M. A. or Śāstri classes and they do not reveal the traits of the modern essay distinctly.

54. Bhāratiya Vidyabhavan, Bombay.

55. Anantasayana, 1954

56. Bombay, 1950

57. Trichur, 1952

Essays in which creative thinking of the authors is revealed are very few in Sanskrit of today. Research-articles of course are written in great number, and Sāgarika, a quarterly Sanskrit research journal (pub. Sānskrit parishad, Sagar) has done a lot to encourage the writing of research articles in Sanskrit. But essay in other languages like the short story has made a very rapid progress and the present Sanskrit essay is unable to cope up with the rapid speed of the modern essay. This clearly becomes evident when we see almost a total lack of the Fine Essay in Sanskrit.⁵⁸ The Sanskritists have not given us essays like those of Charles Lamb or even Stevenson, while in other languages this literary form of the essay has gained impetus and popularity long ago.

Review

We have made a brief survey of contemporary Sanskrit literature above. It was not possible to make a study of all the works published recently in Sanskrit. We have just adopted the method of *Śthālipulā-kanyāya* that is judging by a few specimens, and we have discussed some works, which reveal Sanskrit authors' efforts to keep pace with rapid change in the values in the present time, and we have avoided or have made bare references to the works which are mere imitations or entirely of the antique spirit. We have seen that writing on contemporary themes is going on in Sanskrit. But merely adopting contemporary themes is not a sign of Modernity.⁵⁹ If some body begins to compose verses against Chinese aggression on India in 1962 or against the slaughter of cows in this country, it will not be called a modern poetry only for that. Also, we have seen that new forms of literature have been adopted. But again Sanskritists have not been able to grasp the spirit of modern novel or short story or fine essay.⁶⁰

58. One of the very few authors who attempted the fine essay in Sanskrit is Hṛṣikeśa Mukurti whose essays are collected in "Prabandha-manjari", but these essays were mere beginnings. Recently some attempt was made by another author in his "Pathāka-mukhavisphotakam". But the fine essay did not develop in Sanskrit.

59. Several such works, which are of only momentary importance have been composed in Sanskrit at large in this age. For example, poems as—"Capetica" by Vāsudeva Dwivedi on refutation of China, "Viratarangini" by Śrīdhra Śarmā on the same theme, and also "Virotsāhavaradhanam" by Surendranath on the same theme.

60. We have cited some examples when discussing novel, short story in Sanskrit today. Among recently published works, "Dvā-

Sanskrit has played the role of being a vehicle of literary and cultural consciousness of this country for long. It systematised, conserved and transmitted the intellectual and other movements in the country. It presented the popular movements in refined form and reshaped them. The Bhakti movement in the medieval age was originated by the people, but its philosophy was shaped by Rāmānuja, Chaitanya's followers like Rupagosvamin, Jivagosvamin and also by Madhusudana Sarasvati, who expounded the principle and philosophy of Bhakti Rasa. Jainism and Buddhism originated as popular movements expressing their faith in local languages. But religion and philosophy and poetry of these two great movements of India were composed in Sanskrit. Even the faith of Sikhism, Brāhmo Samaja and Ārya Samāja and so on has been expressed through this language⁶¹. Thus Sanskrit has played effectively its role of understanding new movements of intellect and giving them composed, graphic and classical expression. It has been thus a repository of all expressions of Indian consciousness. But still, in the contemporary period, the Sanskrit author has somewhat remained aloof from the latest trends and movements in cultural and literary world. Let me elaborate this point.

The Sanskritist, deeply steeped in tradition as he is, cannot cut himself off from the undercurrents of antiquity. He is still a man of that world where every thing is definite and pre-arranged. He has a philosophy of ultimate hope and vision of quietude-the philosophy of Absolute and religious morality, sanctioned by Smṛtis and laws. So he cannot understand the ultimate sense of despair, helplessness and alienation that permeates the creative writing of today. Modern intellect has been decentralised and is in search of a new centre of consciousness and

Suparna" (Allahabad, 1963) a novel by Dr. Ramji Upādhyāya, although written in elegant and simple style, tries to interpret the ancient lore in terms of the present, but it fails to understand the new values of modern life. Radio plays have also been written but they also fail to impress us due to the same reason. Three plays by S. B. Velanakar, collected in "Rāṇasīrangah", or three plays of Prabhākara Śāstri (Cited in Authors' thesis on contribution of Jaipur to Sanskrit literature, submitted in Rajasthan University, can be mentioned as examples.

61. Sectarian literature in Sanskrit was produced in profusion by the Āryasamājis etc. The Ārya Samaja produced such prolific authors as Muni Medhāvratā, (author of the Dayānandadigvijaya-mahākāvya and several other works) and Gangāprasad Upādhyāya, author of Aryodayamahākāvya etc. Works to propagate the ideas of other reformers were also written' (CIL p. 215—218)

morality. Faith in the order of things, thoughts and patterns stands mutilated. This new consciousness needs its understanding and evaluation by the Sanskrit authors—a task which has not been perfectly accomplished by them.


I do not mean that creative writing in Sanskrit should become ambiguous and unintelligible, as the so called new movements and isms in the literature of other languages today. But the Sanskrit poet, instead of understanding the situation, begins to prescribe norms, which he has learnt from the canons of Smṛtis or Dharmaśāstra or he talks about self-imposed morality and the ideas of ancient times. In the present day, when men are accustomed with the drab commonplaces of struggle for existence, the story of love, adventure, thrills and narrow escapes may strike the modern reader as unrealistic. Therefore, Sanskrit, which has been doing the task of synthesis of different movements in the world of Art and philosophy, seems to have failed in grasping the modern spirit and in evolving something new and refined by its old process of synthesis. The remarks of Dr. Raghavan—“A feeling of helplessness has come over him today”⁶² indicate the helplessness of the Sanskrit author of today in understanding the rapid change of the values.

But the foregoing does not mean that Sanskrit Author's spirit to make healthy compromise of the old and new has extinguished. Sanskrit language has an extra-ordinary power to recover and recapitulate. The Sanskrit poet was puzzled at first when social and political awakening dawned with the beginning of twentieth century, and vehemently protested the new movements⁶³, but gradually he recovered his shock, as he

62. CIL. p. 205

63. Dr. Raghavan has pointed out that Sanskritists had written books against the new movements at the dawn of this century, refuting widow marriage, abolition of caste system or the purification movement of Arya Samaj, sea travel etc. (CIL. p.214). “While the earlier Sanskritist forced his opponent to read his language, literature and school and met him in debate in the pages of his works, the later pundit failed to play this role when Hinduism was faced by Islam first and Christianity later.....and to that extent Indian Philosophical literature failed to keep itself abreast of the need of the time; this was one of the reasons why on the side of the oncoming social changes, which alone the pundit fought, he was waging a losing battle.” Ibid, p. 215

always did, and not only accepted the situation but also
of new consciousness of this era. But now that the very impetus which
enabled him to make synthesis and coordination amidst the diversity
and chaos, is being annihilated by the modern notions, the Sanskrit
author once again stands puzzled and askance, and Sanskrit has once
again to emerge as a unifying force, if it recovers the shock by the
present decentralisation and evolution of entirely new values.



WHAT IS IN SANSKRIT

M. Rama Rao

Introduction

If a question, "What is in Sanskrit?" is to be answered, I would not hesitate in saying at once, that everything that man needs to-day to lead a full life, is found in Sanskrit, its culture and literature. The ultimate aim of existence should be to attain the highest degree of development in the mental and moral plane, to be useful members of society. The abundance of knowledge from various Sanskrit works comprising the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, epics and the Kāvya of renowned poets of yore and modern times, is perhaps unfathomable. In Sanskrit prose, we have the earliest works in the narrative episodes of the Brāhmaṇas. We have in Daṇḍin's दशकुमारचरित, a collection of exciting and ingenious stories in comparatively simple prose. The stories are secular, and humorous. The पञ्चतन्त्र, is a book of instruction in नीति, or the conduct of one's affairs, more particularly intended for kings and statesmen. As Swāmi Vivekānanda said in San Francisco in 1900, "The origin of Ancient Sanskrit is 5000 B. C. and the Upaniṣads are at least 2000 years before that. Nobody knows how old they are. The Gīta takes the ideas of the Upaniṣads and in some cases the very words. They are strung together with an idea of bringing out in a compact, condensed and systematic form, the whole subject, the Upaniṣads deal with." Recently published information reveals that out of a total collection of 3,40,000 books in Indian languages in the National Library, 1,34,000 books are in Sanskrit. There is also the Constitution of India भारतीय संविधानम् as Sanskrit is one of the languages mentioned in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. Sanskrit and Sanskrit culture shine forth even to-day as a seamless garment, enfolding in its several pleats, ethical and moral precepts and codes, administrative and scientific practices, not to speak of the art of teaching, living, advancement and progress. To imagine that one could drink at the well of Sanskrit knowledge and culture is itself something to be devoutly wished. It is my intention to merely touch the fringe on some of the aspects of Sanskrit literature and thought, which have kindled in me a spark of real adoration for that अमरवाणी. I have in the paragraphs following briefly touched on the art of learning and education, administration, scientific enquiry and living. They are

by no means extensive, and at best are stray beads in the lustrous necklace of Sanskrit thought, culture and tradition. I claim no pride as an expert or a Pandit, but Sanskrit has always so to say been a hobby with me.

Art of Learning and Education

The earliest references, in the field of learning and education, are in the Upaniṣads and the Brāhmaṇas. Kaṭhōpaniṣad in the following verse, gives the idea of the preceptor.

न नरेणावरेण प्रोक्तं एष
सुविज्ञो यो बहुधाः चिन्त्यमानः ।
अनन्य प्रोक्ते गतिरत्र नास्ति
अणीयान् हि अतर्क्यमणु प्रमाणम् ॥

Ordinarily, the preceptor who used to be a house holder, admitted pupils of tender age, who left their parental homes for studies under him. It was obligatory that the instructions were to be imparted by a competent preceptor, competency being the result of perfection, since अनुप्रमाणात् अणीयान् अतर्क्यम् the subtlest is subtler beyond arguments.

The Upaniṣads define how knowledge has to be imparted and mentions that the Brahmācārin, should undergo शिक्षा under a preceptor, should overcome caste pride, fame, anger, bragging and foppishness. These enabled him to attain a degree of calmness and self restraint, when he would be able to usefully assimilate instructions. The period of studentship, was a preparatory field and education would extend very much beyond. When a person entered the householder's life, the various social, moral and domestic duties, taking care of one's health and possessions, are marvellously delineated.

The teaching method was very effective, as the pupil would ask a number of questions, which were answered by the preceptor, in various discourses at length on the topics raised. This meant the need for introspection on the part of the pupil, since knowledge which principally meant truth and reality can only be acquired by the individual himself, while teaching at best would be a means to mediate knowledge.

For advanced pupils, opportunity for mutual discussion, not only amongst themselves, but with specialists and celebrities of the times, was provided at various places. Therefore, these peripatetic scholars,

went to various places in the country and met in what were known as Paṛiṣads, and discussed to mutual advantage and for the benefit of society.

From the educational systems and methods mentioned in the Upaniṣads and the Brāhmaṇas, the following from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, chapter 1, has been interpreted to be a practical advice given to the pupil after completion of the study of the Vedas. In another context, it may mean as a parting advice, as in a convocation address of the present times, enjoining the student to conduct himself worthily.

सत्यं वद । धर्मं चर । स्वाध्यायान्मा प्रमदः ।

आचार्याय प्रियं धनं आहृत्य प्रजातन्तुं मा व्येवच्छेत्सीः ।

सत्यान्न प्रमदितव्यम् । धर्मान्न प्रमदितव्यम् । कुशलान्न प्रमदितव्यम् ।

देवपितृकार्याभ्यां न प्रमदितव्यम् । मातृ देवो भव ।

पितृ देवो भव । आचार्य देवो भव । अतिथि देवो भव ।

What a clear enunciation of the precepts one has to follow regarding personal conduct in reference to the obligation to parents, preceptor and society.

The Mahābhārata, mentions about ideal students, teachers, schools and hermitages. Among ideal students, we have उपमन्यु, आरुणि and वेद, all disciples of धौम्य. The नैमिष, presided over by शौनक, was indeed a haven of learning, attaching to itself ten thousand pupils and disciples. Among hermitages कण्व, had, so to say a Forest University (as per modern parlance) embracing within it, philosophers, logicians and other specialists. The Āśramas of विश्वामित्र and व्यास, also formed centres of cultural and spiritual instruction. Mahābhārata also mentions the teaching of medicine in eight branches.

The Bhīṣma Parva of the Mahābhārata, containing the भगवद्गीता forms what may be termed the quintessence of instructions to lead one's life.

Sir William Humboldt speaks of the Gītā as the "most beautiful perhaps the only true philosophical song existing in any known tongue."

The main theme or the essence in the Bhagawadgītā, is directed to resolve a dichotomy in the mind of Arjuna, as to what is to be done and what is to be avoided. The song "celestial is on the Kurukṣetra

war field. It is said of the Gita,” “यदा यदा माननीयं मनः किं कर्तव्यमिति विमूढं भवति, धर्मसंकटेन पतिता तदा मार्गदर्शनाय गीतां प्रत्येव अभिबलते ।”.

These teachings of the Gītā, which contain in its eighteen chapters, the way of knowledge, renunciation, meditation, devotion and liberation are addressed, not to any one community or individual. It is universal so to say, “गीता संदेशः न एकपक्षीयः, न एक जातीयः न वा एक धर्मीयः विशिष्ट मत जाति पक्षीय व्यक्तिं निमित्तीकृत्य श्रीकृष्णः गीतां उपदिदेश ॥

“The universality of prayer to the Lord is in the verse in chapter nine of the Gita and says :

येऽपि अन्य देवताभक्ताः यजन्ते श्रद्धयान्विताः ।

तेऽपि मामेव कौन्तेय यजन्त्यविधिपूर्वकम् ॥

The verse qualifying action without attachment :

कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन ।

मा कर्मफल हेतुर्भूः मा ते सङ्गोऽस्तु अकर्मणि ॥

will serve as a guide for all time.

Preceptors were expected to teach without any fee, and purely as a matter of religious duty, though they were free to accept any remuneration. Chapter V of Kālidāsa's Raghuvamśa, gives an idea of the preceptor's fees. When कौत्स, completes his studies, though his preceptor वरतन्तु, considered the long and unswerving devotion to him as ample compensation कौत्स, says निर्वन्ध संजातरुषार्यं कार्यं (incensed at my importunities) the preceptor demanded वित्तस्य विद्या परिसंख्य मे कोटिस्चतुर्थो दशचाहरेति “Bring me four and ten crores of money, corresponding to the number of lores studied by you.” कौत्स had no alternative left except to ask king Raghu for the same. Raghu himself being in great adversity having performed the यज्ञ, procurement of money from Kubera etc., follows later on in the V canto.

Therefore, if we analyse, how teaching was imparted, the efficacy and object of learning, the nature of the subjects, qualifications required of the teacher (गुरु) and the taught (शिष्य), their mutual relationship, strict discipline and devotion, would it not be apparent that the responsibility on the teacher was really a very heavy and onerous one? Taking one of Bhāsa's works, the anxiety of a preceptor in reference to the pupil is in the verse from Pañcarātra. when Droṇācārya says :

अतीत्य बन्धूनवलङ्घ्यमित्राणि

आचार्यमागच्छति शिष्यदोषः ।

बालो हि अपत्यं गुरवे प्रदातुः

नैवापराधोऽस्ति पितुर्नमातुः ॥

If we take the उत्तररामचरित, we have the following verse, which says that though the preceptor imparts knowledge to the talented as well as to the dull pupil, he cannot give them the talent for learning, nor can he take it away. A bright gem can only give a reflection but not a lump of earth.

वितरति गुरुः प्राज्ञे विद्यां यथैव तथा जडे

न च खलु तयोज्ञानि शक्तिं करोत्यपहन्ति वा ।

भवति च पुनर्भूयान्भेदः फलं प्रति, तद्यथा

प्रभवति शुचिर्बिम्बग्राहे मणिः नमूदां चयः ॥

Swāmi Vivekānanda says, "The teacher who deals too much in words, and allows the mind to be carried away by the force of words loses the spirit. शब्दजालं महारण्यं चित्तभ्रमणकारणम्. The network of words is a big forest, it is the cause of a curious wandering of the mind." What strict tests revealed a perfect गुरु and शिष्य,

The Art of Living

The introductory verses in the Rāmāyaṇa, where the ascetic Vālmiki questions Sage Nārada about the person endowed with a number of virtues, form an epitome of the life of Śrī Rāma, portrayed in the great epic. Vālmiki asks:

कोनु अस्मिन् सांप्रतं लोके गुणवान् कश्च वीर्यवान् ।

धर्मज्ञश्च कृतज्ञश्च सत्यवाक्यो दृढव्रतः ॥

चारित्र्येण च को युक्तः सर्वभूतेषु कोहितः ।

विद्वान् कः कः समर्थश्च कश्चैकप्रियदर्शनः ॥

आत्मवान् कः जितक्रोधः द्युतिमान्कोऽनसूयकः ।

कस्य बिम्ब्यति देवाश्च जातरोषस्य संयुगे ॥

एतदिच्छामि अहं श्रोतुं परं कौतूहलं हि मे ।

The life of Śrī Rāma was that of one who was the very embodiment of the greatest virtues of human character. How he lived is expressed by the Rt. Hon. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri in his lectures on the Rāmāyaṇa. He says, "So Rāma grew in family life, under father and mother, and under like any of us, a step-mother, who had human frailties. He had his difficulties of a joint family, you see how he went through them all in a story full of tenderest pathos and the most moving emotions. You must study the character of Rāma."

The banishment of Śrī Rāma to the forest, to fulfil the vow of his father to his step-mother, brings out one of the finest emotions, and may be compared to what Shakespeare says in Hamlet, "Perpetual condolment is a course of impetuous stubbornness."

As Śrī Rāma leaves Daśaratha from the palace in the chariot drawn by Sumantra, Daśaratha cries out to stop.

तिष्ठेति राजा चुक्रोश एहि एहि इति राघवः ।
सुमन्त्रस्य बभूवात्मा चक्रयोरिव चान्तरा ॥

Poor Sumantra's flight was that of a person caught between the front and rear wheels of the chariot. Placed in this predicament Sumantra asks the meaning of these contrary instructions. Śrī Rāma says;

ना श्रोषमिति राजानं उपालब्धोऽपि वक्ष्यसि ।
चिरं दुःखस्य पापिष्टं इति रामस्तमब्रवात् ॥

Just say that in the bustle and noise you did not hear him. The justification for telling this white lie is that it is foolish to prolong the wail.

The qualities of a स्थितप्रज्ञ are given in the Gītā in the verse

दुःखेषु अनुद्विग्नमनाः सुखेषु विगतस्पृहः ।
वीतरागभयक्रोधः स्थितधीर्मुनिरुच्यते ॥

While this is so Tulasidas in the prayer song to Śrī Rāma, describes him as follows:

प्रसन्नतां या न गताभिषेकतः
तथा न मम्लौ वनवास दुःखतः ।
मुखांबुज श्रीः रघुनन्दनस्य मे
सदास्तु सा मंजुल मङ्गलप्रदा ॥

Kālidāsa in the 1st canto of Raghuvamśa states the four stages of regulating one's life in the following verse:

शैशवे अभ्यस्तविद्यानां यौवने विषयैषिणाम् ।

वार्धके मुनि वृत्तीनां योगेनान्ते तत्तुल्यजाम् ॥

In the famous drama Abhijñāna Śākuntala, there are four verses in Act IV which have been acclaimed as superb in the following verse:

काव्येषु नाटकं रम्यं तत्र रम्या शकुन्तला ।

तत्रासि च चतुर्थोऽङ्कः तत्र श्लोकचतुष्टयम् ॥

These four verses deal with the instructions for guidance given of Śakuntalā on leaving her foster father Kanva's āśrama for her husband's home. Particularly the verse

शश्रूषस्व गुरुन् कुरु प्रियसखीवृत्तिं सपत्नी जने

भर्तुः विप्रकृतोऽपि रोषणतया मास्म प्रतीपं गमः ।

भूयिष्ठं भव दक्षिणा परिजने भाग्येषु अनुत्सेकिनी

यान्ति एवं गृहिणीपदं युवतयः वामाः कुलस्याधयः ॥

is really apt advice which any parent would give to his daughter, subject of course to small alterations demanded from the alterations to the extant laws of marriage.

Bhartṛhari in his three Śatakas comprising of three hundred verses, suggests a recipe for living, so to say. The शृंगार शतक gives lyrics which contain the deepest thoughts of love and of the lover. The नीति शतक contains words of advice and what distinguishes a wise man and a fool or a buffoon. While the first two Śatakas deal with what may be applicable to mundane existence, the वैराग्य शतक gives the essence of divine worship and the higher philosophical concept of renunciation etc.

If Shakespeare has brought out the feelings and emotions of human beings, under various circumstances, we have parallels in Bhāsa, Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti, not to speak of other unmatched parallels. Taking Bhāsa in his प्रतिज्ञा यौगन्धरायण the feeling which a mother experiences when she has a daughter of marriageable age, but not yet married, in the following verse:

अदत्तेति आगता लज्जा दत्तेति व्यथितं मनः ।

धर्म स्नेहान्तरे न्यस्ता दुःखिताः खलु मातरः ॥

In a complementary verse Bhāsa expresses the feelings of the father:

कन्यायाः वरसंपत्तिः पितुः प्रायः प्रयत्नतः ।
भास्येषु शेषमायत्तं दृष्टपूर्वं न चान्यथा ॥

Does it not appear to anyone who understands these feelings, that the same feelings have pervaded the parents of these many generations.

Bhavabhūti in his उत्तरराम चरित gives expression to the shy feelings of Lakṣmaṇa, in the dialogue between Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā, when they are going through the paintings depicting their lives.

लक्ष्मणः । इयमार्या । इयमपि माण्डवी । इयमपि बधूः श्रुतकीर्तिः (Pointing out to Sītā, Māṇḍavī wife of Bharata and Śrutakīrti wife of Śatrughna).

Then Sita asks: इयमपि अपराका when Lakṣmaṇa skips to mention about his wife's portrait.

Then Lakṣmaṇa (blushing and aside, to himself) says (स लज्जास्मितमपवार्य) अये उमिलां पृच्छति आर्या । भवतु अन्यतः संचरामि. Thus he wants to divert Sītā's attention about the next portrait of भार्यव Rṣi.

Suffice it to say that the exuberance of narration of the feelings of individuals in different circumstances, have found expression, not only in the epics, but in the other limbs of Sanskrit literature. Guidance is practically the theme of the several works. It is no wonder then that the cultural heritage of Sanskrit literature, betokens us to a way of life, full of meaning, happiness and satisfaction. Human nature from the beginning has more or less been the acceptance of certain cardinal principles, and as society develops, a few changes there may be, but in the main, there cannot be drastic deviations from the accepted laws of ethics and morality.

Dr. Raghavan in his two works, "Love in the Poems and Plays of Kālidāsa" and "The Social Play in Sanskrit", has vividly brought out in his own words "the great legacy of treasures of the mind and spirit which ancient Sanskrit literature enshrines."

The Art of Polity and Administration

Besides Upaniṣads, particularly the Śatapatha, Aitareya and Taittiriya, a large number of hymns from the R̥gveda, throw light on

the science of polity in those times. By and large, the Mahābhārata, in the Śānti Parva, gives extensively Rājadharmā, duties of the King and Government. These contain discussions on the important science of Politics, the theories about the origin of the State and Kingship. The duties and responsibilities of the King are discussed at length, so also of the Ministers. Taxation is also mentioned.

Sabhā Parva mentions about राजनीति, a good idea of the ideal administration. One or two verses from the same is worthwhile quoting :

कच्चिदर्थं च धर्मं च कामं च जयतां वर ।

विभज्य काले कालज्ञः सदा वरद मेवमे ॥

कच्चिन्न पाने द्यूतेवा क्रीडासु प्रमदासु च ।

प्रति जानन्ति पूर्वाणि व्ययं व्यसनं तव ॥

In the same Sabhā Parva, there is a discussion regarding emergency policy, during the war between सहदेव and Nila at Māhiṣmati.

Again in the Ādiparva of the Mahābhārata we have what may be termed justification of Machiavellism. Droṇācārya accepts to be preceptor to Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas and practises the concept that any political means, however unscrupulous is justified when it strengthens one party or State.

The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya forms a pioneer work in the field of Polity and Public Administration. Kauṭilya says that Arthaśāstra is the science dealing with the acquisition and protection or governance of a country though strictly Arthaśāstra should mean the science of wealth or economics, because Artha connotes wealth. But Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya is very much more broadbased, as he contends that the term can also include the country where people live together as a community. Kauṭilya therefore says, "मनुष्याणां वृत्तिरर्थः मनुष्याणां भूमिरर्थः तस्याः पृथिव्याः लाभपालनोपायः शास्त्रं अर्थं शास्त्रं मिति ।

Both the authorship and date have been very controversial. Kauṭilya, also named Viṣṇugupta, appears to have been Cāṇakya, who according to tradition overthrew the Nanda Dynasty and enthroned Candragupta Maurya. One author subscribes therefore to the date being the period B. C. 321 — 296. The following from the Viṣṇupurāṇa throws evidence when it says, "कौटिल्य एव चन्द्रगुप्तं राज्ये अभिषेक्षति । तस्यापि पुत्रः बिन्दुसारः भविष्यति । तस्यापि अशोकवर्धनः

Whatever dispute there may be regarding the authorship or date of the work, we have with us the book, which in its 150 chapters, discusses Public Administration in a remarkably thorough manner. Detailed instructions, on the control of the State, the organisation of national ceremony and the conduct of war.

If one considers certain aspects of modern administrative concepts, we cannot but accept the seeds of these are found in the Arthaśāstra. Taking only a few major items, like Public Finance and Crime, the importance of having the coffers of Government full, has been impressed. There was a system of taxation, and agriculture being the main source to produce wealth, the basic tax was on land, depending on the crop harvested. The king levied this tax and it was usually one-sixth of the produce. Even Kālidāsa, has in the Raghuvamśa Canto II mentioned that when Dilipa was enjoined by Kāmadhenu :

दुग्ध्वा पयः पत्रपुटे मदीयं पुत्रोपभुंक्ष्वेति तमादिदेश ।

(My son, extract my milk in a vessel of leaves and drink it) answers as befitting the King's position that he will receive one-sixth part, after giving the due share to the calf and for sacrificial rites. He says :

वत्सस्य होमार्थंविधेश्च शेषमृषेरनुज्ञां अधिगम्य मातः ।

औधस्यमिच्छामि तवोपभोक्तुं षष्ठांशमुर्व्याः इव रक्षितायाः ॥

The taxes need to be remitted generally in kind, land brought under cultivation newly was not taxed fully for five years. Partial or total remissions of tax was made when the harvest was bad. Remission was also admissible when any village embarked on a scheme of collective irrigation projects in public interest. The tax system has thus remained more or less the same with regard to land revenue.

Besides the taxes on land or Land Revenue, they levied road tolls from travelling merchants and these were collected by an officer called Antapāla, who was responsible for the maintenance of roads. Even the rate of levy of taxes on essential goods like grain, oil, sugar etc., was fixed at one-twentieth of their value, while on other commodities it ranged between one-fifteenth and one-fifth. Obviously the complex system of taxation required surveying and accountancy, which was also existing. Taxation was justified on the ground that in return the King offered protection.

Taking the subject of Crime, the present practice of curfew from dusk to dawn, when people's fury is rather high-strung, has its parallel

in Kautilya's Arthaśāstra, as it advises the imposition of a stringent curfew from about two-and-a-half hours after sunset to the same time before dawn.

Justice was meted out in a thorough manner, and the Arthaśāstra mentions about the court with a bench of three magistrates being set up for every ten villages with higher courts in districts and provinces. The Chief Judge was called अधिकरणिक, derived from the word अधिकरण and connotes that he was an official who combined judicial and administrative functions.

Thus Kautilya's Arthaśāstra contains in it all aspects of discipline with reference to the King, his subjects, and corporations, the duties of Government Superintendents who were quite a number for the various departments like agriculture, liquor, weaving, ships, chariots, etc; Law, which included marriage, property of women, inheritance, etc., remedies against National calamities, sovereign states, army recruitment, equipment and training. Thus the Arthaśāstra is a huge compendium of every aspect of Public Administration, and forms verily the most important source of various laws, codes and practices followed from time to time in this country.

Regarding other aspects of administration, how Kālidāsa draws a comparison between Kings Dilipa and Raghu on the one hand and Raghu and Aja on the other is to be found in Cantos 4 and 5 of the Raghuvamśa.

मन्दोत्कण्ठाः कृतास्तेन गुणाधिकतया गुरौ ।

फलेन सहकारस्य पुष्पोद्गम इव प्रजाः ॥

(Just as people long less for the mango blossom by the appearance of the fruit, so were they about Dilipa, as his son Raghu possessed superior virtues).

रूपं तदोजस्वि तदेव वीर्यं तदेव नैसर्गिकमुन्नतत्वम् ।

न कारणात्स्वात्विभिदे कुमारः प्रवर्तितो दीप इव प्रदीपात् ॥

(The resplendent form was the same, the valour the same, and nobleness of nature the same, thus the new born prince Aja did not differ from his father, as an oil lamp with its wick lighted by another).

Required weapons for war being received after the conclusion, is delightfully stated by Bhāsa in the following verse :

एतानि तानि आपत्तितानि
 काले भाग्यक्षयात् निष्फलमुद्यतानि
 तुरंगमस्येव रणे निवृत्ते
 नीराजना कौतुक मंगलानि ॥

We have in the लौकिक न्यायज्ञानं, a handful of popular maxims, and these Nyāyas are only inference from familiar instances, and throws a lot of light in making decisions and to draw up priorities. These were collected and published by Colonel G. A. Jacob of the Indian Staff Corps in 1907. He says, "I have therefore determined to lay before the public the handful of popular maxims, which I have collected during many years of reading, in the hope that they may become the nucleus of a very much bigger collection." One or two of the Nyāyas may be quoted as illustrating the purpose intended.

“नष्टाश्व दग्ध रथ न्यायः”

This expresses how we can have union to mutual advantage, and alludes to two men with horses, and chariots. While travelling-one of them loses the horse while the other has his chariot burnt. They decide to use the available horses to the remaining chariot and pursue the journey together.

Another Nyāya says, “निरामयस्य किमायुर्वेदविद्या” meaning “what need has a healthy man of one skilled in the science of medicine.” These Nyāyas therefore deal mainly with illustrations or दृष्टान्ताः, secondly with rules or principles परिभाषां, and lastly topics or अधिकरण, and serve as a ready reckoner under various circumstances. However all the Nyāyas comprise only popular maxims and there are no technical ones.

Real friendship transcends all social barriers as exist between a King and his subject, rich and poor, the advanced or the backward and is very well brought out in the Bhāgavata; when Kuchela is embraced by Śrī Kṛṣṇa as his very old friend. Think of the real reason of approaching Śrī Kṛṣṇa by Kuchela, though goaded by his wife to collect wealth and riches from Śrī Kṛṣṇa; Kuchela determines to go only because it serves a purpose of meeting an old friend who is the Lord of the universe. The relevant verses are quoted below ;

स एवं भार्यया विप्रः बहुशः प्रार्थितो मृदु ।
 अयं हि परमो लाभः उत्तमश्लोक दर्शनम् ।
 इति संचिन्त्य मनसा गमनाय मतिं दधे ॥

With these few references, it will convince anyone that the art of policy and administration mentioned in the Sanskrit works are embryonic of the later developments.

Arts and Sciences

Image worship does not connote that the Idol or portrait represents the divinity itself. It is a Sādhana or instrument or a diagrammatic help, to attain divinity. The Vedas mention that God being infinite and formless cannot be rendered in the terms of any finite form or body, and therefore stipulated that certain aspects could be symbolised to make it more comprehensible, i.e., साधकानां हितार्थाय ब्रह्मणः रूपकल्पनम्, (for the benefit of the worshipper the Divinity assumes an imaginative form, become anthropomorphous). The Śilpa Śāstras form the code of practice for the image-maker, and contain the canons of proportions setting out the dispositions of the various limbs, gestures, poses of each image. Śilpa-Śāstra may be considered as, so to say, the plastic application of the Gita principle, "action without attachment", which essentially conveys the idea that in all actions, it is the body that acts, while the self is serene and unshaken—thus the figure is a mere actor. The depiction of वृक्षशास्त्राः is referred to in the Mahābhārata, as goddesses to be worshipped by those desiring children. In fact the legendary origin of Pāṭaliputra refers to the marriage of a student to the maiden of a Pāṭali tree.

The standard text book on painting was the Citrasūtra, and it was the most popular book for study. As the very name implies, the book refers to the science of painting and the book is stated to be belonging to the Gupta period. One of the four minor Vedas given in the Bhāgavata is स्थापत्य वेद, which really includes painting and sculpture. The painter at work is referred to in the Mricchakaṭika of शूद्रक when Maitreya says ;

यो नामाहं तत्रभवतश्चारुद्रत्तस्य त्रङ्कयोहोरात्रं प्रयत्नसिद्धैः उद्गरसुरभिर्गन्धिभिः
मोदकैः एव आशितो अभ्यन्तरं चतुः शालकद्वार उपविष्टः मल्लकाशत परिवृतः
चेत्रकार इव अंगुलीभिः स्पृष्ट्वा स्पृष्ट्वा अपनयामि ।

I, who used to sit in the inner courtyard and was fed on highly flavoured sweets through the influence of Cārudatta; with a hundred pans, round me, like a painter surrounded by paint pans, from each of which touched a bit and pushed back). Among the arts of pleasure termed विनोदस्थान,, painting was considered as a very important one. In the ikuntala of Kālidāsa, Act VI, Duṣyanta refers to painting as विनोदस्थान, and says. (Oh ! Chaturika, this work of pleasure that is the

painting has been only half painted by me.) चातुरिके ! अर्धलिखितमिदं
विनोदस्थानमस्माभिः ।

The origin of music has been ascribed to Brahma, who has extracted music from the सामवेद. Therefore सामवेद, has the full complement of the seven notes, and Kṛṣṇa in the Gītā also says वेदानां साम वेदोऽस्मि. Further it was stipulated in the अथर्ववेद that the chaplain of the King, the Purohita, should be really versed in the science of spiritual acoustics. Pre-Aryan music has been preserved by us in the Saṅgita Ratnākara of Sāraṅgadeva, who was born in Kashmir and came down South, devoting all his time to the realm of music. In the Bālakāṇḍa of the Rāmāyaṇa, when Lava and Kuśa, disciples of Vālmiki, chant the verses, they do it with perfect proportion, with an expressive, responsive voice, having had surpassing mastery of the Gāndharva Veda. They are applauded in the following verse :

प्रशशंसुः प्रशस्तव्यौ गायन्तौ तौ कुशीलवौ ।

अहो गीतस्य माधुर्यं श्लोकानां च विशेषतः ॥

The Mahābhārata also mentions about Arjuna being a master musician, as in the court of Virāṭa, incognito, he offered himself as a teacher of music.

Ayodhya, as a place with musicians and dancers appears in the Rāmāyaṇa. Furthermore we have in the Gita Govinda of Jayadeva of the 12th century, the oldest orthodox piece of music, based on the 10th chapter of the Bhagavad Gītā, depicting glimpses of Divine Glory.

Music always had its twin aspect in dance, and dancing is copiously mentioned in the Epics, and in the Malāvikāgnimitra of Kālidāsa we have a glimpse of the art of dancing, practiced in India, nearly two thousand years ago.

Among the sciences, brief reference may be made to the main ones, namely, Astronomy, Mathematics, Botany and Chemistry, primarily to bring out the advances made in those subjects, ages ago.

Astronomy has its beginning in Vedic Astronomy, and later the Post-Vedic and finally the scientific Hindu Astronomy. Vedic Astronomy confined itself more or less to determine the propitious time for the beginning and end of the several Vedic sacrifices, during the various seasons of the year. Vedic Astronomy depended more on the observed positions of the sun and the moon, rather than on calculations. The शतपथ ब्राह्मण defines Amāvāsyā in the following words, "This is Soma

what is the food of the Gods is the moon, who, when he is not seen this night either in the east or the west, enters water and the food giving plants on this earth. He is the wealth of the Gods, viz., food—As he comes over to the earth this night, it is named, “Amāvāsyā.” The term therefore meant in practice the period of the moon’s invisibility. The Upaniṣads and the Brāhmaṇas also mention about the Equinoxes and Solstices. The Post-Vedic Astronomy, contained in the two works of Yājuṣa Jyotiṣa and Archā Jyotiṣa, define the sidereal days, the solar days and the solstices. Thus the summer solstice was at the middle of Aṣleṣā Nakṣatra, while the winter at the first point of Dhaniṣṭha.

Between 100 to 500 A.D. the Siddhanta of पौलिष is really accurate and confirms more or less to the accepted calendar of later time. In five years there are sixty solar months that is according to those rules, there are two adhimāsas in five years. The number of lunar months is 62 and the number of Tithis is 1860. Therefore dividing 1860 by 62, we have the number of omitted lunar days as 30, accounting for the Adhimāsas. The various Siddhāntas of पौलिष, रोमक, वणिट्ट, पैतामह and others give laborious calculations for the determination of time, the eclipses, corresponding generally with equations from Ptolemy.

Scientific Astronomy began from nearly 500 A.D. Āryabhaṭa of Kusumapura (Pāṭaliputra) at the young age of 23, began teaching astronomy to his pupils. He derived the true science, by making use of a large mass of records of observations, both correct and incorrect. Āryabhaṭa, enunciated a number of laws pertaining to the apparent motions of the sun and moon, and which accord with the true ecliptic path of the planets. The consideration of Apogee and Perigee has also been referred to. Varāhamihira, Brahmagupta are later astronomers, whose works Sūrya Siddhānta, and the Brāhma-Sphuṭa Siddhānta, respectively, have large borrowings from works of the Pioneer Āryabhaṭa.

छान्दोग्य उपनिषद्, lists out the various sciences and arts cultivated by Vedic Hindus, and considers गणित (meaning literally calculation, or the science of Mathematics) to be the most superior. It is stated in the Vedāṅga Jyotiṣas, “As are the crests on the heads of peacocks, as are the gems on the hoods of snakes, so is Gaṇita at the top of the science.” The Śulba (शुल्ब) was the Geometry of the Vedic period, wherein is solved propositions about rectilineal figures, mensuration, and various other theorems. It is even questioned whether the theorem of the square of the diagonal, associated to Pythagoras (540 B. C.) when it was already mentioned in the Baudhayana (बौधायन) as early as 800 B.C. In fact there are many other instances where Vedic Mathematicians were the precursors of later theories and solutions. Brahmagupta

of the 7th century, Mahāvira of the 9th century and Bhāskara of the 12th century have made real contributions to the study of Mathematics. Their works involved the import of positive and negative quantities, extraction of square and cube roots as well as the solutions to quadratic and indeterminate equations. It is a mighty contribution of Āryabhata who expressed the form of π (pie) as a fraction $62832/20000$, and which subsequently was more accurately determined to nine decimal places by later Indian mathematicians. Earlier it was proved by Bhāskara that $x/0$ will be infinity. He also proved mathematically that infinity however divided remains infinity, which found expression in Indian Theology a millenium before.

Arthaśāstra speaks of treatises Government used to provide for the citizens for public parks, pleasure gardens and hunting forests, for enjoyment, recreation and sport. Therefore scientific study of plants existed in Ancient India, and the same was termed वृक्षार्थवेद, or भेषजविद्या. These are evidenced in the Agni Purāṇa and Bārhat Samhitā. In the Arthaśāstra, the word गुह्यवृक्ष वेदज्ञ, which literally means an applied botanist, whose work consisted of selection of soil, sowing, grafting, rotation of crops and so on. Only scattered references are available at present in Sanskrit. Even in the Vedic texts, including the Upaniṣads, we have classification of trees mentioned. Thus in the तैत्तिरीय संहिता it is said that the plant comprises of मूल (root) and तुल (shoot), the काण्ड (stem) वत्स (branch) पुष्प (flower) and फल (fruit). The bigger trees are having स्कण्ड (trunk), शाखाः (branches) and पर्णाः (leaves). These descriptions occur in the Ṛgveda as well as the Atharva Veda.

Rasāyana, which is an equivalent of alchemy appears in the अथर्ववेद. No better testimony is there other than that of Sri P. C. Ray, who says, "On reading the चरक i. e., the चरक संहिता one often feels, as if it embodied the deliberations of an international congress of medical experts held in the Hinālayan regions. The work progresses to be more or less of the nature of a record of that congress." Patañjali, whose appearance in the 2nd century B. C. was also an authority on the science of iron, लोह शास्त्र. Nāgārjuna has composed a book on Alchemy, who flourished probably in the 7th century A. D., or earlier.

The general, and rather cursory glances at some of the Arts and Sciences found in Sanskrit works, throw sufficient light on the advances made in them. Each of these form the subject matter of large and extensive themes, conveying to us the contribution which India has made to further advances in the world.

In conclusion, I must say that this paper does not purport to provide an expert's knowledge on the subject. On the other hand, it is enough to illustrate the marvellously extensive knowledge which Sanskrit culture and literature is able to provide for us to-day. It would therefore behove everyone to hearken to the call of that great Institution of Sanskrit Culture. I will exhort everyone to a 'Couplet from some author, as an apt finale to the rather sketchy peroration.

नित्यं संस्कृतं पठन्तु प्रीत्या संस्कृतं वदन्तु

शिष्याः ! संस्कृत भाषोन्नत्यै, पूर्ण सहयोगं प्रदयन्तु ।

A DEFENCE FOR THE THEORY OF RASA

Or

A plea for the emotive basis of Literature.

Prof. Nagendra

Notwithstanding its supreme importance in Indian Poetics, the theory of Rasa had to face opposition from different intellectual quarters, and right from the beginning a number of charges were levelled against it. The major arguments of its opponents can be marshalled as below:-

Rasa has been defined as a transcendental experience akin to the realization of the Supreme Self. This mystical concept agreed with the temper of the medieval ages, but it cannot be accepted in the modern world. When Psychology can attempt a definition of our subtlest experiences, it is difficult to believe that the aesthetic experience remains still inexplicable.

The theory of Rasa lays all its emphasis on emotion, with the result that it fails to do proper justice to the other forms of art which appeal to our imagination or elevate our thoughts or afford subtle intellectual pleasure through ingenious juxtapositions of words. In the past, several rival schools of Poetics had sprung up, showing their preference either for figures of speech or for diction, for suggestive art or for oblique expression-and in the present times also many critics have repeated the old allegations in a different language. Their main argument is that poetry has several functions to perform; to create a beautiful image in the mind of the reader or to provide aesthetic pleasure through ingenuities of the word and the phrase is, by no means, less important than to evoke emotive responses. In the present world, our psychic life has become extremely complicated: reason and intellect play a much greater part today than in the past and as such our experiences are intricately intellectualized. The theory of Rasa has no provision for a proper evaluation of these new forms of aesthetic experience.

According to this theory, the number of sentiments and feelings has been rigidly defined-with the result that the range of literature has

been unnaturally circumscribed. The human psyche is like an unfathomable ocean surging with countless waves and ripples, and it is irrational to reduce them to nine or eleven basic sentiments or thirtythree accessory feelings. There are innumerable forms of subtle and impetuous psychic actions faithfully depicted in the literatures of all ages which cannot be contained within these definitions. In the literatures of the world-nay even in our own modern literature, there may be hundreds and thousands of works of arts wherein it is difficult to determine the basic sentiment or define the Rasa: for example who can determine the basic sentiment in Hamlet or in Wasteland or even in Godān of Prem Chand or Kurukṣetra of Dinkar? The main reason for this failure is that the theory of Rasa which is based on the primeval instincts of man is by itself inadequate to take cognizance of all the actions and reactions of the human psyche today, when the advancing sciences of the conscious and the unconscious mind have opened infinite regions of mystery.

For proper delineation of Rasa, a full situation is essential which is generally difficult to create in shorter forms of poetic art. There are, however, any number of beautiful stanzas or sparkling phrases in literature containing not a full picture, but just a flavour or an extremely fine shape of an experience. How can the consummation of Rasa be possible in such cases?

The relations between the various Rasas have been defined so rigidly that a free play of emotions is seriously hampered. Our psychic activities on the other hand are full of contradictions which really lend power and richness to experiences. The same thing could be said about a poem or a poet's creative genius. The Mahābhārata in Indian literature and Shakespeare's dramas in the West are full of contradictions of all kind: as a matter of fact, their glory lies in these flagrant contradictions. How can these phenomena fit into the pattern of the Rasa theory? They are likely to be condemned as serious violations of the principles of art.

Another limitation of this theory is that it lays undue emphasis on the subjective nature of artistic experience. The aesthetic emotion, according to its exponents, (Cf beauty lies in the mind of the beholder), resides in the consciousness of the reader; as such the artistic emotion of the poet and the emotional content of the poem have no place in their scheme with the result that whenever on account of certain prejudices or preoccupations, the aesthetic sensibility of the reader fails him, even a good poem does not receive due applause. Moreover, it is not quite necessary that the basic sentiment of the reader should correspond in every case to the basic sentiment depicted in the poem: Sometimes there

is complete discordance between the two. For example, let us take a situation in a drama in which the lover and the beloved come across a cannibal devouring human flesh in a hideous forest. The sight will rouse the feeling of indignation in the lover if he is a brave man, fear in the mind of the fair damsel and horror in the spectator. Under the circumstances, in the absence of the necessary concordance between the emotional response of the spectator and the sentiment depicted in the drama, there shall be no possibility of a proper consummation of the aesthetic enjoyment, in spite of the fact that it may be otherwise a powerful work of art. This is one of the glaring anomalies in the theory of Rasa.(i)

The thesis that Rasa is manifested has also been confronted by the theories of communication and artistic creation. The artistic or aesthetic experience according to them, is communicated and it is not a simple basic emotion but a pattern of experiences (ii) made-up of several emotional, imaginative and intellectual responses, and cannot be *evoked* as much. Thus, the theory which defines Rasa as a manifestation of primeval emotions of the respondent does not present a correct and complete picture of the aesthetic experience.

This theory, which is deeply rooted in idealism, postulates permanent values of art. But in contemporary life when all permanent values or ideals are disintegrated and change has been accepted as the law of nature, we can only be sure of the immediate moment and poetry or art today can attempt to express only the 'immediate experience which is in process', everything else being dead stuff. The theory of Rasa, on the contrary, is built on a permanent emotional basis and takes little cognizance of the immediate experience which cannot be converted into aesthetic experience unless it is *universalized*. As such, it is irrelevant to contemporary art.

It lays undue stress on the pleasure-principle, with the result that other healthier values of life-such as elevation of character, discipline of the senses or organization of impulses, cultivation of social consciousness and zest for action etc. become subsidiary in literary evaluation. This can and has done positive harm to life and literature both.

These are the major allegations made by the critics of the past and the present and it is necessary to examine their validity before we can attempt a proper assessment of the theory of Rasa.

(i) cf. 'Mardhekar's views on the subject.

(ii) cf. I.A. Richard's Theory of Communication.

The first and the earliest target is the transcendental nature of Rasa which has been compared by its exponents to the realization of the Supreme Self. (1) This is supposed to be the most vulnerable point in the theory and has been exposed to all kinds of semi-serious criticism by modern writers. This objection, however, can be met without difficulty. The comparison of Rasa with the realization of the Supreme Self only implies that it is an extremely refined or sublimated experience free from selfish involvements, and as such it is superior to the ordinary sensuous or emotional experiences. The Advaita school of Philosophy defines all kinds of joy in terms of spiritual happiness because joy is an attribute of the Spirit and not a function of the mind or senses. Being an extremely refined and sublimated form of experience, the aesthetic enjoyment is different from sensuous enjoyment and akin to spiritual bliss. This is all that is meant by the much abused phrase. If you don't believe in the existence of Soul or Spirit, you can use the word 'consciousness' instead and define Rasa as a composed state of consciousness. Actually, the phrase, as such, is a technical jargon of a particular school of thought and should be understood in its historical context. If the concept of the Supreme Self-the Brahman or the Atman is not acceptable to the modern reader, we should re-interpret the phrase in terms of modern criticism. Personally to me also, the metaphysical definition of Rasa does not quite appeal-not because I am intellectually or intimately convinced of the non-existence of the Supreme Self but because its concept is very much hypothetical, whereas Rasa or aesthetic enjoyment is a positive experience. Therefore, the technical expressions in this context or in the context of any branch of traditional knowledge are to be interpreted rationally. The concepts of the basic elements of life are not stationary-they grow with life, and only in this sense they can be considered universal and permanent. The tragedy has been that those who have studied Indian Science of Poetry and Art systematically have accepted all its concepts in their conventional forms and others who have hardly made any serious effort in this direction are vocal in decrying them on the basis of mere heresies.

The second objection has been well answered by the leaders of Indian Poetics by defining the intimate relations of the various elements of Poetic Art such as Dhvani and Alankāra etc: with Rasa. Dhvani or Suggestion is primarily based on imagination-its supremacy means really the supremacy of the imaginative element in art, and Alankāra or the 'figure of speech' is more-or-less synonymous with 'Poetic image'. Of these, 'Dhvani' is an essential medium of Rasa which can only be suggested and never expressed and 'Alankāra' or the figure of speech also is equally important in so far as the theory of Rasa, though

(i) Brahmaasvada-sahodara i.e. akin to the realization of Brahman.

primarily based on emotional experience, attaches sufficient importance to wit or beautiful expression. Similarly the intellectual element also has its place : in high class poetry, depth of meaning is as important as richness of emotion. Thus, the imaginative and intellectual elements are not neglected in the theory of *Rasa*—the condition, however, is that they should form a part of emotional experience. A conceit or an idea becomes valuable if the poet infuses feeling into it, otherwise it is not relevant to art. Beauty is that essential quality or cumulative effect of poetry which appeals to our sensibility and what appeals to our sensibility must have an emotive basis directly or indirectly. Thus, in a broader sense, *Rasa* and Beauty are identical concepts.

The objection relating to the number of *Rasas* is based on insufficient knowledge of the subject, because the number is a very minor aspect of the theory. It is true that most of the theorists have accepted a definite number of basic sentiments and accessory feelings, but the subject has been very controversial all through and alterations have been made till the end. Then, from time to time, serious thinkers have been raising their voice against the defined numbers. They have maintained that the number of *Rasas* and the sentiments cannot be defined : every feeling—nay even a psycho-physical reaction can develop into a *Rasa*. The inclusion of all kinds of emotional responses or patterns of experiences in the system of *Rasa* makes it further clear that its exponents do not seriously believe in defining the numbers. In every discipline general rules have got to be framed by inductive and deductive methods, and for that it becomes necessary to divide and classify, to use labels, to demarcate—as also to count numbers. No serious writer on the subject has taken these figures as final : whenever this question has come up, he has declared without reservation that the divisions are only indicative and not decisive. Against this background, all the criticism about 'defined numbers' and 'rigid conventions' becomes infructuous—and the question as to what is the basic sentiment or *Rasa* in *Hamlet* or *Godān* becomes redundant, although for a conventional theorist it shall not be at all difficult to determine the primary *Rasa* in *Hamlet* or even in *Wasteland* or nearer home, in *Godān* or *Sekhara*—(it is so easy to do this on the basis of the cumulative effect of each one of these works). Yet, that is not the solution of the problem. The very question as to what is the primary *Rasa* in *Hamlet* betrays a conventional approach and can be answered accordingly. But here the question and the answer, both, are insignificant. The real significance of the theory consists not in determining the underlying sentiment, but in establishing that the aesthetic appeal and consequently the artistic merit of this great drama is based essentially on the richness of its emotive content, or to borrow a phrase from I.A. Richards, on the 'valuable experience' acquired by its enlightened readers.

This explanation contains an answer to the next allegation—namely that Rasa requires a complete situation for its expression, with the result that the beauty of a single phrase or sometimes just one pregnant word finds no place in its scheme. It is, however, nowhere laid down that the whole paraphernalia of the subject, object, external manifestations and ancillary feeling etc. is necessary for the consummation of Rasa—even the effective delineation of one transient feeling, nay of mere gesture, as in many a stray couplet of the Hindi poet Bihari (17th century A.D.) is enough to evoke a complete emotive response. A portrayal of all the components is not necessary—those which are not presented by the poet are supplied by the enlightened reader's imagination. The nature and form of the subject, object, manifestation etc. have been discussed in detail, because without their existence—evident or latent, it is impossible even to conceive of an emotion theoretically. The existence of an emotion without a plausible cause and concrete expressions is not acceptable to the psychologist as well. Some modern critics in Marathi have discovered a finer shade of experience—not an emotion, but a 'flavour' or 'fragrance' of an emotion. The theory of Rasa; however, is still more catholic—according to this theory the permanent attribute of Rasa is the 'Guṇa'—which in essence indicates a mere change in the quality or condition of the mind, and as such even an expression which does not communicate any positive emotive reaction but just 'touches the heart', can by its own magic, steal in and find a place within the orbit of Rasa.

I shall try to make my point more clear by an illustration,

The Golden fish—

“As we admire its beautiful form,
The fish is panting behind the glass.
Here is a yearning for beauty
(and there behind the glass)
Is the yearning for life.”

This is a rough translation of a piece of new poetry by Ajneya in Hindi. What is the secret of its appeal? Fine image? Yes: the image created in the mind of the reader by these few lines is sparkling indeed. But is that all? Is the creation of this miniature pen-picture the final achievement of the artist? Does not the delicate strain of human sympathy which is woven into the texture of this image imperceptibly touch our heart? The image is, no doubt, an artistic achievement by itself, but the ultimate appeal lies in this strain of human sympathy—which is the essence of Rasa.

Another objection refers to the mutual relations between the various Rasas. The theory, it is alleged, lays down rather too definitely how the various sentiments agree or disagree with one another—with the result that the whole process becomes so simple and straight that there is hardly any scope for the complex patterns of conflicting emotions. This allegation also, we submit humbly, is based on insufficient knowledge. No doubt, the conflicts between the sentiments have been defined in detail, but the ways and means of reconciling them have also been indicated side by side—and these ways and means are so numerous that they can comprehend almost all possible contradictions in our psychic life. Even in the context of one single Rasa, the allegation of over-simplification doesn't really hold good, because within the purview of a Rasa like the 'Sringāra' a free inter-play of almost all the different and contradictory emotions has been admitted without reservation. Even in the dramas of Shakespeare which have been cited as evidences to dispute the theory of Rasa, there is hardly any situation or episode in which the conflicts of emotions cannot be resolved according to the rules laid down by our theorists. And, even if these rules do not apply, it hardly makes any difference because (a) this particular topic does not form an integral part of the thesis and (b) that the rules have been changing from time to time along with the developments in poetic practice. Actually, like the number of Rasas, this concept of the relations between various sentiments is just a by-product of the main theory, although in this case too the psychological rationale, of course, is equally sound.

The exponents of the theory, it is further alleged are so dogmatic about the subjective nature of Rasa, that the emotive content of the poem or the artistic emotion of the poet are utterly neglected. This objection can be viewed from different angles. If Rasa means the poetic experience, as it really does, then it is relevant only to a 'being' and to an 'object'. In the trio of the poet, the poem and the reader, the poem is an inanimate object: although it serves as a stimulus to aesthetic experience, yet by itself it does not possess the capacity for experience. The poet, on the other hand, creates Rasa or, technically speaking, creates the art object which evokes Rasa. Thus, in practice it is really the reader who enjoys Rasa. Philosophically also, it is difficult if not impossible to prove that the aesthetic or emotional appeal lies in the object: the Indian as well as the Western systems of Philosophy have not been able to evolve as yet a more convincing principle of the cosmos than Idealism. But I don't want to get entangled in the labyrinth of epistemological arguments—I sincerely believe in explaining the basic principles of poetry in terms of its own science without using the tools of Philosophy and Logic. However, one question still remains to be answered: what is the relation of the

poem or the art—object with Rasa. The straight answer is that the poetic object is the stimulus of Rasa. The most staunch exponent of the subjective theory—Abhinavagupta himself—has attached great importance to ‘expression pregnant with poetic qualities and verbal embellishments’. According to him, Rasa is, no doubt, ‘the uninterrupted enjoyment of the sentiment in its liberated and sublimated form;’ but the cause of this liberation or sublimation lies in the imaginative use of language or in the texture of the poem. Therefore, the poem or the work of art does not occupy an unimportant place in the theory. This just could not happen, because the mainspring of Rasa is the poem itself without which its very existence becomes hypothetical. If under certain circumstances, due to some prejudices or preoccupations, a good poem does not evoke the proper response in a reader, the fault does not lie with the poem: it simply means that the aesthetic sensibility of the reader has failed him. This much could be safely said in defence of the subjective definition of Rasa.

The objective concept also is not ruled out. The founder of the school-Bharata himself and his earliest commentators Lollata and Sankuka defined Rasa as an aesthetic situation i.e. as a presentation of some emotional condition on the stage. Soon after, leaders of the Alankāra School conceived of it as an objectification of some emotional experience in effective words. Rasa, according to these earlier theorists, is an aesthetic object created by the artistic skill of the author in the context of a poem, and of the author and the producer both in the case of a drama: here it is not the aesthetic experience but the object of the aesthetic experience. Similarly, the aesthetic experience of the poet has also been treated with due respect. All the leading exponents of the Rasa theory have acknowledged the importance of the aesthetic experience of the poet in unequivocal terms: “Kaverantargatam bhāvam bhāvayan Bhāva ucyate—that which conveys the experience of the poet is termed as a Bhāva or a Sentiment in technical language.”*

Yathā bijād bhaved Vṛkṣo Vṛkṣāt puṣpam
phalam yathā
Tathā mūlam rasāḥ sarve tebhyo bhāva
vyavasthitāḥ

(Nāṭyaśāstra 6/7).

“Just as a tree springs from a seed and the flowers and the fruits grow from the tree, in the same way the Rasa (or the aesthetic

* Nāṭyaśāstra Chapter VI.

experience) of the poet is the mainspring of the various sentiments and images in the poem."

Commenting on this verse (cited by Bharata in his work), Abhinavagupta quotes the authority of Ānandavardhana to make the position all the more clear:

"This aesthetic experience of the poet is the basic Rasa. Under its effect, the spectator, in due course, realizes the existence of the subject and the object etc. in the play by the positive and the negative arguments. Thus, the poet's aesthetic experience is the seed. The poet, in the final analysis, is not different from the spectator and it is why the author of *Dhwanyāloka*, Sri Ānandavardhanācārya has observed: If a poet is romantic (*Śringārin*) by nature, the entire world becomes charming, but if he is a recluse or a non-attached person, the whole poem loses its appeal. The poet's aesthetic experience serves as the seed and creates the poem which is like the tree; from that grows the flower of the histrionic art and finally the aesthetic pleasure enjoyed by the spectator-which is the fruit. Thus, for the spectator or the reader, the whole phenomenon becomes thoroughly enjoyable." (Hindi-Abhinavabhāratī. p. 515).

In the light of these comments, the point raised by Sri Mardhekar in this behalf is eventually quashed. In the situation referred to by him, the cannibal devouring human flesh in a hideous forest, the poet's experience is the basic sentiment which determines the reader's experience. The basic sentiment in the poem is determined by the poet's experience and not by the reactions of individual characters or of individual spectators who are not able to shed off their personal prejudices. If the poet's reaction is horror or disgust, the emotion evoked in the spectator will be horror or disgust ultimately converted into the *Bībhatsa Rasa*; if it is indignation, the spectator's reaction will be indignation culminating in the *Raudra Rasa*, or if it is terror, the spectator will experience the *Bhayānaka Rasa*. This point has been dealt with in detail in my article on 'The process of universalization.'

Another point of controversy is the principle of revelation or manifestation of Rasa. The thesis, (as it is propounded by Abhinavagupta under the joint influence of the Idealistic School of Philosophy to which he belonged and of *Dhwanyāloka* by Ānandavardhana on which he wrote his famous commentary) was refuted in the past by literary giants like *Bhattacharya* and *Mahimabhatta-nay* even Bharata himself thought otherwise. The illustration of the 'soup' given by Bharata makes it clear beyond doubt that Rasa was a pattern of experiences in which the feelings of appreciation for the poetic as well the histrionic art were

mixed up with relish of the underlying sentiment. Lollata has also endorsed this view in his own way and Bhattachāyaka has openly rejected the principle of manifestation. According to Bhattachāyaka, the basic sentiment which is enjoyed by the spectator in the form of Rasa is not an unmixed experience of the emotion but a complex experience in which his reactions to the histrionic art and poetic beauties are mixed up—it is in essence identical with the 'aesthetic experience' of the Western critics. Thus the modern concept of the 'pattern' (which can only be designed and not just manifested) was not unknown to the Indian masters. All the same, the principle of manifestation cannot be rejected logically. The same modern* critic, I.A. Richards, who has asserted that aesthetic experience is by nature a pattern of experiences, has also clearly admitted in the 'analysis of a poem' that a work of art evokes emotions during the final stages of the aesthetic experience:-

"As a result there follows a stream of reaction in which six distinct kinds of events may be distinguished.

- I The visual sensations of the printed works.
- II Images very closely associated with these sensations.
- III Images relatively free.
- IV References to, or 'thinkings of,' various things.
- V Emotions.
- VI Affective-volitional attitudes."

Principles of Literary Criticism (1961) (p. 117.)

According to this analysis, on reading a poem a chain of events takes place in the mind of the reader till almost in the final stages some emotions are evoked which finally settle down in volitional attitudes to complete the 'pattern of aesthetic experience.' So, the modern Psychological Criticism also re-affirms the thesis that a poem or a work of art evokes an emotion.

It has been established by Psychology that certain basic instincts form the substratum of the human psyche and that they manifest them-

* Richards may not be considered 'modern' today, but in the context of the Theory of Rasa he is certainly modern.

selves in the form of corresponding emotions. As such, the principle of the manifestation of emotions is not a mere poetic convention. The experience or the pattern of experience which is engendered in the mind of the reader is undoubtedly *his own* experience: the poet's experience is of course, the stimulus—but the poet's own experience is not and cannot be communicated or transferred as it is to the mind of the reader.

Here we enter almost unconsciously in the well known controversy in respect of aesthetic emotion or *Rasa* : manifestation vs. communication i.e. is *Rasa* manifested or communicated ? We have dealt with this subject in detail elsewhere; here it will suffice to say that the difference between the two is only academic. The experience which is evoked in the mind of the reader according to the theory of manifestation, is not independent or basically different from the experience of the poet. It is inspired by and, as such bears very close affinity to the poet's experience. Similarly, communication also does not mean that the experience of the poet is bodily transferred to the mind of the reader and the reader enjoys not his own but the poet's experience. This statement would be absurd and Richards has ruled out such a proposition in unmistakable terms. The theory of communication, on the other hand, also implies that the emotive responses evoked by a poem in the reader's mind are similar to the poet's own experience but the experience of the reader cannot, by any chance, be exactly the same as the poet's experience. Both the theories, thus, converge on the same point—viz. on 'the similarity of experience.' The theory of communication does not imply, by any chance, that the reader experiences the poet's emotion and not his own, nor is it suggested for a moment by the theory of manifestation that the reader's experience is purely his own personal experience and that it has no relation with the artistic experience communicated by the poet through his poem. It is, therefore, a difference of approach only; one broaches the subject from the poet's point of view and the other from the reader's.

Now, only two objections remain to be answered, and one of them is that the theory of *Rasa* does not agree with the artistic temper of the present age. This theory is based on the so-called permanent values of life, whereas ours is an age of disintegration of values. In an age of non-belief and to a literature based on the negation of values, such a theory is hardly relevant. No doubt, the danger to human existence today is greater than it ever was, and the civilized world passes through moments of deep anxiety quite off and on, with the result that human faith is violently shaken. The artist, who is more sensitive than the average intellectual, cannot escape the depressing effects of this universal gloom and the literature, which he is creating in an entirely different mood and abnormal conditions, naturally, requires different standards

of evaluation. This is how the modern intellectual argues his point. But is it a complete picture or the whole truth of life today? If it is so how do we explain the incessant struggle for supremacy among the nations of the world—the almost mythical glories achieved by man in the field of Science? The growing dangers to existence can also whet our desires to live and bring the rival powers together; such indications are already there and we can reasonably entertain hopes for a brighter future for mankind. The two probabilities are there and it is upto us to choose either. If some modern thinkers insist on believing that the doomsday has come and our art and literature should necessarily reflect the eternal gloom, the theory of Rasa is not to be blamed—although this phenomenon also does not fall outside its purview. If the artist has the capacity to beautify or poeticise his gloom, the theory of Rasa will be able to take proper cognizance of his art, however detrimental it might be to the mental health of the society. But, even now, the right thinking men, whose vision is more clear and heart more sound, don't accept this view. So long as we live, we must live by faith and if we loose faith in life, art also, like everything else, loses its meaning for us.

This is the existentialist's approach to art who raises yet another objection against the theory of Rasa. An experience, he argues, can be converted into Rasa only after it has settled down in the consciousness of the creator: an immediate experience as such, has little value in this scheme—whereas in new poetry, what is relevant is not even an immediate experience but 'an experience still in process.' This is, however, a mere fancy—just a play on wits and cannot bear the test of reason. In any field of life, by law of nature, emotional enjoyment and creative activity cannot take place side by side, and, therefore, in art also creation is not possible during the state of enjoyment or experience of an emotion. When it is so very difficult to capture in words even an experienced emotion, how can we hope to do that in the case of an emotion which is still in the process of experience? An emotion which is still in the process of experience is only a mass of sensations. Some modern artists have tried successfully to capture these sensations and give them a form but as soon as they assume a form, the process is complete and the 'sensations' become an 'experience'. Croce has explained the principle with great conviction and clarity and defined this action as 'intuition' which is identical with art. For Croce art has two aspects: the internal and the external. Intuition is the internal activity of art on which the artist has no control. In practical terms, however, this is only 'conception' of art: what in practice we call art and discuss as art is the 'externalization' or the concrete presentation of the intuition accomplished by the artist *deliberately* on the basis of his past experience. Thus, the very hypothesis is wrong; an emotion which is still in the process of experience cannot be expressed: what is possible

is a creation or a re-creation of an emotion which has become a part of experience. The existentialist, in this way, starts on wrong premises and then quarrels with established theories of art for no fault of theirs.

The last and the most violent attack is directed against the so-called pleasure-principle involved in the theory of Rasa. The allegation is that this theory focusses all its attention on enjoyment and encourages the quest for pleasure at the cost of other nobler pursuits in life. This is basically a moral objection and has been raised against the hedonist view of life and literature in every age in one form or the other. One direct answer is that Rasa is a synonym for Ananda or the Bliss of Life and not for pleasure, and Ananda or the Bliss of Life as it has been defined in Indian Philosophy and Poetics stands for the consummation of human experience—for a realization of the human personality in its totality. It is not to be mixed up with pleasure or entertainment. Being based on such an all-embracing concept of Ananda, the definition of Rasa includes within its orbit all kinds of human experiences—pleasant as well as unpleasant. After this exposition of the real nature of Rasa, the above allegation becomes irrelevant. And now finally, having said all this in defence, may I pose one counter-question : is not happiness the highest good—or the greatest blessing in human life ? Does not the ultimate value of the good itself lie in its capacity to afford happiness ? The moral values are, no doubt, the moorings of life, but the goal is happiness.

After all these allegations have been dispensed with, it does not require any further argument to establish the validity of the theory of Rasa. Freed from all scholastic conventionalities, in its comprehensive and progressive form, this can safely be accepted as a universal theory of literature—capable of interpreting and evaluating properly the creative literature of all ages and all countries, in all its varieties. Its conception is so complete that starting with human sympathy or emotion as the central and basic element, it embraces all the major values of life within its fold. It is, therefore, in harmony with all the modes and vicissitudes of life and reconciles itself with all conflicting ideals and ideologies. The main cause of its universality is that this theory is built on the solid foundations of humanism and accepts human personality in its totality—with its body and soul, potentialities and limitations and with all its natural instincts and impulses. Just as the philosophy of humanism, with its permanent faith in human personality, is growing with life, so also the concept of Rasa with its permanent roots in human sympathy or emotion is growing with literature. Just as the definition of humanism has modified itself from time to time to suit the new concepts of human relationships, so the theory of Rasa can and should

necessarily broaden its base to comprehend the new developments in literature. Just as humanism only can comprehend the ever-growing concepts of human life, so the theory of Rasa alone can satisfy the requirements of our growing literary sensibilities. So long as we do not discover a greater truth than human existence in the context of life, and a finer reality than human sensibility in the context of literature, it would be difficult to conceive of a system more authentic than the Theory of Rasa in the realm of Poetics.

PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL ORDER IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE:
Rediscovery of the Greek Concepts of
Areté, Aidos, Diké, Sophrosyné and Hybris.

By
Pratap Bandyopadhyay

The universal popularity of Sanskrit literature is due not only to the aesthetic pleasure it has given to the connoisseurs all over the world but also due to the fact that the world has found in it plenty of ideas and ideals which are always highly valuable for giving human life a decent form. Although there is still a dispute over the issue of the didactic purpose of literature, the fact remains that great classicists of the world have left an eternal message for mankind apart from giving aesthetic pleasure. The Sanskrit literary critics, who rightly admitted aesthetic pleasure or *rasāsvāda* as the main purpose of the literary art, noted its educative purpose as well. They did not think that this would belittle the real spirit of the art, because, they maintained, the writer never taught like a master or even like a friend, but like one's beloved.¹ The theory is not a baseless one. The critics simply noted what the writers actually did. A philosophy of moral order is truly found reflected in Sanskrit literature.

There is an insurmountable order underlying our worldly existence. The early Greek writers gave excellent expression to this truth in the superb pieces of Tragedy. As Werner Jaeger points out², the Greeks were aware of the position of the individual in the community. Their organic point of view was that, individuals belonged to a living whole as its constituent elements and that the cosmic whole was governed by some comprehensive laws or natural principles. The basic theme of Greek poetry from Homer onward was man, his destiny and his relation to the gods. The ancient Greek writers have shown, in their respective manners, how man should act with relation to his surroundings. The fundamental organic view gave rise to a number of basic concepts, such as, *areté, aidos, diké, sophrosyné* and *hybris*. Jaeger's enlightening discourse on *areté* presents a nice picture of the ancient Greek culture. *Areté* is often translated as 'honour.' This is a real attribute of the aristocratic nobleman.

Jaeger informs us that the word first appears in Greek literature as the word for 'proud and courtly morality and warlike valour' and that gradually it came to denote the kernel of early Greek aristocratic education. As such, this involves *aidos* or the sense of duty. This leads to the concept of *diké* which may be roughly rendered as 'justice'. This denotes keeping within the bounds of the rational world order. When this order is broken, even though unintentionally, the gods react to set the same aright. *Diké* holds society on a firm ground by preventing lawlessness and self-assertion. Keeping to this order, by doing one's duty in conformity with the laws (*nomos*) of gods, is known as *sophrosyné* or balance. Doing otherwise is an act of *hybris*. From Homer onward the aforesaid concepts have represented true religion which consists in the modest submission to life's bounds.

As the Greeks believed, Zeus has an absolute jurisdiction over the creation which is set in a definite order. One should abide by this order. Anyone violating it must be punished. Prometheus violated this order, even though his purpose in giving away fire to mankind was apparently noble, and was, therefore, bound (Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*). Judged by the standard set up by Zeus, his act was unpardonable, an act of *hybris* consisting in the transgression of the limit of one's allotment. Agamemnon sacrificed his loving daughter; the Greek fleet moved, but in the long run he was murdered by his wife (Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*). The story did not end here. A murder is a contemptible crime— a strong blow against the order of the creation. For what she did, Clytemnestra had to suffer the consequences. She was killed by her own son Orestes (*Choephoroi*). This act of Orestes was viewed differently by the three tragedians. Aeschylus and Euripides brought in here the Erinyes haunting the murderer whereas Sophocles eliminated this part of the story (also not found in Homer). Aeschylus and Euripides appear to hold the view that by taking the law in his own hand and committing another murder, Orestes was equally guilty as Clytemnestra—on the part of both of them murder was an act of *hybris* and therefore, according to the norm of *diké*, both were to be punished. Sophocles, on the other hand, laid more emphasis on the crime committed by Clytemnestra; so much so that what Orestes did appeared to him quite negligible. He considered the act of Orestes to be a readjustment of *diké*. As H. D. F. Kitto puts it, 'A violent disturbance of *diké* has been violently annulled'.³ In accordance with the ideal of *aidos*, it was the duty of Orestes to take action against the great crime. Whatever may be the difference in the approach of the poets, the basic philosophy is the same : One has to abide by the divine law and order and, thus, show *sophrosyné*; to transgress the limit of this order is to show *hybris* which brings evil consequences.

This basic philosophy of a natural order is revealed again and again in the Greek tragedies. Ajax was highly arrogant, too much self reliant; he defied the divine power. This led to his downfall. Oedipus disturbed *diké* by killing his father and marrying his mother, though this was unintentional on his part. Sophocles maintains that the doer's intention or its absence makes no difference—nothing goes unpaid. Oedipus' life met a tragic end for his own deed.

The reader of Sanskrit literature would feel that the idea of the law of *diké* upheld by the Greek tragedians was shared by the Sanskrit writers as well. The two Epics, viz., the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* have acted as inexhaustible store-houses of ideas and plots for the posterior Sanskrit literature. The plots of both the Epics clearly illustrate the law of justice—*diké* or *nīti*. Rāvaṇa transgressed the limit of propriety and showed *hybris* or *anaucitya* by abducting Sītā. The punishment of this was rightly inflicted on him. Justice came from Rāma who, we may say, represented world order. The arrogant Kauravas in the *Mahābhārata* violated the codes of ethics and were rightly vanquished in the battle of Kurukṣetra, which is known through ages as *dharmayuddha* or a fight as a duty on the part of Pāṇḍavas to establish on earth righteousness which corresponds to Greek *diké*. As *ālaṃkārikas* point out in noting the educative value of literature, we learn from these Epic stories that one should behave like Rāma and other righteous persons and not like Rāvaṇa and other evil-doers.⁴ This is illustrated throughout the whole realm of classical literature in Sanskrit.

The plots of all the works of Kālidāsa have a moral basis. The *Raghuvamśa* begins with the story of King Dilīpa and Sudakṣiṇā who did not get a child because of the indifference shown to the divine cow Surabhi by the King who was once in a hurry to meet the queen after her periodical bath. For this offence the king had to suffer, because, says the poet, if one fails to do one's duty of paying homage to those who deserve it, an impediment is caused to the former's attainment of prosperity.⁵ The king deviated from what the Greeks would call the ideal of *aidos* and what our *śāstrakāras* called *dharma*. As an atonement of this, the king had to serve Surabhi's daughter Nandini like a very ordinary servant. That the atonement was sufficient and that the king was entitled to a reward for his humility or act of *sophrosyné* had to be proved through his encounter with the lion in the second canto of the poem.

The story would remind one of what Aeschylus says in the *Agamemnon* :

‘Cry aloud without fear the victory of Zeus,
you will not have failed the truth :
Zeus, who guided men to think,
who has laid it down that wisdom
comes alone through suffering.’⁶

Zeus represents world order. In the story of the *Raghuvamśa* this world order was violated by King Dilipa. This led to his suffering, which ultimately brought him wisdom from sage Vasiṣṭha. This exactly answers what Aeschylus says in the above passage, or Sophocles in the following passage of the *Antigone*.

‘Our happiness depends
on wisdom all the way.
The gods must have their due.
Great words by men of pride
bring greater blow upon them.
So wisdom comes to the old.’⁷

In course of hunting, king Daśaratha killed the only son of a blind sage by mistake and was, therefore, cursed by the sage⁸. Though the act was not intentional, the law of the world is that, nothing goes unpaid. The same was the case with Oedipus. As Daśaratha committed the crime unawares, the curse proved true by way of giving him four sons whereas the king himself was longing for (at least) one. In the end the *Raghuvamśa* shows, through the story of Agnivarṇa, when the king is addicted to sensual pleasures with utter disregard for all duties—an act of deviation from the idea of *aratē*—he becomes responsible not only for his own downfall, but for that of the whole race and kingdom.

The whole story of the *Kumārasambhava* is based on this very concept of *hybris* and *dikē* relating to the demon Tāraka who tried to overpower the three worlds. For his apt punishment, i.e., for the readjustment of *dikē*, the birth of Kumāra was necessary. In order to make this happen, the gods sought for Madana’s help. The price was too high. But ‘all’s well that ends well’—in the long run the desired goal was achieved to the utmost satisfaction of all and even Madana regained his lost form.

In the *Meghaduta*, the plot of which consists in sending a message by a lovelorn Yakṣa to his beloved, now in separation, Kālidāsa has

not forgotten to mention in the very opening verse the Yakṣa's own negligence of duty (*svādhikārapramattaḥ*) whereby he disturbed the order set up by Kubera. Hence by the law of justice the Yakṣa had to be punished according to the penal code of Kubera's administration. For one whose too much attachment to the beloved caused a negligence of duty—deviation from the ideal of *aidos*—separation was the most suitable punishment.

In the *Abhijñānaśākuntala*, Kālidāsa's sense of moral justice has been excellently revealed. In order to present his hero as a righteous person, the playwright has changed the *Mahābhārata* story of Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta. This is a literary principle which later on Viśvanātha noted in the following words :

*yat syād anucitaṁ vastu nāyakasya rasasya vā |
viruddhaṁ tat parityājyam anyathā vā prakalpayet |*⁹

One denying a marriage intentionally – as did the Duṣyanta of the *Mahābhārata*¹⁰ cannot deserve a wife like Śakuntalā who is certified as *murtimatī satkriyā*¹¹. Kālidāsa, therefore, introduced the curse of Durvāsa to exempt Duṣyanta from the unpardonable charge. It is due to the curse that the king forgot everything regarding his love-affairs with the hermit's daughter. For the curse of Durvāsa, again, Śakuntalā herself was responsible. When Kaṇva was absent from the hermitage, it was Śakuntalā's duty to offer due hospitality to sage Durvāsa who arrived there as a guest. She was so much absorbed in thinking of her lover Duṣyanta that the arrival of the sage could not draw her attention. This went against the ideal of *aidos* and by the law of *diké* her punishment was inevitable. Hence was pronounced the curse :

*vicintayantī yam ananyamānasā
tapodhanaṁ vetsyi na mām upasthitam |
smariṣyati tvām na sa bodhito'pi san
kathāṁ pramattaḥ prathamam kṛtām iva |*¹²

Here too, as in the *Meghaduta*, the punishment matches well with the offence. As regards Duṣyanta, he did not care to wait till the return of Sage Kaṇva and to take his permission to marry his daughter in his own hermitage. Was this not an act of *hybris* on his part?¹³ If so, the punishment was inevitable. This is the law of justice. Repentance is the best form of punishment and the whole sixth Act of the play is devoted to this repentance. This, again, would remind us of the Greek philosophy, viz., wisdom coming through suffering (already noted). The Indian writers believed neither reward nor punishment to be eter-

nal. After the reward is enjoyed man comes back to the ordinary level of life from where he has to earn additional merit for further reward.¹⁴ Similarly, when the punishment is over, the door for brighter days are opened. Thus, after Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta have suffered the results of their actions, they get their desired object in the mutual reunion at the hermitage of Mārīca.

Turning our attention to a few other writers we find that Māgha, author of the *Śiśupālavadha*, chose the *Mahābhārata*¹⁵ story of Śiśupāla depicting the punishment of an evil-doer. The Cedi King Śiśupāla has been tormenting the three worlds for the last three births. But this cannot continue for ever. Nārada comes down on earth to inform Lord Kṛṣṇa, then living in one of His incarnations in the house of Vāsudeva, of the wretched plight of the gods and others. The story finds its catastrophe in the killing of Śiśupāla by Kṛṣṇa in the battle field *caidyāvasādaḥ phalam*, as Mallinātha puts it. The actions of Śiśupāla reached the maximum point of *hybris*, *dikē* was highly disturbed and it was high time for Lord Kṛṣṇa to reestablish the order.

In the philosophy of the Greek writers the question of endurance was vitally connected with the concepts of *aretē*, *aidos*, *dikē* and *sophrosynē*. One should accept ungrudgingly what is allotted to one by the gods, irrespective of whether that is pleasant or not. Thus in sophocles' *Trachiniae*, Heracles says :

'Always without a groan I followed my painful course.'¹⁶ Sufferings can be endured if one remembers that man himself is the architect of his fate. This philosophy is brought to light in several passages of sophocles. Thus his Oedipus accuses himself in the following words :

'And it is I,
I and no other have so cursed myself.
And I pollute the bed of him I killed
by the hands that killed him. Was I not born evil ?
Am I not utterly unclean' ¹⁷

The same thought can be traced in Sanskrit literature. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, when Lakṣmaṇa communicates to Sitā the most cruel order of Rāma, viz., her banishment to the hermitage of Vālmīki, Sitā, though hurt at the bottom of her heart, admits the incident as an allotment of her fate and tries to find a reason for this in her own

actions of the previous births—a concept which plays a vital role in Hindu philosophy :

*mamikeyaṁ tanur nūnaṁ sṛṣṭā duḥkḥāya lakṣmaṇa |
dhātṛā yasyās tathā me'dya duḥkhamurtiḥ pradṛśyate ||
kiṁ nu pāpaṁ kṛtaṁ purvaṁ ko vā dārair viyojitaḥ |
yāhaṁ śuddhasamācārā tyaktā nṛpatinā satī ||¹⁸*

In kālidāsa's Raghuvamśa,¹⁹ Sītā makes herself responsible in more emphatic terms :

*kalyāṇabuddher athavā tavāyaṁ
na kāmācāro mayi śankaṇṛyaḥ |
mamaiva janmāntarapātakānāṁ
vipākavisphūrjathur aprasahyaḥ ||*

When the worst calamity had befallen Daśaratha with the banishment of Rāma, he recalled the incident involving himself leading to the death of the son of a sage and inviting curse from the sage. Daśaratha realized that the present situation was an outcome of his own past deed. He said to Kauśalyā :

*yad ācarati kalyāṇi Śubhaṁ vā yadi vāsubhaṁ |
tad eva labhate bhadre kartā karmajam ātmanaḥ ||²⁰*

And then he related to her the whole story.

At the end of the Kurukṣetra war when Dhṛtarāṣṭra realizes that he has lost his friends and relatives including his sons, he admits himself to be responsible for this utter disaster and surmises that he must have committed sins in the previous births :

*na kṛtaṁ suhṛdāṁ vākyaṁ jāmādaghnasya jalpataḥ |
nārādasya ca devarṣeḥ kṛṣṇadvaipāyanasya ca | |
nunaṁ vyapakṛtaṁ kiñcin mayā purveṣu janmasu | ||²¹*

The basic philosophy that nothing goes unpaid may also be expressed thus : Anything to be achieved must be paid for. Duṣyanta paid for his union with Śakuntalā, so did the latter. The same is the case with the heroes of other *kāvya*s and *nāṭaka*s. If not by any other means, at least by striving sincerely for the goal one has to pay. The course of love is not a smooth one. Agnimitra, Pururavas, Rāma, Cārudatta, Nala—each had to pay for union with his beloved. In the

case of Pārvati's penance for Śiva, kālidāsa clearly says : *avāpyate vā katham anyathā dvayaṁ tathāvidhaṁ prema patiś ca tādṛśaḥ*]²² Elsewhere Sitā, when abandoned by Rāma in the hermitage of Vālmiki, says that after giving birth to her child she will practise austere penance so that in the next birth she may be again united with Rāma from whom, then, no separation will be apprehended :

*Sāhaṁ tapaḥ suryaniviṣṭadṛṣṭir
urdhvaṁ prasuteś carituṁ yatiṣye /
bhuyo yathā me jananāntare'pi
tvam eva bhartā na ca viprayogaḥ]]*²³

The same truth is illustrated in a different way by Arjuna's penance and fight with Śiva in Bhāravi's *Kirātārjunīya*, also based on the *Mahābhārata*.²⁴ Nor was Cāṇakya's fight for winning Rākṣasa (in Viśākhadatta's *Mudrārākṣasa*) an easy task. It would have been a violation of the universal order if these characters were sketched as achieving the goal without any difficulty.

Achievement of a desired goal for which one has not to pay anything is unthinkable in the world of justice. Anything to be achieved must be paid for and anything done must produce a result, good or bad, as the case may be. This philosophy has found expression in the thinking of our *śāstrakāras* and also of the literary writers. This is not virtually different from what the early Greek writers wanted to establish and is followed by many other writers and poets all over the world through ages, including the Great English poet William Shakespeare. Macbeth could not evade the consequences of murdering king Duncan. "All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand" ⁵ of Lady Macbeth who was the main instigation behind the crime. None of the conspirators against Julius Caesar was allowed to enjoy the position after the hideous crime had been carried out. The tragedy of Othello was the evil consequence of his blind suspicion against his loving wife. The throne of Claudius, who killed the king of Denmark and married his widow, was not without thorns and he as well as the queen met death eventually (*Hamlet*). Injustice cannot be allowed to prevail. Writers of different countries have given expression to this common thought in different periods in different languages and various modes. Habits vary from person to person, customs vary from land to land, time to time, but the basic ideals are always the same, and as such, they are eternal. They are equally acceptable to men of all ages. In giving expression to the principle of moral order, great writers of the world, specially the classic writers, have certainly contributed to world culture²⁶ which basically aims at the betterment of mankind. Culture of one country may vary

from that of another, but when we speak of the world culture we think of mankind as a whole. Whatever does some good to mankind in general contributes to the culture of the world taken as a whole. The moral thought of the classicists helps men of all ages to mould their life according to certain eternal principles. It inspires us to abide by the eternal principles of universal order and to do good to mankind, at least to refrain from doing evils, because, there is always the assurance of an outcome of anything done knowingly or unknowingly.

NOTES

1. *kāvyaṃ yaśase' rthakṛte vyavahāravide śivetarakṣataye / sadyaḥ paranirvṛtaye kāntāsammītatoyopadeśayuje ||—*
Kāvyaaprākāśa, 1. 2.
2. *Paideia*, translated by Gilbert Highet, Vol.I
(Second Ed., New York, 1962) : Introduction, pp. XVII ff.
3. *Greek Tragedy* (University Paperback edition, London, 1966),
p. 136.
4. Cf. *kāvyaśya prayojanaṃ hi rasāsṣvādasukhapīṇḍadānadyāreṇa veda—
śāstravimukhānāṃ sukumāramatīnāṃ rājaputrāprabhṛtīnāṃ vineyānāṃ
rāmādivat pravartitavyaṃ na rāvaṇādivad ityādikṛtyākṛtyaprayatī—
nirvṛtyupadeśa iti cirantanair apyuktatvāt||—Sāhityadarpaṇa*
(5th Ed. by Haridasa Siddhantavagisa,
Calcutta, 1875 Saka era). Ch. I. p. 16.
5. *pratibadhnāti hi śreyaḥ puṇyapūjāvyatikramaḥ ||—Raghu*, 1.79.C—D,
6. Lines 174-78, translated by Richmond Lattimore : *The Complete Greek Tragedies* edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore,
Vol. I, *Aeschylus*, Chicago, 1959.
7. Lines 1347-52, translated by Elizabeth Wyckoff : *ibid*, Vol. 2,
Sophocles, Chicago 1959.
8. *Raghuvamśa* Canto IX; *Rāmāyaṇa* (edited by Sivarama Sarma
Vasistha, Chowkhamba Vidyabhavan, Varanasi, 1957),
Ayodhyākāṇḍa, Cantos 63-64.

9, *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, VI. 32 (Siddhantavagisa's 5th Ed.).

10. *So'tha śrutvaiva tadvākyaṃ tasyā rājā smaran napi /
abravān na smarāmīti kasya tvaṃ duṣṭatāpasi ||—*

Mahābhārata (Vol. I, Gita Press, Gorakhpur,
2013 Vikrama era), *Ādiparvan*, 74.19.

11. *Abhijñānaśākuntala* (edited by M.R. Kale, Eighth Ed., Bombay,
1957), V, 15-B.

12. Ibid IV. I. This would remind us, by way of contrast, that in Euripides' *Alcestitis*, Admetus did his duty to his guest Heracles even in his (Admetus') worst time and was, therefore, unexpectedly rewarded by the latter who brought life back to his dead wife. The lesson of the play, so to say, is presented in the words of Heracles :

'Admetus, be just. Treat your guests as they deserve'.—
Line 1148, translated by Richmond Lattimore :
The Complete Greek Tragedies edited by David
Greene and Richmond Lattimore, *Euripides*, I,
Chicago, 1955.

13. On the part of Śakuntalā also the same was the offence. Kālidāsa seems to suggest this in the fourth Act : *diṭṭhiā dhumāulidadiṭṭho vi
jaamāṇassa pāvae evva āhudā paḍidā* /—ibid., p. 136.

14. Cf. *te taṃ bhuktvā svargalokaṃ viśālaṃ
kṣīṇe punye martyalokaṃ viśanti* /—*Gītā*, IX. 21. A-B.

15. *Sabhāparvan*, Chs. 33-45 (Gita Press ed., Vol. I).

16. Line 1074, translated by Michael Jameson : *The Complete Greek Tragedies*, Vol. II (see note 7).

17. *Oedipus The King*, translated by David Greene, lines 819-23 : ibid.

18. *Rāmāyaṇa* (Chowkhamba, 1957), *Uttarakāṇḍa*, 48. 3-4.

19. XIV. 62.

20. *Rāmāyaṇa* (Chowkhamba, 1957), *Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, 63.6.

21. See *Mahābhārata* (Gita Press ed., Vol. III, 2014 Vikrama era), *Strīparvan*, 1.13-19.

22. *Kumārasambhava*, V. 2. C-D.
23. *Raghuvamśa*, XIV. 66.
24. *Vanaparvan*, Chs. 27-41 (Gita Press ed., Vol. I).
25. The Tudor Edition of William Shakespeare, The Complete Works,
edited by Peter Alexander, London and Glasgow, 1964 : *Macbeth*,
V. 1. 49-50
26. 'Sanskrit and World Culture' was one of the broader aspects of the
International Sanskrit Conference.

EVOLUTION OF CONCEPT OF MAN IN THE ANCIENT INDIAN LITERATURE

Prof. E. Chelishev

In our paper we would like to mark some peculiarities of the evolution of the concept of man in the tradition of the ancient Indian literature, to determine the nature and the contents of humanism which was typical of the ancient Indian literature on various stages of its development. This problem presenting great scientific interest has never before been dealt with in Indology. The problem naturally requires a serious and all-sided research, but the limits of the present paper allow us to make only some preliminary remarks on the essence of the subject.

The ancient Indian literature, the beginning of which is usually referred to the year two thousand B.C., evolved and developed in the epoch of decline of the primitive communal system, development, rise and decline of the slave-owning system, rise and strengthening of the feudal relationships.

This change of social and economic formations in India naturally left its mark on the evolution of humanism in the ancient Indian literary tradition. It determined the nature of the concept of man peculiar to each historical epoch in the development of the Indian society.

The cult of nature, its poetisation, lyric aspiration, typical of the Vedic literature are connected with exalting of man. Indians in the ancient time imagined deities in a charming human image. The Vedic deities are endowed with features corresponding to the notion of an ideal man, as the ancient Indians understood it. For example, Indra, the deity of herdsman's tribes is represented in the Vedic hymns as a brave fighter, struggling against demons; at the same time he is a deity of thunder, rains, of fertility, embodying a masculine force. Another deity-Ushas, the deity of dawn is represented there in the image of a charming woman and so on and so forth.

Prof. I.P. Minayev points out that one can't ignore the fact that together with recognizing the deities' power in Vedas, an Indian was very often inclined to think that his deity needed worshipping and sacrifices. In many hymns the idea of a deity's dependance upon a human being is asserted.

A further evolution of the conception of man in the ancient Indian literature is considerably determined by the development of a religious and philosophic thought and most of all by the doctrine of "punarjanma" (soul transmigration) as well as by the teaching on karma and mokṣa, which are connected with this doctrine. Both are mentioned in the Upaniṣads. The thought that world, cosmos are the measure of all things is also laid down in the Upaniṣads. But it doesn't deny the value of a human personality as it is.

The lines of the Upaniṣadas given below sound as the assertion of the independant value of human personality, glorifying joy of life on the Earth: "Indeed, the essence of these creatures is the Earth, the essence of the Earth is water, of water plants, of plants flowers, of flowers-fruit, of fruit man, the essence of man family." At the same time one should undoubtedly take into consideration a specific nature of such thoughts. They are expressed within the limits of traditional ritual, religious and dogmatic prescriptions of Brāhmanism.

Authors, who wish to find a foundation in the modern science, try to discover behind mystic sense of the Upaniṣadas, their humanist essence. They try to discover the sense of a man's existence, a man's nature in his connections with the surrounding world.

Religious and philosophical ideas of Upaniṣads are reflected in the Indian literature in two ways. The literature, which reflect the ideology of reactionary elements of society, develops pessimistic, religious and mystic ideas, which are typical of the Upaniṣads. The poets, who express ideology of progressive elements of the Indian society, try to find the assertion of an independent value of personality there. Creative life of Tagore may serve here as a good example. The philosophy of the Upaniṣads influenced greatly Tagore's world outlook. The humanist ideas of the Upaniṣads appeared as one of the sources of his life-asserting optimism, of his invincible belief in man, in the strength and abilities of him.

The Buddhist literature further develops the conception of man. We would like to mention here that in this case we mean the early Buddhism, which developed in definite historic conditions.

The concept of man in Buddhism is also far from being consistent; and this is the cause of various idealistic interpretations of Buddhist philosophy which put forward, at the expense of everything else, the idea of transmigration, the doctrine of nirvāṇa, the sermon of humbleness—that is, mystic, religious and pessimistic side of Buddhism.

Some scholars put another understanding of early Buddhism. Among them there is, for instance, I.P. Minayev, who studying buddhist texts in the end of the last century, discovered in them humanistic tendencies, opposed to conservative ideology.

Some sanskritists, keeping up with the thinking of our time, lay stress upon the fact that buddhist philosophy made its hallmark the law of dialectics, of permanent and universal change. According to Rāhula Sankrityāyana, Buddhism denies the existence of everything constant and static in this world.

An important feature of early buddhist dialectics is its orientation towards man taken along with his contacts with the world around him, an emphasis on the practical activity of man.

The role of active struggle for happiness in this world in the early Buddhism is also insisted upon by a well-known Russian scholar S. Th. Oldenburg and a German Indologist Walter Ruben. Some Indian authors (as, for instance, Rāhul Sankrityāyana) also stress the idea of equality which is, according to their opinion, corner stone of early Buddhism.

Speaking about humanistic orientation of the Buddhist philosophy, these authors point out, at the same time, such features of this philosophy which played a negative role in the development of humanistic basis of Indian cultural tradition.

I.P. Minayeff also underlines ambiguous character of considering man in the ancient Indian literature connected with religious-philosophic ideology of Buddhism. On the one side, he points out orientation of early Buddhism upon personality, upon practical activity of man, stressing the idea that a man can attain perfection by means of his daily actions; on the other side, he shows pessimistic trend in Buddhism.

Such contradictions in early Buddhist philosophy determine the peculiar concept of man in old Indian literature connected with Buddhism.

In the first place, it can be said about jātakas, the sources of which are clearly folkloristic. For the first time an ordinary man, with all his daily troubles, joys and sorrows, always a part of surrounding world, behaving in an active way in life, seeking truth, striving for justice—such a man appears in Buddhist literature. Defending his interests, he may even engage in a struggle with people around him—these conflicts, it is true, are always settled thanks to the wisdom of Buddha, the obligatory hero of all jātakas.

Art and literature of Buddhism depict Buddha as an ideal human personality.

Old Indian Epics may be considered as the most important link in the chain of Indian literary tradition.

The heroes of the old Indian Epics are characterized, on the whole, by an established set of good qualities; they come to struggle with evil forces, with wild, unhuman beings marked by all possible vices. High moral example of Epic heroes was later followed by many generations of Hindūs.

There are, however, some deviations from traditional norms of depicting an ideal hero in the old Indian Epics. It is probably due to the fact of incorporating into the epic poems some folklore themes belonging to various ethnic groups. In spite of the tendency to make up epic heroes as ideal as possible, we find in those poems frequent reminiscences of social and political events of that epoch—of the time when feudal relations were being established in India, reflecting itself in the struggle for power among Indian princes.

On the one hand the epic poetry turns the titanic man, the fighter, who has supernatural force and wisdom, into the god. At the same time the epic heroes—semi-gods possess all features of a common human being. A.P. Barannikov writes that in Vālmiki's "Rāmāyaṇa" Rāma is a man, and his deification described in the beginning of the poem, is a very late fact. This fact didn't affect the image of Rama who behaves as a man in Vālmiki's poems though he possesses great qualities of a hero. At the same time it should be mentioned that the logic of the development of action that requires the motivation of "Mahābhārata" and "Rāmāyaṇa" characters' actions, runs across narrow frames of the stereotyped images, often breaking this frame and infringing the traditional idea of this or that kind of a hero. Then the epic heroes begin to act as living people possessing all people's weakness, feelings and experiences that some times go out of the frames of traditional moral and ethic ideas.

In "Mahābhārata" and "Rāmāyaṇa" all-conquering feeling of love very often breaks the usual scheme, that regulates the epic act and motivates the experience and actions of heroes. In this connection it shouldn't be failed to mention the interesting research of the main characters of two insertions in "Mahābhārata". "The story of Nala" and "The matrimonial faithfulness," made by B.L. Smirnov.

B.L. Smirnov opposes the dynamic powerful women's images of these insertions into "Mahābhārata" to flabby, weak-willed men's ones, considering that every traditional philosophic system of the Indians confesses the man's nature as inactive and contemplative, the woman's as creative and dynamic. In both poems passive and weak-willed men are opposed to active strong-willed women, "Though the latter juridically are in dependance, they actively built the life and the family, gave the beginning to the kin."

We consider this point of view grounded enough. It gives possibility to understand many peculiarities of the evolution of the conception of man in the ancient Indian literature.

The ancient Indian epoch is characterized on the whole by the pathos of heroic activity, although the idea of a heroic action in it is motivated by specific features of ancient Indian religious and philosophic world-outlook. In spite of the fact, that in "Mahābhārata" the idea of transient character of the world is confirmed, this doesn't mean that a man must be passive, renounce the world and become an ascetic. The man must constantly act, but his actions should be disinterested, clean of any selfish intention. He must aspire to fulfil his "high duty", to fulfil his destination on the earth.

The essential changes in the conception of man in ancient Indian literature take place in the classical period, when the problem of a man's character was raised and the interest to a man, to his inner world woke up. The character of a man was discovered for the first time due to accumulation of the social experience, aggravation of class contradictions in feudal India. Idealizing of a man that was a characteristic feature of ancient Indian Epics entered into the conflict with reality. In the refusal of stereotyped view on a man is the great role of common people's art, that made a fruitful effect on the leading authors and first of all on Kālidāsa.

Having refused the absolute essence of a man-character, that was a specific feature of ancient Indian epoch, Kālidāsa wants to create a man's image with all his feelings, troubles, motivated by external circumstances. So, for instance, Śakuntalā in the beginning behaves herself as a young woman entirely in her first love, shy and timid, trustful and

naive. Then we see her as a wrathful accuser, fighting for her happiness and after that, an unhappy, rejected woman etc.

For Kālidāsa the essence of life, the deliverance from the sufferings, the way to happiness are completely in love. Love ennoble the man, inspires him to make feats. In its intention to exalt a man, love is stronger than religious feeling, that puts the man in dependence upon the god. Heavenly creature Urvaśī refused the society of gods for her love to the mortal King Purūravas.

The most important categories of ancient Indian aesthetics based on feelings and sufferings of a man, are evoked by works of literature and art (rasa). But this aesthetic sufferings are entirely abstract, they are considered in isolation from a man, get the independent importance.

The aesthetic category of rasa obviously influences the character of man in the Indian literature, the structure of his image. In many works of Indian literature, written in the different historical epochs, the main role belongs not to the actions of people, but feelings and emotions they evoke.

Because of that the Indian authors are partial to psychological character of facts, to emotional perception of the act. To our mind all this, to a great extent, determines such peculiarities of Indian literature as the abundance of the inner monologues, abstract reasonings, moralizing sayings, long descriptions of psychological state of heroes. All these features lead to the prolongation of the work slow development of the act. As a rule expression of the act in Indian literature is marked by long speeches, pronounced by the characters, speeches that must express the attitude of people to events and, the main thing, their mental state, connected with these events.

The ancient Indian literature on the different stages of its existence always was turned to the man. The human meaning of the ancient Indian literature is embodied in different principles and methods of artistic representation of the man. The humanity as a historical category in the ancient Indian literary tradition little by little changes its matter, motivated by evolution of the social consciousness, modification of the moral, ethic, religious, philosophic doctrines, that determine the character of the Indian society in the different historical epochs. The important role in the development of the man-conception in the ancient Indian literary tradition perform the opposite tendencies of the ancient Indian society, that reflect ideology of the different social groups and strata of the population. Up to our time it may be noticed in the Indian literature the display of different sides of the man-conception composed in the ancient Indian literary tradition.

AN ATTEMPT AT THE REVIVAL OF THE VEDAS IN TERMS OF MODERN SCIENCE

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The Vedas are probably a collection of scientific statements about Nature, and not a poetic precursor, as it were, of William Wordsworth. This assumption is reasonably borne out by the following study of a portion of Indra Sukta II. 12. read with the Sāyanā Bhāṣyam. The second Mantra reads thus :

यः पृथिवीं व्यथमानामदृह-
द्यः पर्वतान्प्रकुपितौ अरम्णात् ।
यो अन्तरिक्षं विममे वरीयो
यो द्यामस्तभ्नात्स जनास इन्द्रः ॥

The earth was made firm. How ? Was the earth made firm by cutting the wings of the hills ? Does the veda really tell a story that the hills, as the eldest children of Prajāpati, had wings, and they flew about and settled wherever they liked, and the earth thus tottered, and Indra cut off their wings, and the earth was made firm ?¹ Even comics would not venture upon such a puerile fancy. The Vedas are not comics, as it were, nor is Indra some sort of a Phantom or a Batman.

Sāyana says हे जनाः, यः इन्द्रः व्यथमानां चलन्तीं पृथिवीमदृहत् शर्करा-
भिर्दृढामकरोत् । दृह दृहि वृद्धौ ।

The mention of the root दृह दृहि वृद्धौ clearly indicates that the process by which the earth was made firm, involved some sort of an increase, वृद्धि. And the expression शर्कराभिः clearly indicates the very process which involves an increase as such. शर्कराभिः means 'by crystallisation'. Crystallisation amounts to solidification, and when some liquids undergo solidification, they increase in volume. Water, for instance, increases in volume when it crystallises into snow and later

becomes ice. Since the mantra under consideration refers to the earth, let us see what the modern science has to say about the evolution of the solar system and the creation of the earth in it.

By the time of Newton, it had become possible to speculate intelligently about the creation of the earth and the solar system. Newton himself suggested that the solar system might have been formed from a thin cloud of gas and dust which slowly condensed under gravitational attraction. As the particles came together, the gravitational field would become more intense, condensation would be hastened, and finally the whole mass would collapse into a dense body. In essence, this is the basis of the most popular theories.²

Let us now revert to the mantra. Sāyaṇa's expression शर्कराभिर्दृढामकरोन् makes sense as referring to the process of condensation in the creation of the earth. The Veda qualifies the earth as पृथिवी व्यथमानाम्.. Sāyaṇa explains व्यथमानाम् as चलन्तीम्. The root of व्यथमानाम् is व्यथ् which is explained by the Dhātupāṭha as व्यथ भयसंचलनयोः. In English, the word 'trepidation' is derived from the Latin 'trepidatum' meaning 'to hurry with alarm'. The Latin 'trepidus' also means 'restless'. In using the word चलन्तीम्, Sāyaṇa, it seems, seeks to suggest that the earth was restless on account of trepidation. Trepidation is a libration of the celestial sphere assumed to explain a supposed oscillation of the ecliptic.

The Veda further says, यः पर्वतान्प्रकुपितौ अरम्णात्. In the context of the creation of the earth, the mantra introduces a new factor namely, the mountains. Sāyaṇa explains this portion as यश्च प्रकुपितान् इतस्ततश्चलितान्पक्षयुक्तान्पर्वतान् अरम्णात् नियमितवान् स्वे स्वे स्थाने स्थापितवान् । अरम्णात् रमु क्रीडायाम्.

प्रकुपितान् means इतस्ततश्चलितान्, moving hither and thither. How come the mountains were moving here and there? Regarding the formations, the science says that, the general picture of the crust is that of a structure composed of two main types of rocks—basalt and granite, with the less dense granite riding buoyantly on the basalt, forming continents and, in places where the granite is particularly thick, mountains.³ The cooling of the earth from an original molten or near-molten state would help to explain its wrinkled exterior. As the cooling earth shrank, its crust would occasionally buckle. Minor buckling would give rise to earth quakes. Larger buckling would eventually produce mountain ranges.⁴

Sāyana's इतस्तनञ्चलितान् seems to mean that when the earth was cooling off from a molten or near-molten state, every mass of crystallised granite was moving here and there in the molten or near-molten basalt on account of the centrifugal force generated by the rotation of the earth. The idea of the centrifugal force is seemingly conveyed in the Sāyana Bhāṣyam by the expression पक्षयुक्तान्. The mountains had wings, पक्ष. What is the meaning of पक्ष, and how did the mountains come to have them? According to science, as Laplace described in 1796, the vast contracting cloud of matter was rotating to start with.⁵ Now when a mass rotates at a great speed, the angle at the circumference around the centre of rotation tends to decrease in order to balance the motion of the mass with the angular momentum. It may therefore be reasonably presumed that when the earth was in molten or semi-molten state, the great speed of its rotation caused its plastic mass to bulge out, and the mountains were having wings. This presumption is supported by the revelation of Vanguard I that there is asymmetry in the equatorial bulge, giving the earth a "pear" shape.⁶

Sāyana explains अरम्णात् as नियमितवान् स्वे स्वे स्थाने स्थापितवान् । अरम्णात् रमु क्रीडायाम् । In 1940, the Israeli physicist C. L. Perkeris put forward a theory, and the American geologist D. T. Briggs elaborated it. It begins by supposing that heat coming from the core periodically sets up a series of vertical eddies in the mantle. The eddies of heated material rise toward the crust and sink again after they cool there. Where two neighbouring eddies move downward, a portion of crust is sucked downward, too, forming a root of light crustal material in the heavier mantle. This root is converted by the mantle's heat into granite. Afterward, isostasy causes the root and its over-lay of light material to rise and form a mountain chain⁷. It is apparent from this scientific view that in order to stabilise the entire mass of the earth, there was a play of forces which finally fixed the position of the mountains. नियमितवान् स्वे स्वे स्थाने स्थापितवान् seems to indicate this very point, and रमु क्रीडायाम् may be presumed to indicate the play of forces in stabilising the earth.

The past tense of अरम्णात् is significant, too. Perkeris and Briggs, the scientists, had opined that though the mantle, now, was not liquid, yet it was nevertheless plastic, and as such there existed slowly churning vertical eddies of mantle material. John O'Keeffe of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, however, pointed out in 1959 that the persistence of asymmetry in the equatorial bulge, as revealed by Vanguard I, meant that the mantle had the rigidity of brick all the way down to the core⁸. The past tense of अरम्णात् seems to indicate the

view of science that the entire mass of the earth got completely set long time ago.

स जनास इन्द्रः finally seems to state that the force which brought about all the foregoing evolutionary concepts is a force called इन्द्र. The entire Indra Sukta II.12 in the R̥gveda seems to be a geological study dealing with the evolution of the solar system and the creation of the earth. It is not Sāyaṇa alone, who has tried to interpret the Vedas as a work of natural philosophy. The Nirukta, too, has a scientific bent of mind. To quote a passage from it, तत्को वृत्रः ? मेघ इति नैरुक्ताः । अपां च ज्योतिषश्च मिश्रीभावकर्मणो वर्षकर्म जायते ।⁹

In recent years, scientists have proposed a plausible mechanism to explain how a highly dispersed gas could be brought together by the extremely weak force of gravitation to form the sun and the planets. Particles in space are bombarded by radiation from all sides, but if two particles come close enough together to shade each other, they will be under less radiation pressure on the shaded than on the unshaded sides. The difference in pressure will tend to push them toward each other. This mechanism is called 'the pressure of light'¹⁰. It is perhaps in this very sense that Yāska has referred to ज्योतिः in explaining the function of वृत्र.

Sāyaṇa and Yāska may be vague in describing अहि and वृत्र as मेघ, yet all such words as इन्द्र, मित्र, वरुण, वृत्र, अहि, seem to be definite scientific terms which could be precisely defined. Attempt should be made to define the Vedic terms by reviving the Vedas in terms of modern science.

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3. Ibid. p. 98.
4. Ibid. p. 101.
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SANSKRIT AS A DISCIPLINE

Dr. Antonio Binimelis Sagrera

It is neither my intention to repeat here what has already been said so often about the scientific revolution, which took place in Europe after the discovery of Sanskrit in the Eighteenth Century, nor even to mention the great contribution made by this ancient language in the research made now-a-days in Europe on linguistics, philology, philosophy, religion, mythology, etc. a method based on the comparison of the three major languages of the Indo-European family, such as Latin, Greek and Sanskrit.

The theme, that I propose to develop in this paper deals with certain aspects of the study of this language which are entirely different and relate to the present rather than to the past. I think that it is worthwhile to note that the study of classical languages like Sanskrit, Latin and Greek has now become even more essential, particularly due to the fact that now-a-days it is a fashion to study technology and science, when the technologists and scientists seem to monopolise the human knowledge and have replaced philosophers. I shall try to illustrate my answer in the following paragraphs :

All the educationists and pedagogues admit that in order to facilitate the development of mental faculties, it is necessary that these faculties should be allowed to have a full play and exercise themselves, to enable the mind to achieve maturity and predispose it to creativity to put this in the exact Indian terminology, rather the mental faculties should be properly trained by yoga. It is with this training that these faculties are invigorated and strengthened.

Now, when we perform exercises to train these faculties, we undergo a certain discipline. It is this discipline which is the theme of this paper. Rather than speaking to you in vague and general terms, I shall speak to you in concrete terms, illustrating it with my own personal experiences, in order that, if these experiences have any scientific values, they may be considered not as a particular case, but a universal one which is valid for ever and for all men.

During my first years as a student, the two subjects which posed to me a lot of difficult problems were Latin and Mathematics. They offered to me not only just one or two problems or enigmas to be solved, but many complex ones and to solve them all a strong mental effort was necessary and an effort in which all the faculties were to intervene. For example, the memory by which we recall what has already been learnt; the power of understanding required to analyse and specify the various parts of the problem just as in mathematical terms, the one relating to space and time, the formula for calculations of speed of a moving object, etc. or in grammar, the agent, the verbal action and the place and time, etc. On analysing such problems, we value the role of memory and understanding and we realise that these two faculties are not enough. It is also necessary to have a certain amount of will-power which at a given moment of this analytical process contributes to it more than anything else. So to speak, the will-power acts as a moderator of impulses, makes us confident of ourselves and at the same time trains our patience.

Now, the aim of this analytical process is to solve the problem and this cannot be achieved without a certain amount of common-sense. Without the help of common-sense, the intellectual faculties become useless. All the other faculties have to make proper use of it and it becomes the most essential, when one has to determine the exact nature of a problem.

Therefore, the effort which a young student has to make in order to find out in a Sanskrit Śloka its meaning and the phonetical rules and to assign them a proper place in grammar or discover the changes which the endings of words undergo in accordance with the euphonic rules or sandhi that consists in a set of rules that do not change the meaning of words, but their form and to render that Śloka into his mother tongue—all this effort is not a waste of time. If, at the very outset, a student has to struggle to make an analysis, there is no doubt that his mental faculties will invigorate and train themselves. The repetition of this analysis or training will automatically enable him to think and formulate hypothesis which are totally independent of the grammatical rules. That is to say that such a training will be the necessary means and an effective tool in the hands of a student to work and make research with full confidence in himself, because of the maturity of his mind.

In this regard, it is worthwhile to study at the High School level a classical language as a major subject. I say a classical language, because not all the languages offer the same discipline as a classical language does. It has richness, variety and beauty; and if someone asks me that, after devoting my life-time in the study of classical

language, which one I would like to recommend to them, I shall say it without any hesitation or fear of any criticism, that Sanskrit will be the most suitable one for this above-said purpose. I thereby do not wish to deprive other classical languages like Greek and Latin of their excellence and literary aesthetics, but I wish to point out that Sanskrit combines in it all the qualities necessary for the development of our mental faculties. This I say for obvious reasons and because the structure of Sanskrit is both analytic and synthetic, a combination in the most perfect way, whereas Latin and Greek offer such a characteristic, but their structure is analytical rather than synthetical. On the other hand, Sanskrit makes use of both systems according to the choice and wishes of the writer.

In support of this statement, I shall give certain examples by quoting some Ślokaś.

In fact, if we compare the literary expressions of the passages IV, 7 and 19 of Gīta Govinda, we will see that Jāyadeva uses the analytic style, when he wishes to be lyrical and avoids the compound or synthesis, and thereby gives the effect by reflecting on human emotions profoundly. The two Ślokaś read as under :

Vilapati, hasati, viṣṭidati, roditi
cancati, muñcati tāpam//

Gīta Govinda IV 7

Sā romañcati, sitkaroti, vilapaty ut-kampati
tāmyati, dhyāty, udbhramati, parimilati
pataty, udyati, murchaty api.

Gīta Govinda IV 19

On the other hand, the same author has used instead of this clear and simple analytic style, synthetic compounds which are in abundance in the first of the three songs and which reads as under :

Lalita-lavaṅga-latā-pariśilana-komala-malayasamīre
madhukara-nikara-karambita-kokila-kūjita-kunjakuṣīre
vi-harati harirīha sarasavasante

To discover and rather to know how to attribute to each word, whose flexion does not appear anywhere else but at the end of the compound word, the most appropriate role in the sentence is not an easy job nor is it easy to anatomise such a compound word and give it: translation which may appear to be elegant.

In this exercise in which all the mental faculties play their role and in which the mind discovers and contemplates one by one many possibilities and in which it selects among all the unique and the only one which fits better in the context, the student is obliged to think that eventually it is the object which any serious pedagogue proposes and for whom the teaching is nothing but the initiating the student to submit his thoughts to a logical analysis by evaluating them with questions which consists of a kind of a group of ideas and calls himself a mid-wife.

In this sense, the classical languages have a definite function just like the Mathematics by converting themselves into an instrument which stimulates the mind. Therefore, there is no doubt that the scope of a classical language suggests a high degree of intellectual maturity and enables man to play his proper role which, though does not relate directly to this specialisation, contributes the indispensable means for reflecting and thinking seriously what life offers him.

Then how should one study Sanskrit and when we say Sanskrit, we also mean Greek and Latin; this is a question on which not all the teachers have agreed. In my opinion, to learn by heart a few verses and the translation, which the teacher has assigned to them, is not beneficial, however much this exercise may strengthen the memory. Thus, the student learns them in a routine manner as the priests learn the quotations from the Holy Book and the pandits, the mantras. This is the pedagogical system which is in fashion unfortunately even today and this is exactly what does not satisfy any body's mind, even less the mind of students, who revolt not against Sanskrit but against the non-comprehension of the sounds and meanings, which the pandits make them learn. They are taught as they teach a parrot how to speak without understanding what they say and the result is that all this bores them. If they were to understand the meaning which lies beyond the devanāgarī script and if he were to learn how to discover the melody which each one of the sounds has, there is no doubt that instead of getting bored, he would enjoy and besides his soul would awaken and he would like to know where lies the beauty of all that literary text.

From what I have said previously, we can conclude that a great preference has to be given to the effort which the mind makes than to retain and memorise the text in a matter of routine and this is possible if the teacher knows how to handle both the theory and the practice, if he knows how to discover the functioning of the mind of each student and, how Socrates, knew to guide him to that discovery even to the point of

taking into account the meaning of each word and the function it plays and thus getting out with a single blow the idea expressed by the author in the text.

Once we get the idea, the only thing that remains is to express it in one's own language. It is here where the aesthetic formation of the individual plays an important role. The student has to translate it in which the author of the text would like to express it in the past, but in the form and style of a modern language.

If at schools some compulsory courses in Sanskrit were introduced today and if this discipline were to be taught according to a rational system, as that of Mathematics or Sciences, I am sure that such an experiment would give an excellent result, especially in the first years of Middle Education.

Therefore, if someone asks me what lacks in Sanskrit to be a living language today in the world of technology I shall reply that it does not need any special protection from the Authorities in the Government, nor there is any need to emphasize on the *raison d'être*, of a culture which even today gives homogeneity to the heterogeneous society of India, but the truth is so obvious and everyone admits it. What really lacks is a group of teachers, both wise and devoted, who love Sanskrit and who know it perfectly well and also know how to teach it to others.

Another aspect of no less importance is that the study of Sanskrit should present to the student in that manner in which he would translate into his own language the world of ideas. This exercise will train him and will provide him with an aesthetic-literary formation and will dress his thoughts in beauty. This stylistic formation will serve as a model for his creations, not only the artistic ones but also the scientific. How many scientific works have been created out of like a rough stone. How boring is the language in which the modern scientist speaks to us. How ambiguous and vague his language is. All this dryness can be avoided, if the scientist in his childhood has had an aesthetic and humanistic education. The artistic formation in the early years of education is indispensable. Sanskrit is the most appropriate discipline to achieve it, particularly when we take into consideration the treasure and the quantity of ideas it has. The analysis and the study of *ālaṃkāras* and particularly of the *arthālaṃkāras* which are based on essential principles of logic not only will make the student to appreciate their beauty but also it will help him to understand the principles of analogy, comparison, inference, etc. and the *Śabdālaṃkāras* will delight him with their musical notes. As an example of what I have just said, I shall

submit the reader to the verses of Jaya Deva in which the cuckoo appears to fill the whole self with its blows. Jaya Deva has achieved this musical effect with the skillful combination of onomatopaeias like in the abovementioned verses.

To know how to appreciate the beauty is in itself the same thing as to identify oneself with the sentiments and emotions expressed literarily. This emotional identification is called by the ālampkārikas as "rasa", which is the essence of the literary composition and which the rasikas, men of taste, knew how to absorb and take delight in them and which is one of the purposes which must be the aspiration of every student.

Further to this aesthetic-literary character of Sanskrit and the imposition which it has to cause in the tender soul of the student during the first years of study is the scientific, religious, folkloric and philosophical content of the Ślokas. It will not be out of place to say here that many of the theories which are in fashion today and are taken as modern ones or believed to have been formulated for the first time these days were already known and even formulated if not to say developed in the philosophical texts preserved in the libraries and museums.

This is one of the strongest reasons for the research workers to see that these are actually found in those texts and what use the man of today can make out of them. In this sense, we must interpret the saying of Cicero that the History or rather the Past is the sample of Life.

How should the Sanskrit teachers teach today the students who are not interested in learning this discipline is the task which I shall develop in the following paragraph.

The teaching of a language should be distinguished by three well defined stages :

1. The first consists in learning the structure of the language, as characterised by the morphology which in Sanskrit and other classical languages consists in the declination and conjugation of variable words. The role played by each one of these words in a grammatical structure is very easy to discover : in overcoming this difficulty there is nothing more easy than to detach it by a mental effort.

The teacher has to teach the parts with which a word is composed : he has to bring out the root and its primary meaning besides its shades of meaning which that word has with the modifications and with

the additions of prefixes and suffixes and infixes and enlargements and above all he has to show clearly how and why and the origin of the declensions both of nouns and verbs and the changes in the composition and sandhi suffer. Let us have for example the declension of -m of the Indo-European language which in Sanskrit is m and which is used for making neutral nouns and the singular accusatives of nouns and adjectives and once the words have been declined by giving them semantic values and he has to emphasize on the most common and principal uses of each one of the cases, explaining that the accusative is the object of the transitive verbs, by quoting examples such as : Agnim ide- I praise Agni ; or when the accusative is constructed with intransitive verbs denoting movement to indicate the word "adquem" such as in divam yayuh=They went to the sky etc. In short, the theory has to be followed up immediately by practice and it is in practice where the mind exercises and gets ready to discover at any given time and in any textual passage such a use.

2. With a good mastery of morphology, we may say that the second stage of learning of a language begins. This second stage consists in studying the internal structure of the language, the syntax of sentences, the coordination and subordination and consequently, the transition of one idea into the others. One of the efficient way of learning consists in the teaching of a type of sentences and once the student has understood it, he has to construct with his own vocabulary other sentences of the same type, but they should have different words. In this exercise, morphology and syntax both of words and sentences change wonderfully.

3. The third stage consists in analysing, translating and commenting the classical texts with the help of available material such as the history, mythology, religion etc. and particularly the wise guidance of the teacher who has to make efforts both to teach and to make the student enjoy the teaching.

CONCLUSION

From the above said, we may deduce that :

1. The study of a classical language and particularly of Sanskrit not only gives the student a humanistic formation, but like the Mathematics it contributes to the maturity of his mind.
2. Therefore, Sanskrit has to be imposed as an obligatory subject in the Middle School level.

3. Its teaching has to be rational and this gives rise to the need that the teaching has to be in the hands of learned professors who know how to avoid the routine and the learning by heart of Ślokas of a literary text.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Sanskrit texts to be used by Students should consist in anthologies in which some very easy passages, and if possible, the beautiful ones and of great present-day interest have been selected. This selection should also be in harmony with the theories which are in fashion today.

Easy grammar books with a great abundance of examples, discussing the rules and the most essential types of rules should be available. The method how to use dictionaries and perfectness in correct reading of text which lead to a good translation do not contribute less to the intelligence of the student.

I would like to conclude this paper with the hope that the pedagogues and educationists present here will give proper attention to my recommendations and that each one of us will contribute to revive the teaching of Sanskrit.

VEDĀNTA AND WORLD THOUGHT

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Historically speaking the earliest system which took shape in Hindu thought was the Advaita system. This was followed by the Bhedābheda, Viśiṣṭadvaita, Dvaita and the Śaiva Siddhānta schools. A careful reader of these systems can easily find out that these systems were formulated by the Hindu teachers because they were not satisfied with the representation of truth made by the earlier school and with the explanations offered by them in regard to the vital issues of Hindu philosophy. So the later systems sought to develop the earlier system by contributing their own interpretation of truth. Thus the Bhedābheda school came into existence because it was not satisfied with the Advaita system but at the same time it was not opposed to the truth of Advaita. What the Bhedābheda school meant to do was, while it was opposing the Advaita system it was explaining the truth as Identity *and* Difference or Advaita and non-Advaita or Bheda and Abheda. The system of Viśiṣṭadvaita, similarly, was opposed to the earlier schools of Advaita and Bhedābheda but it was not against the truth of Identity or Identity and Difference. This branch of philosophy came out with the explanation that while the truth is Identity and Difference the correct interpretation would be to interpret the truth as Identity *in* Difference. Likewise, the Śaiva Siddhānta school is opposed to the earlier branches of philosophy, but it was not antagonistic to the idea of Identity or Identity and Difference or Identity *in* Difference.

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1. From the name chosen by the founders to these systems the relationship existing among these schools may be understood. Advaita system is known as kevalādvaita, the Bhedābheda system speaks for Advaita as well as dvaita, the Viśiṣṭadvaita school advocates Advaita qualified by Difference and the Śaiva Siddhānta is called the school of Śuddhādvaita. The relationship of the Dvaita system will be discussed in the later portion of the article.

It will be clear from the above exposition that a system or teacher has two important roles to play. One role is to oppose the interpretations of the earlier school and the other is to build his own arguments to develop his school. No Hindu teacher could relieve himself of these two responsibilities. Sometimes due to the force of circumstances or the nature of the problems at hand, some scholars of Hindu thought have to give more prominence either to oppose the ideas of the rival systems or to construct their own school in a positive manner.

In this connection we may have to note a significant fact. We know that the Advaitins advocate the Nirguṇa ideal and this concept forces them to keep the world and the individual souls out of the fold of Reality. Moreover, the nature of the Nirguṇa idea is such that it cannot be proved to be Nirguṇa by any positive method of argument. The only way to establish the Nirguṇa concept is to negate the reality of the world and the individual souls. As we know the help extended by the scriptures in this regard is not much as the scriptures contain the Saṁguṇa and its allied ideas too. The Advaitins are therefore compelled to seek a way to disprove the world and the souls which are practically seen and felt by each of us.

Compelled by these circumstances the Advaitins sought the help of Logic and Reasoning to establish their major claims. It may be pointed out in this context that it is the peculiar nature of the human intellect to take a deep interest in logic and to succumb to the limitations and imperfections of reasoning. Knowing fully the nature and weakness of the human mind the Advaitins attempted to appeal to the human intellect in a psychological manner.²

The first teacher to employ the method of logic and reasoning in Hindu philosophy to disprove the reality of the world and the souls was Gauḍapāda. By his subtle and fire logic Gauḍapāda endeavours to completely shake the belief in Causality, the difference or dependence

2. From the earliest times the Buddhist scholars have adopted the method of logic and reasoning and they have gone to the acme of perfection in this field. Although the Buddhists believed in Intuition as the supreme judge of reality, as they did not accept the validity of scriptures, they had to depend completely on logic and reasoning to establish their theories. Some modern critics of Indian philosophy like Dasgupta (Ind. Phil. Vol. I pp. 420-29) have expressed that Gauḍapāda borrowed this method from Buddhism. This fact cannot be denied.

of the souls to Brahman and the reality of the world. The logic of Gauḍapāda is so powerful that it cannot be logically counteracted. Gauḍapāda has not got even the least sympathy for the world or for the difference that is existing among the individual souls.


Śaṅkara, even though he had the highest respect and honour for his teacher, Gauḍapāda, seems to think that his teacher has used a strong dose of logic. Although Śaṅkara was himself a logician of highest rank, he knew that too much reliance on logic and the usage of logic beyond its scope and limits as his teacher has unfortunately done will do harm³ to Hindu philosophy in the long run. In his major contributions to Hindu philosophy such as his *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* and other works Śaṅkara never indulges in *katarka* or destructive logic either to disprove the reality of the world or to deny the separate reality of the souls. Instead of condemning the world and the souls as illusory appearances he assigns them a lower or a secondary status. This deviation from his teacher's path cannot be thought to be simple. The immediate disciples of Śaṅkara like Maṇḍana⁴, Suresvara⁵ and others even though they seem to have known the limitations of logic they in their over-enthusiasm to establish the truth of Advaita as taught by the system of Advaita have preferred to give more prominence to the method of argument as shown by Gauḍapada than to the teachings of Śaṅkara. It is from their period the history of Hindu thought takes a notable diversion. It was Mandana who for the first time in the history of Hindu thought showed how it is logically impossible to relate the subject and the object; it was he who for the first time complicated the ideas of Avidyā and Māyā which were simple and un-complicated as conceived by Śaṅkara; it was he who for the first time propagated the idea of the imaginary nature of the individual souls; it was he who for the first time raised many logical objections to the doctrine of difference. Similarly, Suresvara and Padmapāda⁶ who were also the direct students

3. What is established by one as something undeniable is easily exploded by another logician and his conclusions, in their turn, suffer a similar fate; "If one establishes something subtle by reason, another posits something else subtler still for there is no limit ever seen to arguing" Śaṅkara's words as quoted by Venkatarama Iyer, op. cit. p. 146.

4. See Dasgupta, Ind. Phil. Vol. II. p. 87.

5. Ibid, p. 98.

6. Ibid, p. 102.



of Śaṅkara, created many logical deadlocks with regard to the reality of the world and to the relationship of the souls to Brahman. In the same way Vacaspati⁷ (840 A.D.), the author of the famous book *Bhāmati* and Sarvajñātmāmuni⁸ (900 A.D.), a disciple of Suresvara try to show that Perception and other instruments of knowledge cannot establish the reality of the world.

Thus before the time of Bhāskara⁹ (who is post-Śaṅkara and pre-Rāmānuja), the famous advocate of the Bhedābheda school, many logical minded and reputed Advaita scholars have appeared in the world of Hindu philosophy and have raised many logical queries regarding the reality of the world and the individual souls. So it is natural that any scholar who wanted to establish the reality of the world is compelled to suitably answer the questions raised by the Advaita scholars that logic should be given a prominent place in deciding the issues. Bhāskara too was a best logician and he has effectively used logic in disproving many contentions of the Advaitins.

Rāmānuja¹⁰ (1017-1137) who came after Bhāskara was not satisfied either with the pure Advaita of the Advaitins or with the explanation of Bhāskara which interpreted the truth as Identity and Difference. According to Rāmānuja the truth is neither bare identity nor Identity and difference. In his opinion it is identity as qualified by difference. In order to establish his claim Rāmānuja had to demolish firstly the logic of his predecessors. But as Ramanuja accepted the authority of the Epics and other religious literature besides the Upaniṣads etc., he quoted from them in order to prove the reality of the world etc., and used logic in a limited way. This is the main reason that Rāmānuja has failed to satisfy many logical minded modern and ancient scholars who accuse Rāmānuja as being more theological than philosophical.

After the age of Rāmānuja there appeared in the Hindu philosophical world two great exponents of Advaita, Śrīharṣa¹¹ (A.D. 1150)

7. Ibid, p. 106.

8. Ibid, p. 111.

9. For an excellent exposition of the philosophy of Bhāskara see P.N. Srinivasachari, *The Philosophy of Bhedābheda*.

10. All books on Indian philosophy will give a summary of Rāmānuja's philosophy.

11. See Dasgupta, *Ind. Phil. Vol. II* p. 125,

and his commentator Citsukha (A.D. 1220)¹². These scholars had a liking to logic more than any other Hindu scholar. With their subtle, deep and destructive logic they have posed many intricate questions which have baffled and perplexed the critics of Advaita. Any one who happens to read the works of these scholars will feel that they are reading a work on logic and not a work on philosophy. The achievements of these scholars in the field of logic are to be congratulated but the introduction of logic to this extent in Hindu philosophy against the spirit of Śaṅkara is something which cannot be appreciated.

The age of Śrīharṣa and Citsukha was followed by the appearance of the great teacher Madhva (A. D. 1238-1317). He was a staunch supporter of Dvaita and Difference. Therefore he had to logically answer all the objections of his Advaita predecessors against the concept of Dvaita and Difference. Madhva has written many works to answer the logic of his opponents. We shall show in the following chapters that the objections of the Advaitins are very powerful that a logical answer by the dualists to those problems are absolutely impossible.

The Advaita scholar Vidyāranya (A. D. 1350)¹³ and the Viśiṣṭādvaita scholar Vedānta Deśika (A. D. 1268) followed Madhva. These scholars are noted for their polemical and dialectical skill.

These scholars were followed by the famous Dvaita scholar Jayatīrtha (A. D. 1365-88)¹⁴ who in his commentary on the works of Madhva has attempted to answer the fresh objections of the non-Dvaita scholars levelled after the time of Madhva. The credit of standardising and establishing the creed of Dvaita goes to the scholarship and the logical skill of this philosopher, Nṛsiṃhāśrama¹⁵, another notable Advaita scholar followed (A. D. 1500) this powerful Dvaita systematiser.

The last chance of answering all the objections against the Advaita system was given to Madhusudana¹⁶ and the last chance of defending the

12. Ibid, p. 147.

13. For a clear exposition of Vidyāranya's philosophy, see T.M.P. Mahadevan, Advaita Vedānta.

14. See Narain, Cri. Madh. Refu. Sam. Ved.

15. See Dasgupta, Ind. Phil. Vol. II. p. 216.

16. Ibid, p. 225.

Dvaita school was taken by Vyāsātīrtha¹⁷. Madhusūdana's date is A.D. 1500 and Vyāsātīrtha's date is A.D. 1478-1589. Although there were some more scholars after these scholars Madhūsudana and Vyāsātīrtha, we may ignore them.

It was during the thirteenth century the great teachers of Śaiva Siddhānta¹⁸ appeared in Tamil Nad and systematised the Siddhādvaita truth in their works. As all these works were written in Tamil, the rich ideas and powerful objections of these scholars to other systems could not spread to a wider circle of scholars.

The views propagated and maintained by all these scholars and teachers are indispensable to the correct understanding of the Ultimate Truth. It is with this view in mind a critical approach is made in the following sections to the theories advanced by all these Hindu philosophers.

The history of Hindu philosophy may be divided into two major periods namely the age of Revelation and the age of the Systems. The age of the Upaniṣads is held to be the age of revelation by the Hindu tradition. During this age many spiritual aspirants with very deep earnestness and strenuousness attempted to obtain the true vision of Truth. In their endeavour and self-preparation to know the truth they developed in them the faculty of Intuition. It is because of the development of this intuitive power, the Supreme Truth unfolded itself to those great thinkers of the age and they became the Seers of Reality. The upaniṣads are the texts in which the truth, as seen by the seers is recorded.¹⁹

17. See Nārāṇ, Crī. Madh. Refu. Sam. Ved.

18. For an account of Śaiva siddhānta philosophy, see Devasenapathī, Śaiva Siddhānta.

19. Many eminent Indian and Foreign scholars have edited, translated, annotated, explained and discussed the texts of the Upaniṣads and their philosophy. In all books on Indian Philosophy one may find an exposition, detailed or succinct, of the problems relating to the study of the Upaniṣads. These texts are also known as Vedānta texts.

The truth as contained in the Upaniṣads cannot be named as Advaitic, Bhedābhedic or Dvaitic²⁰ because many passages of these revealed texts lend themselves to be interpreted in favour of Advaita and some are plainly Bhedābhedic or Dvaitic. It is a matter of common knowledge that the conceptions of Advaita, Bhedābheda and Dvaita are contradictory to each other. If the nature of truth is Advaitic it cannot possibly be the other two and vice versa. That being the case, one may wonder, as to how the Upaniṣads can contain in them mutually contradictory ideas with regard to the Supreme Truth. It is strange to observe that nowhere in the Upaniṣads any attempt is made to logically relate these seemingly contradictory passages.

In many passages of these texts Brahman is conceived as Nirguṇa²¹ and in some places Brahman is spoken of as Saṁguṇa²². The individual souls are said to be non-different from Brahman²³ and also as parts or dependant on Brahman²⁴. The world is held to be the false aspect

20. The term Advaita means non—duality; the philosophy which speaks of the non—difference of the individual souls and matter and their identity with the Supreme Reality which in Hindu thought is known as Brahman, is Advaita philosophy. If the individual souls and matter are said to be both different and non—different, it is known as Bhedābheda philosophy. Bhedābheda means identity and difference or identity *in* difference. The branch of philosophy which speaks of real or metaphysical difference of the souls and matter from Brahman is known as Dvaita philosophy. The term Dvaita means duality.
21. Nirguṇa means 'qualitiless'; normally in the Upaniṣads this aspect of Brahman is denoted by the words *neti neti*, not this not this, i.e. Brahman possesses not this quality, not that quality and so on which finally means Brahman is in possession of no quality or attributes. Such passages are too many to be quoted here. For example see B.U. 2.3.6; 3.9.26.
22. Saṁguṇa means 'with quality'. e. g. S, U. 6.8.
23. S. U. 4.3; T. A. 3.12.7.
24. C. U. 8.7; B. U. 4.4.22
25. S. U. 4.9-10.

of Brahman in some texts²⁵ and in some, Brahman is said to be the material as well as the efficient cause of the world²⁶.

We are not told by the seers as to how Brahman can be both Saguna and Nirguna; the individual souls can be non—different and at the same time be parts or dependants of Brahman; the world can be real and false entity. We cannot say that the seers overlooked or evaded these contradictions. Nor can we say that the truth revealed itself to some seers as Advaitic and to some as non—Advaitic perhaps in accordance with their personal spiritual development²⁷ or due to some reasons unknown to us.

Then, one may ask, what would be the probable explanation for the occurrence of these plainly contradictory ideas in the Upaniṣads? The only possible and reasonable explanation appears to be this: the truth is by nature both Advaitic and non—Advaitic and to realize as to how this could be, one has to go beyond the region of the rational thought, mind and develop the power of intuition. Only by the faculty of intuition the real nature of truth can be grasped and when intuition grasps the truth, the truth can be Advaitic as well as non—advaitic at once and there will be no contradiction in its being so²⁸. The seers of truth obtained the vision of the reality which was both Advaitic and non—Advaitic but as the seers grasped the truth by their power of intuition, they saw no contradiction in it and so they never felt the need of relating and reconciling the Advaitic and non—Advaitic truth.

Most of the students of philosophy may not agree with the above explanation. If they do not agree with us we shall not find fault with them because the human mind is such that it cannot agree to reconcile the plainly contradictory ideas. The human mind will either attempt to ignore one of the contradictory concepts or will try to reject one of the two. The mind will take into consideration only the identical or similar concepts but not the doctrines that are in opposition.

26. C. U. 6.2.3-4; T. U. 2.7.

27. There may be different levels in the spiritual development of ordinary human beings, but with regard to the seers, all are blessed beings and as such no such levels are possible.

28. It is the nature of the mind to understand the truth in portions. Intuition can realise it full and complete.

The great teachers like Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Meykandār²⁹ knew the nature and defects of the human mind. These teachers very well knew that unless something convincing is placed before the mind it will never take any interest in the matter presented before it. It may be observed in this connection that some of us without our consciousness begin to like the Advaitic truth, some the Bhedābhedic truth and some the Dvaita truth³⁰. It is a mystery to probe into the nature of the mind as to how one prefers Advaita and the other non—Advaita. It is beyond the ken of the field of normal Psychology. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for such preferences we may have to accept them as mysterious.

The great Hindu teachers being fully aware of the mysterious nature of the human mind have come forward to present the truth in such a way that the mind will take interest in getting itself attached more and more with the truth because of the coherent and convincing presentation. The selective method of presentation of the truth for the benefit of the human mind is known as the System of philosophy. Thus all systems by their very nature are bound to accept either Advaita or Bhedābhada or Dvaita but not all. This will come to mean that all systems are partial representations of truth. At this point one may genuinely ask whether the teachers are justified in presenting the truth in a partial way in the name of systems and whether those who take a sincere interest in these systems get any spiritual benefit out of this

29. To general students of philosophy the names of teachers like Gauḍapāda and others may be familiar. But the name of Meykandār may not be so familiar to them. He was the first systematic exponent of the Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy. Meykandār's date is generally accepted to be the thirteenth century A. D.

30. 'Broadly speaking, the bent of the human mind is towards either realism or idealism. Not that the two are mutually exclusive and can be kept in water—tight compartments. Rather they cross and recross each other's path at many points. But still the fact remains that the disposition of some minds is mainly in the direction of idealism. This was what Schlegel meant when he said that every thinker is born either as a Platonist or as an Aristotalian. Systems of philosophy take their colour from this original bent of the thinker's mind. Realism naturally results in pluralistic metaphysics while idealism leads upto a monistic philosophy. This is so both in the East and the West. 'Venkatarama Iyer' Advaita Vedanta p. x.

sincerity, The teachers when they formulated the truth into systems knew very well that a correct, complete and deep understanding of any of these systems will one day open the eyes of intuition in us and when this happens the truth will reveal its real nature. Therefore it is in no way wrong to present the truth as a system as our great teachers have done and it is not faulty to follow any system in a good spirit. But a superficial, emotional and false attachment to any of these systems will generate only trivial rivalry and unnecessary quarrels amidst us instead of developing the intuitive power³¹.

Sometimes to our surprise we find that the great teachers themselves openly accuse one another saying that other teachers have distorted and misrepresented the facts regarding the Ultimate Reality.³² This however, should not be taken in their expressed meaning. Our teachers have gone so high in spirituality that they will never stoop to the level of indulging in petty quarrels. These accusations of teachers against each other can therefore be interpreted that they are just to

31. There is nothing wrong in following any of these systems in an emotional way, thinking that the particular system will certainly help us to develop the hidden spiritual powers. This type of thinking and attachment is not harmful in any way. But when we try to establish the supremacy of the system which we like most over the other systems and indulge in quarrels with others, it helps us in no way. Such quarrels will breed only hatred and difference among us. From time to time, in the past, Hindu scholars have engaged themselves in this type of unwanted acts. This remark should not, however, be understood in a wrong way. The present author is fully aware of the enrichment brought to the field of Hindu philosophy by the purely intellectual debates undertaken by the different systems of thought. At the same time, it cannot be denied that these powerful arguments of scholars have complicated the problems relating to the major issues of Hindu philosophy instead of supplying solutions to those problems.

32. Bhāskara, a well known teacher of Bhedābheda philosophy, condemns that Śaṅkara teaches a wrong doctrine. (See Indian Philosophy by Dasgupta, Vol. III p.1); Madhva's hatred of Advaita is so great that he calls "Advaitins 'deceitful demons' who play in the darkness of Ignorance and who must run away now that the Omniscient Lord (the son of Dualism) is coming to destroy their darkness of arguments and false interpretations of the scriptures"—as quoted by Chandradhar Sarma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p. 372.

sustain our inborn liking to realism or idealism. It cannot obviously mean more than that. As we have already remarked in the early parts of this chapter, the ultimate reality as revealed by the Upaniṣads is more than Advaita, Bhedābheda and Dvaita. Should any teacher really mean that his system alone is correct then while every teacher claims like this how are we to ascertain for ourselves whose claim is more valid. There is no final way of arriving at a conclusion as regards this matter.

The strength of all Hindu systems lies not in their mere claims of superiority but in their logic and reasoning. It is the logic that is the touchstone of a system. That is why the great teachers have taken a special care to found their systems on logic and to present their arguments in favour of their claims in a reasoned manner.

While the systems of philosophy are based on logic, logic in its turn is based on the *pramāṇas*³³ or valid instruments of knowledge. *Pratyakṣa*, 'perception', *Anumāna*, 'inference' and 'Śruti,' 'scripture' are the three major³⁴ instruments of knowledge accepted by all Hindu systems. When we establish contact with the objects of knowledge through our senses it is called *pratyakṣa*. Seeing an object if we infer another object which is invariably associated with it even though we do not have any perceptual contact with that object, it is *Anumāna*.

The fact that perception and *anumāna* have been accepted as valid instruments of knowledge in Philosophy does not ensure that all perceptions and inferences are bound to be correct and cannot be wrong. There may be misperceptions and incorrect inferences.³⁵ But it is difficult to ascertain which is right perception and which is right inference. If we entertain a doubt regarding our empirical perceptions we may somehow try to verify the validity of it either with the help of a *pratyakṣa* whose correctness has been already proved or whose correctness will be subsequently proved or with the help of a valid inference.

Similarly if we doubt the validity of an empirical inference we may correct it with the help of a valid *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*. We normally

33. For an account of the *pramāṇas* as held by the Advaitins, see Venkatarama Iyer, *op.cit.* pp.139-160; for Bhedābheda see Srinivasa-achari, *Advaita and Viśiṣṭadvaita* pp.19-30; for Dvaita see B.N.K. Sharma, *Philosophy of Sri Madhvācārya* pp.82-92.

34. There are some minor *pramāṇas* accepted by individual schools but they are not so important to be noted here.

35. In philosophical language this is called 'erroneous knowledge'.

assume that if certain conditions are satisfactory, we take that particular perception or inference as valid. But it must be noted that if we doubt the very correctness of our instruments of knowledge there is no absolute criterion by which the validity of them can be checked or proved. Therefore, strictly speaking it is a mere belief that some of our perceptions and inferences are correct and some incorrect. This belief cannot be logically substantiated.³⁶

In spite of it, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* have been accepted by all Hindu systems as valid instruments of knowledge for the purpose of building their logical arguments for and against many philosophical contentions. Whatever might be the actual validity of these *pramāṇas*, it must be accepted that the usage of these two *pramāṇas* is strictly restricted to empirical facts.

The main issues of Hindu philosophical systems are to deal with the problems of God, Soul and the ultimate status of the world or Matter. These are problems which cannot be settled or approached through empirical perception or inference. They are super-sensuous matters whose nature and scope lie beyond the limits of these instruments of knowledge. At this stage, we may ask, what is the *pramāṇa* by which we can try to solve these supra-rational problems. All Hindu systems have unanimously accepted that *śruti* or scripture is the only *pramāṇa* which has authority over these problems. All issues relating to God or Brahman, the nature of individual souls, and the status of the world or Matter have to be estimated only with the help of the scriptures. There is no other key to these problems.

Besides the Upaniṣads the Hindu tradition has accepted the *Gītā*³⁷

36. "When I consider the matter carefully, I do not find a single characteristic by means of which I can certainly determine whether I am awake or whether I dream. The visions of a dream and the experiences of my waking state are so much alike that I am completely puzzled, and I do not really know that I am not dreaming at this moment". Descartes—as quoted by Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol.II, p.454fn.

37. This is one of the most popular texts of the Hindus. The *Gītā* has been translated and interpreted by many eminent scholars. An account of the philosophy of the *Gītā* is given in all books on Indian Philosophy.

and the Brahma Sūtra³⁸ as authoritative texts in regard to spiritual and supersensuous matters. But unfortunately the language of the Gītā allows itself to be interpreted in favour of Advaita and non-Advaita and therefore it cannot be taken to advocate any particular system. The Brahma Sūtra has been written in aphoristic language and it is not clear what the author of the text intends to convey with regard to the major problems of Hindu Philosophy.

We may have to observe a peculiar position here. The great Hindu teachers came forward to formulate different systems of philosophy; they had to fall back completely on the authority of the same Upaniṣads whose ambiguous conception of truth was mainly responsible for the birth of the systems. In this regard the help extended by the Gītā and the Brahma Sūtra is not very useful. Therefore, strictly speaking the Hindu philosophical systems become meaningless as 'systems', from the Western philosophical point of view.

But the great teachers have saved these systems from this pathetic position by the skill of their master-minds. It is by using their extraordinary minds these teachers have built different Hindu systems.

38. The Upaniṣads, the Gītā and the Brahma Sūtra are held in high esteem by the great builders of Hindu philosophical systems. All these three are known as the *Prasthāna trayā*, three ways to Hindu tradition. Brahma Sūtra has been commented by many ancient teachers of India. Radhakrishnan, the greatest living philosopher of India, in his book entitled *The Brahma Sūtra*, gives a masterly summary and interpretation of the ancient commentaries.

THE BRAHMASIDDHĀNTA OF ŚĀKALYA SAMHITĀ

by

D. G. DHAVALÉ

There are four astronomical works available at present the authorship of which is attributed to Brahma (or Pitāmaha). The oldest is no doubt the Pitāmahasiddhānta which forms part of the *Pañcasiddhāntikā* of Varāhamihira. Then there are the *Brāhmasphuṭasiddhānta* of Brahmagupta, the *Pañtāmahasiddhānta* of the Viṣṇu—dharmottara-purāṇa and finally the *Brahmasiddhānta* of Śākalyasamhitā. All chapters of the last work end thus—

इति श्री शाकल्य संहितायां द्वितीयप्रश्ने ब्रह्मसिद्धान्ते . . . ॥

One, naturally, wonders why this book is called the *second prāśna* of the Śākalyasamhitā. Is there, or was there, a big treatise known as Śākalyasamhitā of which the present work is a part? Dikshit¹ states that he had not heard of any other prāśna of this samhitā being extant. The same position is reiterated in a recently published Bibliography by S. N. Sen².

Now, while preparing a critical edition of this particular *Brahmasiddhānta*, I was fortunate in securing a copy of a South Indian manuscript. This manuscript is located in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras. For further reference I will indicate this manuscript as S.

S. has a distinct individuality of its own. There are many lines interspersed in the text which are not found in any other edition.

1. S. B. DIKSHIT, 'History of Indian Astronomy in Marathi' (1896), p. 188.
2. S. N. Sen, 'A Bibliography of Sanskrit words on Astronomy and Mathematics, (1966), p. 189.

The most significant characteristic of this ms. is the fact that while all other texts have six *Adhyāyas*, this one has an extra seventh. It is a lengthy chapter having 492½ slokas, and ends—

इति श्री शाकल्य संहितायां द्वितीय प्रश्ने ब्रह्मसिद्धांते सप्तमोऽध्यायः ॥

This leaves no doubt that the chapter is part of the treatise and is not a result of some spurious folios being placed inadvertently with the genuine text. This opinion is further strengthened by the observation that the contents are in the form of a dialogue between Brahma and Nārada consistent with the rest of the treatise.

That the treatise really ends with this chapter is indicated by the last few lines.

इति स्मरन्तदानन्दे समाधिं समवाप्नुयात् ।

इत्थेतदखिलं ब्रह्मपैतामहमनुत्तमम् ।

यो वेद स परं ब्रह्मसदानन्दः स्वयं भवेत् ।

The contents of the seventh *Adhyāya*, however, do not justify its inclusion in a treatise on astronomy. In fact the chapter reads more like a *Purāṇa* than an astronomical essay. Whatever astronomical references there are in it are about the same as are found in some of the *Purāṇas*.

Another individual characteristic of S. is an extension of *Adhyāya* I by 90½ slokas beyond the number found in other manuscripts. It is observed, however, that many of the other manuscripts end the first chapter abruptly. E. g. the ending, noticed by Dikshit¹ in the *Ānandāśrama* m.s. is मौर्व्या चतुष्के . . . ”. Dikshit² also mentions another manuscript,—Ketkar’s—in which he found a *śloka* not seen in any other ms. This *śloka* also occurs in S. indicating possibility that the Ketkar ms. may have been a South Indian one.

This is followed in my manuscript by two verses from the present *Sūryasiddhānta* (XIV 18,19). There is then some discussion of these verses; some fault finding and then the following verses—

1. Loc cit p. 365

2. Ibid, p. 513. The second line of the *śloka* is स्याद्य प्रथम प्रश्ने सौरवाक्यमिदं भवेत् ।

तदाद्याप्रश्नदोषेण द्वितीयोऽयं च दृश्यति ।

तृतीयः पौलिशः प्रश्नः चतुर्थस्तु तथैन्द्रवः ॥

पञ्चमो रोमणः षष्ठो गार्ग्यो जैबस्तु सप्तमः ।

अष्टमश्चापि वासिष्ठो माण्डव्यायोगपरादिनः ॥

The single line quoted above in footnote 2 is itself sufficient to indicate that the *Sūryasiddhānta* is considered here as the first *praśna*. This *Siddhānta* is supposed to have been told by Sūrya to Maya. Further clarification is provided by the later reference to other *praśnas*. The position settles down to this :—

1. First *praśna* Sūryasiddhānta as told by Sūrya to Maya.
2. Second *praśna* — Brahmasiddhānta of Śākalya.
3. Third *praśna* — Pauliśa siddhānta.
4. Fourth *praśna* — Somasiddhānta¹
5. Fifth *praśna* — Romaśasiddhānta
6. Sixth *praśna* — Gargasamhitā
7. Seventh *praśna* — Some treatise which must have existed under the name of Brhaspati²
8. Eighth *praśna* — Vasiṣṭhasiddhānta as told by Vasiṣṭha to Māṇḍavya.

1. Further support is lent to this identification from the finding that, in the *Somasiddhānta* published in the Benares Sanskrit Series, No. 152, fascicule (i), six of the ten chapters end by calling the *Somasiddhānta* as the fourth *praśna*. Thus Chapter I ends—
चतुर्थे शौनक प्रश्ने... Chapter V... चतुर्थे प्रश्ने...

Four more chapters end in one of these forms.

2. No such treatise is known at present. But there is a possibility of its having existed some time in the past since, Varāhamihira has mentioned Brhaspati as one of the Ṛṣis, whose authority he quotes, in his writings, from time to time.

This solves the question how the Brahmasiddhānta is *dvitīya prāśna*¹.

The question still remains why it is *dvitīya prāśna* of the *Śākalyasamhitā* ? What is or was the *Śākalyasamhitā* ? The only answer to this one can think of is to say that the author of this particular Brahmasiddhānta wanted to claim that his siddhānta was a part of a great work which included the others in the above quotation. The word *prāśna* also means "a short section of a work". The author evidently chose *Śākalyasamhitā* as the name for this great work. The practice of passing off one's work under some famous legendary name is not unknown in ancient Indian Astronomy. There probably never was an astronomer named Śākalya.

Dikshit after remarking on the ending of *Adhyāya* I, as mentioned above says "... the second *Adhyāya* begins with an altogether new subject. The statement of *paridhi* must come in between". This remarkable foresight of this brilliant scholar is fully borne out in these extra lines in S. in which values of *paridhi* are given before the usual verses of *Adhyāya* II begin.

There is no reason to doubt, therefore, that these extra verses are a genuine part of *Adhyāya* I and that they have somehow been left out of most of the north Indian manuscripts.

References to other *prāśnas* are also found in, what I may now call, the incomplete texts. Thus in Ch. III 30 we have

स्यादेतत्प्रथमप्रश्ने तूष्णीं गत्यन्तरयतः । कथितं . . . ॥

Again in Ch. V 10

स्यूलाणु प्रथमप्रश्नेऽपीत्येवार्धत्रयं स्मृतम् ॥

and IV 38. अनुक्तं यत् एवैतदन्यप्रश्नचतुष्टये ।

1. It is interesting to note that in the very first chapter of the Brahmasiddhānta these very eight authorities have been mentioned as the originators of astronomy. Thus—

एतच्च मत्तः शीतांशोः पुलस्त्याच्च विवस्वतः ।

रोमकाच्च वसिष्ठाच्च गगदिपि बृहस्पतेः ॥C॥

अष्टधा निर्गतं शास्त्रं — — ॥

Similarly in V 16 we have

प्रश्नत्रयेऽप्येवान्यस्मिन् स्थितौ सूक्ष्मफलं स्मृतम् ।

Comparison with other treatises

It is generally agreed that this *Brahmasiddhānta* is based on the modern *Suryasiddhānta*. On comparison it was found that agreement in actual wording of the two *siddhāntas* occurs in 65 lines or *caraṇas*.

While comparison with S. S. was of major interest; some other comparisons which were discovered incidentally are given below. In the extra verses in S. between the first and second *adhyāya* the following lines are found :-

गायत्रे सिद्धान्त श्लोकद्वयम्---

परार्थं प्रथमाहेस्मिन्नायुषो ब्रह्मणोऽधुना ।

सप्तमस्य मनोवार्ता द्वापराणां गजाश्विनः ॥

खच्चतुष्के भनागार्ध(?)शररन्ध्रनिशाकराः । (र्थ?)

स्पष्टैरतीताः सूर्याब्दा वर्तमानात्कलेरपि ॥

Dikshit has noticed the existence of these lines, with some variation, in *Somasiddhānta*. The *Somasiddhānta* published in the Benaras Sanskrit Series (No. 152) has these *ślokas* at I. 35,36. Dikshit also mentions, in the same place, that these *ślokas* are also included in the *Romaśa Siddhānta*. The modern *Romaśa* has not yet appeared in print. I could, however, find the *ślokas* referred to in a manuscript of the treatise in the Mandlik Library of the Fergusson College. The *ślokas* occur at I 17,18 and differ from the above quotation only on minor points. Hence they are not reproduced here.

The present Brh. closely follows the modern S.S. in data about planetary motions etc. In fact this data is common to other *Siddhāntas* also, e.g. the *Soma*, *Vasiṣṭha* and *Romaka*. This *Siddhānta* has one remarkable feature, namely, the detailed description it gives of the supposed motion of the *Saptarṣis* and the coordinates of its individual stars¹. Varāhamihira was the first author to introduce this subject in an astronomical treatise² though he himself quotes Vṛddhagarga as his

1. See Chapt. II

2. Br. S. Ch. XIII

authority. Since, however, no complete manuscript of Garga's treatise exists Varāhamihira may well be called the first author to treat of this subject in his book. The subject was next included in the Brh. to be followed by later authors like Āryabhata II Muniśvara, and Bhatta Kamalākara¹.

The name Śākalya and the date of the Siddhānta

Many sanskrit astronomical treatises are of doubtful origin, in the sense that their authorship cannot be attributed to historical persons. For convenience therefore astronomical works are often grouped into two distinct classes; (1) those going under the name of legendary authors (अपौरुषेय.) and (2) those written by historical authors (पौरुषेय). Some of the former are,

1. *Suryasiddhānta*
2. *Romaśasiddhānta*
3. *Paulīśasiddhānta*
4. *Vasiṣṭhasiddhānta*
- 5 5. *Pitāmahasiddhānta*
6. *Somasiddhānta*
7. *Brahmasiddhānta*

Some of the latter are,

1. The *Āryabhatīya* of Āryabhata I
2. *Brahmasphuṭaśiddhānta* of Brahmagupta
3. *Panicasiddhāntikā* of Varāhamihira
4. *Siddhāntaśiromaṇi* of Bhāskara II
5. *Laghumānasa* of Munjāla
6. *Siddhāntasārvabhauma* of Muniśvara
7. *Siddhāntatatvaviveka* of Kamalākara

1. An earlier author, Lalla, has also devoted one *Śloka* to the subject.

It will thus be seen that the *Brahmasiddhānta* under discussion is अपौरुषेय. In the same way as other *Siddhāntas* go under the name of deities and legendary personalities like Sūrya, Soma, Vasiṣṭha,, Pitāmaha etc. the present work goes under the name of Brahma and is supposed to form part of a larger work going under the name of Śākalya—a name well known to students of R̥gveda. It is obvious that this vedic Śākalya could not have been the author of eight considerably later works on astronomy which are supposed to form the eight *prśnās* of the *Śākalyasamhitā* listed earlier. It would seem certain that some imaginative composer, of a period which must be post-Āryabhaṭa-Varāhamihira, who composed his *Brahmasiddhānta* by borrowing from earlier works and, letting his imagination turn truant, attributed the authorship of all the eight *siddhāntas* to the great name *śākalya*. It is hardly worthwhile arguing that there may have been a later Śākalya after the Vedic one. If names like Surya, Vasiṣṭha are held by people even today why not Śākalya? The difficulty would be that this later Śākalya would also have to be the author of all the eight *siddhāntas* which constitute the *Śākalyasamhitā*. I am, of course, aware of the fact that at least one later author considered Śākalya to be a real person. Kamalākara in his *Siddhānta tatva viveka* says

शाकल्यसंज्ञ मुनिना कथिताः सदाणाः ।
सप्तपितारक भवतः ध्रुवकाशकटाक्ष ॥

Kamalākara seems to believe in the past existence of Śākalya. In this respect Kamalākara is in good company since Varāhamihira also quotes the authority of Garga and Āryabhaṭa II quotes Paraśara.

Dikshīt (P. 189) used a certain statement in the first *Adhyāya* to arrive at the conclusion that the *Brahmasiddhānta* could not have been composed earlier than Śāka 743. The statement in question is

प्रमाथी प्रथमं वर्षं सौरं कल्पस्य सर्वदा ॥ I. 37

By an ingenious argument Dikshīt considers the epoch when *pramāthī* could be the first solar year and draws the above conclusion. By the same method the latest year of composition could not be later than 827 Śāka.

" Dikshīt also indicates, in the same place, that the composition must be after the five *siddhāntas* of the *Pancasiddhāntikā*. This is clear from a reference to the five in the first *Adhyāya*. Since, however, most of these five have a later version and since a number of verses in our *Brahmasiddhānta* are identical with the modern S.S., the conclusion may safely be

drawn that the Brh. was composed after the modern S.S. Dikshit is of the opinion that even the modern S.S. could be pre-varāhamihira.

No other evidence, internal or external, is available to fix more precisely the date of this work. It is a peculiar feature of this work that while there are repeated references to legendary authors no historical author is mentioned anywhere in the book. This only adds to the difficulty of deciding upon the date of the work. Nor is this difficulty mitigated when one observes that the only later author who mentions the name Śākalya is Kamalākara who belongs to the 16th century of the Śāka era !

If a treatise has a commentary a major limit can be put on the date of the work provided, of course, the commentator gives his own date. An illustration is the case of Bhattotpala who gives the date of his commentary to the *Brhatsamhitā* as 888 Śāka. Thus 888 is the major limit to the date of the Br. S. The nearer the date of the commentator is to the author the closer is this major limit. But the Brh. has no commentary. Amongst the legendary *Siadhāntas* commentaries exist only for the S.S. and the *Somasiddhānta*.

Out of the eight *Siddhāntas* which constitute the eight *prāśnas* of *Śākalyasamhitā* three do not exist as at present. These are the works of Puliśa, Garga and Brhaspati. The work of Puliśa is known only to the extent it is treated by Varāhamihira in the *Pancasiddhāntikā*. No *Paulīśasiddhānta* as such exists today. Incomplete manuscripts under different titles like, *Gargasamhitā*, *Brhadgargasamhitā*, *Gargasamhitā-jyotiṣa* etc. are known to exist in some libraries but no complete manuscript has so far been discovered.

All the remaining five *siddhāntas* are known today, though, evidently, not in the form in which they may have existed in very ancient times.

Now, all these five *siddhāntas* have a common feature viz. that they are presented as being told by some revered preceptor to a disciple. The following table will make this clear :—

Siddhānta	Preceptor	Disciple
1. Sūrya	Sūrya	Maya
2. Brahma	Brahma	Nārada
3. Soma	Candra	Śaunaka
4. Vasiṣṭha	Vasiṣṭha	Māndavya
5. Romaśa	Viṣṇu	Vasiṣṭha & Romaśa

It is difficult to say if any clear cut conclusion could be drawn from this observation. One may venture a guess that perhaps all these five siddhāntas were composed at a time when it was the fashion to present them as a *Samvāda* between a teacher and a pupil. They may have been composed at more or less the same time.

Analysis of the subjects dealt within each chapter.

A peculiar characteristic of this *Brahmasiddhānta*, which considerably reduces its value as a scientific treatise, is that there is a considerable mixing up of subject matter treated in the different *Adhyāyas*. This fact has been considered very well by Dikshit (p.188) in his discussion of the Brh. To quote him—

“This text does not have chapters with titles like Madhyamādhikāra, Spāṣṭādhikāra, etc as other siddhāntas have. Every chapter contains something from different Adhikāras. The six chapters cover mostly all subjects. What is more, religious matters which are not astronomy are also given.”

A neat summary of the nature of the contents.

It is not surprising, then, that the *Adhyāyas* of the Brh. do not have any titles but just end as *Adhyāya* number so and so. I find, however, that in the Bibliography the titles of the *Adhyāyas* are included. They are as follows :—

Adhyaya	Title
I	<i>Kāla-nirupaṇa</i>
II	<i>Grahāṇām ucca-nīca sthānakathanam</i>
III	<i>Tithi-nakṣatrādinirupaṇa</i>
IV	<i>Grahodayāstādi-nirupaṇa</i>
V	<i>Grahasamāgamayuddhādi-nirupaṇa</i>
VI	<i>Chedyakādi-nirupaṇa</i>

I did not find these titles in any of the manuscripts I used. Since, however, a large number of manuscripts of this work are available and since I used only eight of them, it is possible in some of the manuscripts I have not seen that these titles are to be found. From what has been said above the titles are in any case but rough indications of the material covered by the *Adhyāya*.

We may now consider in some detail the contents of the *Adhyāyas* one by one.

Adhyāya I—(III Slokas)—

Adhyāya I begins with an appeal by Nārada to Brahma in which the latter is asked to give detailed information about heavenly bodies. Brahma agrees and explains how *jyotiṣa* is one of the six limbs (*Aṅga*) of the *Vedapuruṣa*, claiming it to be the main *Aṅga*. He then goes on to describe the sources of the science of astronomy (I/9); and it is here, that, for the first time, we read the names of the eight authors whose works are later called the eight *prāśnas* of the *Sākalyasamhitā*. This is followed by a number of verses which normally constitute the *Madhyamādhikārā* of any astronomical work and covers definitions and values of *kāla*, *varṣa*, *yoga*, *manu*, *kalpa*, the revolutions of planets in a *yuga*, *ahargana* etc.

Subjects like *ṣaḍaśṭimukha* which the S.S. deals with in Ch. XIV under the title of *Mānādhyāya* are included in the first *Adhyāya* of the Brh. These *ślokas* are, in fact, identical in the two *siddhāntas*.

Reference has already been made to some additional *ślokas* discovered in S. in continuation of *Adhyāya* I of other mss. It is quite possible that this continuation may really be the beginning of *Adhyāya* II. (There is a note in English at this point in my copy of S. which says, "Here I.G.L.C. (?) marks the end of I *Adhyāya*. In any case, the discussion about *Jyāpiṇḍa* and *Jyārdhapīṇḍa*, which in the S.S. is included in *Adhyāya* II, starts here in the first *Adhyāya* and continues in the additional *ślokas*. Other contents of this part have already been referred to earlier.

Adhyāya II (259 ślokas)

The early *ślokas* of this *Adhyāya* deserve the title *Grahāṇām-uccanicaśthāna Kathanam*, inasmuch as they deal with *manda*, *śighra*, *ucca*, *nīca*, *pāta* etc. which form the proper subject of *Spaṣṭādhikāra* and is the second *Adhyāya* in most treatises.

A large number of *ślokas* in this *Adhyāya* are utilised to explain the causes of difference between a *spaṣṭagraha* and a *madhyagraha*, the causes of *manda* and *śighra* of the planets, whether it is to be explained as due to *pravaha* (*māhavāyu*) or *upagraha*, some attempt is made to explain what constitutes an *upagraha*. If, however, one uses the dictionary meaning of the word *upagraha* as a "presiding spirit which directs a planet's motion" there is not much to choose between *Māhavāyu* and *upagraha*.

A common subject in astronomical treatises is '*Viṣkambha*' i.e. the diameter either of the disc of a planet or of its orbit. This subject also forms part of the second chapter though in a treatise like the S.S. it is included in the fourth and seventh chapters.

Also found in this chapter are the polar longitudes (*dhruvas*) of the asterisms which in the S.S. form a subject of the eighth chapter. An additional variation with respect to the S.S. is that while the latter gives the *bhoga* i.e. the portion of the divisional asterism covered by the star in question, the Brh. gives directly the degrees of longitude. This data is followed by figures giving the number of stars in each asterism—a subject not touched at all by the S.S.

A few *ślokas* are used for indicating the symbols which stand for the different asterism, e.g. a horse represents *Aśvinī*, a wheeled cart *Rohiṇī*, antelope head *Mṛgaśīras*; etc., etc.

The latitudes of the asterisms are also given in this chapter. In the S.S. of course, they occur in the eighth chapter.

Also included here are the coordinates of some stars other than the asterisms viz. *Agastya*, *Mṛgavyāḍha*, *Agni*, *Brahmahṛdaya*, *Prajāpati*, *Apamvatsa*, and *Āpa*. The coordinates are the same as given by the S.S. the *ślokas* are highly similar, but not identical.

Curiously enough Burgess in the translation of the S.S. remarks that the last three stars, of the above seven, are not mentioned in the *Sākalyasamhitā*; The preceding paragraph clearly shows that they are.

It will be seen, thus, that most of the subjects that constitute the eighth chapter of S.S. are included, in the second chapter of the present *siddhānta*.

This chapter also includes, what must be considered, the most remarkable feature of the Brh. viz. reference to the motion of the Saptarṣis and their coordinates. This subject has already been touched upon earlier.

The chapter ends with several *ślokas* on the construction of a kind of *Golayantra* and a discussion on the measurement of coordinates.

Adhyāya III (172 slokas)

The first few *ślokas* of this *Adhyāya* describe the meaning of *yoga* and *karaṇa* and how to calculate them. The rest of the *Adhyāya* is

devoted entirely to a discussion of religious observances like fasts and funeral rites (*śrāddha*); auspicious or inauspicious times for these observances, conventions regarding the counting of lunar *tithis* as may be useful for reading a *pañcāṅga* etc. An *adhyāya* in 170 śloka entirely out of place in an astronomical work ! Subjects like this may well be included in a *samhita* but they have no place in a *siddhānta*.

Adhyāya IV (121½ ślokas)

This *Adhyāya* is again a mixed one treating of many subjects which generally form independent chapters in most treatises. Thus it deals with *Udayāsta* (Chapter IX of S.S.), the phases of the moon, of which some explanation is attempted including the purāṇic story of the curse of Dakṣa; some instructions for setting up an observatory (Chapt. XIII of S.S.) and for the construction of an astronomical instrument called *Kapālayantra* for the measurement of time. There is just a reference to *Śṅgonnati* (which again forms a separate chapter in S.S.) but hardly any discussion about it.

Adhyāya V (83 ślokas)

This *adhyāya* provides a refreshing change from the confusing and sometimes irrelevant contents of most of the earlier ones. It deals with *Samāgama* and *Yuddha* of the planets. Subjects like *Rohinīśakāṭabheda* and eclipses are also included in this chapter. This is not inconsistent. A very good account of *Chāḍya*, *chāḍaka* and eclipses is given. Older notions are tested and rejected. One comes across some very highly sensible and logical remarks. Thus, after explaining what *yuddha* is we find the following very profound statement :

जगतः कल्पनैवेयं भावाभावाय केवलम् ।
अन्योन्यमतिदूरस्थाः कथं युद्धं प्रकुर्वते ॥॥

Again after ascribing eclipses to the traditional agents Rāhu and Ketu the author finally declares :

शीघ्रगामी शशी सूर्यं छायां पश्चिमतोऽपि वा ।
प्रागेत्यतीत्य तत्पश्चाद् ग्रहणं भास्करस्य हि ॥

It is not my contention that the notions of the author in the above two verses are original. They were probably well known at the time of Aryabhaṭa and Varāhamihira.

Adhyāya VI (155 ślokas)

This small *adhyāya* deals with the same subject as is covered by the sixth *adhyāya* of S.S. which latter has the title '*Chedyakādhikārah*', i.e. projection of eclipses. The treatment is similar, a few *ślokas* being identically the same.

Note : The following abbreviations have been used in the above :

Br. h= Brahmasiddhānta

Br. s.= Br̥hatsamhita

S.S. = Suryasiddhānta

ROLE OF MĪMĀMSĀ IN THE MODERN WORLD

Pt. K. Srinivasachari

The Mimāmsā Sutra of Jaimini seek to investigate the proper meaning of the several disputed passages occurring in the Karma-Kānda of the Vedas. A study of these sūtras is instructive in many ways. Among other things, the student of Mimāmsā Śāstra is impressed by the bold and original character of Jaimini's teaching. Besides, both Jaimini's method of interpretation and his conclusions are refreshingly non-sectarian and modern.

The Vedas are interpreted in different ways by different Ācāryas. Jaimini attempts rationally to discover their real teaching. It is recognised on all hands that the rules (nyāyas) he has framed for a consistent interpretation of the Vedas are reasonable and sound. The Mimāmsā rules of interpretation though originally laid down for enabling one to interpret the vedic texts in a consistent and systematic manner have in later times been used to interpret any work of importance, particularly works pertaining to the Vedānta and Dharma Śāstras. That is why advocates of widely different systems of thought such as Vedānta, Nyaya etc., quote these rules in support of their varying views; and no wonder Venkatadhwari in his Viśvagunādarśa pays an eloquent tribute to the absolutely binding nature of Jaimini's rules.

नैयायिकावा यदि शाब्दिकावा त्रयीशिरस्सु श्रमशालिनो वा ।
वादाहवे बिभ्रति जैमिनीय न्यायोपरोधेसति मौनमुद्राम् ॥

If a position taken is shown to contradict any of Jaimini's rules, the upholder of that view has to own defeat whether he be a Vedāntin, Naiyāka or Vaiyākaraṇa.

Though Jaimini was not the first to inquire into the meaning of the Vedas, as is evident from the names of ṛṣis (1) whose views he

1. The Mimāmsa Sutras refer to the following ṛṣis,

- (1) Bādarāyaṇa, (2) Bādari, (3) Aitiśāyaṇa, (4) Kārṣyājani,
(5) Ātreya, (6) Āśmarathya, (7) Kāmukāyaṇa, (8) Lāvukāyaṇa,
(9) Ālekhana.

quotes, he was certainly the first to present to the world a systematic work expounding the principles according to which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted. In all probability, his work must have inspired Bādarāyaṇa to attempt an exposition of the teaching of the jñāna-kānda of the Vedas. For we find the latter alluding to several of the conclusions arrived at by Jaimini. Even if the traditional view that Jaimini was the pupil of Bādarāyaṇa is correct, there is nothing strange or improper in a teacher referring to the views of his renowned pupil. The fact that Bādarāyaṇa's name is mentioned in Jaimini's work may not prove that Jaimini might after all have followed Bādarāyaṇa's example. For Jaimini makes no mention of the conclusions reached and set forth by Bādarāyaṇa in his Vedānta Sūtras. On the other hand, Bādarāyaṇa refers to the conclusions arrived at in Jaimini's work(2). These facts will lead to the conclusion that Jaimini must have been familiar with the views of Bādarāyaṇa as with those of many others and that at the time the Mīmāṃsa Sūtras were written the Vedānta Sūtras were not in existence. The latter work must have been a subsequent production.

Pāṇini has employed certain ordinary terms in a fixed technical sense in his works.(3) Other śāstrakāras have also followed him in this matter. This practice of using technical expressions by arbitrarily fixing an unusual meaning to terms needlessly enhances the difficulties of the study of the Sāstra. Jaimini was quite content to use terms in their generally accepted meaning. In this respect, he stands distinct from other sūtrakāras. Śabara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa have highly commended this practice. (3a)

The interpretation of the Vedas is a task of no mean difficulty. The Vedas abound in statements which are (1) puerile (such as वायुर्वैक्षेपिष्ठा देवता Vāyu is a quickly moving deity, अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषजम् The fire is an

-
2. Brahma Sūtras III. 3. 33 and 50 containing the word तदुक्तम् refer respectively to Mīmāṃsa Sūtras III 3. 9 and II 3. 3.
 3. Ordinary expressions such as vridhhi, guna etc., which mean respectively growth and quality are used by Pāṇini in a peculiar sense. Vridhhi means for him the letters आ, ऐ, औ guna refers to the letters अ, ऐ, ओ
 3. a लोकेष्वर्थेषु प्रसिद्धानिपदानि तानि सति सम्भवेनदर्शान्येवमूत्रेणित्यवगन्तव्यम् (शा० भा) सूत्रकारप्रशंसावा लोक इत्यादिनोच्यते । प्रसिद्धैरभिधानाद्धि नशिष्याः क्लेशितायतः ॥ (श्लो० वा)

antidote to dew); (ii) self-contradictory (such as कोहिलद्वेदयद्गुप्तिन् लोकोस्ति वानवा who knows if there is another world) and (iii) in conflict with the evidence of the senses (such as, धूमएवाग्नेर्दिवाददृशे नाक्षिः during day time we only perceive smoke and not fire.) (4) Jaimini discusses the question whether these Vedic passages are really puerile and comes to the conclusion that they are not futile or self-contradictory or faulty. He is the first to point out that these passages are intended to create in our minds a positive desire for such actions as have been prescribed by praising them, and create an aversion for those that have been prohibited by condemning them. (5)

The description that Vāyu is a quickly moving deity really emphasises the importance of Vāyavyāyāga by drawing attention to the fact that Vāyu being a rapidly moving deity, the performer of this sacrifice is sure to get its fruit speedily. Again the passage that we do not know for certain if there is another world does not convey any doubt concerning the existence of paraloka—its existence is affirmed in the Vedas—but asserts that in connection with jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice the place known as prāgvamśa śalā should be provided with windows. It is part of prudence not to forego immediate advantages in the hope of reaping some future reward. After all we may or may not reap the benefits of the sacrifice in another world, but we are sure to be affected by smoke here and now if we neglect to provide the sacrificial place with windows. (6)

The passage that during day time smoke alone is perceived and not fire shows that in performing prātarhoma the proper mantra to be uttered is the ṛk 'suryojyotih etc' and not 'agnirjyotih etc.' As Agni is said to reach Surya during day time, he becomes invisible and hence the inappropriateness of the mantra addressed to him in the homa performed in the morning. Here the question is 'Is Agni really invisible during day time ?' The answer suggested is that it is not clearly

4. शास्त्रदृष्ट विरोधाच्च I. 2. 1.

5. विधिनात्वेक वाक्यत्वात्स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनांस्युः I. 2. 7.

Some arthavādas are said to discharge certain functions over and above that of praising or blaming some actions, Vide Tadaṣṭa-sankhyādhikaraṇa, Rātrisatrādhikaraṇa, etc.

6. आकालिकेप्सा 1.2.12

perceptible during day time; it is clearly perceived only during nights. (7) Thus the apparent meaning of some of the Vedic texts gives no clue at all to their inner significance and does not convey their real purport. Hence Jaimini says that we ought not to be carried away by their mere outward meaning but ought to probe deeper into their inner significance. This is a very important principle of interpretation and rightly its applications has been extended to other branches of literature. (8) Jaimini's interpretative approach as distinct from grammatical literalness is quite modern.

We may see a few illustrations. There are obvious difficulties in interpreting statements such as, बबरः प्रावाहणिरकामयत in a literal sense. If the instance cited is taken to mean that 'Babara, the son of Pravāhana desired', it will follow that the Vedas must have been composed after the time of Babara. This cuts at the anāditya of the Veda. Jaimini's interpretation of such passages is very interesting and may be philologically important. The expression Babara is taken by him to mean the whistling wind, for from the burring sound made by the violent wind it can well secure that name and Pravāhana is taken to mean that which pushes forward. (9) Following this lead Kumārila explains away with equal skill and insight many difficulties met with in the Purāṇas.

In the performance of the prescribed karmas, the different mantras, it is held, help to remind us of the several actions and objects associated therewith. The presence of such apparently meaningless mantras such as, सृष्येव जर्करी तुर्करीतु may however, appear, to shatter this view. Consistently with his view Jaimini cannot accept this mantra to be meaningless. He holds that here also the mantra must refer to certain sacrificial objects and acts; only we do not know what these are. He has the frankness to tell us that he does not know them. Herein lies the supreme greatness of Jaimini. This reveals the genuinely scientific nature of Jaimini's attitude. Our ignorance of the meaning of several mantras ought not to lead us to reject them as valueless.

7. दूर भूयस्त्वात् I.2.12

8. सर्वोपाख्यानेषु च तात्पर्यं सति श्रावयेदिति विश्लेषानर्थक्यात्कथंचिद्गम्यमानं स्तुति निन्दापरिग्रहः तत्परत्वाच्चोपाख्यानेषु नातीव नन्वाभिनिवेशः कार्यः.

तन्त्र. वा. P.116

9. परन्तु स्तुति सामान्यमात्रम्. I.1.31

On the other hand, one ought to endeavour to the utmost of his abilities to get at their import. (10) Hence Jaimini figures eminently modern.

That Jaimini has no caste-prejudice may easily be proved, To take only one instance. The Vedic passage रथकारोऽग्नीनादधीत enjoins a particular duty, ādhāna Karma, on the Rathakāra. The question here is 'Is the Rathakāra here referred to a dvija or non-dvija?' He cannot accept the latter view for the members of the fourth class are prevented from studying the Veda and naturally they cannot perform the Vedic karma. Probably, this consideration may have induced Apastamba to take Rathakāra as a member of any one of the first three classes engaged in building chariots. (11) Jaimini does not allow himself to be bound down by the shackles of caste; he does not speak for any caste and has therefore no need to twist the text. He takes the term Rathakāra in its usual sense of a member of the fourth class. The member of the first three classes are not to engage in the mechanical arts. (12) Secondly, the expression rbhunāmtvā occurring in the mantra relating to ādhānakarma refers only to the saudhanvana caste (13), that is, the Rathakāra caste and this falls outside the pale of the first three varṇas. It is against all accepted canons of textual interpretation to discard the obvious meaning of a passage in favour of another to suit accepted conventions. Thus, when the Vedic passage is definitely known to expect the rathakāra to perform a certain karma, (14) it would hardly be fair to explain it differently in order to respect the convention that dvijas alone are allowed to carry on Vedic studies and perform sacrifices. The reasonable course would be to admit that the Rathakāra can study that portion of the Veda which relates to his duty.

10. सतः परमविज्ञानम् I.2.41.

11. ये त्रयाणां वर्णानामेतत्कर्म कुर्यु स्तेषामेषकालः. (आ. श्रौ. सू.)

Rudradatta comments as follows :—

त्रिषु वर्णेष्वन्तर्भूता एव स्ववृत्ति कश्चिन्ना ये रथं कुर्वन्ति तेषामयमाधानकालः.

12. अकर्मत्वात्तु नैवं स्यात् VI.1.46

13. सौधन्वनास्तु हीनत्वान्मन्त्रवर्णात्प्रतीयेरन्. VI. 1.50.

14. वचनाद्रथकारस्याधानेस्य सर्वशेषत्वात्

A similar difficulty arises in regard to the interpretation of the scriptural text *एतदग्निं स्रग्धरं यजन्तः*. The sacrifice mentioned here refers to the hunter-chief. Is he a hunter by birth or a dvija ? Jaimini, consistently with his position, accepts the first view, on the ground that it is the most natural and understands the term *Niṣāda sthapatih* as a *karmadhāraya* compound (*niṣādhaśāsana sthapatīśca*). (15) Any other interpretation would do violence to the text and would be far-fetched. If it is taken as a *tatpuruṣa* compound, it will have to be interpreted with the aid of *lakṣaṇa* which involves *gaurava*. In all cases, a simple and natural meaning is preferable to a figurative interpretation. Hence Jaimini thinks that the sacrifice in question is enjoined on the chief among the huntsmen. The appropriateness of this view is evident, for, the *dakṣiṇā* to be offered at this sacrifice is the hunter's net. (16)

Thus Jaimini admits that certain sections of the fourth *varṇa* such as *Rathakāra* and *Niṣāda* are entitled to perform some Vedic rites; but at the same time his general position is that the members of the last class are not expected to perform *vedic-karmanas*, for the obvious reason that they do not possess the two essential qualifications for performing sacrifices, viz., *Agni* and *Vidya*. (17) Does this not argue sectarian bias on his part ? To say that they are not to perform these ceremonies, because they have not the prescribed qualifications, does not mean that they are assigned an inferior status. For Jaimini says that the *Brāhmins* ought not to perform the *Rājāsūya-sacrifice* (18) and that the *kṣatriya* and *Vaiśya* are not to perform the *Satra-yāga* (19) and that the *Devas* ought not to perform any sacrifice. Certainly this cannot be understood as marking off certain sections as inferior to others. This non-sectarian attitude of Jaimini which makes him allow specific rights in the Vedas to all 'varṇas' is something strikingly modern.

15. *एतदग्निं स्रग्धरं यजन्तः* सामर्थ्यात्. VI.1.51.
16. कृष्टं दक्षिणा.
17. निर्देशाद्वाक्याणां स्वादप्यग्नेवेत्यमन्त्रव्यः कर्तुं ब्राह्मणं श्रुतिगिन्यावेयः VI.1.26
अपि वा वेद निर्देशादप्यग्नेवाणां प्रतीयेन. VI.1.33
18. अवेष्टौ यज्ञ संयोगात्कर्तुप्रधानमुच्यते. II.3.3
19. ब्राह्मणानां वेतरयोरातिव्याभावात्. VI.6.18

Sacrifices require a multitude of accessories and articles which could not be produced by poor people. It would therefore appear that only richmen are to perform them. But Jaimini thought that many people would take shelter under this and neglect their sacrificial duty. No man can be absolutely poor all the time. (20) Just as poor men strive hard to earn a living, even so they ought to work hard to secure the means necessary for discharging their religious duties. Person: who are crippled and maimed ought to take the necessary steps to set right their defects. (21) Unless a person is completely incapacitated he must try to discharge his duties. (22) Thus Jaimini preaches the gospel of purposeful action.

Jaimini was singularly tolerant and impartial. In interpreting the Vedas he would not accept certain views merely because they were current among the Aryans; nor would he reject certain views for the simple reason that they were put forward by non-Aryans (mlecchas). The Aryans on account of their deep and abiding interest in dharma, whose exact nature can only be gathered from śabda, were zealously preserving the traditional meaning of śabda. Hence in the event of a conflict between the Aryan and non-Aryan interpretation of śabda Aryan interpretation would quite naturally be preferred to the other. Jaimini would abandon even Aryan view if it conflicts with the Śāstras; and accept the non-Aryan views in all cases where the Aryans were not acquainted with the meaning of Vedic expressions. (23) The non-Aryan view is not taboo merely because it is non-Aryan. 'Pika', 'Nema' and 'Tāmarasa' for instance, are accepted by Jaimini in their Non-Aryan connotation.

Just as Jaimini does not hold that among the four castes any one is superior to the rest, he does not consider that women are inferior in status to men. It is interesting to note that Jaimini's views regarding

20. अनित्यत्वात्तुनैवं स्यादर्थान् द्वय संयोगः. VI.1.40.

21. अङ्गहीनश्च तद्धर्मा. VI.1.41

22. उत्पत्तौनित्यसंयोगात्. VI.1.42.

23. चोदितन्तु प्रतीयेताविरोधात्प्रमाणेन. I.3.

The Aryans were not acquainted with the meaning of words such as—pika, nema, and tāmarasa and they had to accept the meaning of these words as current among non-Aryans.

the rights of women would do credit to any modern reformer. He dismissed Aitisāyana's view that women are not entitled to perform sacrifices. Here he has Bādarāyana on his side. (24) It may be asked how women can perform vedic rites, which obviously involve much expenditure, when they have no property of their own? As we are often told that at the time of marriage they are purchased from their parents, they could have no independent right of their own. (25) Jaimini's reply to this objection is that women have a right to their husband's property, and that the practice of presenting cows, chariots, etc., at the time of marriage will not amount to purchasing them. (26) The śāstras explicitly declare that the husband along with his wife has to seek the four puruṣārthas and that the fruits of sacrifices are shared in common. Whenever a sacrificer gives away some of his possessions as offering to a deity saying 'This is no longer mine', his wife also has to repeat, 'This is no longer mine'. This clearly indicates that the wife has a right to her husband's property. (27) Besides this she can have property of her own. Equally modern is Jaimini's views on the rights of a king.

Even the question of the extent to which the king may be said to have rights over his kingdom received Jaimini's attention. The performer of the Visvajit-sacrifice has to offer his entire property as dakṣiṇa. When a monarch performs it, is he to give away the whole country which he rules? Jaimini thought that the subjects had certain inalienable rights in the country, that the king was only entitled to receive a certain percentage of the produce as tax, and that as his rights over the kingdom were by no means absolute, (28) he could not give it away.

Jaimini's definition of the method of reaching truth has been shown by his followers as the five aṅgas of 'Adhikarana'—Viśaya, Sandeha, Pūrvapakṣa, Siddhānta and Prayojana. This way of dealing with a

24. जातितु बादरायणोऽविशेषात्तस्मान्त्रयपि प्रतीयेत जात्यर्थस्याविशिष्टत्वात्. VI.1.8.
25. ऋषिकृषाग्रामद्रव्यत्वंस्त्रीणां द्रव्यैस्समानयोगित्वात्. VI.1.10.
26. ऋयस्य धर्ममात्रत्वम्. VI.1.15.
27. स्ववत्तामपि दर्शयति. VI.1.16.
28. न भूमिस्स्यात्सर्वान्प्रति अविशिष्टत्वात्. VI.7.3.

problem on its own merits is quite modern and agrees with the procedure in courts of law today. It was after Jaimini that the name 'Adhikarnika' means 'Judge' and 'Adhikarana' means a court of law in Sanskrit. In conclusion it may be pointed out that Jaimini attempted the stupendous task of interpreting the Vedas and succeeded most eminently in that undertaking. This is an ample testimony to his intellectual powers and critical insight. An ardent devotee of truth he would not strain the text to suit conventions. His work bears the stamp of one who is courageous and independent and is completely free from sectarian bias. And in all these ways, Jaimini is modern and may well be a model for thinkers of today.

JAINA SANSKRIT LITERATURE AND MODERN PROBLEMS

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With the development of science and technology, the world has changed rapidly during the last two centuries. It is during these very centuries that Sanskrit ceased to be a natural medium of expression with the Jaina, as with the non-Jaina authors. It is, therefore, but natural that there is no direct mention of the modern problems in the Sanskrit literature of the Jainas. It would, however, be seen that the Sanskrit literature of the Jainas is not without relevance to modern times. It is true that the severe austerities, with which Jainism is generally associated, seem to be out-of-date, yet there are concepts, which are of more basic and universal significance, and which need to be reviewed in the light of modern society.

An attempt has been made to analyse the causes of the modern problems. It has been felt that the problems of modern society arise out of either of the following causes :

1. Scarcity
2. Injustice
3. Ignorance
4. Selfishness

Scarcity

Science tries to solve this problem in its own way by inventing tools for increasing production, by improving means of comforts and luxuries and by developing new means of fighting against the furies of nature.

As far as the science tries to solve this problem, we have to welcome it. At the same time, we should concede that there is an artificial scarcity, created by indulgence to such tendencies as hoarding and

profiteering nor only by individuals but by the nations also. Some of the nations do have an inclination for expansionism. Some of the nations make attempts for bringing smaller nations under their influence. The tendency to glorify a king who desires to conquer others' territory (vijigīṣu) is very old.

Thus the scarcity of natural resources become more acute on account of the struggle for wealth and power. It is on this aspect of the problem, that the Sanskrit literature of the Jainas has a great role to play. It teaches the motto of 'the lesser the possessions, the greater the happiness'. One should not be a slave of worldly objects. Possession is not so much of an asset as a liability. A life of race for possessions is to be replaced by a life of contemplation and contentment. However rich a society may be, an individual has to put some limitations on his possessions. This idea of self-imposed austerity is not to be confused either with a morbid sense of self-mortification or with a life of inertia and inactivity.

Injustice

The rule of the jungle prevails where justice fails. The bigger fish swallow the smaller ones. This is called matsyanyaya. This injustice prevails in individual as well as social and political life. As a result we have frustration in individual life and revolution and war at social and political level.

At the individual level, Jainism brings us the hope of justice in the form of doctrine of karman. The law of cause and effect works automatically and unfailingly in the sphere of ethics. We have, therefore, no reason to be frustrated. Nor can we escape the result of the wrongs done by us to others.

At the social level, Jainism teaches equality of all life. Opposition to casteism and racialism has been one of the main creeds of Jainism. In 897 A.Jinasena declared in clear terms that mankind is one community-manuṣya jātirekaiva (Adipurana, 38.45).

At the political level the creed of non-violence has the potentiality of wiping out the institution of war from the surface of earth. It may be noted that with the advancement of our capability to use deadly weapons, the world has to choose between the total destruction and non-violence. No other literature of the world has taught the virtue of non-violence so elaborately as the Jaina literature.

Ignorance

Though the modern man is generally well-informed, his problems seem to multiply rather than decrease. It is not an indication of something basically wrong with our understanding of the problems ?

Jainism teaches that all knowledge is relative and co-related and should be treated as such. Let us not assume the attitude of finality about our knowledge. Let us not think of a particular problem in isolation. Let us not adopt one-sided approach. The attitude of the Jainas is clearly laid down in an old verse which says that one who knows one thing in every respect knows every thing in every respect and one who knows everything in every respect, knows one thing in every respect.

eko bhāvahsarvathā yena jñātah
sarve bhāvāḥ sarvathā tena jñātah
sarve bhāvāḥ sarvathā yena jñātah
eko bhāvāḥ sarvathā tena jñātah.

This theory of relativity of knowledge is perhaps the most valuable contribution of the Jainas for the modern times. In these days of specialisation, we are more likely to forget the totality of life and treat different aspects of our knowledge in isolation. All knowledge should be inclusive of other branches of knowledge and not exclusive.

Selfishness

Selfishness cannot be overcome by mere moralisation but by self-realisation. Though all life is not one, as taught by the Vedānta, yet all life is identical in nature. Any ill-feeling, in fact, vitiates our moral structure first; it harms everybody else afterwards. To use an old simile of the Jaina literature, if a man beats another with a hot rod of iron, he will burn his own hands first before he can beat the other.

Self realisation in Jainism, means a clear concept of the self as distinct from the matter. Our baser instincts of anger, pride, hypocrisy and greed are deeply rooted in a confusion between the self and the matter, which is termed as non-self in Jainism.

Conclusion

There is a human side to all problems. It is here that the Jaina thinkers are relevant. Science and technology cannot help much in

this. Here arises the need for philosophy. From this point of view it can be said that there is hardly any problem, for which the Jaina literature does not offer a solution. It may, however, be noted here that Jainas have always distinguished between the essentials of philosophy and the social structure based on it, while being rigid for the former, they have adopted a liberal attitude towards the latter. The change in the social structure, therefore, does not affect their basic creed. Somadeva in 959 A.D. made the position clear when he declared that all such social customs, as are not in contradiction to the righteousness of the attitude or which do not vitiate the cardinal moral virtues, are to be observed by the Jainas :

sarva eva hi Jainānām

pramāno laukiko vidhih.

yatra samyaktva hānir na

yatra na vratadūṣaṇam.

(Yāśastilakacampu, 8.34.)

CONTRIBUTION OF SANSKRIT TO THE WORLD THOUGHT OF DHARMA

S. V. L. NARASIMHAM

Lord Sri Rama never earned even for his own happiness or for his wife's. He considered that the establishment, protection and living up to the ten principles of Dharma is very essential for the sustenance and survival of human society. Society in the days of Rāmāyana firmly believed that the practice of Dharma and Satya would bring in its wake every desirable happiness and that any lapse in the practice thereof would bring about untold misery.

(श्लो) “वृत्तिः, क्षमा, दमोऽस्तेयं, शौचमिन्द्रियनिग्रहः

धीः, विद्या, सत्यमक्रोधः दशकं धर्मं लक्षणम् ।”

Courage, patience, control of external senses, non-stealing, perfect purification, control of inner senses or mind, Intellect, knowledge, Truth, Lack of anger—all these ten principles constitute Dharma. Whenever Dharma is endangered, God Himself will take incarnation to protect the righteous, to destroy the wicked and to establish Dharma in the World. What is the contribution of the Rāmāyana to the World thought of Dharma.

Mandodari, Kowsalya, Hanumān and Jatāyu had occasions to dilate on Dharma and Adharma. Weeping at the corpse of her husband, Mandodari says :

(श्लो) “शुभकृत् शुभमान्नोति पापकृत् पापमश्नुते

विभीषणो सुखं प्राप्तः त्वं प्राप्तः पापमीदृशम् ।”

The good man gets good fortune. Misfortune greets the bad one. Vibhiṣana, has attained bliss and your lot is this unparalleled agony.

When Rama was firm in his resolve to proceed to the forest, Kowsalya says :

(श्लो) “यं पालयसि धर्मं त्वं धृत्या च, नियमेन च
सर्वै राघवशार्दूल धर्मस्त्वाम भिरक्षतु ।”

Dharma, which you have been practising steadfastly, may that alone afford you supreme protection.

Hanumān says to Rāvana :

(श्लो.) “प्राप्तं धर्मफलं तावत् भवता नात्रसंशयः ।
फलमस्याप्यधर्मस्य क्षिप्रमेव प्रपत्स्यसे ॥”

Without doubt you fully reaped the fruit of Dharma. Very soon you will reap the fruit of Adharma involved in clandestinely bringing away Sitā.

Jatāyu says to Rāvana :

“न हि दुष्टात्मानो आर्ये मा वसत्यलमचिरम्”

The Goddess of Wealth does not reside in the house of the wicked for long.

Sacrificing the throne, Rāma courted banishment into the forest lest his father should be guilty of breaking his promise to Kaikayī. Rāma says :

“उद्विजंते यथा सर्पात् नरादनृतवादिनः”

People turn away from a liar as from a serpent.

It is in this background of Dharma and Satya that Society flourished in the days of Rāmāyana.

KING AND PEOPLE : The kings were very kind to their subjects. Daśaratha loved his subjects as his own children.

“रामः परमो धर्मः शशास परया मुदा”

Eminently liberal, Rāma rules in an exquisitely pleasant manner.

(Sugreeva also ruled the Vānaras generously). Gentle and fondling, Sugreeva led the vānaras with every favour respecting their sentiment. If the Rulers were so kind to the subjects, the latter by their supreme devotion reciprocated adequately.

“द्रष्टुमशक्यमयोऽहम् नापिराजन्यभक्तिमान्”

It is impossible to find any person in Ayodhya without devotion to the King.

A person missing Rāma was considered a sinner. He even cursed himself. Hanumān tells Sitā : “We serve Sugreva with supreme devotion”. Hanumān is an ideal servant. Achieving his Lord’s object at any cost is his only aim. He does not expect any reward. This attitude of Hanumān reflects in general the utmost devotion to duty which prevailed then among servants who were adequately remunerated in time.

FATHER AND SON : Sons implicitly obeyed their fathers, while fathers loved their sons dearly. Seeta says :

“सपितृवचनं श्रीमान् अभिषेकान् परं प्रियम्”

To Rāma, his father’s word is dearer than his coronation itself. Rāma says :

“अस्वाधीनं कथं देवं प्राकारै रभिराध्यते ।

स्वाधीनं समतिक्रम्य मातरः पितरं गुहं ॥”

How could one worship elusive God leaving aside readily accessible and immediately pleased parents who would confer every blessing ? Daśaratha loved Rāma so much that he could not live even for a few days without him.

HUSBAND AND WIFE : Marital life was considered a sacred one, as depicted in the lives of Rāma and Sitā. Spouses were devoted to one another. Even death did not separate them. Rāma says to Sitā :

“प्राणेश्येति गरीयसि”

You are dearer to me than my own life. Without Sitā he would neither take food nor get sleep. Sitā herself pays him the compliment that he never evinced even the slightest interest in other women. He virtually ran mad when Rāvana carried her away. Hanumān says that having been denied her company, Rāma got so completely lost in her thoughts, that he would not drive away insects and reptiles which sat and crawled over his body. As for Sitā, even heaven without Rāma had no charm for her. The yogic interpretation reflects the craving of an aspirant-Jeevatman for the unification with Paramātman.

When Rāma dissuades her from going to the forest along with him, she tells him that in his company the forest with wild grass and thorns, would be smooth like cotton and deer's skin and that the so-called evil in the forest would turn good and wholesome. Husband's unique place is thus described. Anasīya says :

‘नानो निशिष्टं पश्यामि बांधवमीदृशं त्वहम्
सर्वत्र योग्यं वैदेहि तपः कृतमिवाव्ययम् ॥’

A wife has no relative superior to her husband. He is like inexhaustible penance. Sitā says :

“दीनोवा, राज्यहीनो वा, यो मे भर्ता समे गुरु :”

Sad or without Kingdom, my husband alone is my god.

Wives were not treated as slaves. When Rāma was about to leave for the forest, Vasīṣṭa says :

“आत्मा हि दारा स्सर्वोषां दारासंग्रहवर्तिनाम्
आत्मेयमिति रामस्य पालयिष्यति मेदिनीम्”

A wife is the very self of her husband. Being Rama himself, Sita would now rule the land. It was considered a gross sin to wound the feelings of a Pativrata. Mandodari weeping at the corpse of Rāvana says :

“पतिव्रतानां न अकस्मात् पतंत्यश्रूणि भूतले”

Tears don't roll down to the ground from the eyes of a Pativrata without foreboding some grave catastrophe.

BROTHERS : brothers, as a rule, never quarrelled. Ideal brotherhood probably is nowhere depicted better than in the lives of Rāma and Bharata. One vies with the other in calling to his aid subtle points from Dharma Śāstra to establish the other's claim to his father's throne, and to prove that he himself is not entitled to it! The very Devas were plunged in delight on hearing this argument of the brothers. Rāma says to Lakṣmaṇa :

“यद्विना भरतं त्वांच शत्रुघ्नं चापि मानद
भवेन्मम सुखं किञ्चित् भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा”

I abhor even an iota of happiness, falling to my lot, without you, Bharata and Śatrughna, sharing it. May fire reduce such happiness to ashes !

MINISTERS : Ministers and experts in administration were impartial and incorruptible, perfect and judicious in the matters of administration. If the time needed it, they punished their own sons. They did not harm even their enemies who were not at fault.

KINGS : The Kings adhered to the rule of law. Rāma says to Vāli :

“न वयं स्ववशे स्थिता :”

“We are not in our hands. We are in the hands of Dharma and bound by it”. The Kings were eminently Just. No one coveted another's wife. There was no liar or atheist. Having Rāma as their ideal, they never indulged in mutual quarrels. Harmony and contentment prevailed everywhere. Stress was on duty but not on rights.”

Wherever one went, he heard the chanting of Rāma's name and his stories. The entire world was pervaded, as it were, by Rāma. In Rāvana's Lanka also there was peace and plenty and orderly rule, with civilisation at its zenith due to the magnificent power and Tapas of Rāvana. But his cruel nature and his unrighteous way of life led to the ruin of himself and his kith and kin inspite of some short-lived spectacular prosperity. Thus in ancient days, we found that Rāma triumphed by adhering to Dharma and truth while Rāvana met with utter destruction due to his misdeeds. May virtue and truth triumph for ever as in the days of the Rāmāyana, in our present-day World with the same idealistic Cultural heritage.

CONCLUSION :

Even in the modern World, don't we find that our NARĀDHI-PA, our DEŚĀDHYAKṢA The Hon'ble Sri V. V. Giri, President, Republic of India, acted as a Dharma Samsthāpaka in Bangla Desh, without any idea of territorial aggrandisement? Isn't the magnanimous action of “Cease-fire” of our virtuous, glorious and victorious Prime Minister of India, Bhārata Ratna Smt. Indira Gandhiji really our substantial contribution to the World thought of Dharma in the modern World? Are we not thinking now that Indira's Dharma is not only India's Dharma in political, social and educational circles, but also that of the various prosperous

countries in the World for the successful accomplishment of noble, worthy and useful activities ?

I, therefore, once again thank our Government of India in general and the Union Ministry of Education and Social Welfare in particular for having organised this unique INTERNATIONAL SANSKRIT CONFERENCE, “VISWAJNĀNA YAJNA” for the first time, for the propagation and practice of the principles of Dharma in the World and also for having rendered this function in the annals of the World Sanskrit Conferences, an ever-enlightening and ever-exhilarating one.

SANSKRIT : A LIVING SOURCE LANGUAGE OF INDIA N. B. MARĀTHE

Sanskrit is a dead language is an oft-quoted statement. This statement is to be examined in proper light. When examining this statement, without entering into the clumsy definitions as to what is exactly meant by the dead language, one can simply illustrate the dead languages like Hittite, Mittite, Phoenician, Armenian etc. These languages are not at present in currency. No body speaks or writes in these languages at the present though literature is available in these languages. They were current sometime in the history. Scholars take up research work on these languages and findings are submitted to the readers but not through the medium of these languages. In other words they are not current. Is the same case true with Sanskrit language ? I am afraid, the case is not at all similar. The creative writings in Sanskrit of the last two decades may substantiate the argument that the sanskrit language is not at all dead but it is still a living language. Writings are still continued in this language.

To illustrate it through a few examples, it may be pointed out that the bibliography of current sanskrit publications, during the ten years (1958-67) period has recorded over 2300 titles published in India alone. It also claims that over thirty sanskrit periodicals are published regularly including two daily papers, disregarding their size, printing, get up, number of copies printed and the price etc. One will have to agree that this is not possible in a dead language.

To quote one or two more classic examples of modern epic in Sanskrit one has to quote recently published poetry in 11000 verses in three volumes namely 'Sritilakayaśornavaḥ'—composed by Ex-governor of Bihar, Late Śrīdhar Mādhav Aney, a great follower and lover of Lokamānya Bāl Gangādhār Tilak, a great patriot of early twentieth century, which may be treated as a creditable performance of modern age. Dr. J.B. Chaudhari's dramas which are enacted with great vigor and vitality is another classic example comparable to another constitutionally recognised Indian language. One may quote Sri S.B. Velankar's

originally written dramas in Sanskrit staged and enacted in Bombay by Brāhman Sabha. There are great extempore orators in Sanskrit. Their oratory can be witnessed in Sanskrit conferences held throughout the states in the Pandit conferences in India.

The establishment of Sanskrit Universities in India during post-independence era may be cited as another high land mark in the history of modern period. Apart from these special Sanskrit Universities like Sanskrita viśvavidyālaya, Varanasi, Lālbahadur śāstri Sanskṛta vidyāpītham at Delhi, Kāmeśvara Sanskrita viśvavidyālaya at Darbhanga, Raviśankar Sukla Samskṛtavidyāpītha at Raipur in Madhya Pradesh, there are innumerable institutions like, Bangiya Sanskrit śikṣā pariśad, Bhāratiya vidyabhavan, Tilaka Mahārāṣṭra Vidyāpītha, etc. University status institutions are trying to teach and take examinations in Sanskrit. Besides almost all recognised general Universities in India have their Sanskrit faculties. Moreover, the *toḥ* or Pāṭhaśāla system which was traditionally developed in India is still current in remote villages where the students go and reside in teacher's houses to learn their daily lessons.

The Sāhitya Akademi, which offers literary awards to the best writing in Indian literature, has as well bestowed literary awards for Sanskrit literature during these years.

A source language of India

It is not only a living language like any other Indian language but also it is a source language to the languages of the Indian continent. It is a well established fact that every language of Indian continent looks forward to Sanskrit vocabulary, stock of words, grammar etc. Not only the linguistic but the religious, philosophical and allied aspects are well connected and deeply rooted with Sanskritic studies. Our all traditional writings are only in Sanskrit. Since no scholar or research student, can afford to ignore the Sanskritic studies and march ahead in his studies, it is worth claiming that Sanskrit is not only a living language of India but also it is a source language of India too.

In this humble argument one point is to be cleared further that although there are more than 14 constitutionally recognised modern Indian languages, they cannot claim that they are source languages. It is the great privilege of Sanskrit only. It will be perhaps unnecessary to harp on this point with illustrations, because copious illustrations can be added on this point. Every educated person has to remain indebted to Sanskrit and studies available based on Sanskrit.

Not only Indian scholars but also foreign Indologists have recognised the impact of Indian thought perpetuated through the sanskritic studies in moulding the world thoughts. UNESCO Educational experts today are engaged in the study as to how best the ideals visualised by the Sages of Ancient India through the medium of Sanskrit, can be implemented.


Language of the elite

Another point may be cleared in this sequence is as to how Sanskrit could remain a living language during these two or three thousand years; historically speaking every language changes from place to place and at the end of every century. Either dialectical variations creep in or the stress and tones are affected. But these factors do not show much effect on the sanskrit language for the simple reason that it remained always in the hands of the elite. They tried to keep the purity of sanskrit language perhaps right from the time of Prātiśākhya.

What are Prātiśākhyas ? They are nothing but rules and regulations of each branch (= śākhā) of Vedas. They give clear-cut instructions as to how the words are to be pronounced, how they are to be joined (= samāsa), how the sounds like udātta, Anudātta, Svarita, or low, medium and high pitch tones to be kept (--- hrasva, dīrgha, pluta) intact in the language etc. These elaborate arrangements brought the Sanskrit studies to the same level through centuries after centuries. From Prātiśākhyas to Nāgeśabhaṭṭa of seventeenth century and from William Carey of early nineteenth century to the modern age of revival, Sanskrit remained only in the hands of these learned class of the society. No monarchical change has affected this traditional way of Sanskrit learning. It, therefore, remained intact through the generations. Whenever this method to learn the language properly was neglected its effects were obvious and we have on the record the hybrid Sanskrit in the hands of Buddhistic followers. Whenever Sanskrit went into the hands of masses, who little cared to keep its purity, it lost its classical charm.

The Inscriptional Sanskrit, for example, is often found not in the same orderly manner. It takes a new or different shape altogether. The Sanskrit in the hands of Jainas and Buddhistic scholars had taken another shape. These variations are due to the changing of hands. The classical purity could not be retained because these two offshoots never cared for the Hindu tradition to that extent as to keep the forms according to its tradition.

To conclude my points it may be summarised as follows : Sanskrit is not a dead language like Hittite or Mittite, it has its own healthy life, it serves as a source language to the Indian offshoot languages and culture, it remained in the hands of elite classes throughout the history. No monarchical change affected its cultivation; but it suffered in the hands of masses. Still its health is in a stage of improvement.



SANSKRIT VIS-A-VIS PROBLEMS OF MODERN CULTURE

Dr. Mahendra Kumar Varma

Sanskrit language and literature are primarily concerned with an ancient society. Hence many people naturally ask as to what is the utility of Sanskrit for the modern society and culture. It is possible to get answers to our modern problems by studying a language prevalent in the past society and culture ?

In my humble opinion, study of Sanskrit has a definite utility even for the modern society.

Sanskrit is the language of that society which is very ancient one and which covers a very vast period of time, having seen many ups and downs and faced variegated problems. Hence it is very useful to find out if any problem faced by us was faced by the Sanskrit-speaking people also and if there is any answer suggested by them.

As an example, we can take the problem of indiscipline, specially indiscipline among the young, faced by us. Young people have always been there in every society. So the Sanskrit-speaking society also had them. And sometimes or the other, the problem of indiscipline must have cropped up in the past as well.

Hence let us find out if a study of Sanskrit language and literature suggest any answer to this problem of indiscipline.

While making such a study, we come across the saying '*vidyā dadāti vinayam*'.

What is the aim of education ? The answer given in the aforesaid saying is that education imparts *vinaya*. Now, what is this *vinaya* ? *Vinaya* is generally translated as humility. It is formed from the root *vinī* meaning to lead in a special manner. Hence, in my opinion, *vinaya* means that quality which makes a man lead himself in a special manner. Thus I opine that *vinaya* should mean self-discipline.

I would like to explain it in this manner. Suppose, you are passing by the road and you see a stone lying just in the middle of the road. Now, if you are asked to remove the stone and you remove it at once this will be called discipline. But, if no one says anything to you and you yourself remove the stone, this will be called self-discipline, that is, *vinaya*.

So according to the Sanskrit dictum, *vinaya* (self-discipline) should be the aim of education. Because it is *vinaya* which should be the most coveted virtue of an educated youngman.

Discipline can be taught even to the un-educated persons, nay, even to the animals. But what is expected of an educated person is to behave properly in the society without being asked to do it.

Thus we find that in the Sanskrit-speaking society, self-discipline was the aim of education and the education was imparted in such a way that germs of indiscipline were gradually eradicated from the young people and when they finished their education, they came out as self-disciplined youngmen.

In the modern times, we find that education does very little to impart *vinaya* to our young people. Our education generally lays emphasis upon learning something either to earn money or to pass through an examination only. Such is the aim of education in the modern days.

So naturally not having known the importance of self-discipline, our youngmen fall an easy prey to indiscipline.

True, some attempt is made to teach discipline to youngmen by laying down hard and fast rules, by military-training etc.


But as the Sanskrit-speaking people rightly recognised, it is not discipline but self-discipline which is most important in a society. Because discipline teaches you to obey, and more often than not, to obey out of fear. So discipline may be quite all right in a martial organisation or in a society ruled by dictator or martial law.

But what is of prime importance in a democratic society or nation is self-discipline (*vinaya*). Because what type of that democratic nation be where police, military and courts rule supreme and people are not the masters of their own? And how long will it be possible to keep the people disciplined by police, military and courts? Once the administration breaks down, there is chaos. But if the people are

self-disciplined, they will behave properly and carry on their affairs in the right manner without fear or favour.

So the best remedy for indiscipline is to inculcate the spirit of *vinaya* (self-discipline) in the young people during the very years of their education, as is rightly suggested by the Sanskrit-dictum '*vidyā dadāti vinayam*'.

Thus I conclude that study of Sanskrit does quite often suggest answers to the problems of modern culture and can be definitely useful even to-day.



ROLE OF SANSKRIT IN THE MODERN WORLD

S.N. Sharma

Sanskrit, in India and in the wider world, can play a vital role to bring in peace, foster friendship by creating an atmosphere of understanding among nations through its high ideas and the ideals which the people of India have conceived and pursued during the past ages. It has in the past deeply influenced and effectively moulded the varied cultural patterns of millions upon millions of peoples. "If I was asked what is the greatest treasure that India possesses and what is her finest heritage, I would answer unhesitatingly, it is the Sanskrit language and literature and all this contains. This is a magnificent inheritance, and so long as this endures and influences the life of our people, so long will the basic genius of India continue. Apart from its being a treasure of the past, it is to an astonishing degree for so ancient a language, a living tradition¹". In the words of William Jones, Sanskrit is "more perfect than Greek, more copious than Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either".

Being the repository of a mass of literature which has given expression to the intellect and the spirit of India in her progressive march through great creative ages, it is a veritable mirror of Indian civilisation and culture, and as such can serve as a powerful medium to the peoples of the world to get together, with its message of Ahimsā (non-violence), Satya (truthfulness), Asteya (non-stealing), Śauca (purity), Indriyanigraha (controlling the senses) Kṣamā (forgiveness and tolerance) and above all, the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

Prof. Max Muller speaks of the Upaniṣads thus². "They are, in the true sense of the word, guesses at truth, frequently contradicting each other, yet all tending in one direction. The key-note of the old Upaniṣads is "know thy self". The "know thy self" of the upaniṣad

1. Shri Jawahar Lal Nehru, "Hindu" dated 13-2-1949.
2. Origin and Growth of Religion PP. 317-8.

means know thy true self that which underlies Ego, and find it and know it the highest, the eternal self, the one without a second, which underlies the whole World." No language of the world other than Sanskrit contains literature which with supreme confidence and faith declares to man "thou art that" तत्त्वमसि. It is here that we have a marvellous phrase for mankind अमृतस्य पुत्राः Children of immortality. This spiritual lore is our strength. Herein lies the distinctive glory of India.

In the face of the menace of the nuclear arms, and the troubled circumstances full of unrest and the mutual distrust in the world, these texts can prove very helpful in easing tension and giving delight by providing spiritual splendour to the mankind. "Sanskritists, historians, philosophers, religionists all who are interested in India's past and concerned about India's future may find here something of what each is already seeking in his separate line"³ - A.A. Macdonell remarks: "They do not aim at securing earthly and afterwards heavenly bliss in the abode of Yama by sacrificing correctly to the gods, but at obtaining deliverance from mundane existence by the absorption of the individual soul in the world-soul through correct knowledge. Here, therefore, ritual appears as useless and saving knowledge as all-important. "And then there is the concept of the family of man, the unity of man, वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्, a concept that cuts across all barriers of caste and creed religion and nationality, race or political ideology ; a vision that unites mankind into a single family. Because of this ancient spiritual lore, India excels any other country in the world.

Sanskrit has never been confined to India alone. It has accepted the best from every direction. आनी सद्वाः ऋतवो यन्तु विश्वतः 'Let noble thoughts come to us from every side'. Sanskrit literature is thus rich in religion, philosophy, law, linguistics, aesthetics, fine arts, positive and technical sciences, gnomic and didactic verses and belle letters. Due to its quality and quantity, this language is important not only for the people of India but for the entire mankind. Wherever Hinduism or Buddhism has gone in the past ages, Sanskrit has been the major vehicle for carrying the message of its ideals.

The study of Sanskrit involving the rigorous dialectics of its grammar and different systems of philosophy forms an intellectual discipline of the highest order. Most resonant and musical in character,

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3. Hume, Vide introduction to the Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads. P. 71.
 4. India's Past. P. 47.

Sanskrit makes a never-failing appeal to the deeper aesthetic sensibility of one and all. This language is not merely a classical language just enshrining the ancient Indian literature, but is of much greater significance, as it is an instrument of the greatest precision in the depiction of all thought-processes, however deep and subtle. It has the power to lift us above ourselves, which is one of its most subtle aesthetic and dynamic appeals.

In Sanskrit, the intellect of India found its culmination ; it has been and still is a source of sap and sustenance for the many Indian languages.

In the present age, what man needs is wisdom and a new vision. Sanskrit has given such a vision—the vision of the divinity of man. Every human being carries with him a spark of divinity, a spark of unique potentiality. It is for us to realise that vision and act upto it to create understanding among the warring nations, races and political ideologies.

Let us hope that Sanskrit may play a vital role to usher in an era of co-operation and co-existence and help bring peace to the misery-stricken people who, otherwise are materially well off. Sanskrit can claim to play a vital part in promoting and maintaining this unity, for, its importance had been only religious and cultural, not political. It has a message of good wishes for one and all :—

सर्वे भवन्तु सुखिनः सर्वे सन्तु निरामयाः ।

सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु मा कश्चिद् दुःखभाग्भवेत् ॥

May happiness come to all,
With freedom from disease !
May all see the best of life,
And from misery release !!

“LEGAL & JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ANCIENT INDIA”

Mrs. Kamlesh Prasad M. A. B. L.

The purpose of my talk is to tell you about the origin of law practiced by the people in ancient India and also to show to you that in ancient India the nature of disputes between citizens was remarkably similar to those which occupy the law courts today, that disputes were decided essentially in accordance with the same principles of equity and fair play which are the basis of judicial process in our time; that the rules of procedure and evidence were not very different from those followed today; that the trial consisted of the same four stages of complaints, reply, hearing and decision; that the judiciary consisted of a hierarchy of judges with the court of the Chief Justice (Prāḍ-Vivāka) at the top, each higher court being invested with the power to set aside the decision of the court below and the problem of arriving at the truth was as real then as now.

The Hindu law, according to the Hindu belief, is of divine origin, being derived from the Vedas which are revelations from GOD ALMIGHTY, heard by Brahma and others-whence they are also called “Śruti” (what was heard). Brahma, the self-existent having extracted or prepared this law from the revealed ordinances or the Vedas, fully taught it to his grandson the first MANU who again having remembered all that, taught the same to his sons MARICHI and other sages denominated Lords of created beings (Prajāpatīs). In consequence of being remembered by MANU and the rest the Hindu Law is termed “SMṚITI” (what was remembered) as well as the “DHARMA -ŚĀSTRA”.

Therefore, any study of Indian jurisprudence must begin with an enquiry into its foundation which is the concept of Dharma, a word of the widest import and not easily rendered into English. Dharma includes religious, moral, social and legal duties and can only be defined by its contents. The great Codes of Manu, Yājñavalkya, Brhaspati and other law givers were called Dharma-Śāstra. The mānava Dharma Śāstra or Samhita of Manu is above all of them. It is regarded by us Hindus as next in sanctity to our scriptures, the Vedas and is the oldest of the

memorial laws. The seat of the judge in law court was called Dharmāsanam. It also meant the sum total of traditions, obligations and customs which bound together all the members of a clan or caste and were called Kula-dharmah-Sanātanah. It could also mean the code of conduct in polite society. Lastly, it meant the law of the land. But the word Dharma was never used to describe a man's faith or religion.

The word Dharma is derived from the root dhṛ which means to support or to hold together. But what precisely was the force which held the society together was explained by Manu. According to him, it was sadācāra or righteous conduct "ācārah paramo dharmah". This too was vague. What constituted Sadācāra or righteous conduct? Manu again provided a guide ;

Vedah Smṛtiḥ Sadācārah Svasya ca Priyam ātmanah etacchaturvidham prāhuh Sākṣād dharmasya Lakṣanam.

- “(1) The injunction of the Veda,
- (2) The prescriptions of the Smṛtis,
- (3) Sadācāra—that is the righteous conduct established by custom and public opinion; and
- (4) conduct according to one's conscience—these are the four attributes of Dharma”.

Manu further specified the ten elements of righteous conduct thus:

Dhṛti Kṣama damos steyam Śaucaḥ indriya nigrahaḥ, Dhirvidyā tapah Satyam daśakam dharma-Lakṣanam.

“Contentment, forgiveness, mental discipline, non-stealing, purity of thought and action, Curbing of the sensory organs, cultivation of wisdom, acquisition of knowledge and learning, life of simple austerity and truthfulness are the ten elements of righteous conduct”.

This comprehensive definition is hundred per cent secular and there is not a word in it about religion, belief or faith.

The meaning of Dharma did not remain static. It evolved with the evolution of society. By the time of Māhābhārata, the code of righteous conduct was enlarged to include the pursuit of material welfare in wordly life.

The inclusion of the pursuit of material welfare indicates that as civilisation advanced in India it was recognised that for the average

person material welfare was a necessary condition of his spiritual development, because material want could destroy a host of virtues.

Explaining why good conduct is the essential foundation of society Bhiṣma in Śānti-Parva, pointed out that even those who violate Dharma depend on it for their preservation. Giving a remarkable illustration he said that a thief lives comfortably by depriving others of their properties and violating the law. But he relies on the righteous conduct of others to preserve his own ill-gotten gains and seeks the protection of the law when his own property is stolen by another thief.

Thus, Dharma in Indian Jurisprudence meant the code of righteous conducts in social life as well as the law of the land; Dharma Śāstra meant the written code prescribing such conduct and Dharmāsana meant the seat of the judge or the king when he decided disputes between citizens.

I shall now describe briefly the nature of litigation in Ancient India which will also throw some light on the contemporary economic conditions because the jurisprudence and legal system of a society are founded on its economic system.

We have no reports of decided cases except stray gleanings from Sanskrit novels and plays. But we have the evidence of the ancient and medieval texts, the Artha Śāstra, Manusmṛti Yajñavalkya, Vivāda Chintāmani, Vyavahāra-Chintāmani and other great works on law. In Vachaspati's Vivāda Chintāmani written in the 15th Century A. D. the word "Vivada" means dispute. The writer affirmed Manu's classification of all litigations under eighteen principal heads of title. This indicates that in ancient India this classification was an integral part of legal system and was adopted by the law courts. This is corroborated by the fact that the same classification prevailed in all other commentaries and in Kautilya's Artha-Śāstra. The eighteen heads of litigations were :

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|--|-------------------------|
| 1. Non payment of loans | riṇādānam ; |
| 2. disputes relating to pledges or deposits— | nikṣepah, |
| 3. sale without ownership— | aswāmi Vikrayah; |
| 4. affairs of joint concern or partnership— | Sambhuya Ca Samuthanam; |
| 5. revocation of gifts— | dattasyānapakarma Ca; |

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|--|--------------------------|
| 6. non payment of wages— | Vetanasyaivacādānam; |
| 7. breach of agreement— | samvidasca vyatikramahś |
| 8. recession of purchase or sale— | Kraya Vikrayānuśaya; |
| 9. disputes between the owner
and the keeper— | Vivādah Swāmi Pālayoh; |
| 10. boundary disputes— | seemā—Vivāda dharmasca; |
| 11. assault—physical; | |
| 12. assault verbal— | pāruṣye danda Vācike; |
| 13. theft | steyam; |
| 14. violent crime of any kind— | sāhasam; |
| 15. adultery— | stri-sangrahana meva ca; |
| 16. duties of husband
and wife— | stri-pum-dharmah; |
| 17. partition of property— | vibhāgaḥ and |
| 18. gambling and betting dis-
putes— | dyūtam āhvayah. |

A study of the law under any of these different heads is illuminating. I propose to give you a few flash-light pictures to stimulate your interest and arouse your curiosity about the subject. The principle of partnership is thus enunciated in Nārada-Smṛti "when traders and others carry on business jointly it is called a partnership or a joint concern".

The law provided "Phala heto rupāyena karma Sambhuya Kurvatām Adhara-bhutaḥ prakṣēpat uttīṣṭeran-stathonśataḥ," when several partners are jointly carrying on business for gain the basis of their enterprise is capital. Each partner was required to contribute or raise capital according to his prescribed share in the firm".

Thus the fundamental purpose of a partnership was to make profit by investment of capital. This indicates that ancient India had reached a stage of economic development when capital accumulation was taking place.

The law further prescribed : —

“Samavāyena Vañijām lābhārtham Karma Kurvatām lābhā-lābham yatha dravyam yatha va samvida Kritām”.

*When several tradesmen carry on a joint business for gain, the profit and loss of each shall be in proportion to his share of capital unless there is a special agreement to the contrary.

The relation of partnership was based on the principle of utmost good faith. Any breach of this resulted in the expulsion of the offending partner.

If one compares this law with our law of partnership today, some of the sections of the Indian Partnership Act of 1932 might be the carbon copies of these provisions.

The law governing the payment and non payment of loans was formulated into an elaborate code. Nārada-Smṛti says ;—

Ruṇam deyaṁ ca yena Yatra yatha ca yat dāna Grahaṇa dharmasā ṛṇadānam iti Smṛitam. “When debt is payable, which is not payable by whom, when and how it is to be paid, the rules of giving and receiving-all this is comprised under the law of Debt”.

Loan was defined thus :—

Sthāna Lābha nimitham yad dāna grahaṇamiṣyate tat kusidam tena vṛtīḥ kusidinam, “When for the purpose of security and profit, loan is given and taken, it is called loan on interest. It is by this that money lenders make a living”.

About the rate of interest the Vivāda-Chintāmaṇi provided on the authority of Manu that the money lender shall stipulate an interest sanctioned by Vasiṣṭha, for increasing the capital. He shall take monthly the eighteenth part of a hundred. In Vasiṣṭha Smṛiti, it was enjoined that the rate of interest should not be so excessive as to outrage morality.

The interest was either compound or simple or periodic. According to Yājñavalkya there was no interest if the loan was secured by a usufructuary pledge.

Vivāda-Cintāmaṇi provides “knowing that there is much profit from trading on the seas, the money lenders fix a higher rate of interest on loans relating to it”. This indicates that there was a regular, brisk and profitable overseas trade.

On ownership and right of property Manu says that there are seven virtuous means of acquiring property :—

Succession, gain and purchase or exchange which are allowed to all classes, conquest which is peculiar to the military class ; lending at interest, husbandry or commerce which belongs to the mercantile class ; and acceptance of presents by the sacerdotal class from respectable persons.

Marriage amongst the Hindus, though essentially a religious sacrament partakes also of the nature of a civil contract. The law provided eight forms of marriage ; Brāhma, Daiva, Ārṣa, Prājāpatya, Āsura, Gāndharva, Rākṣasa, and Paisāca.

About the woman's property the law provided that what has been given to a woman, before or after her nuptials, by the father, the mother, the husband, or a brother, or received by her at the nuptial fire, or presented to her on her husband's marriage to another wife, is denominated a woman's property

About adoption, Manu says :

“A son of any description must be anxiously adopted by a man destitute of male issue for the sake of the funeral cake, water and solemn rites and for the celebrity of his name.

About the gift and alienation the law provided that the gift of that portion of property which may remain after the food and clothing of the family is neither invalid nor immoral but alienation of any portion of one's property—thereby distressing his family, is immoral and therefore unfit but nevertheless valid. In this context Manu says—He who bestows gifts on strangers with a view to wordly fame, while he suffers his family to live in distress, though he has power to support them, touches his lips with honey but swallows poison. Such virtue is counterfeit.

Thus I think I will not be wrong if I say that most of the provisions of law in force in our country today are strikingly similar to those in vogue in ancient India.

I shall now tell you something about the system of judicial administration and the procedure followed by the law courts of ancient India.

In Kautilyas' Artha Śāstra the realm was divided into administrative units called Sthāniya, Dronamukha, Khārvatika and Sangrahaṇa.

Sthāniya was a fortress established in the centre of eight hundred villages, a droṇamukha in the centre of four hundred villages; a Khār-vatika in the midst of two hundred villages and a Sangrahaṇa in the centre of ten villages.

For deciding disputes between citizens, law courts were established in each Sangrahaṇa, droṇamukha, and Sthāniya and also at the meeting place of districts. The court consisted of three jurists and three ministers. Kauṭilya is lacking in further details which is provided by the great jurists, Manu, Yājñavalkya and others.

A trial or suit was divided into four essential parts or stages :-

Plaint-Bhāṣā; reply-Uttara; trial or investigation-kriyā and decision-nirnaya.

According to Yājñavalkya
Yo dandyān dandayed rājā Samyag
Vadhyānsca ghātayet Iṣṭam syāt
kratumiṣṭena Sahasra-śata dakṣiṇābhīh.

“The king or the judge under him is required duly to punish those who merit punishment and execute those who are guilty of a capital crime in accordance with the procedure laid down in the texts. . The word Samyag is important. It means in a proper manner. In case of doubt the accused could not be punished. Thus the principle of no conviction without a proper trial and benefit of doubt for the accused were understood and enforced in India even in the ancient time.

The rules for interpretation of texts were well settled. If there was no conflict between the Dharma Śāstra and Artha Śāstra both were to be enforced but in case of conflict the Dharma Śāstra prevailed. And if there was an inconsistency or conflict between the two texts of Dharma Śāstra, that which was in accordance with equity was to be preferred.

The king and his judges were required to take an oath of impartiality when deciding disputes between citizens. It is thus enjoined in Nārada Smṛti :- “When the king sits down on the judgment seat let him be impartial towards all beings, having taken the vow of Vaiśva-sevā.

According to Brhaspati, there was a hierarchy of courts in Ancient India beginning with the family courts and ending with the king. The institution of family judges is noteworthy. The unit of society was the

joint family which might consist of four generations. It was desirable that disputes should be decided in the first instance within the family. The next higher court was the judge; and the next was the Chief Judge who was called *Prādvivāka*. At the top was the king. The jurisdiction of each was determined by the importance of the dispute, the minor disputes being decided by the lowest court and the most important by the King. The decision of each higher court superseded that of the court below.

There was a system of appeals because the decision of a high court could supersede that of the lower court only if there was an appeal or revision,

In *Bṛhaspati-Smṛti* the duty of a judge was thus prescribed : “A Judge should decide cases without consideration of personal gain or prejudice or any kind of personal bias and his decisions should be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the texts. A judge who performs his judicial duties in this manner achieves the same spiritual merit as a person performing a *Yajña*.”

The judiciary was entirely independent even at that time. All the ancient texts enjoin that the judges must decide cases regardless of the King's wishes, and even point out the king's own errors. A judge who sympathised with the breach of the law by the King was deemed to be guilty of the breach himself.

Dishonesty in a Judge was regarded as one of the most reprehensible crimes. Judicial misconduct included private conversation with a party before the decision of the case. Dishonesty in a judge and perjury in a witness were made equal with *Brahmahatya*—murder of a *Brāhmaṇa*.

Bṛhaspati says—“Judges should be banished if they perpetrate injustice, if they live on bribery and if they betray the confidence reposed in them. A judge guilty of bribery was liable to forfeiture of all his property.

A suit or trial was called *Vyavahāra* which means removal or determination of doubt regarding the rights and obligations of the parties to a dispute.

The principle of public trial was well established in Ancient India. Even the king was to decide cases in the court-building and not in his palace or private chambers. The court hours were fixed according to the climate of the land and hearing took place in comparatively cool hours of the morning.

If a party was unable to fight his case, he could engage a representative who was called *pratinidhi* whose acts were binding on his principal.

But in a number of specified categories of proceedings, mainly criminal trials, the defendant or the accused was not permitted to engage a representative and his personal presence was required.

Nārada Smṛti provides about review of decision thus—"A litigant who thinks that his case has been decided and determined contrary to law and justice can have his case reviewed if he agrees to the condition of double punishment. According to Nārada a litigant deserved a re-hearing if the decision was false, that is contrary to law or if the judges were divided in their opinion.

Thus the most remarkable feature of the judicial system which prevailed in ancient India was its similarity to the judicial system of modern India.

TRENDS IN INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Dinesh Chandra Shastri

With the dawn of civilization in a pre—historical age various arts and sciences developed in India, the rudiments of some of which were recorded for the first time in the vedic hymns though in an intermixed eulogising manner. Descriptions of the nature and functions of mind occur even in the hymns of the R̥gveda and Yajurveda. Subsequently, the fundamental Vedic concepts gradually took definite shapes, and, as recorded in the Upaniṣads, mind was given its proper important place in the human person, and also in the philosophical speculations of that time. But, precise psychological speculations are to be found only in the later philosophical literature of India like the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, sāmkhya pātañjala, Vedānta, Jaina, Bauddha and other systems. In every system psychology or speculations on 'mind' found its proper place in the scheme. But psychology was never treated as a separate branch of learning as it is done to-day.

Broadly speaking, the psychological theories which developed in ancient India may be divided into three sections or groups. The first group of psychologists or philosophers held mind or manas to be only a mechanical instrument of atomic size (*aṇuparimāṇa*) serving as a connecting link between the knowing agent (*jñātṛ*, *ātman*) and the sense-organs in order to produce knowledge. According to them mind is a very subtle insentient (*Jada*) substance (*dravya*) though not constituted of the five material elements called the *bhūtas*. Mind has got no special attributes like colour, touch, etc. or like knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc. which are all special attributes produced in the soul through soul-mind conjunction (*ātma-manahsamyoga*). Each eternal soul possesses an eternal mind as its eternal associate. The psychologists of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā; and some other systems, belong to this first group. This view may be called as the mechanistic view of mind.

The second group holds that mind is a very subtle substance (*dravya*) of plastic and transparent nature possessing a medium size (*madhya-parimāṇa*). Being of plastic or pliable nature mind admits of various modifications according to the object it takes. It expands and

contracts according to the size of the objects, and being transparent, it takes the form (*ākāra*) of the object even with regard to its qualities in which the mind is interested.

Though mind is insentient (*juḍa*) by nature, it appears as a conscious agent (*Jñātr*) capable of knowing and functioning due to its contact with the soul (1). Being of transparent nature due to *sattvaguna* constituting mind, it takes reflection of the consciousness of the soul which is pure basic consciousness by nature. Mind is constituted of three *guṇas*-substances or forces-called *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, generating cognition, activity and inertia respectively. It is by the virtue of *sattvaguna*, that mind is predominantly in favour of knowing truths. '*Tattvapakṣapāto hi dhīyām svabhāvaḥ*'. The *sāmkhya*, *pātañjala*, *Vedānta* and some others belong to this group. It should also be noted here that to these systems, and the systems to be mentioned in the third group, the word for 'mind' is *antaḥkāraṇa* which includes *buddhi*, *citta*, *ahamkāra* and *manas* with all their denotations severally and collectively. The *Upaniṣads* also use these words loosely to mean mind as a whole, or to mean some distinct aspect of mind. The view of this second group may be called as the psychic view of mind.

The third group, comparatively less known and favoured includes the *śākta* *Āgamas*, *yogavasiṣṭha* philosophy, *pratyabhijñā* *Śaiva* school and some others.

According to them, the self as pure consciousness assumes, through its unrestricted power of freedom, some limitation so as to manifest as mind (2). Therefore, mind is a form of consciousness itself. It is a limited form or a descent of consciousness. This may be called as the spiritualistic view of mind. These are the three main trends of Indian psychology.

In another way, it may be said, that some systems have formulated their view of mind from a lower level of matter by raising and refining the matter, while the other systems have the mind constituted of somewhat higher principle of the *guṇas* having been evolved from *prakṛiti*. Again, the third group of systems has held mind to be a modification or descent of the highest Reality of consciousness.

1. 'Tasmāt tatsamyogādacetanaṃ cetanāvadiva lingam' *Isvarakṛṣṇa-Kārikā*-20.

2. 'Citireva cetanapādādavarūḍhā cetyasamkocini cittam' *Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya*-5, 'Calā citirmanonāmni', *Tripurārahasya-tantra*-18.117

With the exception of this third group of schools, all other systems lay emphasis on the chāndyogya-texts like *annamāyaṃ soṃya manaḥ*, etc. (mind is made of food), and hold that mind is by nature *jaḍa* or insentient. So, it may be said broadly that the Vedas and the Indian philosophies hold mind to be a very subtle insentient (*Jaḍa*) entity.

The Indian Psychologists never confused mind with the soul. To them mind is *antaḥkaraṇa* or an inner instrument belonging to the soul as an aid to knowledge, enjoyment, etc. Even the Śākta Āgama, which holds mind to be a form of consciousness, treats mind as '*karana*' or instruments of the soul. '*Ātmano hi manaḥproktaṃ karaṇam Jñānakarmaṇi* (3).

The different states of consciousness or knowledge are the three states of 'waking', 'dream', and 'sleep', and also two other less considered states of 'swoon' and 'death'. These five states of mind or mental consciousness have been defined and explained by different schools in their own way.

According to the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Prābhākara, and others there is no sort of consciousness or cognition in deep sleep. To them cognition and consciousness are synonymous. But to the Sāṃkhya, Pātañjala, Vedānta and others there is a sort of cognition even in deep sleep. According to the Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala, sleep itself is a kind of subtle mental modification or *cittavṛtti*, while according to the Advaitins it is through the modifications of *avidyā* or causal mind that the soul consciousness functions as a revealer even in sleep. The darkness of ignorance and also some undifferentiated bliss is perceived through those modifications of the causal mind called *avidyā-vṛtti*.

According to śākta Āgama sleep is a mental state of *nidrāprakāśa* (4), i. e. an indeterminate knowledge of *nidrā* or the unmanifested primal ignorance (5). Due to the absence of *vimarśa* (*amarśa*) or determinate cognitions, the mind in deep sleep is said to be '*mūḍha*' and '*līna*', i. e. unconscious and absorbed.

The states of swoon and death are less discussed being less important or less known. The Brahmasūtra in an aphorism '*mugdherdha-sampat-*

3. Tripurārahasya-18. 47.

4. Tripurārahasyatāntra, 16.71

5. Tripurārahasya-tāntra, 16. 73

tiḥ pariśeṣāt (6)-states that in the state of swoon though the mind seems to be completely absorbed as in the sleep, it is actually half absorbed which is indicated by abnormal breathing, and facial or other physical expressions.

The state of death, which has also some similarity with sleep in bringing about cessation of pains (7) is also a different state when the mind rests in itself or is absorbed into *prāṇa* the life-principle (8) losing all its functions and determinate cognitions. Of course, at the point of death there is an inner flash of knowledge (9) which determines its future procedure. It is stated in the *upaniṣads* and other scriptures that subsequently the mind of the dead recovers its determinate consciousness at certain stages, and its cognitions are like dream cognitions. The Buddhists also admit the persistence of mind or *manodhī* even after death.

The most important of the states of mind or consciousness is the states of dream and sleep. They provide some clue to the ascertainment of the nature of mind and soul, and also raise many problems of great psychological interest.

According to the schools of logicians like the *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, etc. the dream-cognitions are but confused or erroneous recollections-*smṛtibhrama*-due to the defect of *nidrā* or drowsiness. The *prābhākaras* who deny any *anyathākhyāti* or otherwise-apprehension hold dream-cognitions as recollections with omissions and want of discrimination.

According to the *Sāṃkhya* and *Pātañjala* systems also the dream cognitions are confused recollections with false mental constructions added, though, according to *Vijñānabhikṣu*, the *Sāṃkhya* is inclined to the theory of *akhyāti* or lack of discrimination like the *Prābhākaras*.

The *advaitavedānta* school, however, has strung a different note with regard to the dream-cognitions, which according to them, are illusory cognitions, the objects being temporarily created from *saṃskāra* or impressions with the help of nescience, and drowsiness—*avidyā* and *nidrā-doṣa*. Those objects of inscrutable nature are directly visualised through

6. *Brahmasūtra*, -3.2.10.

7. 'Suṣuptivad duḥkhābhāva janakatvāt' (*Brahmasūtra*-Śaṅkarabhāṣya)

8. 'Manah prāṇe' *chāndogya upaniṣad*, 6.8.6.

9. 'Etasya hṛdayasyāgraṃ pradyotate' *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, -4.4.2

the functions of the causal mind as individual nescience (*avidyā*), by the soul through its own light. 'Atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ *svayaṃjyati*'—in this state of dream the self has (evidently) it self as light says the Upaniṣad, there being no other external light to help its vision.

Again, passing of the soul through these states of Jāgrat, *svapna* and *susupti* without retaining the previous states, proves that the soul is unattached to these different states which are only mental. '*Asaṅgo hyayaṃ puruṣaḥ*'—the self is verily unattached—is the Upaniṣadic dictum.

The Vedas, the Upaniṣads (10), the Agamas, and the philosophical systems have mentioned many special attributes, modifications or functions of mind. The Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika schools however, enumerate them as nine, viz., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, volition, virtue (*dharma*), vice (*adharma*) and knowledge-impressions (*samskāra*), which, according to them are not attributes of mind, but are special attributes of the soul (*ātma-viśeṣa-guṇa*). But they also admit that these attributes are produced in the soul due to soul-mind conjunction (*atmamanah-samyoga*) and with the exception of *dharma-adharma*, and *samskāra* which are imperceptible special attributes of the soul, the other six attributes are also perceived through mind (*mānasapratyakṣaviśaya*). The Pātañjala and sāmkhya have enumerated five kinds of mental modifications called *cittavṛtti*, as, *pramāṇa*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa*, *nidrā*, and *smṛti* i.e. the mental modifications of valid cognitions, erroneous cognitions, contentless verbal concepts, sleep-cognitions and recollections. It should be understood that these are only the cognitive mental modifications, the others being pleasure, pain, etc. or the more subtle modifications like *jñānāśaya*, *karmāśaya*, *jīvanahetuprayatna* i. e. knowledge-impressions, action-residues, and the life—sustaining volition. Vyāsa, the commentator on the aphorisms of Patañjali, also gives a list of imperceptible attributes or modifications of mind—*aparidṛṣṭacittadharma* (11) which may be considered as the preconscious and unconscious attributes, and the unperceived propellers of mind.

In fact, all the special attributes or modifications of mind may be divided into three groups as cognitive, emotional, and volitional—*jñānātmikāvṛtti*, *bhāvātmika vṛtti* and *prayatnātmikā vṛtti*.

(1) The cognitive modifications are broadly five as already mentioned by Patañjali, doubt being included in *viparyaya*.

10. Aitareyopaniṣad. 2.5.2; Brhadāranyakopaniṣad—1. 5. 3.

11. Yogasūtvadhāsyā,- 3.15

(2) The emotional modifications have been mentioned as pleasure, pain, desire (love) and hatred-*sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā* *dveṣa*-as enumerated by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. This is also a very broad account for philosophical purpose, there being many other emotional modifications like heroism, fear, laughter, abhorrence, spiritual devotion, etc. The Nyāya system will, of course, intend to include all of them in those four emotions—pleasure, pain, desire and hatred. Indian poetics or the Alankarāśāstras have exhaustively dealt with variety of human emotions.

(3) The volitional modifications of mind which are called *praynta* or *kṛtī* are mainly of three kinds *pravṛtti*, *nivṛtti* and *jīvanayoni* i. e. inclination for effort, for withdrawal, and the life-sustaining volition which is not perceptible. *Cikrṣā* or desire for action which precedes *pravṛtti* is produced from *iṣṭasādhana-tva-jñāna* and *kṛtisādhya-tva-jñāna*- i. e. from the knowledge that some action is conducive to pleasure, and is also capable of being performed. Though included in *icchā* or desire, it may be regarded as quasi-volitional due to its direct causality of *pravṛtti* and *ceṣṭā*, i. e. inclination and effort. There is an old psychological saying that-*‘jñāna-janyā bhaved icchā icchā janyā bhavet kṛtiḥ/kṛtijanyā bhaved ceṣṭā, ceṣṭā-janyā bhavet kṛyā’*°.

These are in brief the main trends of Indian psychology with regard to the nature and behaviour of human mind. But there are other trends or aspects of Indian psychology with regard to the methods of sublimation, and highest possibilities of mind. In this field there are mainly two trends or lines of *sādhana* or process of discipline through which our mind can be sublimated to reach its highest possible state.

The Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the dharma-śāstras, the Pātañjala, and other Vedic systems are inclined to select some objects, actions, and reject and prohibit others for the attainment of mental advancement. They denounce prohibited action with preference to enjoined actions, denounce vices with preference to virtues, denounce matter with preference to spirit, denounce the world with preference to God or Brahman. The power of withdrawal (*nivṛtti*) and renunciation (*tyāga*) are essential for moral and spiritual advancement. But the Āgamas or the śākta-Tantras show a different attitude by entertaining the entire universe as spiritual and divine.

To them nothing is harmful, vicious and discardable, if viewed with true perspective, and used in a proper way (12). The entire universe is spiritual, and, therefore, there is no matter, or world to be abhorred and

denounced. There is no object or deed as impure save and except our mental attitude which makes things and actions pure or impure. Therefore, sublimation and spiritualisation are essential for spiritual upliftment, but not so much of withdrawal or renunciation.

Besides these two main trends of mental attitude towards the inner and outer things, and towards the process of *sādhana*, there are also two other different attitudes of Indian Philosophy and psychology. While some schools are more devoted to and based on their conclusions (*siddhānta-niṣṭha*), others are more devoted to and occupied with the processes of advancement (*sādhana-niṣṭha*).

The Upaniṣads, the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta systems and others are examples for the first group. The Dharmaśāstras, the Āgamas or the Tantras, the Pātañjala system, and others may be regarded as *sādhana-niṣṭha*, who are more concerned with the practical processes of advancement than with their metaphysical conclusions.

CONCEPT OF MIND IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Dr. Vidhata Mishra

Upanṣadic seers were foremost in their age in philosophical reflection in general and psychological insight in particular. The way of explanation and description of various instruments of human knowledge is mainly symbolic. The nature of self, mind and intelligence are described with the help of analogy. The outer objects are given the name of inner capacities. Sun, moon, river, ocean, lamp, animals and living beings are given the names of inner abilities. To critiques these similes and metaphors may seem common and childish. But in view of time and knowledge of the day, they explained it satisfactorily. The religion, mysticism, metaphysics and psychology were woven together in the Upanṣads. The specialisation of knowledge was not in those days. It is of very recent origin. The ancient seers received visions. They saw the truth of things in an intuitive way.

The Maitrāyaṇīya upaniṣad raises the question of the efficient cause. It entitles the soul with the power of action. It tells us of a discourse held between the Vālakhilyas and Prajāpati, about the nature of mind and body. Accordingly, the body is verily like an unmoving cart and the soul is the mover of it. The soul is the pure, tranquil, imperishable, unborn entity. It stands independently on its own greatness.

The Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad says—"Soul is the master of all bodily faculties. It is the master of all sense activities. As a razor is placed in the razor case or fire in the fire—hearth, similarly does this conscious self pervade the body upto the very hairs and nails. Senses depend upon soul as the relatives upon the richman, even so does the conscious self feed with the senses and the senses feed on the self. Here the word soul or self is used in different meanings. In some cases it is mind, antaḥkaraṇa, cetanā or buddhi.

As a matter of fact mind is the instrument of the soul, It perceives and feels the external objects of the world. In Vājasaneyi Samhitā there is a full discourse on the nature of mind. In the first verse of this collection mind is characterised 'which goes after.' It implies that it is

not bodily sense but it is the soul. It is not a physical sense organ for then it can not be conceived as going out of the body. Further in three verses of the same set it says about three fold description of mental activities viz. intelligence, feeling and resolution. In the fifth and sixth verses mind appears as an entirely epistemological subject. It is taken to be the principle of both the social and individual mind. It is the divine entity which goes to distant realms while in waking and sleeping states it is the undying flame in the race, It is Prajñāna—Knowledge and cetāsa, the principle of life and dhṛti. It is the principle that holds on resolution. It is manas that is able to grasp past, present and future. The mind of a particular man is superior to the collective or social mind for after all the social mind exists only through the individual mind. The term 'mind' is very often used in the sense of soul. In some places it is used as its capacity as a physical instrument. It is that which knows name and form, It is not equivalent to the body. But it is something which includes the body. Every object is known because it has its name and form. Form of an object is known by mind. Hence it is a mental thing. Name of an object is expressed by speech. When a man knows these two things he knows the whole universe. In the second chapter of Aitareya Āraṇyaka we find further an advance in the psychological analysis. There is a clear enunciation of an idealistic doctrine. According to it all reality is mind. In fact, it is the knowledge itself. A distinction is drawn between the self as knower and mind as simply a sense organ. The self of man is more developed in respect of understanding and knowledge than of other things.

The Upaniṣads declare that the self or soul is the basis of real search of knowledge. Self is the inner, primal and central truth to all activities of mind. Mind is light and it has an unique symphony. It has the highest speed in movement and it evolves into understanding. Mind, sometimes, is regarded as the sixth sense. The other senses vision, hearing, touch, smell, taste may become specialisation of the sense-mind. It may use these sense organs for the basis of its experience. But it exceeds them all and becomes capable of direct experience. Later on in the Upaniṣads concept of mind and soul became separated. This separation was carried forward in the making of various Darśanas. They developed their own conception of nature and function of mind on this basis. They attempted to tackle specific physiological and psychological problems in their own way.

Nyāya Darśana and Mind.

Gautama was the enunciator of Nyāya System. He has never mentioned distinctly anywhere that mind is a sense organ. But Vātsyāyana has commented that his implication of the mind was like that of

a sense organ itself. He includes the mind in the sense organ. He further points out its distinction from the external senses. He argues that perception of pleasure is produced through mind. It is just like any other sense organ like eye and ear. *Prāsaśtapāda* describes the mind as internal organ. It is *Antahkaraṇa*. He argues that pleasure and pain are not perceived through the external senses. They must be perceived through internal organ and that organ is mind itself.

According to the *Vaiśeṣika* *manas* is one of the nine *dravyas*. It means the substances. It is one of the categories or the *padārthas*. A substance, accordingly, is that which has qualities. *Ātman* or soul is a substance and is spiritual by nature. It has an intelligence as a quality. Similarly *manas* is one of the nine substances. Mind can not be identified with the soul. It is the internal organ. It serves as the instrument of knowledge for the soul. Both *Nyāya* and *Vaiśiṣika* hold that *manas* is quite different from *Ātman*.

Kaṇāda gives an account of the nature and function of mind. The reasons advanced by him prove the existence of mind. Both *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* rely on the factor of concentration for proof for the existence of mind. They believe that the intellectual activities are perceptual and conceptual. They depend on attention. It proves the instrument of intelligence. The *Vaiśeṣika* acknowledges that the knowledge of an object is received by the sense organ. But self does not get any knowledge till the mind comes in contact with it. Mind must be in contact with the self or *Ātman*. It may happen that sense organs come into contact with the object and mind with the soul. There must be contact between *manas* and the sense organs for production of knowledge. This is why the objects are before us but we do not see them. The sounds are there but we do not hear them. We do not get the meaning and their implication by themselves. Mind is absorbed at some other place. That object on which the mind is concentrating or attending is the only object cognised by soul. Only then we get the meaning of the object and this is the proof of the existence of mind. *Śrīdhara*, a great *Naiyāyika* holds that the contact of the objects, the sense organ and the soul depend upon some other cause in bringing about the due effect. Because even when the former contacts exist, the necessary effect does not appear, and this instrumentality, upon which they depend is that of mind. Here objection is raised. The fact is that a man is capable of attending to more things than one at a time. The *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* object that the feeling simultaneity is owing to the rapidity of transition of internal sense. The *Nyāya Sūtra* holds that the non-simultaneity of cognition is indicative of mind. *Vātsyāyana* says in his *Bhāṣya* that non-simultaneity here means the non-simultaneity of several cognitions through several sense

organs. Another objection is raised here that in practice we do not experience the simultaneity of experience. Whatever the state of affairs it holds that mind is essential for perceptual knowledge. It must exist. There must be one mind for one body. Otherwise there would be the possibility of the simultaneity of cognitions. In the Nyāyabhāṣya it is said that if there were several minds it would be possible for several sense organs to be in contact with several minds, simultaneously whereby there should be several cognitions appearing at one and the same time. But this never happens. Therefore, there is a singular mind in one body. The corresponding Vaiśeṣika Sūtra goes a step further and holds that the volition of mind is indicative of the fact that the mind is one for one body. The efforts of one man appear one after the other. When there is effort in one direction he does not put forth his energy in any other direction. The evidences as such show the singleness of mind. Just as we pass a pin through several pages of a note book we feel it is done at once and simultaneously. We experience that mind attends to many objects at the same time. But this illusion is created by the speedy shifting of mind. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers do not admit the possibility of a mixed mode of consciousness. Every psychosis is simple. There can not be a psychic compound of simultaneous psychosis owing to the atomic nature of mind. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that moving and supporting ones own body is the result of innumerable single efforts. Self and mind can not possess the same characteristics. Self is all pervading. Mind can not be so. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra holds that all pervading nature of self and Ākāśa is not present in mind. It is maintained in the Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya that all knowledge arises because the contact between the soul and the object through mind is the non-inherent cause of cognition. Mind is not all pervading like Ātman. Hence there is not simultaneous cognitions of objects. Mind is proved to be atomic by Vaiśeṣika thinkers.

Jaina Darśana and mind

According to Jaina Darśana there are five sense organs. They are tactual, gustatory, visual, olfactory and auditory. They have the capacity of perceiving touch, taste, colour, odour, and sound respectively. Each of these again is of two kinds—physical and psychical. They are called Dravya Indriyas and Bhāva Indriyas. The physical senses are caused by the rise of the corresponding physique-making Karma. The physical senses are caused by the destruction cum subsistence—Kaṣāyopaśama—of knowledge obscuring Karmas.

The Jaina philosophers recognise five different states of the soul. The first of them is its essential state. This is the state which never changes

through the manifestation of karma. The soul, for instance can never become unconscious. The second state is the result of the manifestation of karma. All accidental qualities of the soul belong to this state which are produced through the rise of karma. The third state is produced by the suppression of karma—*aupaśamika bhāva*. All states of the soul arise through the subsistence of Karma under this category. This state resulting from the destruction of Karma is the fourth state—*Kṣayika karma*. This is the consequence of the total annihilation of a particular type of karma. The fifth state is the mixed form of the second, third and fourth states. In it the process of destruction cum subsistence of a particular type of karma occurs. The completely obscuring Karmic particles that are manifesting themselves are annihilated. Those particles existing in potentia are suppressed, and the partially obscuring ones are continued to manifest in this state,

Jaina thinkers assumed the existence of mind with evidence. They found this evidence in the experience of the world. They gave the empirical proof for the operation of mind. The contact of the sense-organ with the soul alone does not give cognition in relevant experiences. There is the absence of *manas* and there must be the mind. That is quite necessary for the cognition of an object.

Abhidhānarājendra maintains that the word '*manas*' has a functional significance. It describes the function of the mind like thinking, imagining and expecting. The structure of mind is inferred from this functional significance.

Upaniṣadic philosophers held that the mind is manufactured out of food that we take. Food takes three different forms. The heaviest form becomes excreta. The medium quality becomes flesh and the subtlest part becomes mind.

In the Jaina system the analysis of mind is done in a similar way. The Karmas spring from the lower phase of the human body. It gives rise to the modes of life and consequently it gives dispositions of mind. They believe that mind is an internal sense-organ. Pūjyapāda writes that the mind is an internal sense-organ and it is called—'*anindriya*'. It does not occupy a particular site in the body and it does not last for a long period. On the other hand, sense organs have their seats in the different parts of the body. They last for a longer period. The mind is, therefore, not a sense organ in the ordinary sense. But mind enjoys a unique status. It cognises internal activities. Vidyānanda in his commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* argues that the mind is not a sense-organ and it is quite different from it. The sense-organ apprehends specific objects. One sense-organ can not apprehend the object of another. Such is not the case of

mind. It can cognise all objects of the senses. So it can not be regarded as a sense organ. Mind is an important instrument and it helps the self in cognizing internal states like pleasure, pain etc. Hemachandra defines mind as follows—Mind is the organ of all objects of all the senses. It is not specifically determined like any particular sense. All the senses are cognized by the mind. It is the organ of cognition of all objects and it is an instrument of the Ātman—the self. The physical mind is the material atoms. These atoms are transformed in the form of mind. There are infinite numbers of groups of material atoms. The psychic mind is in the shape of attainment. It consists of the relevant obscuring karma and it is in the form of the self. Thus it is apt to cognize its objects. The state of mind is just like that of the other senses. It is dissimilar to them in the cognition of the object. All other senses cognize their own objects. But mind cognises all the objects of all the senses. The other sense-organs are external in their location. But mind is internal. It does not have any special object for its cognition. The internal activities like pleasure, pain, recognition, love etc. are performed by the mind. All these activities are rooted in sense-perception. All the various states of mind are based on the sensory cognition. Hence, the fact that mind is the organ of cognition of all objects, is indicated. The fact remains that object of sensory perception is the object of mental cognition.

According to Jainas all the senses grasp their objects in direct contact with them. But there is one solitary exception—the eye. The visual sense perceives the object at a distance. It perceives without coming in direct contact with them. They hold that objects themselves come in contact with the senses. The senses remain in the same state where they are located. The Jainas maintain that Cetanā is the quality of the soul and it is different from the bodily aspect. There is one Lokāyata view. Every jiva, according to it, is a composite of body and soul. The soul is the active partner of that. The body is inactive and passive. Jainism avoids the limitation of both mentalism and materialism. It recognises that mind and matter are correlated. The distinction of self and non-self is the out-come of the essential character of mind.

Buddha Darśana and mind.

Individuality is the unstable state of being. Body is of the abiding existence. Mind or consciousness is not of the nature of abiding existence. There can be no individuality without putting together. There can be no putting together without a connection. There can be no connection without becoming. There can be no becoming without becoming different. There must be a dissolution. There must be a passing away. Sooner or later it will be inevitably complete. Buddhism

recognises six types of consciousness. There are six varieties of bases—the āśrayas. The organs of vision, audition, smelling, tasting, touch and consciousness itself. There are six objects—the viśayas. They are colours, sounds, smells, tastes, touches and ideas. There are six senses including the mind. The mind is the faculty of intellect. It cognises non-sensory objects. It is immaterial and indivisible. Excluding mind there are five sense-organs. They are called eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. They are composed of a transcendent and subile matter. They are divided into classes. The organs of smell, taste and touch apprehend other objects when they come in contact with their objects. They are Prāpyakāri Indriyas. The organs of vision and audition apprehend their objects without entering into a direct contact and they are called Aprāpyakāri Indriyas. The mind is the instrument of man. There are two conditions necessary for release of mind. The mind withdraws from what appeals to sense. The mind fixes itself on the opposite¹. All things are rooted in desire. They have their origin in work of mind. Mental contact gives rise to them. Their confluence is feeling. Their chief state is concentration. Their dominant influence is mindfulness. Their wisdom is there beyond. And, of all things, release is the care.²

Sāṅkhya Darśana and mind

The Sāṅkhya recognises eleven senses. Accordingly there are five organs of knowledge, five organs of action and mind as the internal organ³. The Sāṅkhya Kārikā mentions eleven senses and sometimes thirteen. They add intellect and ego to the above list. It divides the external senses into two classes e.g. organs of knowledge and organs of action. In other words they are called sensory and motor organs. The visual, the auditory, the olfactory, the gustatory and the tactual are the organs of knowledge. The vocal, the apprehensive, the locomotive, the excretory and the generative organs are the organs of action⁴. According to Sāṅkhya the sensory organ means the determinate sensory psychophysical impulses which react to the objects perceived. Mind is reflection or discrimination. It carefully reflects upon the objects

1. Majjhima Nikāya-9. 26
2. Anguttara Nikāya-4. 31
3. Sāṅkhya Pravacana Sūtra-11. 19
4. Sāṅkhya Kārikā-35
5. Yogavārtika-11.18

intuitively apprehended by sense-organ. It determines and discriminates in their right perspective. *Vijñānabhikṣu* holds that the intellect and the ego are the subtle sense organs⁵. The *Sāṅkhya* maintains that the sense organs move to their objects in the form of modifications. They take in their forms and apprehend them. They cannot grasp their objects without being related to them. They cognise all objects distant and hidden. Accordingly mind is the organ. It has an important function of synthesising the sense data into percepts. It suggests alternative courses of action and it carries out the restriction of the will through the organs of action. There is no distinction between the organ and its function. Mind is the door-keeper. The senses are the doors. *Buddhi*, *Ahaṁkāra* and *manas* are not carefully distinguished. They are taken as the inner instrument-*antaḥkāra*. This threefold instrument is one and one only. This is like the seed, the sprout and the tree. It falls alike under the relation of cause and effect. The cooperation is necessary for both perception and action. Mind assumes manifold forms in connection with different senses. Mind is not all pervading since it is an instrument possessing movement and action.⁶

The *Sāṅkhya* philosophers are *Satkāryavādins* and they hold that the effect is already in the cause. Wisdom can not belong to *Puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* is pure consciousness. It belongs to *Mahat* and from this *Mahat* is created *Ahaṁkāra*. It is both ego and self consciousness. The *Ahaṁkāra* is mental. *Buddhi* is more cognitive in function. *Ahaṁkāra* is more practical and its psychological function is self-love. *Ahaṁkāra* is inferred from its effect. The *puruṣa* identifies itself with the acts of *Prakṛti* through *Ahaṁkāra*. It passes to the self the sensation and suggestions of action communicated to it through mind. It thus helps in the formation of concepts and decisions.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines the function of mind as reflection or discrimination. *Vācaspati* explains that the mind carefully reflects upon the objects intuitively apprehended by a sense organ. It determines it as relating to the object to its properties in the subject-predicate relation. The first apprehension is simple and immediate and it is produced by a mere thing. *Caṇḍapāda* in his commentary holds that the mind is that which intends the function of both the organs and transmits a definite opinion to the soul through individuation and intellect. The intellect is the highest organ and it is responsible for total knowledge in the *Puruṣa*—the self.

6. *Sāṅkhya Pravacana Sūtra* 11,16

7. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*-27

Jaimini-Sutra and mind

Jaimini is the propounder of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. He defines perception. It is the cognition produced in soul by the contact of sense-organs with the objects. Jaimini does not differentiate in perception. The Mīmāṃsakas recognise two kinds of external and internal sense-organs. The olfactory, the gustatory, the visual, the tactual and the auditory are of the first kind. Of these the first four are made up of earth, water, light and air respectively. The auditory organ is of the nature of space-Dīk. It is confined within the ear hole. The mind is the only internal sense organ. It is atomic in nature. There is no possibility of simultaneous cognition. In the perception of external objects it acts jointly with the external sense organs. It produces inferential cognition and it brings about recollection. It has to depend upon the subliminal impressions for this act.

Advaita Vedānta and mind

Śaṅkara is the propounder of the Advaita system. According to him Brahman is the permanent light of consciousness. It is universal, eternal, ubiquitous and infinite. It is manifold by various objects. It is called object-consciousness—Viśaya-caitanya. It is instrument by mental modes and called cognitive consciousness—Pramāṇa caitanya. When it is modified by mind it is named cognising consciousness—Pramāṭr caitanya. There is one cosmic consciousness and it is determined by mind or internal organ. Its activities or mental modifications and the objects are cognised. They are determinants of the universal illumination of consciousness.⁸ Accordingly all activities assume the self-sense. It is of the form of pain. It is motivated by desire.⁹ Activity and enjoyment are dependent on a dualistic vision. That is not the highest truth. There can be no agency without the limitation of the Ātman by a body. Every limitation is unreal. Vedāntic view of mind bears similarity with the metaphysical outlook. The author of Māṇḍūkya kārikā holds that Īśvara is Brahman. It is the ultimate Reality. It is seen through the veil of Māyā. Hence He is believed to be the creator of the world of multiplicity. Actually the world is not created. It is just the imagination of mind of the cosmic self.¹⁰ The individual

8. Vedānta Paribhāṣā. 55.

9. Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 11. 3. 40

10. Māṇḍūkya kārikā 4; 72

Jīva has many gradations. They are the bodily self, the vital self, the mental self, the intellectual self and the blissful self. They are the sheaths of the individual Jīva.¹¹ The waking self comes into contact with the external world in nineteen ways. There are five organs of perception. They are vision, sound, touch, smell and taste. There are five organs of action. There are five vital breaths. They are mind, intellect, mind stuff—citta and egoity. The waking self has its cosmic part. It is the vaiśvānara self. Regarding the mode of perception it holds that there is the translucent antahkaraṇa. It is of the nature of light—Taijasa. It moves out to the object through the channel of the sense organs. It is modified into its form. This modification of the internal organ into the form of the object is called vṛtti. It is the mental mode and it apprehends the object. Outgoing of the apprehension of mental mode to the object is evolved in perception only. Śāṅkara holds that the mind goes out to the object. It assumes its forms. The form of the object corresponds to the apprehending mental mode.


Sāṅkhya and Vedānta give priority to the mind. Accordingly the mind itself goes out to the object and it acts upon it. And it assumes the form of the object itself. They believe that buddhi is an intermediate reality between unconscious matter and conscious spirit. It is material but it is made up of very subtle matter.

Mind according to Aurobindo

Śrī Aurobindo maintains that absolute is both individual and universal. It is static as well as dynamic. It is transcendent as well as immanent. The absolute possesses the supreme energy manifested in all parts of the universe. It is an evolution of the energy called super mind.¹² Śrī Aurobindo looks at the parts of individual being from the stand point of Sādhana. Yoga implies the transformation of each and every part of one's being for the realisation of ultimate reality. Śrī Aurobindo conceives the meaning of manas based on yogic experience. He distinguishes physical and thought minds. To him physical mind receives power from the physical senses and transmits them to buddhi. The thought mind receives back from the buddhi and transmits their idea through the organs of sensation and action. Physical mind is fixed on physical objects and happenings. It deals with them according to their own nature. It can, with difficulty,

11, Taitt. upaniṣad 2. 29

12. Life Divine p. 190



respond to higher forces. It is sceptical of the existence of physical things. It is the field of smaller sensations. It is instrument of all desires, reactions to the impacts of the outer physical and gross material life. It is the agent of the most lesser movements of our external life. The complete use of pure reason brings us finally from the physical to metaphysical knowledge. According to Aurobindo there is an inner as well as outer consciousness all through our being upon all its levels. The ordinary man is aware only of his surface self. He is quite unaware of all that is concealed by the surface. We believe it to be all that we are. But it is only the small part of our being. By far the larger part is below the surface. Our waking consciousness is only a wave of the vast series of waves inside this ocean of waves. It is very complex. Part of it is sub-conscious and it is subtler than our waking consciousness. Part of it is on a level with it, but behind and much larger than it is above and super conscient to us. What we call our mind is only an outer mind. It is a surface mental action. It is instrumental for the partial expression of a larger mind behind, of which we are not ordinarily aware. We can know it by going inside ourselves. The function of mind is to organise and systematise the knowledge.¹³

An adequate philosophy of mind and exploration into the hidden regions of mind convince us otherwise. It shows that mind is an independent power of existence. It is capable of formulating the nature of Reality. The nature and function of mind are significant for the metaphysical pursuit. It conceives pure reason and it articulates the infinite and valuational nature of Reality.

**“A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE DEFINITIONS OF ‘KĀVYA’
OF RASAGANGĀDHARA IN THE LIGHT OF THE TECHNIQUE
OF NAVYA NYĀYA LOGIC”.**

Dr. D. C. Guha

Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha has given four definitions of Kāvya in his Rasa Gaṅgādhara as follows :—

- (1) Ramaniyārthapratipādhakāḥ śabdaḥ Kāvyaṁ.
- (2) Camatkārajanakabhāvanāviśayārthapratipādhakāśabdatvam
- (3) Yatpratipāditārthaviśayakabhāvanātvam Camatkārajanakatāvacchedakam tattvam.
- (4) Svaviśiṣṭajanakatāvacchedakārthapratipādhakatāsaṁsargeṇa Camatkāratvavattvam.

Of these definitions the technique of Navya Nyāya has particularly been applied in the third and the fourth ones.

The technique of ‘Anugama’ based on the principle of relation (Samsargaṁudrayā anugamaḥ) has been used in the last definition on account of which the definition has become flawless from many angles of vision.

Though the first definition is quite workable, yet there is ‘Gauravadoṣa’ or the defect of cumbrousness in it inasmuch as the particular ‘śabdas’ called ‘kāvyā’ are innumerable. Moreover, by taking a ‘Samūhālambana pratipatti’ or a knowledge with more than one independent thing as—its object, the definition may sometimes become too wide in such cases when an indifferent object may be known along with the meaning of the kāvyā.

Hence the second definition has been suggested in which ‘śabda’ has been replaced by ‘śabdatva’ which is a ‘jāti’ or universal and hence one. Again, ‘pratipatti’ or knowledge in general has been replaced by ‘bhāvanā’, which according to Jagannātha, is frequent recollection

(punṣṭ punaranusandhārātmā), in which it is impossible to hold that irrelevant objects (udāsinapadārtha) will always be known along with the meaning of the words called 'Kāvya'.

But this second definition also may not be considered quite satisfactory if someone takes his stand on the logical principle of Navya Nyāya called 'ankura' and says that at least in some limited cases irrelevant objects may be known along with the meaning of 'Kāvya', and hence the definition would again become too wide in those cases.

To avoid this defect the third definition has been offered by pursuing upto the 'Avacchedaka' by saying that if the 'Avacchedaka' called 'bhāvanātva' is taken into account, then the 'bhāvanātva' existing in the 'bhāvanā' of irrelevant objects not being the 'Avacchedaka' of the 'Camatkārajanakatā', the definition of 'Kāvya' would not become too wide.

But even this third definition, flawless as it is to a great extent cannot be called 'anugata' or universal in so far as it constitutes 'yat' and 'tat' as its component parts. Hence the fourth definition has been offered according to the principle of 'Anugama' through the use of relation (Samsargamudrayā anumāḥ).

The fourth and last definition is "Camatkāratva-vattvam" which is short and at the same time universal and flawless in every respect, because, "Camatkāratva" being a 'jāti' is one, and words qualified by this universal called 'camatkāratva' through the aforesaid indirect relation (Svaviśiṣṭajanakatāvachchedakārthapratipādakatā) would be called by the term of 'Kāvya'. Here in this relation the relevant objects connecting the 'Camatkāratva' with the words of 'Kāvya' being included into the relation, there would not be 'gaurava doṣa' in it and 'camatkāratva' being one and the same this definition would be 'anugata' or universal for all the Kāvyas.

STAGING OF SANSKRIT DRAMAS IN MODERN INDIA

PROF. S. P. CHATURVEDI, *Allahabad*

With the advent of independence and consequent renaissance in our country, the Indian Genius is re-expressing itself in the new set-up of things. A well marked tendency can be noticed in the sphere of art and literature. It is therefore necessary that a new assessment of values is attempted about the traditions of Sanskrit dramas. The traditions should be re-oriented to serve the original purpose in a more effective way.

It is well-known that Drama holds a mirror to society.

It was a recognition of the realistic approach to Drama that our Dramatists of the old times introduced their contemporary dialects, (known as prākṛit languages) in their works. All Sanskrit Dramas, including those of Bhāsa, Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti, have prākṛit passages put in the mouths of the characters of lower rank and also of those not supposed to be highly educated, thus while a king, his ministers and other characters of high rank spoke in Sanskrit; the queen, her friends, the jestor and servants spoke in contemporary Prākṛit. This Co-existence of Sanskrit and Prākṛit languages in the same work was not only recognized and popular, but was prescribed in the authoritative works on Dramaturgy in Sanskrit literature. The reason is obvious. These authorities desired that the Sanskrit Dramas were brought closer to the realities of life. It can be easily observed that in a modern high-class enlightened family, the gentleman speaks in English, the lady in high-flown regional language and the servants in the dialects of the regions they come from. If a society, in which different members spoke in different languages suitable to their rank and taste, is to be reflected in the Sanskrit Dramas, it was inevitable that besides Sanskrit, contemporary dialects should be freely used in the case of un-educated or low-ranked characters. The contemporary audience of Bhāsa & Kālidāsa must have immensely enjoyed this familiar spectacle, wherein their own dialects figured side by side with the all important Sanskrit language. While a dramatic work remained essentially a Sanskrit drama, its writer did not hesitate to introduce current dialect also.

The truth is that Sanskrit language was, and continues to be regarded as an all-important language and therefore it has been named as the language of gods (immortals). It has been used as a language of high classical literature of All-India popularity and circulation throughout the literary history of India. Important works of All-India fame & recognition have always been written in Sanskrit. The words in regional language, however popular in their regions are less known and not studied in all parts of India. For this phenomenon, the reason is not far to seek. The Sanskrit (Pāṇinian form) is not subject to phonetic changes, which affect the regional dialects. The dialects (i.e. Prākṛit languages) changed in the course of their development to Apabhraṃśa and then to modern Indo-Aryan languages; but the Sanskrit (literally refined and purposely called Sanskrit remained more or less unchanged being handled by the learned (śiṣṭas). This is why changes occurred in the Prākṛit passages of the text of the Dramas of Bhāsa and Kālidāsa, but the Sanskrit passages remained practically unchanged in the text as handed down to us in the Mss of Sanskrit dramas.

The question before us is that in our laudable desire to propagate and popularise Sanskrit, when we think of staging Sanskrit dramas, what should be the position of the more or less unintelligible Prākṛit passages. It is not unknown to Sanskritists that in the course of reading and teaching these Sanskrit passages, they are rendered in Sanskrit to understand them. The editions of Sanskrit dramas give invariably in the foot-notes the Sanskrit renderings of these Prākṛit passages. This is quite natural and understandable...we are mainly concerned and conversant with Sanskrit, so the Prākṛit passages are over-looked and not studied. Of course, for Philologists and Linguists, the Prākṛit passages will continue to remain equally important and will have to be studied with care and close attention.

In the background of what has been stated above, it will be desirable to make an innovation in the staging of Sanskrit dramas. The Sanskrit should be retained, as given in the text. But it will result in bringing the Sanskrit Drama nearer to its aim (holding mirror to society), if the Prākṛit passages are replaced by our current dialects. The Sanskrit work will remain essentially a Sanskrit work as before. But the replacement of the unfamiliar Prākṛit passage by the current dialects or regional languages will put life in the performance and fulfil the object, which the writers of the dramas had in their view in introducing the Prākṛit passages.

This innovation will thus bring Sanskrit nearer to the audience and the spectators will take more lively interest in witnessing a Sanskrit play. Also the replacement will make up to a great extent for the difficulties

which an ordinary spectator must experience in witnessing the staging of a Sanskrit drama with cent-per-cent Sanskrit passages.

The above suggestion is made in this assembly of the Orientalists with the hope that it will receive due attention and, if approved, will be implemented throughout the world, when a Sanskrit drama is staged.

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